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Abstract 
 
 
Empirically, the aim of this thesis is to understand how national party dynamics 
determine legislative behaviour in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. Through 
a case study of the 60th Congress (2006-2009), I sought to identify the informal 
rules that the parties have locked in for determining appointments to legislative 
committees and the Directive Board. The first part of the case study overviews 
the historical evolution of political parties in Mexico and shows how these have 
adopted the behaviours and strategies that affect their performance in Congress. 
This is complemented with an empirical description of the Chamber, its rules 
and the organisation of party groups in the 60th Congress, which presents a 
clear picture of how parties create informal rules and lock them in. The case 
study ends with a quantitative analysis of background information of 440 
members of the 60th Congress, showing that parties have a tight control over 
political careers, facilitated by the existence of term limits and the political 
careerism that characterises the political elite. I conclude that the Mexican 
political system has been shaped by the three main parties to suit their interests, 
thereby undermining the quality of democracy. Following the theoretical 
precepts of historical institutionalism, this research claims that Mexican 
institutions emerge and change through collective agreements of actors, who are 
responsible for making institutional paths dependent. I argue that path 
dependency in Mexico is conditional, in that elites have been willing to make 
some institutional changes but not others, depending on the extent to which 
creating new rules has a negative impact on their power. An innovative view of 
path dependency, this finding is the main theoretical contribution of my work, 
complemented by contributions to party and legislative organisation theories 
with aims at explaining legislative parties’ behaviour in imperfect institutional 
settings. 
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Introduction 
 
In comparison with any other country with a presidential system of government, even 
within Latin America, Mexico has a particularly interesting party and institutional 
design because one single party ruled and shaped it for decades. Unlike other Latin 
American countries, Mexico democratised without a comprehensive constitutional 
reform or a break from the old regime (Merino, 2003). Instead, it did so in a truly 
pragmatic manner, making partial reforms to the Constitution and other legal 
frameworks, such as electoral rules (Fuentes Reyes & García Muciño, 2010; 
Prud’home, 1998), only when they were absolutely necessary and convenient for the 
elite’s interests. This approach to democratisation had unintended consequences 
which impacted on Mexican politics and policy-making for life. Namely, these 
consequences are: the substitution of the PRI-created over-powerful presidency, 
known as hyperpresidentialism, with a partidocracy, a system dominated by partisan 
interests; the existence of parties with excessive power that are far from representative 
of society; and constitutional term limits. 
 
The National Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, abbreviated 
as PRI) monopolised power from 1929 until the end of the 1990s, creating an over-
powerful executive which was closely linked to the party. The legislative branch 
functioned merely as a ‘rubber-stamping’ agency that approved anything the president 
– and therefore the party – submitted (Casar, 1999). This situation made Mexico 
‘hyperpresidentialist’, which meant that the president was in full control of the 
country, without any checks or balances by another entity other than his own political 
party (Elizondo Mayer-Serra & Nacif, 2002). 
 
Congress was also dominated by the PRI until 1997, when the two major opposition 
parties, the Democratic Revolution Party (Partido de la Revolucion Democrática, 
abbreviated as PRD) and the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, 
abbreviated as PAN) won enough seats for the PRI to lose its absolute majority. 
Hyperpresidentialism could then remain in place only if the president controlled the 
PRI’s party group in the Chamber of Deputies, which in turn had to negotiate with the 
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opposition to scrutinise and approve bills in the most favourable way for the party’s 
interest (Ibid). 
 
However, the plural Congress that emerged from the 1997 election was only the 
beginning of the end of the PRI’s absolute power. The party’s agenda-setting became 
much more difficult to achieve as the PRD and the PAN acquired greater negotiating 
powers (Ibid). Three years later, the PRI lost the presidency to the PAN and it became 
clear that three forces instead of one now controlled the party system.  
 
In the new political context, the PRD, the PAN and the PRI, in an attempt to secure 
the best position possible for decision-making and agenda-setting, shaped institutional 
rules in their favour. As organisations with the means to influence the institutional 
framework of the country, they shifted power from the presidency to the Congress – 
where they were all represented – and therefore substituted hyperpresidentialism with 
a partidocracy, where the president is weak and the three major parties are very 
powerful (Coppedge, 1993). 
 
The scope and strength of Mexico’s partidocracy has been increased by the 
preservation of term limits. The non-re-election clause, introduced in 1933 by the PRI 
to keep control of the members of its legislative party group, has been impossible to 
reverse. Instead of preventing particularistic behaviours and promoting the greater 
good, it has contributed to the increase in specific parties’ power (Béjar Algazi & 
Waldman, 2004). 
 
Non-re-election is used by party leaders to enable careful selection of those members 
who will represent the organisation’s interest in an important forum such as the 
Chamber of Deputies. In addition, it has given the parties the power to reward loyal 
members and punish the mavericks and non-conformists, thereby having a tight 
control over political careers and creating a set of enduring informal rules and 
strategies for candidate selection and legislative appointments (Nacif, 1997). 
 
Adopting the authoritarian and at times dubiously transparent attitudes of the PRI has 
been the only option for the PRD and the PAN in order to take part in the decision-
making process (Wuhs, 2008). Consequently, they have developed their own sets of 
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strategies and rules, which have created an agency problem in the country; that is, 
parties are far from what society wants (see Table 3.3 in Section 3.1 for levels of trust 
in parties in Mexico). Instead of being the representatives of the electorate’s interests 
in policy-making, they pursue particularistic issues and work mostly for their own 
benefit. Furthermore, all three parties are hierarchical and elitist, which makes them 
even less representative of their voters. 
 
Therefore, this research focuses on how, since the 1990s, the three main forces have 
imposed their interests on institutions and set up structures, informal rules and 
behavioural patterns to better suit their needs. For instance, they have adapted 
processes for legislative committee appointments in the Chamber of Deputies and 
negotiated suitable working procedures to improve their agenda-setting opportunities 
in Congress (Caballero & Dávila, 2006). In theoretical terms, we shall see that this 
situation poses challenges to scholarly concepts of party behaviour. Through 
interviews with Dámaso Morales (parliamentary advisor to Dep. Alejandro Chanona, 
Convergencia), Susana Monreal (Deputy, PRD), Jesús Ramírez (Deputy, PAN), and 
Gerardo Sosa (Deputy, PRI), I learnt that party lines are decided upon centrally but 
influenced by factions, and legislative organisation, as seats in committees are not  
distributed just on the basis of seniority, but consider many other factors (Morales, 
interview, 2009; Monreal, interview, 2009; Ramírez, interview, 2009; Sosa, interview, 
2009). 
 
Empirically, the case herein discussed provides substantial evidence on the effects of 
term limits over electoral competition, political careers, institutional dynamics and the 
(unfinished) consolidation of democracy in the country. Overall, these issues show 
that Mexico has indeed moved from hyperpresidentialism to a weak presidency 
overpowered by a partidocracy, in which the PRI, the PAN and the PRD shape the 
country’s system as they see fit (Wuhs, 2008). 
 
Despite recent developments in electoral rules that improve transparency in political 
processes, mechanisms such as checks and balances, representation and accountability 
are yet to be fully implemented. These shortcomings are partly related to the 
institutional arrangements of the Mexican presidential system discussed above, but are 
also connected to contextual factors (Molinar Horcasitas, 1991). 
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That is, progress in democratic performance and stability depends on institutional 
arrangements inherent to each country which has adopted a presidential system, and 
not on the actual theoretical design of it (Cheibub, 2007). Policy-making, coalition 
building and other common matters of good and bad governments are affected by ‘the 
constitutional powers of the president, the degree of party discipline and the 
fragmentation of the party system’ (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 463). 
 
This explains why the presidential systems that were created in Latin America, 
although constitutionally inspired by the US model, are often unstable and inefficient 
–though the American model has, in recent years, also experienced gridlocks as a 
result of the divided government that was elected in 2008. Opposed to the North 
American ‘Madisonian’ constitutional liberalism, where checks and balances are 
adequately carried out, Latin America’s governments are largely authoritarian; 
presidents rely strongly on force and popularity, and they have even been labelled as 
‘illiberal democracies’ (Zakaria, 1997) or ‘delegative democracies’ (O’Donnell, 
1998). In its own particular way, Mexico fits within this description of regional 
governments because its parties act in an authoritarian and hierarchical way, and 
resort to the popularity and force of individuals during election time. 
 
The political history of the country has shaped Mexico’s institutions in such a way 
that the rational choices of individual and collective actors are extremely influential 
for the stability and evolution of all governmental bodies (Wuhs, 2008). The clearest 
example of this is that democratisation took place without thorough legal reforms, and 
was instead based on pragmatic changes agreed by the elite. This is a classic example 
of how representation of legislative institutions in some Latin American presidential 
systems has been undermined. This has happened simply because they have evolved 
in ways which have heightened partisanship and political conflicts rather than 
reducing or institutionalising them (Philip, 2003). 
 
Legislatures in these situations have a hard time performing their natural tasks, such 
as representing the electorate’s interests in policy-making. Theoretically, congresses 
or parliaments can play three different roles in the process of policy-making: 
‘originative, by making and breaking executives, who then shoulder most of the 
policymaking burden; proactive, by initiating and passing their own legislative 
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proposals; and reactive, by amending and/or vetoing executive proposals’ (Cox & 
Morgenstern, 2001, p. 171). Many Latin American legislatures, including Mexico 
until the PRI lost the majority in the mid-1990s, can be qualified as reactive (see for 
example Casar, 2002). This means that the necessary cooperation between elites to 
ensure equality and participation (Lijphart, 1977), often considered basic components 
of a democracy, is difficult to achieve. Hence, the overall quality of democracy is 
unsatisfactory. 
 
The institutional design of the Mexican political system, characterised by parties with 
too much power, especially the PRI, suggests that these actors have blurred the 
boundaries between powers and purposes of institutions across the country. This 
situation, in turn, results from the inability of the political elites to change their 
attitudes in order to ensure that ‘democracy is the only game in town’ (Linz & Stepan, 
1996, p. 5).  
 
Good leadership principles are innate in public opinion in Mexico and elsewhere in 
Latin America (as suggested by Peruzzotti, 2001) but, unfortunately, this has not 
generated changes in the elites. However, it should be clarified that, even if 
democracy could be far better than what it is now, the Mexican system works 
reasonably well, at least in comparison to the years when it was a single-party 
government.
1
 
 
Overall, the inefficiency of Congress and the parties’ behaviour has caused the 
Mexican electorate to be disenchanted with democracy itself. This is a common trend 
in the Latin American region, where several studies have revealed that the ‘mass 
public today appear disaffected, disenchanted, and, at times, even available to support 
politicians whose democratic credentials are dubious at best’ (Hagopian, 2005, p. 
361). On the other hand, there is also some good news within this rather grey Latin 
American portrait: it is unlikely that democracy could give way to a return to 
authoritarianism any time soon. 
 
                                                 
1
 Crespo (1991) argues that since opposition parties began to consolidate their presence in the country’s 
political scene, opportunities for a long-term democratisation process were present and solid. 
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Political reforms approved in 1996 made Mexican voters and opposition parties 
believe in electoral processes with regard to their transparency and also led to the 
acceptance of the results by all political forces (Magaloni, 2005). However, parties are 
still regarded as elites that pursue their own interests instead of representing society 
when it comes to decision-making. Furthermore, the elites are known for transferring 
to institutions their poorly democratic practices, thereby making them inefficient (as 
suggested by Mora-Donatto, 2006). 
 
As previously stated, this research observes and describes the complex puzzle derived 
from the close interrelation between actors and institutions, in which parties have used 
and shaped institutions as they have seen fit. Focusing on the Chamber of Deputies in 
Mexico, this thesis identifies the power networks within political parties, describes 
their nature and assesses the effect they have had on the Chamber’s design and 
procedures. In other words, the main objective is to describe the origins and logic of 
Mexico’s partidocracy, with particular focus on how it operates in the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
 
1 Methodology 
A key issue for the success of this research consists of selecting and developing an 
adequate methodology to collect, process and present empirical evidence in order to 
give the reader a thorough explanation of how the power networks operate. Therefore, 
prior to briefly discussing the assumptions and expected results of this work, it is best 
to begin by describing the methodological approach which I took. Both strengths and 
weaknesses of the research design will be identified. 
 
1a The variables 
This thesis seeks to unveil the effect of party behaviour on the Chamber of Deputies’ 
design, which can be proven by analysing the processes for committee appointments, 
the distribution of seats in governing positions, and the negotiation of other procedural 
issues at the beginning of each legislature. These matters can be grouped under the 
term ‘legislative behaviour’. 
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A complementary way of assessing the power of partidocracy over the Chamber 
would be to analyse processes of scrutiny and approval of bills in key ordinary 
committees. This would allow the identification of how factionalism and loyalties 
operate at the core of legislative decision-making, and thus to monitor how deputies’ 
legislative performance can affect future career prospects. More specifically, 
analysing committee negotiations would reveal interesting information on how each 
party and its respective factions maintain discipline and could help identify who the 
main leading figures of each group are in reality. Thus, at the start of my research in 
2008, I sought to understand the effects of party power through a combined analysis 
of committee appointments and negotiation of bills in the budget and gender equality 
committees.  
 
Access to information on committee discussions and negotiations is generally not 
easily granted, at least not for very recently discussed pieces of legislation. I learnt 
this during the two years I worked at Fundar, an NGO in Mexico City focused on the 
improvement of transparency and accountability in the public sector. One of my main 
tasks was to monitor the approval of federal budgets in the Chamber of Deputies, in 
order to ensure that transparency and accountability mechanisms laid out in legislative 
and federal rules were followed. My job was to track as many budgetary negotiations 
as possible and there were only two ways of accessing the information directly: 
obtaining an invitation to a committee meeting, or requesting the transcripts or 
minutes of the meetings via the information request system of the Chamber. In my 
experience the former was easier to achieve than the latter, as minutes generally took 
longer to be distributed to other bodies of the Chamber outside the committees. Not 
being permanently in Mexico City during my doctoral research meant that attending a 
meeting was very difficult. Thus, the necessary information on bill scrutiny would be 
best sought through minutes or transcripts of meetings, and those concerning bills 
approved in 2007 were more likely to be available outside committees. 
 
I therefore planned to focus on the scrutiny and approval processes around the 2007 
federal budget and contrast these with the processes surrounding an important bill 
dealt with in the gender equality committee. Former colleagues of mine at Fundar 
were to advise me on which gender equality bill to select, so that I focused on a 
salient one for most parties. I would have, therefore, compared the dynamics of 
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discipline in similar ‘high importance’ agenda setting conditions. Before attempting a 
request of the necessary minutes through the information request system, I sought 
advice from former colleagues and contacts in the Chamber on the likelihood of my 
success. The overall consensus was that it would take months, if not years to get the 
documents I needed and there was no guarantee that I would get minutes from the 
relevant meetings where the most useful discussions for my research purposes took 
place. Through one of these contacts I was able to obtain an electronic version of a 
minute of one meeting in the early 2007 budgetary discussions but I found no 
evidence of party or factional discipline. My contact was unable to provide any more 
documents and I decided not to risk proceeding with a research design where key 
information was not guaranteed. 
 
If I had analysed committee negotiations, I would have expected the approval of the 
federal budget to be more tightly controlled by party leaders than the negotiation of a 
bill on women’s rights, as budgetary matters are generally more important for parties 
than gender issues. But I was also likely to observe diverging levels of discipline and 
commitment between deputies closely linked to grassroots movements and activist 
groups for gender rights and those who are more independent. Overall, the analysis of 
committee business would have provided substantial evidence on the complexity of 
party discipline and the dispersion of deputies’ loyalties.  
 
Having discarded one useful source of empirical data meant defining and portraying 
legislative behaviour exclusively through appointments to committees, governing 
bodies and procedural negotiations, and leaving out concrete examples of how parties 
and factions exert their power. My research design was admittedly weakened by this 
situation, although every attempt was made to compensate by including detailed 
information from interviews conducted to deputies and parliamentary staff. 
 
Once I revised my design, the next research task was to lay out dependent and 
independent variables. I identify the dependent variable as the legislative behaviour of 
deputies. In turn, the independent or explanatory variables consist of party dynamics 
and the manifestation of the power of the parties, both within the Chamber and 
throughout the whole political system, including electoral politics and the party 
system. However, it will be seen that Mexican parties are extremely factionalised as a 
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result of their historical evolution and as a consequence of the formation and change 
of all the political institutions of the country. Consequently, intervening variables such 
as factionalism and relevant events in the country’s political history and context must 
also be considered in the causal mechanism. 
 
1b Analysing the variables through a case study 
The interaction between these variables will be observed through a case study. 
According to Ragin (1992), the term ‘case’ can acquire many different meanings and 
cases can be matched to appropriate theories or they can lead to theory creation. In 
short, the process of ‘casing’ can be seen as matching ideas with evidence. 
 
Gerring (2009, p. 94), in turn, defines a case as ‘a spatially delimited phenomenon (a 
unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time’. For example, 
cases can be nation states, regions, cities, or specific institutions. It follows that case 
studies can be defined as: 
 
…the intensive study of a single case for the purpose of understanding a larger 
class of cases (a population). Within each case study there are a certain 
number of observations, which contain several dimensions known as variables. 
If the case study entails a proposition of causal effects or mechanisms, then the 
variables are classified into dependent (referring to an outcome) and 
independent (the causal factor which the outcome is dependent on). The 
majority of case studies involve synchronic observations, that is, they focus on 
observations of within-case changes at a single point in time (Ibid). 
 
Furthermore, case studies are suitable for generating hypotheses and they can almost 
always guarantee internal validity, which means it is rather easy to establish how true 
causal relationships are within a case study, at least in comparison to cross-case 
studies. In addition, they are favourable for identifying causal mechanisms and 
generally produce deep analyses on a sample of heterogeneous populations, so as to 
explain the particularities of ‘rare’ or exclusive units. The causal mechanisms 
identified within case studies are strong, which means that the effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent one across a population of cases has high 
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levels of magnitude and consistency, portraying deterministic causal relations. Case 
studies are especially recommended where vast information is available on the topic 
of interest (Ibid). 
 
The specific case study analysed in this research is the 60th Congress (2006-2009), 
chosen for the vast availability of information on it but also, and most importantly, 
because it is a ‘rare variation’. That is, as will be explained below and at length in 
Chapter 4, the 60th Congress was inaugurated amid the political turbulence which 
followed the controversial presidential elections of July 2006, when the parties’ 
dynamics and their quest for power and influence were particularly interesting. 
 
Perhaps the reader should be warned that the scope of the study – especially in terms 
of the political party information collected and analysed within the quantitative 
analysis – was narrowed throughout the empirical section of the research in order to 
achieve comparability.
2
 Thus, only the three largest parties were included in the 
dataset used for predicting committee appointments and also in the accounts of the 
historical evolution of party organisations. These are the only ones that have endured 
in the party system, as smaller parties fail to reach the 2 per cent threshold established 
in the electoral law for keeping their registration and with it the right to electoral 
competition. 
 
1c Sources of information and data 
This research began in 2008, just before the 60th Congress ended. Therefore, access 
to primary sources of information such as publicly available official communications 
could be obtained easily. As a result, the main sources of information for the 
construction of the qualitative analysis of the case study were legal documents, the 
Gaceta Legislativa (Legislative Gazette; the official diary which reports the 
Chamber’s activities in terms of bills received, discussed and approved, among other 
official events and matters), party manifestos and communications, as well as other 
                                                 
2
 That is, I chose to include only the three largest parties, as they are the only comparable ones. The 
smaller parties lack the institutional capacity to affect the political system like the PRI, the PRD and the 
PAN, not only because their participation in elite decision-making is reduced, but also because it is 
frequent that they do not survive more than one term in congress, due to the failure to reach the 2 per 
cent electoral threshold to maintain registration. 
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supporting evidence gathered from the press and academic projects monitoring 
legislative issues. 
 
The dataset used for the quantitative analyses carried out in Chapter 5 was constructed 
using information from Impacto Legislativo’s website. Having originally started as an 
academic project at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), and 
then continued independently as an online platform for showcasing information and 
performance statistics of the members of Congress, Impacto Legislativo was a reliable 
and substantial source of information for this thesis.
3
 Using their search engine, I was 
able to record the following for the members of the 60th Congress belonging to the 
PAN, PRD and PRI: age, level of education, type of seat, previous political offices 
held (both elected and appointed), previous party affiliation, positions held within the 
party structure and affiliation to party-related organisations. 
 
Other databases were available around the time when I collected my quantitative and 
empirical data. For example, I considered using the University of Salamanca’s 
longitudinal survey data on parliamentary elites in Latin America for retrieving 
information on deputies’ views on party discipline. However, as in any survey, 
interviewees were anonymised and even records of party affiliation were eliminated 
where necessary in order to avoid information being traced back to respondents; what 
my research needed was qualitative, in-depth information from purposely selected 
interviewees. I therefore decided to rely exclusively on interviews, as discussed 
below. 
 
Despite official documents being available (and consulted) for the qualitative 
approach to the case study, those sources left out important details regarding 
individuals’ choices and unofficial information behind certain appointments or the 
decision-making process. Therefore, it was best to also resort to interviews to ‘fill in 
the gaps’ of the argument. 
 
                                                 
3
 Background information on the members of the 60th Congress was also available on the Chamber of 
Deputies’ official website. However, important details were missing for many individuals and so I 
decided to rely mainly on Impacto Legislativo’s website and use the Chamber’s data only as a back-up 
if needed. 
20 
 
Rathburn (2009, p. 686) rightly points out that interviews can be rich sources of 
information: 
 
Interviewing, despite its flaws, is often the best tool for establishing how 
subjective factors influence political decision-making, the motivations of those 
involved, and the role of agency in events of interest. Behavioralism and 
rationalism alert us rightly to the importance of rigor in our analyses, but there 
are steps that can be taken to eliminate some of the concerns about reliability 
and validity. Scepticism should not be exaggerated. 
 
Interviewing emphasises complexity and context, which allows the researcher to 
explore motivations and preferences of stakeholders, thereby looking into the topic 
she is approaching in-depth, way beyond official or written sources. This practice 
allows, therefore, the gathering of data on ‘human beings’ effort to intentionally 
transform their environment on the basis of cognition, reflection and learning’ (Ibid, 
p. 691). 
 
There are, however, risks of subjectivity derived from interviewing. The researcher 
must be prepared to disregard certain parts of the interviewee’s statements based on 
an ideological approach established before the interview. In addition, particular 
biases, as per the interviewee’s position, whether political, bureaucratic or ideological, 
should be anticipated. 
 
Before starting with the interview process, a thorough examination of publicly 
available primary and secondary sources should be made. This simplifies the 
preparation of questions and also allows for a better use of the information gathered 
from interviewees. In addition to this, Rathburn (Ibid) presents a series of 
recommendations for better and more reliable interviews, which include recording the 
conversation to ensure no information is left out; starting out by meeting with lower-
ranking individuals and then working one’s way up the hierarchy; and preparing basic 
sets of questions which can be further developed throughout the interview. 
 
For the case of this research, most of these recommendations were valid and were 
therefore followed. An extensive review of primary and secondary sources was done 
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as a starting point in order to identify the missing information. Important pieces of 
information were indeed missing, because informal mechanisms dominate in much of 
the legislative process, including committee appointments and allocation of seats 
across the governing bodies. Furthermore, since the causal mechanism being studied 
involves intervening variables such as party factionalism, it was important to try to 
trace its nature and effects through interviews. 
 
Since the early stages of this research, I prepared questions for members of Congress, 
parliamentary staff and scholars specialising in Mexican legislative issues. Seeking 
representativeness of interviewees and ensuring collection of sufficient information on 
informal mechanisms, I contacted 27 deputies and former deputies from the PAN, 
PRD, PRI, Convergencia, Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (Partido Verde Ecologista 
de México, abbreviated as PVEM) and Social Democratic Alternative Party (Partido 
Alternativa Social Demócrata, abbreviated as PASD). Anticipating that some 
interviews with deputies would be unsuccessful,
4
 I sought to maintain 
representativeness by approaching parliamentary advisors from all three parties and 
administrative staff from committees.
5
 The full list of interviewees and questions used 
are included in Appendix 1. 
 
In January and February 2009, just a few months before the end of the legislature, I 
interviewed 13 individuals: four members of Congress, six parliamentary advisors or 
other members of staff within the Chamber and three scholars. I carried out semi-
structured interviews, which meant that although I had a set of standard questions to 
ask each individual, during the meeting I enquired about additional matters, or asked 
for further clarification on some of the issues discussed in the set questions. I chose 
not to record the interviews, as in my previous professional experience
6
 I had 
interviewed members of Congress and had learnt that the information was 
considerably better and more abundant in the absence of a tape recorder. As a result, I 
was careful to take good notes during the interview and as soon as it was over I would 
                                                 
4
 Members of the PRI were particularly difficult to interview. 
5
 Advisors and parliamentary staff are normally quite close to deputies and their parties, and are 
actively involved in the deputies’ activities within committees. Therefore, they are also valuable 
sources of information. 
6
 Between 2005 and 2007 I worked as a researcher in a project monitoring the Chamber of Deputies’ 
activities, carried out at Fundar, a Mexico City-based NGO. 
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type them on the computer and save the file to use with information drawn from my 
own memory.  
 
The gathered data was used to put together an empirical description of the 60th 
Congress and specific material was quoted; most of the interviewees agreed to be 
quoted on most of the information they provided but when they requested me not to 
do so, I made a note of it and used the information cautiously and anonymously. This 
more accurate picture allowed for the empirical puzzles to be further identified and 
described, and therefore the rest of the research design was put together. 
 
On a second fieldtrip to Mexico City throughout September 2009, I carried out 21 
interviews with 14 members of Congress (both in the 60th and 61st Congresses
7
) and 
seven parliamentary staff members. The questions for these interviews were much 
more specific than the previous ones and dealt more with motivations and roles in the 
allocation of committee seats. It was easier to obtain honest and detailed responses 
because those belonging to the 60th Congress were no longer in active service and 
thus they did not feel unsafe in revealing politically sensitive information. Once again, 
those who chose to remain anonymous are not quoted throughout this research. 
 
Both fieldtrips resulted in a valuable and comprehensive pool of qualitative data to 
use in the case study. For instance, I was able to see clear examples of the role that 
factions and leaders outside the Chamber play in appointments and I improved my 
understanding of how closed-door negotiations are orchestrated and what 
consequences they might have. For the particular case of the 60th Congress these 
issues were perhaps two of the most important sets of informal mechanisms that 
highlight the strong effects that partidocracy has had in the Chamber of Deputies. 
 
One of the goals of this case study is to prove that political parties’ power has 
increased through the existence of term limits and the predominance of informal rules. 
Within the Chamber, this is translated into the control of committee appointments, 
closely intertwined with controlling political careers. 
                                                 
7
 Although this research concentrates on the 60th Congress, the testimonies of members of the 61st 
were very useful to trace general patterns of partisan procedures to allocate committee seats and 
positions across the group’s organisation inside the Chamber. 
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As can be seen, the case study of the 60th Congress was carefully constructed, 
seeking enough evidence to reach the established goal. A combination of interviews 
and the review of written sources (official, academic and journalistic) enabled me to 
portray a comprehensive picture of the Chamber. 
 
Having described and justified the methodology employed in this work, we can now 
begin a general overview of what this study attempts to prove. I shall also explain 
how these findings will contribute to the academic literature. 
 
2 Research goals and expected findings 
2a Research objectives and theoretical contributions 
The main research question asks what agents trigger the legislative behaviour of 
Mexican deputies that affects the institutional operation and design of the Chamber 
and its committees. Legislative behaviour can therefore be identified as the allocation 
of committee seats and governing bodies’ positions, along with the appointments to 
parties’ coordination offices. In response to the question, I test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Distribution of committee seats and positions in the Directive Board of the 
Chamber of Deputies are made through informal mechanisms –as well as 
formal ones- which have been shaped and locked in by the parties, and 
therefore reflect their historical evolution, interests and internal power 
struggles. 
 
In other words, the general purpose of this research is to delve into the causes, 
features and effects of Mexican partidocracy, and understand how the PRI, the PAN 
and the PRD have acquired the amount of power they now have, and, most 
importantly, the way in which they use it to control the political system. Thus, I shall 
map out the existing relationship between the effects of the national partisan 
dynamics, such as factionalism, territorialism and de-institutionalisation of parties, on 
the behaviour of Congress members and the institutional design of the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
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More specifically, in pursuing an inductive case study of this institution, I aim to 
identify the independent variables which bring about certain behavioural traits among 
deputies, which constitutes my dependent variable. In turn, this will shed light on 
what underlying factors or intervening variables trigger or constrain discipline and 
cohesion of party groups therein represented and will clarify the magnitude of the 
power of political parties, as they are responsible for the predominance of informal 
rules in the institution. 
 
A suitable theoretical framework to guide the case study is institutionalism. Though it 
has some limitations in terms of long-term predictions and explanations of evolution 
and change (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Weyland, 2002), institutionalism can successfully 
guide the construction of an inductive case study in which the explanatory variables 
are found in establishments such as parties, the electoral system and the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
 
A rather short and simple way to summarise the main principles is to say that 
institutions are regarded as constraints on actors’ behaviour (Peters, 1999). They 
shape the actors’ conduct and set patterns for actions to be carried out. Over the years, 
several variations of institutional perspectives have emerged (Hall & Taylor, 1996), 
two of which are particularly useful for this thesis: rational choice institutionalism and 
historical institutionalism. 
 
An extensive discussion of the particularities of each approach is offered in Chapter 2 
(or refer to Hall & Taylor, 1996; March & Olsen, 2008). For the time being, it is 
worth saying that the historical evolution of the Mexican political system has 
determined the immense power of the parties and the weakness of the formal rules 
supporting the governmental bodies as one of the unintended consequences of the 
pragmatic democratisation that took place in Mexico. This is very well explained by 
the historical institutional approach. In turn, the strategic calculation of the actors 
involved in the allocation of committee seats within the Chamber can be understood, 
even without the existence of perfect conditions, through the rational choice stream. 
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In addition, the concept of path dependency, used by the institutional perspective to 
address the issue of change and continuity in institutions, explains why parties have 
kept on imposing informal rules across the entire political system (Pierson, 2000).
8
 
 
This research not only uses path dependency as a key explanation for parties’ impact 
on the design of political institutions, but also contributes to the scholarly knowledge 
on its manifestation. I argue that the Mexican case is one where path dependency 
happens in a partial rather than a generalised way. In other words, path dependency is 
conditional because the political actors reach collective agreements to change the 
rules of behaviour, i.e. institutions, only if this suits their interests, making some 
historical events path dependent and not others. 
 
For example, while significant changes were made to electoral rules in the 1990s to 
make elections fairer and cleaner, term limits and other outdated formal frameworks 
remain unchanged. As a result of the changes, opposition parties have grown stronger, 
causing the PRI to lose its absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies and finally 
its 70-year-long presidential rule. However, pluralism in Congress – i.e. minority 
government – is now difficult to manage, and informal and hierarchical agreements 
are the preferred tool for elites to negotiate the decision-making procedures. This 
argument will become clearer at the end of the empirical case study presented in Part 
II of the thesis. 
 
Factionalism is another very important concept for this research. It will be seen that 
the three parties in Mexico have become internally divided and smaller groups (called 
factions, and whose leaderships operate through vertical, top-down mechanisms) seek 
the achievement of particular interests, or the manifestation of dissent has appeared 
and become embedded (Boucek, 2009). This poses difficulties for the parties’ agenda-
setting in Congress and raises the need for further informal rules to emerge in order to 
accommodate multiple agendas and interests in decision-making. 
 
                                                 
8
 This has happened as per decision of the political elite, but responding to historical and contextual 
requirements set by the evolution of Mexico’s democracy, which is why I approach the matter from the 
historical institutionalist point of view, rather than adopting an Elite Theory approach. 
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This work also aims at contributing to the existing literature on legislative and party 
theory. By understanding the dynamics leading the procedures of the Chamber of 
Deputies, I suggest that theoretical concepts regarding the purpose of committees (like 
those discussed by Kaeding, 2004) and other organisational issues such as party 
cohesion and discipline (such as in Krehbiel, 2000; Morgenstern, 2004; Stratmann & 
Baur, 2002) are not entirely suitable for addressing the Mexican context. New 
applications or conceptualisations are therefore proposed, stressing the role that 
loyalties to factional leaders or party figures who can facilitate further political posts 
play in party politics (Langston & Aparicio, 2009). 
 
2b Preliminary assumptions 
A very general first statement towards solving the puzzle of this work is that it is 
obvious, and to some extent logical, to assume that legislative behaviour and the 
factors that drive it have their origin in party politics. Therefore, to answer its main 
question, my research must necessarily take a first step in understanding the logic and 
nature of parties in Mexico, which are powerful, hierarchical and very much interest-
based as well as ideological. As suggested above, it is also important to look into 
power networks within them – greatly associated with factionalism – and the 
significance of guaranteeing decision-making posts for their survival. 
 
I argue that parties are organisations whose performance and success in being elected 
to office have varied greatly throughout their historical cycles. This corresponds to 
Mexico’s political history during the 20th century, where the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) monopolised government offices for decades. Opposition parties 
did not truly emerge until the 1970s and they did not place strong electoral pressure 
on the PRI until the 1990s. Consequently, concentration or loss of power of the PRI 
has changed the outreach of the Democratic Revolution Party’s (PRD) and the 
National Action Party’s (PAN) own electoral power over time. In turn, this has 
affected these parties’ influence over institutions and also the operation of internal 
power networks. 
 
In addition, over time, the country’s political cycles have created geographical and 
sectoral strongholds for each of the actors where, very roughly speaking, the North of 
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the country, business and Catholic elites vote for the PAN; the West of the territory 
and the intellectual, liberal sectors of society vote for the PRD; and the South and the 
unions vote for the PRI (Reveles Vázquez, 2005b). 
 
These geographical and sectoral strongholds have a twofold effect on the parties: on 
the one hand, they have been key for the achievement and maintenance of electoral 
victories, especially at initial stages of the opposition forces’ participation in local 
elections. On the other hand, they have been catalysts of internal battles for power and 
distribution of offices between party members. This is also associated with the nature 
of the parties’ formation and historical evolution, which has led to a rather dispersed 
leadership structure affecting decision-making and accountability in political 
institutions (for instance, see Becerra Chávez, 2005; Borjas Benavente, 2003; 
Hernández Vicencio, 2009; Mirón Lince, 2005; Reveles Vázquez, 2003a). 
 
Moreover, the long-term dominance of the PRI over the country’s life created an 
entrenched political culture where clientelism, loyalties and centralisation of 
executive decision-making in the ruling party have been the norm. Because modern 
political institutions were created and shaped by the PRI, the aforementioned political 
culture inevitably prevails. As a matter of fact, both the PAN and the PRD have been 
unable to escape the adoption of clientelistic practices themselves.
9
 Perhaps the most 
significant change that has occurred has been the increased decentralisation of party 
politics in favour of strong regional or sectoral forces (Díaz Rebolledo, 2005). 
 
The Mexican case, therefore, is one where institutions have been shaped by the rules 
and policies of one party and the opposition has been infected by the same disease. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the interaction of parties within the political system is 
oriented towards effectively distributing the greater amount of power among the three 
most influential actors. It is interesting to observe that the institution of term limits has 
remained stable throughout the last decade, which might suggest that all three parties 
have allowed it to reach a state of equilibrium because it benefits their internal 
distribution of power. 
                                                 
9
 It would probably be fair to say that the PAN and the PRD have not been too reluctant to adopt these 
‘ancient’ practices and attitudes, as they provide an advantage with regards to legal protection and 
access to public funds. The funds are especially useful for funding media coverage during elections. 
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Consequently, over time, parties have shaped the rules of the system to ensure better 
opportunities enable them to remain key actors in the decision-making process, 
especially since the emergence of divided government in 1997 (Wuhs, 2008). This has 
involved both electoral rules and also internal procedures in institutions where organic 
laws are rather weak. 
 
As in any presidential system, the only governing body which hosts all the existing 
political forces
10
 in Mexico is the Chamber of Deputies, the Lower Chamber of the 
legislative power. In recent years, it has acquired much more power than the 
Executive and it gives all the parties represented in it the opportunity to influence 
public policies, along with ‘visibility’ among the electorate. However, its operational 
rules are outdated, leaving open doors for the parties to establish temporary 
procedural arrangements to deal with all matters from committee appointments to the 
revision and approval of bills. 
 
2c Empirical considerations: party power and the Chamber 
Having portrayed the nature and logic of the parties’ power, the next step of this 
research is to observe how their dynamics affect the Chamber of Deputies in 
particular. As suggested in the previous section, the interaction of the PRI, the PAN 
and the PRD in the Chamber has reshaped the institutional design. 
 
It is possible to identify three main ways in which they shape the institutional design 
of the Chamber: through the extrapolation of internal divisions in the parties to the 
Chamber’s organisation and operation; by exerting a tight control on candidate 
selection processes as a consequence of the manipulation of political careers; and the 
insertion and maintenance of a hierarchical decision-making process within the 
Chamber. 
 
The first issue refers to the fact that important figures within the parties exert pressure 
to control the access to power. In practical terms, this means that governors, regional 
party leaders and members of the National Executive Committees will demand that 
                                                 
10
 For a list of the parties represented in the 60th Congress and the number of seats they held, see 
Chapter 4. 
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the party leader in the Chamber places their protégées in certain committees or in the 
Directive Board (Langston & Aparicio, 2008; Díaz Rebolledo, 2005).  
 
Moreover, the point will be made that the control of candidacies, along with opaque 
and hierarchical decision-making practices within the Chamber, are possible as a 
consequence of two factors. The first and most significant element for the entire 
political system is the existence of term limits, also referred to as constitutional 
prohibition of re-election. The second factor, and more inherent to the Chamber itself, 
is the predominance of informal rules which fill the gaps that the formal rules have 
left due to the lack of reforms to adapt the institution to a context of pluralism. Most 
provisions are adequate for a one-party majority but definitely not for a situation of 
divided government and large minorities (Mora-Donatto, 2006). 
 
As suggested, the constitutional prohibition of re-election has important consequences 
for the entire political system (Carey, 1996). One of the most important issues is that 
it complicates the possibilities for politicians to build their own career with the 
support of their electorate, as is the case for members of Congress in the United 
States, for example. Instead, access to positions is generally possible only by having 
the right connections with someone in a party who has the authority or legitimacy to 
secure candidates’ participation in an election. Therefore, the overall effect of term 
limits is counter-intuitive, because it strengthens parties’ control over politicians 
rather than weakening it. 
 
Once in office, congressmen and women, both at the federal and local levels, 
governors, mayors, councillors and bureaucrats must foster a good relationship with 
party figures if they want to remain in politics. After all, they are the ones in control 
of the movement of people between posts. This ‘good relationship’ most likely 
implies that deputies are expected to facilitate agenda-setting and the achievement of 
specific interests. The easiest way to do so is by taking part in relevant committees or 
in the Directive Board, which sets the legislative agenda for each plenary session, 
among other procedural tasks (Congreso, 1999). 
 
It should be rather clear by now that the combination of increased party power and 
weak institutions such as the Chamber of Deputies gives way to the control of 
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political careers. In turn, this is a key factor for explaining appointments, as 
mentioned earlier in this introduction, as a manifestation of legislative behaviour and 
is therefore subject to further rigorous analysis in this thesis. 
 
3 Case study: 60th Congress of the Chamber of Deputies 
The creation of legislative procedural rules, both formal and informal, which make the 
environment favourable for the parties’ agenda-setting, along with the parties’ control 
of political careers through candidate selection and appointments within the Chamber, 
explain how the institutional design and operation of the institution has been affected 
by party dynamics. 
 
This interaction between parties and the Chamber, as stated earlier, is the main focus 
of this research. Thus, in order to test the statement made in the previous paragraph, 
the 60th Congress (2006-2009) is approached as a case study in two different yet 
complementary ways. 
 
3a The qualitative analysis 
The first section consists of a thorough empirical description of the Chamber, 
explaining organisational features and decision-making structures. It discusses the 
duties of each one of the governing bodies according to the legal frameworks but also 
shows how agreements, namely informal guidelines negotiated by the parties at the 
start of each congress, are in reality the ruling provisions. 
 
It will be seen that opportunities for participation in decision-making are rather 
limited for rank-and-file members of Congress (Monreal, interview, 2009). Party 
leaders and committee presidents have the highest chances of setting rules and 
guidelines. Many of the most important negotiations and bill approvals take place 
behind closed doors, which will be exemplified and documented in Chapter 4. 
 
The power of the leaders of the PAN, the PRI and the PRD in the 60th Congress was 
such that they increased the number of seats in the Budget and Finance Committees to 
secure at least two secretariats for each party (Caballero & Dávila, 2006). This 
undoubtedly had repercussions on the design of the Chamber for that three-year 
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period and also for crucial legislative approvals such as the Federal Budget and the 
Fiscal Reform. 
 
Parallel to the analysis on how the Chamber works, a contextualisation of the 
legislature within the broader national political context is necessary. This is because 
the point has been made that party politics outside of Congress are determinants for 
what happens inside the legislative institutions, which is particularly true for the 
selected case study for this research, as it was elected alongside one of the most 
controversial presidential elections in the country’s history. The result of the electoral 
process was a highly polarised society and, most importantly, a declared battle 
between the PAN and the PRD for power at every single opportunity that arose across 
federal and local governments (see for instance Caballero & Dávila, 2006; 
Reforma/Staff, 2006a, 2006b). 
 
Therefore, long and tedious negotiations between party leaders were necessary to 
avoid gridlocks between 2006 and 2009 (Caballero & Dávila, 2006). That is, stability 
was achieved through elitist processes and, ironically, the existing partidocracy 
proved helpful for managing a critical situation which could have made polarisation 
and conflict even more acute. 
 
Furthermore, in observing a general layout of the parties’ organisations within the 
Chamber, it is possible, at least for the period in this study, to identify how political 
rationale could have been applied during the allocation of leadership offices. Their 
structure also suggests the way in which decision-making and monitoring of 
behaviour was carried out, which in turn sheds light on evaluation mechanisms for 
deciding on future political careers. 
 
Due to the coexistence of formal and informal rules to guide legislative procedures in 
the Chamber, a thorough empirical description should draw from both official 
documents and first-hand insights. Therefore, as mentioned in the methodology 
section, this research relies heavily on semi-structured interviews with members of the 
60th and 61st Congresses, parliamentary staff and advisors, as well as specialists on 
Mexican legislative topics. With such substantial information, a deep understanding 
of the rationale behind appointments, agreements and negotiations is achieved. 
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3b The quantitative study 
The second approach towards how it is that parties’ power affects legislative 
behaviour and in turn has an impact on the the institutional design of the Chamber is 
of a quantitative nature. Using information retrieved from Impacto Legislativo’s 
website, I constructed a database of the members of the PAN, the PRD and the PRI – 
a total of 440 individuals – in the 60th Congress. I used relevant background 
information of the deputies to find the best predictors for appointments to committee 
presidencies, the Directive Board and to ‘priority’ committees. An additional goal was 
to predict the factors which make a politician more likely to be appointed to a 
proportional representation (PR) seat. 
 
The variables used in the statistical analysis were defined in relation to the statements 
made in the empirical description about party strategies to control careers. Hence, for 
each one of the observations an entry was made regarding records of previous 
political careers, either in elected offices or bureaucracies. Active involvement across 
party offices or within those sectors associated to the party’s strongholds was also 
considered. Furthermore, education level, age and gender were recorded to be used as 
control variables. 
 
First of all, basic summary statistics derived from the dataset showed that the vast 
majority of the Chamber’s population had not been elected to public offices prior to 
the 60th Congress. Although the proportion of deputies who had been bureaucrats was 
not extremely high, it did suggest a slightly more significant proportion than the 
number of deputies who had been in elected office before. 
 
In terms of age, gender and education levels, the dataset complemented the qualitative 
description of the Chamber. It portrayed the 60th Congress as unsurprisingly 
predominantly male, with an average age of 46, 49 and 52 years for the PAN, the 
PRD and the PRI respectively. Furthermore, it can be observed that more than half of 
the members of the Chamber have a university degree. 
 
As was suggested, the rationale behind the collection of background information was 
to find predictors for appointments within the Chamber. These cannot be obtained 
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from just looking at the proportion of deputies with previous political careers. Only 
rigorous statistical analysis would provide reliable and valid results. 
 
Therefore, the interest in appointments was translated into dependent and independent 
variables, based on the data collected for the population. Four dependent variables 
were identified: committee presidency; priority committee seat; senior position in 
priority committee; and senior position in Directive Board. 
 
Although the arguments presented so far have discussed allocation of committee seats 
in general, only presidencies could be predicted with significant results; hence the 
specificity of the dependent variable ‘committee presidency’. Perhaps a clarification 
of ‘priority committees’ is also pertinent; it refers to those members of the Congress 
who had a seat in one of the eight committees dealing with delicate topics of national 
interest.
11
 Predictions for both rank-and-file seats and senior positions in these 
committees were statistically significant. 
 
The 13 independent variables consisted of: previous experience as a federal deputy, as 
a senator, as both of these officers, as a local deputy, as a governor, as a mayor, as a 
councillor, as both mayor and councillor, as a federal bureaucrat, as a bureaucrat at 
the state level, as a public servant in a municipality, active involvement in the party 
and affiliation to a sector associated to the party of representation. All these represent 
the various possibilities for the parties to intervene in a deputy’s political career. 
 
In addition, three variables were added as controls: level of education, gender and age. 
Two models were run for each independent variable, the difference being an 
additional control for party of representation in one of them. That is, the second model 
for each case included six control variables: level of education, gender, age, PRI, PAN 
and PRD. 
 
A detailed discussion of the analysis and its results can be found in Chapter 5. For the 
moment it is worth saying that committee presidencies, along with appointments to 
                                                 
11
 Committees of Agriculture, Energy, the Interior, Finance, Budget, Constitutional Amendments, 
Oversight and Parliamentary Practices. 
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priority committees and to the Directive Board, are indeed more likely for those 
individuals who have been politically active in the past. 
 
However, different career paths are an asset for each of the positions set as dependent 
variables. That is, past experience as a federal deputy can predict an allocation of a 
committee presidency. In turn, seats in priority committees are more likely to be 
obtained by someone who has been a public servant at the federal level, at both rank-
and-file and senior positions. The best predictors for the Directive Board were careers 
at the municipal level, where those who had been mayors or councillors were at an 
advantage to be appointed to one of the few positions in the governing board of the 
Chamber. 
 
Furthermore, since the overall purpose of this research is to understand how parties’ 
power impacts on the Chamber through the control of political careers, it is also 
interesting to portray a profile of those who were elected to a proportional 
representation (PR) seat. It would be logical to assume that they would be long-term 
career politicians working much more for the party’s interest than for the electorate. 
As a result, the quantitative approach of this research includes a logistic regression for 
‘PR seat’ as a dependent variable, with the same independent and control variables as 
the previous analyses. The results show that those who had been a federal deputy, a 
senator or both, as well as those who had been federal bureaucrats, were more likely 
to be placed on the PR list. In contrast, whoever had been a local deputy was more 
likely to be nominated as a single-member district (SMD) candidate.
12
 
 
3c Expected overall results of the case study 
Altogether, the qualitative and quantitative approaches (Chapters 4 and 5) briefly 
overviewed prove that being loyal or at least somewhat linked to the party and its 
leadership figures pays off for being considered for the key roles for decision-making. 
The specific way in which these dynamics affect the Chamber will be discussed in 
more detail throughout the following chapters. 
 
                                                 
12
 Single-member district candidates are those elected by the public on open lists. 
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Overall, this research identifies the particularities of the Mexican political system that 
have developed from the country’s contemporary evolution and uses these 
specificities as explanatory factors for the peculiar design and operation of the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
 
It is worth saying that, in a broader picture, the reality portrayed in this work reflects 
the lack of political accountability in Mexico, defined as ‘the responsiveness of 
governmental policies to the preferences of the electorate’ (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 
2006, p. 6). This type of accountability, and more precisely its vertical 
manifestation,
13
 is not easily achieved due to the imperfect nature of the relationship 
of representation and the lack of the necessary conditions for controlling agencies to 
function adequately (Ibid). 
 
This reflection supports the academic literature which stresses the importance of 
achieving representative institutions to enhance popular support for democracy. For 
instance, Hagopian (2005) states that ‘where institutions of political representation are 
vibrant, and where parties are responsive and accountable to the preferences of 
citizens that can associate in the terrain of civil and political society, democracy is 
somewhat inoculated from setbacks’ (Ibid, p. 321). 
 
Despite the discontent of the Mexican electorate with their parties, informal rules and 
negotiation of power do take place within formal processes. 
 
4 Thesis structure 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first one, encompassing Chapters 1 and 2, 
discusses general facts about Mexico’s politics and institutions, justifying the 
relevance of the research topic in terms of empirical puzzles and the theoretical 
contributions that it could make. 
 
More specifically, Chapter 1 provides the reader with a background on the Mexican 
political system, paying special attention to its legislative power. In addition to 
                                                 
13
 Guillermo O’Donnell differentiates between vertical accountability, which consists of external 
checks, and horizontal accountability, referring to the operation of internal controls in the system 
(O’Donnell, cited in Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006, p. 9). 
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familiarising the reader with the case study, it serves the purpose of giving a 
convincing explanation of why it is of particular interest. It also identifies the 
empirical and contextual queries to be addressed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
 
Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical framework guiding the arguments presented herein. 
It discusses the suitability of historical institutionalism for this inductive case study 
and further explains the argument of conditional path dependency outlined in this 
research. In addition, it presents the research question, hypothesis and objectives, and 
shows how my work contributes to the broader literature on party behaviour, 
legislative organisation and the empirical effects of term limits. 
 
In turn, Part II contains the two empirical chapters of this thesis, each one offering a 
thorough insight into one piece of the puzzle. They are preceded by a 
contextualisation of the origins of party behaviour, laid out in Chapter 3, where the 
focus is the emergence, factional nature, and hierarchical dynamics of the parties. 
Chapter 4 offers a rich description of the institutional design and operation of the 
Chamber, taking as an example the 60th Congress (2006-2009), as described by 
official documents but also through real-life experiences of congressmen and women, 
parliamentary staff and specialists on legislative matters in Mexico. Finally, Chapter 5 
goes deeper into the issue of political careers and legislative offices by running 
logistic regressions to find predictors for committee presidencies, appointments to 
priority committees, the Directive Board and nominations for PR seats prior to the 
election of 2 July 2006. 
 
A final conclusion revisits the research goals set out at the beginning of this work, 
assessing – through a summary of the empirical and theoretical arguments made in all 
five chapters – the level of success in answering the research question and 
contributing to the scholarly literature as originally planned. A brief mention of future 
research interests is also included. 
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PART I. CONTEXTUALISATION AND THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
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Chapter 1. The Mexican case: term limits, factionalism and electoral 
rules 
 
Mexico has some similarities with other non-consolidated democracies such as those 
in the Latin American region. In these places, informal rules are often stronger than 
legal frameworks and therefore leave room for clientelistic practices. Furthermore, 
leaders could accumulate more power than they are constitutionally supposed to have, 
because of a lack of effective checks and balances. Therefore, it is expected that some 
institutions might not perform efficiently or in accordance with accountable and 
transparent practices. Consequently, functions such as representation and participation 
might be underachieved. 
 
Despite the Mexican constitutional design being very different from elsewhere in the 
region, it has a few similarities with other countries. Its evolution over time has 
mainly responded to pragmatic agreements between the members of the elite, making 
it even more sui generis. In addition, Mexico differs from most Latin American 
countries in that it has not experienced a military dictatorship and elections have 
almost always taken place since its independence. However, elections were dominated 
by a single party for many years, which meant that the role of Congress was not to 
represent the electorate’s interest, but to ‘rubber-stamp’ the president’s policies 
instead. Mexico’s authoritarian past is thus not military but political. 
 
These specific traits of the country’s political system generate very interesting 
empirical puzzles regarding legislative dynamics and the extent of the power of the 
political parties. The most important query is related to the fact that, while their 
objective should be to increase representation and reduce parties’ control over 
political positions, term limits have in fact empowered parties across all levels of 
government. Therefore, this chapter discusses why Mexico is a unique case of 
institutional design by looking into its presidential, electoral and party systems, and, 
most importantly, its legislative power. 
 
This chapter provides a detailed overview of how scholars have studied the political 
actors and factors that have shaped the Mexican system into a partidocracy, where 
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parties tightly control political careers and institutional processes. In addition, the 
literature review and the identification of areas of contribution to the field offer the 
reader a useful background on the topic. Thus, by the end of this chapter it should be 
clear why Mexico has failed to clean institutions from old practices, even since the 
PRI lost full control of the country in 1997. 
 
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, this chapter sheds light on the elements 
and dynamics that the academic literature has yet to address in order to complete the 
picture of power networks in the Mexican system. These will then be addressed in the 
remaining chapters of this thesis. 
 
In the first section, I will briefly describe and assess the nature of Mexico’s 
presidential regime, along with its party and electoral systems. The second section 
will be devoted to providing the reader with a general background on the country’s 
legislative power, which will be done through an overview of the academic literature 
produced in the last few decades on the subject, highlighting the key issues of the 
institution’s evolution which have shaped it to become what it is today. Finally, the 
third section highlights the puzzles to be addressed in the empirical chapters. 
 
1.1 The Mexican political system 
Mexico adopted a presidential system after becoming independent from Spain in the 
19th century, as did all the other countries throughout the Latin American region. 
Inspired by the American example, the writers of the first Mexican Constitution and 
the ones that followed foresaw a separation of powers, where the Executive would be 
checked and balanced by the legislature and the rule of law would be guaranteed by 
the judiciary. Nonetheless, as numerous scholars have argued (Hagopian, 2005; Linz 
& Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell, 1998; Zakaria, 1997), the Latin American version of 
presidentialism does not work as smoothly as the American model does: presidents 
have very strong powers and in most cases the Congress is institutionally unable to 
fully play its role of overseeing the Chief of the Executive. Furthermore, much has 
been said about the faulty law-enforcement mechanisms operating across the region. 
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However, the political complications of poor checks and balances, which result in a 
lack of transparency and low accountability (both vertical and horizontal),
14
 do not 
necessarily stem from constitutional design per se. Rather, there are additional 
underlying causes such as the combination of informal rules, old political practices 
across the executive, the legislative and judiciary and a political culture which does 
not promote civil participation. Ultimately, this derives from a non-consolidated 
democracy, allowing faulty inter-branch relationships and electoral systems that 
favour elites instead of the electorate. 
 
1.1.1 The country’s democratisation process 
Guerrero (2004) recognises democracy as a system in which there are specific forms 
of accessing power and others for making use of it. The use of political power must 
guarantee the freedom of rights and also be shared in such a way that it leads to an 
adequate balance among the institutions holding the power. This, in turn, means that 
political actors must act responsibly, as they will be held accountable through 
electoral mechanisms by the citizens.  
 
There are three conditions which favour the responsible use of power in a 
democratic regime: the existence of checks and balance mechanisms between 
actors and institutions; the capacity to guarantee public responsibility; and the 
possibility for the media to be independent in order for them to oversee 
political actors and denounce any form of corruption (Ibid, pp. 38-39, my 
translation). 
 
The fact that the country was ruled by a single party for just over 70 years is a 
sufficient condition to assume that checks and balances were absent for decades. 
Furthermore, Congress was dominated by the presidency, which in turn was closely 
intertwined with party life and politics. The Executive was, for a long time, an 
overwhelmingly dominant body across the country. The PRI had very little interest in 
                                                 
14
 Guillermo O’Donnell identifies two types of accountability: vertical (consisting of external checks) 
and horizontal (which is the operation of internal controls in the system) (O’Donnell, cited in Peruzzotti 
& Smulovitz, 2006, p. 9). 
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becoming internally democratic and the president had to maintain the association of 
numerous sectors while obviously keeping them happy. Each president had his own 
style, but most of them were authoritarian and imposed their politics and views within 
the party and on other governmental institutions. 
 
Forms for accessing power and making use of it were all but specified; they were 
mainly dictated by informal rules as per the elite’s interests. Hence, a general balance 
of the country’s political performance would show that, at least during the PRI’s 
reign, Mexico failed to comply with most of the conditions necessary for democracy 
to become embedded. 
 
Magaloni (2005, pp. 121-122) discusses the logics and components of 
democratisation and she states that: 
 
the democratization dynamics of one-party-dominant systems is different from 
other regime transitions. The goal of the opposition is to defeat the party 
associated with the authoritarian past through the ballot box. Defeating the 
ruling party is extremely hard. The electoral arena is biased for two reasons. 
First, there are significant incumbency advantages, of which the most 
important is the ruling party’s unilateral control of the state apparatus and the 
vast sources of patronage it can employ to deter voters from embracing the 
opposition camp. Second, the ruling party controls both the legislatures and 
opposition or, if need be, manipulate the voter registration, election procedures 
and even the outcome of the elections. 
 
It is difficult to draw the line or point in time and space to the democratic 
establishment in Mexico because it was not a matter of an individual dictator stepping 
down or the military going back to the barracks, as was the case elsewhere in Latin 
America. As mentioned in the introduction, Mexico’s political overhaul was a case of 
authoritarianism being eliminated through the ballot. ‘As elections become more 
competitive, the major political players tend to renegotiate the existing rules of the 
game so as to reflect the new balance of forces. A distinctive trait of this type of 
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transition is that democratization might take place even without the alternation of 
power in office’ (Magaloni, 2005, p. 123). 
 
The birth of democracy in Mexico can be traced to the point when elections became 
competitive and when the opposition accepted electoral institutions as legitimate. This 
was achieved through the approval of electoral reforms, which gradually allowed for 
increased political competition. Table 1.1 shows the main reforms at the federal level. 
 
The reforms approved in 1989 paved the way for fairer elections, as the Federal 
Electoral Institute (IFE, its Spanish abbreviation) was created to oversee them. Salinas 
negotiated better elections with the opposition – mainly the PAN, as the PRD voted 
against the reform in the end – in exchange for support for the approval of NAFTA-
related policies. This electoral reform also had the purpose of showing Canada and the 
United States that Mexico was democratic and reliable. 
 
Further electoral reforms approved in 1996, along with institutional compromises at 
the elite level, were crucial for democratisation. Once the IFE was made fully 
independent from the PRI-controlled Executive, only a constitutional reform could 
reverse it and the PRI no longer had the absolute majority to pass it. Why the PRI 
allowed this democratisation pre-condition can be answered as an ‘endogenous 
change […It] ultimately depended on strategic choices made by the incumbent in 
response to its anticipation of electoral fortunes, and the expected reaction by 
opposition forces to the choice of retaining unilateral control of the elections, versus 
tying its hands not to commit fraud by delegating’ (Magaloni, 2005, p. 145). 
 
However, having free and fair electoral processes is not a guarantee for democratic 
consolidation or its endurance (Huber et al., 1997). In order for this to happen, 
democracy ‘must be self-enforcing, meaning that all relevant political players must 
have an interest in abiding by the election results, even if they lose’ (Magaloni, 2005, 
p. 146). 
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Table 1.1 Electoral Reforms in Mexico 
1977 1989 1996 2007 
Opened legal possibilities for 
opposition movements to 
constitute as political parties 
and to compete in elections 
Creation of the IFE 
to ‘guarantee’ clean 
and fair elections 
Promoted more 
participatory spaces 
and allowed the 
opposition to win 
legislative seats and 
other important 
federal and local 
offices 
Restrictions to 
campaign funding 
and the purchase of 
spots on the media 
Introduced proportional 
representation seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies (which 
increased from 100 to 200 in 
1987) 
 Autonomy of the IFE  
  Increased the number 
of seats in the Senate 
through proportional 
representation 
 
Source: Author’s creation 
Acronyms correspond to: Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) 
 
Middlebrook (2004) also identifies as a key element for the democratisation agenda 
the de-concentration of authority and the alteration of the balance of political power in 
public institutions. He identifies several institutional obstacles for an accurate balance 
of power: 
 
The most important of these is the constitutional prohibition (in effect since 
1933) against the consecutive re-election of federal deputies and senators to 
positions in the same Chamber. There is considerable agreement among 
political analysts that the no re-election rule hinders the development of a 
more autonomous and influential legislative branch by limiting legislators’ 
accountability to their constituents and by preventing them from accumulating 
experience or acquiring substantive expertise in specialized areas. 
Nevertheless, despite some support for a constitutional reform that would 
permit consecutive re-election (with term limits) to positions other than the 
presidency, none of Mexico’s major parties made this issue a high priority for 
legislative action during the first half of the Fox administration (Ibid, pp. 15-
26). 
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Public officials in Mexico must learn to establish the boundaries between public and 
private spheres. This is done by ensuring horizontal accountability and access to 
information. Most importantly, there should be an effort to end traditions of 
corruption and impunity and to strengthen the effective exercise of citizenship. 
Furthermore, it is very important to build strong party-civil society linkages, which 
are crucial for triggering democratic changes (mainly electoral ones) (Ibid). 
 
Overall, the Mexican political evolution, especially during the ‘third wave of 
democratization’ (Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005) of the 1990s, has led the country to 
cleaner and fairer electoral processes, a consolidated party system
15
 and a more active 
participation of Congress vis-à-vis the Executive. In fact, the electoral system is ‘one 
of the mechanisms of integrative control of the Mexican political system’ (Nohlen, 
1993, p. 143, my translation). 
 
However, I should stress the fact that the general balance of Mexico’s progress 
towards a much more stable and democratic regime is still rather negative. The 
political class has yet to improve its attitudes to draw the boundaries between private 
and public matters, and also to promote accountability. 
 
Whitehead (2002) agrees with the fact that a regime change in the country would 
necessarily entail deep transformations: 
 
In the Mexican case, the governmental institutions have not just been 
established for a long period of time and are thus well organised, but they are 
also deeply penetrated by the PRI’s authoritarian system of government. 
Therefore, an important change in the legitimation principles could simply not 
be contained within the neutral state institutions. It would entail a wide 
restructuring of those institutions to recover their initial functions or, at least, 
                                                 
15
 Among other scholars, Wallis (2003) argues that the current Mexican party system is 
institutionalised, and justifies his statement based on the existence of the following factors: ‘domination 
of elections at all levels by the three main parties; an approximate left–centre–right ideological 
spectrum across the parties in that block; evidence of a willingness to negotiate electoral and legislative 
alliances; the generally savvy choices of the Mexican electorate; and the carefully constructed rules of 
the game, culminating in the 1996 reform, which creates conditions for serious competition – within 
parameters’ (Ibid, p. 33). 
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to reshape their current function modes in a durable manner (Ibid, pp. 126, my 
translation). 
 
1.1.2 Political actors and rules 
Mexico was once known for having one of the most powerful executives in the Latin 
American region. Weldon (1997, p. 227) explains that there are four necessary 
conditions behind this situation: ‘1) a presidential system based in the constitution; 2) 
unified government, where the ruling party controls the presidency and both houses of 
congress; 3) discipline within the ruling party; and 4) a president who is the 
acknowledged leader of the ruling party.’ He also states that if any of those four 
conditions change, then the status quo of ‘presidencialismo’ (Mexican 
presidentialism) can become unstable and fall apart. Especially in the case that any of 
the three latter conditions ‘no longer hold true, then the president of Mexico will 
possess only constitutional powers, and he will lose the meta-constitutional powers 
for which Mexican executives have been notorious’ (Ibid, pp. 227-228). 
 
Some of these conditions began to weaken during Salinas’ presidency, mainly 
because he was not seen by all the sectors within the PRI as their true and strong 
leader. However, Zedillo’s term saw the strongest period of decay of the Mexican 
‘presidencialismo’: in 1997 the PRI lost the majority of seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies, which made Congress much more powerful. In turn, this brought a new 
relationship between the Executive and the legislature and with it, a constraint on the 
‘meta-constitutional’ powers of the president and the end of Congress’ role as a mere 
‘rubber-stamping’ agency for the Executive’s bills. 
 
During Zedillo’s presidency, the Executive began to appear much more vulnerable 
due to insufficient votes in the Chamber for approving constitutional reforms and the 
lack of formal presidential powers for performing legislative tasks; there were also 
visible cleavages, and even polarisation, within the PRI. Perhaps a clear example of 
how Zedillo’s term was troubled due to difficult policy-making was the Tequila 
Crisis, a devaluation of the Mexican Peso often attributed to a political mishandling of 
the economic reforms approved in December 1994. In addition, the ministerial cabinet 
under Zedillo became unstable, evidencing a shift of the president from being ‘a great 
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giving-referee’ to having to pragmatically negotiate to build coalitions so as to escape 
from governmental deadlocks (Guerrero, 2004). 
 
The prevalence of clientelistic practices has promoted the emergence of a political 
context in which local bosses work for themselves and interfere in the candidate 
selection process, as well as in certain procedures such as budget allocation: 
 
New actors and groups, now with an increased capacity to make use of 
resources in different regions and spaces facing a disappearing state, not only 
continue ignoring formal rules as the mechanisms through which relations in 
public life ought to be guided, but are also the new heads of fragmented 
clientelism and those who impose the conditions under which the new 
informal rules must be followed (Ibid, , pp. 171, my translation). 
 
Although informal rules have been always been present (and important) in Mexican 
politics, they have become even more salient in the last two decades, even replacing 
formal frameworks across different levels of government in the country: 
 
The state has not been re-defined, rather just weakened and retracted, so it 
cannot even be understood as an agent capable of forcing the compliance of 
new rules of the game: the rules which prevail are still the informal ones, but 
now without a central agent capable of establishing the spaces for negotiation 
and exchange. When losing the capability to impose rules on the actors, the 
uncontrolled informality does not help strengthen political stability or 
governance and, of course, it does not favour the conditions to design a limited 
and responsible exercise of political power either (Ibid, pp. 126, my 
translation). 
 
It is a fact that political elites in Mexico are mostly worried about their individual 
benefit and the maintenance of clientelistic loyalties, thereby further reducing 
responsibility and vertical accountability. Given that citizen involvement is limited, 
politicians have no restrictions on launching their own careers very early in the 
electoral campaign process. They do not even care if by running for office they may 
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cause a division or a fracture in their party and maybe even governmental paralysis 
(Ibid). 
 
A lengthy overview of political parties, their historical evolution and their power 
strategies is given in Chapter 3. Nonetheless, within the contextualisation of the 
Mexican system being provided here, it is worth pointing out a couple of issues. 
 
First of all, the party system has evolved since the 1990s from a hegemonic one to a 
more competitive one. This new scenario has affected policy-making and negotiations 
within the legislative power and also among the ministries. Guerrero (Ibid) identified 
it as one of the main causes of cabinet instability during the late 1990s, as the 
ministers, especially those dealing with budgets and social policies, had to negotiate 
with different players when seeking support for the Executive’s bills. 
 
In addition, the system has engaged wider sectors of society, especially those 
operating at the regional level, but in order to win elections at the national level all 
parties have been forced to become ‘catch-all’ organisations, ‘and those party leaders 
or party nominees who have been most eclectic in campaign message and style have 
proved to be the most successful’ (Klesner, 2004, p. 136). 
 
Klesner (Ibid, pp. 128-129) provides a much synthesised picture of the Mexican party 
system after 2000, when the PAN won the presidency: 
 
A three-party system at the national level, the party system has functioned as a 
pair of two-party systems outside the greater Mexico City area. The PAN 
became the PRI’s main competitor in the North and the Center-west because 
of the PAN’s pre-market ideology (attractive to northerners) and its embrace 
of Catholic social philosophy (appealing to the Catholic Bajío). The PRD 
became the PRI’s opponent in the south because of its greater emphasis on 
distributive justice and its economic nationalism, important in a region with 
endemic poverty and inequality and especially threatened by the forces of 
economic globalisation. Yet the dynamics of two-party systems create 
incentives for those parties to operate as catch-all parties. 
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The main differences between the parties, and which eventually lead to polarisation 
between and within them, do not lie within ideological or religious matters, but rather 
in the means that politicians choose to link themselves with economic and political 
flows (Martínez, 1997). That is, clear and extreme placements along the left-right 
scale respond to associations with the means of production. Again though, it should be 
said that all three major political forces are predominantly catch-all parties. 
 
As suggested earlier, Mexico’s political system was shaped throughout the very long 
reign of the PRI. Therefore, every single institution had stable, albeit informal, codes 
of practice, mechanisms for rewards and punishments, and resources to distribute 
among loyal individuals. 
 
The same thing applies to the parties. Opposition forces were obliged to compete 
under the electoral system implemented by the PRI, at least during the first years of 
their existence. In fact, the PRD itself was created and largely formed by individuals 
who split from the PRI. It was not until the electoral reform of 1996 that a more just 
and transparent competition could take place. However, because political institutions 
are not entirely clear from old practices and that attitudes and behaviours have not 
been fully changed, it is obvious that there is still plenty of room for corruption and 
excessive use of power by the governing elites. 
 
In addition, the Mexican electoral system has evolved to be one of the most restrictive 
ones in the world in terms of the limitations it imposes on campaigns, for example the 
use of media and the content of campaigns, and yet the parties have still managed to 
keep a tight control on electoral resources and processes. Despite the creation and 
gradual empowerment of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), which makes sure that 
elections are free, fair and transparent, parties have still secured access to substantial 
public resources, including funding, not only for elections, but also for their overall 
subsistence. It is precisely because of these privileges that the parties have been able 
to hold the party system together and tightly control it in all aspects. 
 
Based on the aforementioned context of political irresponsibility and lack of 
horizontal and vertical accountability, it is impossible to ignore the fact that there are 
legal and informal constraints on democratic consolidation. This research argues that 
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such a situation is easily identified in the legislative power. Therefore, the next section 
outlines the main challenges to democracy which emerge from or involve Congress. 
 
1.2 The Congress 
Mexico has a bicameral federal Congress, where the upper Chamber is 
constitutionally obliged to represent the states of the federation and the lower one 
dictates and approves legislation in representation of the citizens. Hence, the latter has 
greater salience and political importance for parties as organisations that represent the 
electorate’s interest, and is perhaps more important for policy-making. This research 
therefore focuses solely on the Chamber of Deputies, the Lower Chamber. 
 
The legislative body under consideration is composed of 500 members, 300 of whom 
are elected in single-member districts (SMD). Each district has one deputy elected by 
the majority principle and the remaining 200 legislators are elected in five multi-
member districts through closed and blocked lists. Thus, with one vote, constituents 
choose a majority deputy and also contribute to the likelihood of a party list to fill in 
proportional representation (PR) seats. The PR seats are allocated according to the 
percentage of the votes obtained by the political parties and certainly favours the 
candidates at the top of the list (Nohlen, 1993). 
 
To coordinate such a large number of representatives, the Mexican Lower Chamber, 
also known as the ‘Legislative Palace of San Lázaro’, has developed an increasingly 
hierarchical organisation. In addition, there are 44 ordinary committees in charge of 
scrutinising policy proposals and also a highly politicised internal environment. 
 
Furthermore, the Chamber is strongly influenced by the electoral system, due to its 
size and the use of mixed electoral methods to allocate the seats. The most important 
effects are: the increasing number of parties represented and yet the inability of any to 
constitute a majority; the obscurity of principal-agent relations due to a multiplicity of 
active interests towards building political careers; the empowerment of parties as 
suppliers of clientelistic incentives for loyal members; and the constant reshaping of 
the Chamber’s institutional design by party elites to better satisfy their needs. All 
these matters will be addressed in later chapters. 
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The complexity of the institution and its undeniable importance for Mexican 
democracy has led many scholars to carry out lengthy analyses to understand how it 
works and the role it plays in politics, among many other aspects. Very valuable 
information has been produced and a brief overview of it will help the reader to build 
some background knowledge of the Chamber, so as to better understand the 
assumptions made in this research. As a preamble to the following chapter, which 
places this work within the broader literature, it will also serve the purpose of locating 
the work within the academic literature on the Mexican Congress and thus identify the 
theoretical contributions that it should make. 
 
A simple way of presenting the scholarly work is to follow Ugalde’s (2000) 
classification into four main thematic groups according to the main topic they focus 
on explaining: 
 
1. Historical issues; 
2. Legal matters; 
3. Economic/budgetary powers of the institution; 
4. Behavioural consequences of non-re-election (related to low accountability). 
 
However, for this work’s purposes, I shall make an adjustment and I will group the 
literature into two broad categories, the classical school and the public choice 
approaches. 
 
1) A classical school approach focuses on describing the institution per se and the 
legal framework developed throughout history. Ugalde’s historical and economic 
aspects are included in this category and the topics analysed include separation of 
powers (both vertically and horizontally) and the consequent cooperation between the 
governmental institutions in charge of exercising those powers, where bicameralism is 
a further relevant topic. Special attention is drawn to the executive-legislative 
relationship and to the legislative constitutional powers such as the power of the 
purse. There is also an overarching concept of all the legal issues: governance, based 
on constitutional provisions. 
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A common foundation to all of the works within this approach is the understanding of 
democracy as a representative form of government which guarantees civil liberties 
that are grounded in a constitution. 
 
2) A public choice approach analyses the behaviour of members of Congress triggered 
by different principals or factors. The most common explanation is that term limits 
and the partisan powers of the presidency, which was stronger before 1997, are 
determinant on how deputies and senators function. A considerable amount of work 
has been written about the changes of congressional behaviour as an institution after 
the presidential elections of 2000. 
 
Furthermore, scholars discuss how the impossibility of building uninterrupted 
legislative careers leads to low vertical accountability. Especially in the PRI’s case, 
the parties’ influence on deputies’ acts is paramount. Nonetheless, very little has been 
said regarding the other parties and on the relationship between the opposition’s 
increasing access to governorships and the greater pressure this could bring to 
legislative approval of the budget. 
 
The following pages give an overview of the literature belonging to both approaches 
in order to place this research within the adequate body of knowledge. This shall 
clarify the discourse I will use, and also pinpoint possible fields of contribution. 
 
1.2.1 The classical school 
As a general starting point, the legal approach (the main element of the classical 
school) includes considerations on whether the Mexican presidential system has 
certain characteristics which make it resemble a parliamentary system (see for 
example Valdés Robledo, 2006). However, scholars such as Carpizo (2003) give 
proof against such claims. To begin with, Article 49 of the Constitution lays out the 
separation of powers and clarifies that no power can be concentrated in just one 
person, except in extreme situations. 
 
The legislative powers of the president have led to a sui generis executive-legislative 
relationship, which affects policies and politics in Mexico. As a result, numerous 
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studies have sought to research the origins of such powers, and they have found that 
they are laid out by the Constitution in Articles 71, 72b and 74. 
 
Article 71 gives the head of the Executive the power to initiate legislation. Before 
1997, when the PRI had a majority in Congress, this meant that the Chamber of 
Deputies only rubber-stamped presidential initiatives and the majority of the approved 
bills were put forward by the president. If they were left to fade away without further 
scrutiny, it was because the Executive had lost interest in them (Carpizo, 2003). As 
numerical proof for this argument, Carpizo (Ibid, p. 84) gives examples on how ‘in 
1935, 1937 and 1941 all the bills sent by the Executive were approved unanimously in 
the Chamber of Deputies. In 1943, 92 per cent of the bills were unanimously 
approved; in 1947, 74 per cent; in 1949, 77 per cent; in 1953, 59 per cent; in 1955, 62 
per cent and in 1959, 95 per cent.’ 
 
Furthermore, Article 72b of the Constitution gives the president the power to veto a 
congressional decision, which suggests that undesired outcomes could be prevented 
from becoming law.
16
 Article 89 of the Constitution establishes that laws are to be 
executed by the president, and thus the practical, and perhaps more important and 
complicated process of policy-making is concentrated in the Executive’s hands (Ibid). 
 
According to Carpizo (Ibid), there are several situations regarding the Executive’s 
powers that could suggest that the President has opportunities to overstep 
constitutional boundaries to abuse power. However, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 
includes elements such as the appeal for legal protection on the grounds of violation 
of rights and liberties (juicio de amparo). Furthermore, the judiciary has the right to 
punish the Executive if it overuses its power. For instance, the president could be sent 
to court for not publishing an approved bill in the official diary. 
 
Despite the legal constraints, in practice, and as has been previously mentioned, 
informal rules guiding the decision-making process allowed the president to keep 
Congress subordinated. Before divided government emerged in 1997, the main 
reasons for this were (Ibid, pp. 115-116, my translation): 
                                                 
16
 In Mexico, a bill only becomes law if it is published in the official diary (Diario Oficial de la 
Federación) by the President. 
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1. The majority of the deputies belonged to the PRI party led by the president. 
Through party discipline, all the president’s bills were approved; 
2. If they rebelled, they were most likely ending their political career, since the 
president is the greatest provider of the main offices and posts in public 
administration, in the state-company sector, within popular elected offices and 
in the judicial power; 
3. As gratitude, since they knew they owed their seat to the president; 
4. In addition to the salary, there are other economic benefits which depend on 
the head of political control; and 
5. Acceptance that the legislative power followed the instructions of the 
Executive, which was the most comfortable attitude and the one requiring the 
least effort… 
6. [Another reason is that] deputies cannot pursue legislative careers on their own 
because they cannot be re-elected for the immediate period.’ 
 
It should be said, however, that after 1997, when the PRI lost its majority in the 
Chamber, and even more after the PAN won the presidency in 2000, many of the 
aforementioned reasons were no longer valid. Congress, and the Lower Chamber 
specifically, have recovered much of their constitutional power for decision-making, 
but the main claims supporting this change in the patterns of the executive-legislative 
relationship are better explained by the public choice approach and therefore will not 
be addressed at this moment. 
 
Within the classic, legal view, constitutional powers granted to Congress in order to 
control the Executive’s abuse of power are also recognised. Carpizo lists the 
following: ‘a) the power of the purse, b) the ratification of specific acts, c) political 
responsibility trial, d) extraordinary sessions and e) implicit faculties’ (Ibid, pp. 215, 
my translation). The most important of them is, by far, the financial power or power 
of the purse. 
 
Article 74 of the Constitution gives the Executive the exclusive right to present a 
proposal for public income, which is scrutinised and discussed in both Chambers and 
thus it could be assumed that the Executive must present a reasonable or moderate 
proposal in order for it to be easily approved. 
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Perhaps the legislative Chamber with the greatest economic power to oversee the 
Executive is the Chamber of Deputies, since budget approval, namely the expenses to 
be made by the federal government each fiscal year, is not discussed by the Senate. 
This has given way to a continuous quest for the fulfilment of particular political 
interests in the form of pressure towards deputies and the establishment of channels of 
influence of important political figures. Since the state of public finances is also solely 
scrutinised by the deputies, corruption denouncement and the guarantee of 
transparency are the responsibility of the Lower Chamber. 
 
Overall, the legal view then focuses on analysing the reasons why the constitutional 
provisions are not followed in practice, even though the legal instruments are there. 
As has already been said, after divided government emerged in 1997 and even more 
after the victory of the PAN’s Vicente Fox in 2000, numerous political changes have 
taken place. These changes are also important for the classic approach to Mexican 
government; Carpizo (Ibid, pp. 263, my translation) concludes the latest edition of his 
book on the country’s presidentialism with the following statements: 
 
…c) Political change at the presidential level and the composition of the 
federal Congress – in which no party has an absolute majority in any Chamber 
– opens the possibility, although it is not guaranteed, that the political power 
process be carried out through constitutional channels. 
d) It is not convenient for anyone to have a weak federal executive power that 
cannot fulfil its legal responsibilities. A weak federal executive would be 
disastrous for the country. What is desirable is the disappearance of the 
lingering elements and scars of presidentialism, in order for a true presidential 
system to operate with the limitations, delimitations and equilibriums 
established by our Constitution. 
e) There are favourable political and social conditions in order to move from a 
system of concentrated power to one of balanced power… 
 
In addition to the constitutional attributes of both powers, the legal approach raises the 
importance that bicameralism has regarding executive-legislative relations. Covián 
(2004) argues that bicameralism favours presidential power and undermines popular 
representation. This is especially true when we consider that a presidential veto has to 
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be blocked by two Chambers instead of just one. Furthermore, a bill must be approved 
by two Chambers before it can be sent back to the Executive for its publication and 
implementation, which also makes the legislative process slower and subject to 
political blockages in any of the two Chambers. 
 
It should also be mentioned that the existence of governability, which is directly 
related to constitutional provisions, is key for an adequate balance of power and the 
emergence of an active citizenship (Valadés, 2005). This also means that adequate 
checks and balances must not only guarantee a horizontal division and cooperation of 
powers, but also the control of alternative sources of power in order to ensure 
democracy, which is important in order to avoid the substitution of the public 
interest’s representatives by private interests or forces (Carbonell, 2006). 
 
Therefore, Carbonell (Ibid, p. 68) argues that ‘the viability of constitutional 
democracy, especially regarding the goals which support it and make it sensible, 
depends on the fact that such substitution does not happen and that the powers – 
public and private – are able to find the legal and institutional limits that will allow 
liberties to breathe.’ 
 
Along similar lines, and based on the fact that the separation of powers in a 
democracy implies the creation of mechanisms for checks and balances, Mora-
Donatto (2006) analyses the concept of parliamentary control and concludes that it is 
carried out in many ways and by all actors. That is, not only do minorities or 
opposition groups control the Executive in order to point out unaccomplished tasks or 
mistakes, but they are also vigilant of the majorities. 
 
In the concrete case of the Mexican political system, both Chambers exert 
parliamentary control, but they do so in different ways. According to Mora-Donatto 
(Ibid), the basic mechanism used is the legislative process, because the minorities take 
part in the preparation and approval process of bills and also because it is a public 
event. These two features of the legislative process guarantee that Congress fulfils its 
main task and raison d’être: the representation of society’s interests. Other 
parliamentary activities which serve as a control of the Executive are the investigation 
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committees, although they have inherent weaknesses and flaws, and the addresses that 
the secretaries of state give to Congress. 
 
In addition, Mora-Donatto (Ibid) suggests that the annual presidential address should 
be used as an effective channel of communication between the Executive and the 
legislative. Above all, she argues that a key element for accurate parliamentary 
control over the Executive is the existence of complete information. Unfortunately, 
information is scarce among legislators, especially when it comes to budget approval, 
because the presentation of the annual budget proposal is quite complicated and the 
Ministry of Finance does not give out full information on the calculations used (see 
Caballero & Dávila, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, for Mora-Donatto (2006), Congress plays the leading role in a 
parliamentary democracy, both in presidential and parliamentary systems. Its main 
function is to represent the plurality of interests and to ensure that legislation is made 
responsibly; it is quality rather than quantity that should drive the legislation-making 
process. Hence, an updated parliamentary legal framework becomes crucial for an 
adequate legislative process. 
 
As for the Mexican case, Mora-Donatto (Ibid, pp. 8, my translation) identifies the 
following key challenges faced by Congress: 
 
1. to redefine the organic structure and dimension of the Chambers; 
2. to consolidate the bodies of technical support; 
3. to leave fully behind the predominance of the Executive in the planning 
and design of the legislative action of Congress; 
4. to turn the committees into adequate scenarios for processing 
parliamentary work; 
5. to break with the trend of ‘massive bill approval’, which has repercussions 
for the quality of the parliamentary production and for the loss of 
legislative quality; 
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6. to overcome the predominant role of the parties in Congress’ work through 
the parliamentary groups and to reinforce the, until now, secondary role of 
the individual legislator;
17
 
7. to face, through innovative procedures, the omnipresence of the media 
which, due to the slow internal functioning of Congress, has progressively 
become the authentic forum of political confrontation and the ideal place 
for discussions between political alternatives. 
 
Furthermore, she claims that: 
 
as a consequence of these omissions which have placed the Mexican Congress 
in a delicate situation, it is possible to understand the erosion of its image 
among the society, which is not capable of expressing any feeling of 
appreciation or popular identification with the institution that legitimately 
represents it, as reflected among the varied opinion polls (Ibid, pp. 8-9, my 
translation).  
 
It is undeniable that political parties play a crucial role in Congress, especially for the 
tasks of parliamentary control and representation. This has been even truer since the 
2000 election, a key event for understanding the contemporary Mexican Congress. 
Along these lines, Valdés Robledo (2006) also recognises the importance of political 
control of the Executive by Congress, especially under divided government, where 
more minorities have the opportunity and possibility to participate in policy-making. 
 
Mora-Donatto (2006) points to the importance of two decision-making bodies: the 
Political Coordination Board (JUCOPO, its Spanish abbreviation), which is formed by 
the congressional party leaders and reaches agreements by absolute majority; and the 
Directive Board (Mesa Directiva), which makes decisions based on consensus and 
absolute majority voting. Due to their hierarchical importance and attributions, but 
mainly because of the fact that within them the most controversial political interests 
sit down at the same table to reach agreements, both bodies must be observed closely 
in order to understand the logic of important outcomes and bill approvals. 
                                                 
17
 This suggests highlighting the need for electoral connection, a concept which will be stressed 
throughout my research. 
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Unfortunately, full information on how they operate and why they decide the way 
they do is not available (see Caballero & Dávila, 2006). 
 
A newer stream of the legal approach claims for constitutional reforms that could 
improve checks and balances. Interestingly, it stresses the need to connect the 
legislator with citizens’ preferences and promote cooperation between powers rather 
than concentrating on reducing the Executive’s legislative powers (Negretto, 2006). 
 
It should also be mentioned that within the legal approach, several scholars have 
written about the need to insist on the approval of the pending state reform. Most of 
them consider that immediate re-election should be allowed. However, Camp (2007, 
pp. 187-188) argues that,  
 
although the deputies themselves have raised the issue of eliminating the 
prohibition on immediate re-election, the Mexican public is definitely opposed 
to such a reform. In a comprehensive poll in 2005, more than two-thirds of 
Mexicans were against the immediate re-election of federal deputies and 
senators … The only structural change in the Chamber of deputies the public 
appears to favour is reducing its size (60 per cent favour 100 or 200 deputies 
instead of 300), suggesting, in part, the low esteem in which the legislative 
branch is held. 
 
Overall, this approach and the one to be overviewed next should both be understood 
in parallel with the broader literature on the US Congress, since it is considered a sort 
of role model on which plenty of theoretical work has been written and which is 
extrapolated to other countries. Within the scholarly literature on the United States’ 
legislative institution, Ugalde (2000) identifies two main periods: in the first half of 
the 20th century academics focused on seniority issues and on the strength of the 
committee system, which he defines as ‘textbook literature’; the stream thus fits in 
some way into a classical or legal approach. 
 
Starting from the 1970s, however, the focus was instead on legislative behaviour and 
authors such as Mayhew (1974) and Ogul (1976) started seeing legislators as rational 
individuals who respond to institutional incentives. However, the strength and 
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centrality of the committee system is still relevant for this stream. Congressional 
theory on how other countries’ congresses work and the one I intend to apply to the 
Mexican case evolved from this second stream. Let us now review the literature on 
the rationality of Mexican legislators. 
 
1.2.2 The public choice approach 
This approach was chosen to analyse Congress assuming that legislators are rational 
individuals who make decisions based on their individual interests and other political 
commitments, such as party lines or career goals. Although power is exercised by 
institutions, these are created by and comprised of individuals and thus particular 
interests play an important role in everyday practices and structural design.
18
 
 
By the end of the 1990s, Nacif (1997) drew attention to the importance of the PR 
formula launched in 1960, which, he argues, is useful to allow opposition to gain 
territory in the Lower Chamber and to some extent suppressed the negative effects of 
term limits. However, term limits do not allow for the professionalisation of the 
opposition and thus the positive effect of the opposition’s competition is neutralised. 
 
Nacif (2005b, p. 14) also discusses the new role Congress plays within the context of 
the divided government that emerged in Mexico after the PRI lost the majority in the 
Lower Chamber in the midterm elections of 1997, and concludes that the new 
relationship between the Executive and the legislative involves ‘two key factors: the 
preferences of the actors – political parties – and the institutions that set the rules for 
the policymaking process’. Within this new relationship between the two powers, 
Congress plays as the agenda-setter and the Executive is some sort of veto player, 
where negotiations between the parties must take place in Congress in order for a bill 
to be approved. He finds that the ‘theory of the median voter’ is the most suitable for 
explaining the scrutiny of bills and the approval process within the Chamber. One of 
the negative effects Nacif observes in the policy-making process under divided 
government is that responsibility becomes dispersed and when undesired effects take 
place, actors blame each other for it. 
                                                 
18
 This goes along with the new institutionalism’s argument that the choices of those who design 
institutions and their underlying context matter (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). 
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Casar (2000) differentiates between party cohesion and party discipline. She also 
claims that the electronic voting system installed in 1998, which displays on a large 
screen the vote of each deputy and keeps a historical record of votes, will help 
scholars better understand the behaviour of the deputies. She concludes that 
negotiation and consensus will be a constant in a divided government, especially 
between the PRI and the PAN, since their programmatic structure is similar. She 
acknowledges the gaps within legislative studies and the lack of information to 
improve academic work on the topic. 
 
Jiménez Badillo (2006) agrees with the fact that cooperation between parties is very 
likely in a divided government. As for the 57th and 58th legislatures, cooperation and 
negotiation were key for the opposition’s opportunity to increase participation in 
policy-making. Jiménez Badillo also differentiates between discipline and cohesion 
and proves that between 1997 and 2003 party discipline decreased. Further, she 
argues that internal party cohesion also decreases as votes are tighter on certain issues. 
 
In Mexico, party discipline responds to a scheme of stimulus and rewards. In the case 
of the three largest parties in the 58th Congress, party discipline decreased for the PRI 
as it lost the presidency and thus the possibility for rewarding its members. 
Interestingly, Jiménez Badillo (Ibid) found that the PAN, even though in control of 
the Presidency, faced reductions in party discipline when having to make government 
decisions. The PRD was also less cohesive in the 58th Congress in comparison to the 
57th. 
 
In turn, Ugalde (2000) analyses motivational goals as a more effective determinant of 
legislative oversight than institutional design. He constructs a model of Congress 
based on the American example, taking into consideration term limits and other 
structural differences between the Mexican and the American model. He then presents 
four hypotheses to explain the relationship between individual goals as an explanatory 
variable and legislative oversight as a dependent variable (Ibid, pp. 12-13): 
 
1. The impact of legal authority is considered secondary as compared to 
deputies’ motivations and goals. 
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2. Term limits decrease legislative oversight because they reduce legislators’ 
experience and alter their goals, mainly because PRI deputies depended on 
the president in order to advance their career after leaving Congress. 
3. The partisan powers of the president influenced PRI deputies’ behaviour 
because the only way to ensure a career was to toe the party lines, which in 
turn were marked by the presidency. 
4. The frequency of oversight is directly related to the size of the opposition 
in the Chamber: the greater the size of the latter, the more oversight takes 
place. 
 
Based on in-depth interviews and surveys, Ugalde concludes that motivations are not 
the only determinants of the inefficient legislative oversight: 
 
The gap between motivations and capabilities must be closed, or the Mexican 
Congress will have a strong voice but not enough power and expertise to 
influence public policy and to control the actions of government effectively. If 
Congress does not enact further reforms, the shift in power may turn out to be 
disappointing in terms of creating a true system of checks and balances (Ibid, 
p. 166). 
 
Along the same lines of a more rational approach to legislative decision-making in 
Mexico, Díaz Cayeros & Magaloni (1998) argue along Ugalde’s (2000) lines that 
legislative oversight does not necessarily turn out weak because of legal constraints or 
capability issues, but rather because of motivations. They support their claim with 
budget approval data and public account reviews in which even PRI deputies vote 
based on their interests within committees instead of toeing party lines. Thus, the PRI 
is proven to be fragmented when it comes to certain topics. 
 
Also among this stream, authors focus on the effects of candidate selection processes 
for Congress seats, especially since the opposition has gained more political 
importance. For example, Langston (1998) gives evidence on how the candidate 
selection process within the PRI, after divided government emerged in 1997, has 
substantially changed. Nowadays, the governors and other local actors play an 
important role. 
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Another way to explain how parties influence Congress is to observe political careers. 
Langston & Aparicio (2009) look at the political careers of members of the 57th, 58th 
and 59th Congresses and conclude that term limits and federalism strongly influenced 
their performances in office. They argue that the electoral system for the Chamber of 
Deputies and the fact that states’ budgets fundamentally come from the federal 
government make governors very powerful when it comes to selecting candidates. 
This is because governors nominate deputies who will ensure more resources will be 
approved by the latter during budget negotiations. Governors are important party 
figures at the state level and have the capacity to exert a great deal of pressure on the 
central party offices and the legislative agenda. 
 
Langston & Aparicio (Ibid, p. 9) argue that: 
 
since the downfall of PRI hegemony, state governors have become crucial 
actors in distributing state bureaucracy jobs and nominations for elected 
positions for municipal, state and even some federal posts, like the Chamber of 
Deputies. The state executives also control millions of dollars in funds which 
they can distribute as they see fit, making them important patrons. Because of 
this control over resources in a federal system with no consecutive re-election, 
many politicians now base their political careers in state and local politics. 
 
The above findings are closely related to the background that incoming deputies have 
and the career path followed after leaving office. Thus, the authors claim that: 
 
based on estimates of multinomial regression models, our results indicate that 
experience in local or national positions correspondingly leads to future 
positions in the same political arenas. Partisan affinity with state governors 
affects the likelihood of winning a local post, whereas local election calendars 
affect the future level only for the PAN deputies. Because so many of the party 
politicians who win a post in the national assembly come from municipal or 
state posts, this also means that many of the leaving deputies return to their 
localities to continue their political careers (Ibid, p. 25). 
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Last but by no means least among the most recent work on legislative behaviour of 
the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, Díaz Rebolledo (2005) analyses deputies’ 
behaviour with an interest rather similar to that put forward in this research. Seeking 
to explain deviations in parliamentary voting so as to confidently predict the 
emergence of legislative paralysis, he presents the following main hypothesis: 
 
Deputies maximise the probability of obtaining a higher popular election 
office. That is, while they are in office, deputies decide the direction of their 
vote on bills, seeking to increase the probability of winning in the future a seat 
in the Senate or a governorship and, because of that, they mirror in their voting 
the preferences of the electorate. Thus, the main contribution of their focus lies 
in retrieving the electoral connection that previous research has rejected as a 
factor within the legislative game (Ibid, pp. 314, my translation). 
 
Díaz Rebolledo argues that term limits do not cancel the electoral connection, but 
rather transfer it from the district to the state level. ‘When voting on bills, a deputy 
will try to satisfy the majority of the constituents of her state and, as the district’s 
preferences come close to the state’s preferences on different topics, deputies – even 
accidentally – will be responsible towards the voters who chose her’ (Ibid, p. 317). 
 
Díaz Rebolledo runs several models to prove the correlation of the electoral 
connection with variables such as the election origin of the deputy, her participation in 
committees and the party she belongs to. He finds that ‘the election principle does not 
have a significant statistical difference in the voting behaviour of Congress members’ 
(Ibid, p. 323), because all are worried about pursuing a political career. Furthermore, 
regarding the performance of deputies in committees, he claims that ‘since legislators 
in committees should be located in the median voter line and reproduce their party’s 
line in all decisions, we should expect that they are also less tempted than the rest of 
the legislators to ignore their party once they are on the floor for voting on the bill’ 
(Ibid, p. 325). 
 
Finally, Díaz Rebolledo concludes that, based on the fact that there is no significant 
difference between voting behaviour of deputies from the PRI and the PRD regarding 
a presidential bill, ‘the progressive ambition theory is strengthened by proving that it 
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is not the preferences of the deputies per se, but rather those of the state electorate, the 
ones which intervene in the decisions of the former. The result itself eliminates the 
possibility of ad hoc explanations’ (Ibid, p. 327). 
 
1.2.3 Where does this research stand? 
The preceding pages summarised the main arguments and theories on the Mexican 
Congress, some based on the application of broader models and analytical 
frameworks used around the world. A general conclusion on the trend of the literature 
available is that, in the past few years, even legal studies on Mexican Congress have 
begun to consider the importance of political mechanisms in the shaping of the 
normative framework. Thus, provided that political processes are intrinsic to all 
legislative components, the legal view cannot exclude the political side of the 
decision-making process. This is especially true if we consider that informal rules 
play an important part in Mexican politics and they will remain informal if the 
necessary consensus, pacts and negotiations for making them formal depend on 
political interests (Philip, 2003). 
 
This research therefore provides further evidence on how particular interests deeply 
affect legislative institutional processes and practices. Using an institutional approach, 
it adds to the literature grouped under the public choice approach by finding empirical 
evidence on the link between term limits and the control of political careers. 
 
On a more empirical note, it is also possible to conclude that the Chamber of Deputies 
is indeed vulnerable to the effects of the electoral and party systems and to the 
strongly entrenched trend of non-democratic political attitudes. Hence, its role as a 
representative institution that serves the democratic consolidation process cannot be 
fulfilled. Issues such as the strategic distribution of positions throughout the Chamber 
between parties and then among party factions, or the excessive concentration and use 
of power in the parties, provoke empirical puzzles and defiance towards the 
applicability of theoretical frameworks to the institution discussed herein. The next 
section highlights these puzzles as a preamble to the following chapters. 
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1.3 Remaining empirical puzzles 
As has been repeatedly stated, the Mexican system is one where informal rules have 
been guiding almost all political processes. This is a product of the historical 
evolution of the country, led by elites unwilling to sacrifice the successful 
achievement of their interests. 
 
Consequently, this research can be seen as an inductive case study seeking to 
understand why legislative behaviour happens the way it does. A first step in 
identifying the particularities or ‘empirical puzzles’ of the Mexican Chamber of 
Deputies in terms of the interaction among parties across different processes, such as 
the allocation of seats in committees or governing bodies, is to briefly resort to the use 
of counterfactuals. This will allow us to identify what the outcome could have been if 
the conditions had been different, and thereby confirm that the determinants of 
legislative behaviour are indeed the ones assumed so far.
19
 
 
Thus, it is possible to claim that if the country had not been governed by the PRI for 
so long, the evolution of the party system and governmental institutions would have 
resulted in more plurality. The legislative power would have been better equipped as a 
representative body in charge of checking and balancing the Executive, instead of just 
rubber-stamping presidential bills. 
 
Furthermore, real opposition parties could have been born earlier and therefore 
become established sooner than they were. This would have resulted in more active 
participation in the design of the institutional framework and therefore in the adoption 
of legal frameworks for Congress that would have supported plural interactions. 
Ultimately, this would have allowed fairer competition among the parties for 
decision-making within the Chamber and therefore restraints on their power could 
have been implemented.
20
 
 
                                                 
19
 Counterfactuals are useful when addressing arguments which rely on path dependency to identify 
empirical puzzles (Levy, 2009). 
20
 However, the case of Venezuela shows that having strong and stable parties from an early stage does 
not guarantee a long-lasting or stable democracy, as Coppedge (1994) argues. 
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However, none of the above is true; Mexico is indeed a unique case with a particular 
institutional design and therefore it raises a series of questions with regard to 
conventional theories of legislative procedures and party behaviour. 
 
The empirical distinctiveness stems from four main issues: the mixed electoral 
formula for the Chamber, the constitutional prohibition of re-election, the 
predominance –and nature- of informal rules in the Chamber of Deputies, and the 
factionalism of the parties. Factionalism leads to the existence of multiple leaders or 
moral authorities. 
 
The constitutional prohibition of re-election has several consequences. First, it 
impedes the professionalisation of politicians and also the continuity and effectiveness 
of public policies. Second, it complicates the construction of career paths in politics. 
 
Parties control access to every elected office throughout the country. Thus, those who 
wish to continue a political career once their tenure is over must be selected as 
candidates by a party, generally the same one that elected them to office in the first 
place.
21
 
 
Parties are organisations with fixed, collective interests that designate senior members 
to act as leaders and maintain party cohesion. They are also entitled to punish or 
reward members for their loyalty and compliance with the party’s lines and 
expectations. Therefore, parties have a great amount of control over ambitious 
politicians seeking to maintain a career in the public life. 
 
Within the Chamber, this means that deputies will try their best to toe the party lines 
but at the same time pursue their own interests. Thus, they are likely to request 
allocation to those committees which are most appropriate or relevant to their 
professional experience/background and also where they can better serve their 
interests. 
 
                                                 
21
 However, some switch parties before an election if they are likely to obtain a good position. This 
occurrence will be explained in Chapter 5. 
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However, loyalty to Mexican parties, at least in the case of the three largest 
organisations, is not so simple. There is more than one leader to keep pleased, as 
parties have evolved into organisations composed of factions and where multiple 
figures have the power to place an individual on a candidate selection list. 
 
Just like the Brazilian system, federalism builds the nature of legislative 
representation. That is, legislators feel more obliged to represent their state in 
Congress, because their career prospects are affected by state-level actors and 
dynamics, as governors have wide-ranging powers (Samuels, 2003). However, career 
prospects in Mexico are even more complicated, as they are controlled not only by 
governors or municipal authorities, but also by faction leaders within the party and 
other influential individuals. 
 
Furthermore, the combination of SMD candidates and PR seats results in an even 
greater leeway for party figures to place ‘their people’ high enough on the closed list 
to guarantee their election. PR also means that there are spaces for ‘career politicians’, 
in the sense of those who move from one public or elected office to the next, without 
necessarily serving the electorate’s interests, to secure a long-term tenure, as long as 
they maintain a good relationship with the party officials. 
 
As the reader might have realised, although there is a constitutional prohibition for re-
election, this is only to prevent consecutive tenures. Once their term is over, deputies 
have to wait only one legislative period before they can be elected into the same office 
again. It will be seen for the case of the 60th Congress that only a few follow this 
path, but those who do are generally placed as candidates on closed lists and are likely 
to be appointed as presidents of committees as they can be trusted by party officials. 
 
The Chamber of Deputies has a set of legal frameworks which were created for ruling 
procedural matters such as the distribution of committee presidencies among the 
parties. However, because the committee presidents have promises to keep and 
loyalties to reward across factions, and also to the issue of ensuring effective agenda-
setting, negotiations at the beginning of each legislature are far from transparent or in 
accordance with the written rules. Instead, a set of informal rules known as 
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‘agreements’ (acuerdos) or fast-track modifications to small parts of the text on the 
formal rules are used as procedural guides. 
 
Therefore, it is evident that the historical evolution of the political institutions, along 
with the maintenance of the status quo for the parties’ convenience, has led to a sui 
generis situation in Mexico. 
 
Within the literature on the Mexican Congress, most authors have focused on 
explaining legislative behaviour solely along the lines of roll-call voting, which 
involves measuring party cohesion according to floor votes. Nonetheless, the 
empirical puzzles herein described suggest that legislative behaviour, at least if 
conceived as allocation to committee seats or governing positions, stems from the 
possibility to override term limits and the consequential power advantage that this 
brings to the parties. 
 
This proposed explanation of legislative behaviour can therefore shed light on 
previously untouched aspects of congressional studies with a focus on Mexico. The 
findings shall hopefully serve to contribute towards the body of studies classified 
under the public choice approach discussed in the previous section. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter’s purpose was twofold: first, it sought to explain why Mexico is unique 
in its institutional design, with a particular focus on its legislative power. Second, it 
accomplished the key research task of identifying the contributions that my work 
could bring to the academic literature on Mexican politics and to legislative theory 
testing outside the American Congress (i.e. in ‘imperfect’ cases). 
 
With regard to the singularity of Mexican institutions, I stated that the country 
democratised in a pragmatic way, without a thorough constitutional reform. Despite 
positive changes since the late 1990s, when electoral competition challenged the 
power of the PRI, the prevalence of old practices such as corruption and clientelism, 
and the weakness of political institutions has made democratic consolidation 
complicated and unfinished. The electoral reform of 1996 gave way to better electoral 
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processes and a year later to a minority government. This gave the legislative body a 
more prominent role in the country’s decision-making. However, it has been very 
difficult to change political attitudes and behaviours, crystallised during the long reign 
of the PRI and deeply embedded across the whole political system. This is especially 
evident in the institution I will focus on: the Chamber of Deputies, which is a body 
formed by numerous individuals fighting for power and the fulfilment of their 
interests. Chapters 4 and 5 will discuss the matter in detail. 
 
In turn, the review of the academic literature on the Mexican Congress, mostly 
focused on the Chamber of Deputies, shows that a considerable and valuable amount 
of work has been done to understand why it is such a complex institution. All schools 
of thought have agreed on the fact that the practices observed in the Chamber have 
affected public policy-making and the balance of power among parties in and outside 
Congress. However, there is still room for more detailed observations on the 
interaction of three very important factors: electoral rules, party politics and the 
creation of informal rules that empower important figures within parties. My 
contribution, which seeks to understand how these interactions affect processes for 
candidate selection and the distribution of committee and governing bodies seats, 
aims at narrowing this gap. 
 
Finally, this thesis not only seeks to contribute to the specific literature on Mexican 
politics and institutions, but can also provide added value and theory-testing 
opportunities to broader frameworks such as historical institutionalism, as well as 
party and legislative organisation theories. Thus, the next chapter explains how this 
research fits within broader theoretical frameworks. 
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Chapter 2. Broader theoretical frameworks and contributions 
 
The previous chapter explained the particularities of the Mexican case which make it 
interesting to study. It also identified the possible areas of contribution to the literature 
on Mexican politics, principally the field which seeks to understand the dynamics and 
procedures taking place within the Chamber of Deputies. The empirical puzzles 
identified as the leading concerns of this research were associated with the effects of 
term limits on the power of the parties, and with the historical formation of 
institutions that has led to the predominance of informal rules. 
 
Furthermore, I have said that the Chamber is perhaps the body which most reflects the 
context of the Mexican system, such as the increasing effects of parties’ power on 
institutional designs, triggered by term limits. This has led to a situation where 
informal rules dictate regular processes, overriding or substituting formal codes. 
Overall, the Chamber’s operation is a clear example of how the Mexican system 
follows its own path. 
 
More specifically, the control of political careers through committee appointments, as 
well as the negotiations among parties and their internal factions to control certain 
decision-making offices, entail the use of ‘old school’ practices such as clientelism. 
Term limits make the manifestation of loyalties to different party figures more 
complex and often lead to severe conflicts among factions. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this research not only seeks to contribute to the 
specific literature on Mexico and its institutions, but also offers good empirical 
evidence for theory testing of broader frameworks. Therefore, this chapter offers the 
reader a much deeper analysis of the theoretical puzzles that the Mexican Chamber of 
Deputies presents, now from the general perspective of party and legislative 
organisation theories. It will also address the overarching theoretical paradigm, the 
‘historical institutionalism’, which is the most appropriate theory for this research as it 
values the contribution that each of the political actors makes to the overall operation 
of the system. 
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In addition, in this chapter I explain the construction of the empirical case study on 
the Mexican Chamber of Deputies and what the expected results might be. It is, 
therefore, a necessary prelude to the second part of the thesis, which presents the case 
study. The first section discusses the theoretical challenges that the Chamber’s 
legislative organisation presents to committee distribution theories. In turn, the second 
section explains the main traits of the historical stream of institutionalism and justifies 
its suitability as the guiding framework of this work. The chapter goes on to explain in 
detail how this work contributes to the wider body of theoretical academic studies on 
political parties and the effect of term limits on representation and democracy. 
 
2.1 Theoretical puzzles: patterns of legislative organisation 
Because very particular historical processes of institutional formation have shaped the 
Chamber, it is difficult for it to employ mechanisms for legislative procedures used 
elsewhere. Thus, it is not easy to apply theories of legislative organisation towards the 
understanding of committee purposes and similar issues. In the following paragraphs, 
I will discuss how this matter presents itself as an interesting theoretical puzzle, which 
will be addressed throughout this research. 
 
Much scholarly literature has been produced on Congress’ very important role in 
policy-making within any type of system, as suggested in the previous chapter for the 
Mexican case. Different approaches have been taken towards its study, such as legal 
views, political approaches (such as behavioural or partisan studies), and procedural 
ones. However, here I shall discuss only legislative theories trying to explain the 
function of committees and the logic which drives members’ appointments. I will also 
refer to scholarly assumptions on legislative party cohesion. 
 
2.1.1 Legislative organisation theories and the role of committees 
Theories on legislative organisation stem from analyses on the US Congress. 
Although the Mexican case does not fit tightly into any of the categories considered 
by committee or cohesion theories, these do explain to some extent certain 
behavioural patterns in the Chamber of Deputies. 
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In most congresses, committees are the main bodies in charge of scrutinising bills and 
making any necessary adjustments before they are voted for in a plenary meeting, or 
‘on the floor’. Furthermore, they can be seen as ‘jurisdiction-specific subunits of their 
parent Chamber’ (Shepsle, 1978, p. 4). Hence, it is logical that both parties and 
individual members will distribute committee seats very carefully, with aims at 
producing the best possible policy outcomes. 
 
The distribution of committee seats is done under two different premises: a 
distributive perspective or an informational one. The distributive view assumes that 
‘committees allow members of parliament to trade influence with one another, 
gaining power in the policy area they care most about, while sacrificing the ability to 
determine policy in areas less salient to them’ (Kaeding, 2004, p. 357). Members of 
committees somehow select themselves because they can fulfil heir own interests by 
sitting there. Consequently,  
 
committees tend to consist of policy outliers – members with a high demand 
for the policies in their jurisdiction – and congressional rules and procedures 
give such committees dominance over policymaking within their domain. The 
belief is that members homogeneously demand high levels of benefits from 
policies that fall within their committee’s jurisdictions (Ibid).  
 
In turn, the informative approach rejects such a ‘rational choice’ concept of the 
purpose of committees. It states that, as the main bodies of action within Congress, 
committees should have the goal of allowing members to develop policy expertise in 
an area of their interest and/or capabilities (Krehbiel, 1991). 
 
Committees are not autonomous entities. They are agents of the institution as a 
collective entity, supplying information that reduces individual legislators’ 
uncertainty about the consequences that are representative of its own policy 
preferences … Non committee members can have the greatest confidence in 
signals they receive only when there are two informed opinions, especially 
when the informants are ‘natural’ adversaries. From this perspective, 
legislative choices in salient policy domains are median choices (Ibid, p. 358). 
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Most legislatures function based on a combination of both approaches, as policy-
making is indeed driven by political interests, whether personal or partisan, but at the 
same time it requires in-depth knowledge of the subjects within each committee’s 
jurisdiction. 
 
The Mexican Chamber of Deputies has 44 ordinary committees which scrutinise bills 
within their area of focus, and a fluctuating number of special committees that are set 
up to investigate very specific issues. Quite logically, the selection of committee 
members relies heavily on political interests. However, in addition to the normal and 
somewhat expected battle among parties to control committees, the Mexican scene is 
further complicated by internal struggles between factions and the diverse interests 
that deputies might have, such as loyalty to sectoral organisations and faction leaders. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the clashes of interests, the seat allocation process does manage, 
to a certain extent, to accommodate party members who know the subjects well 
enough to set agendas effectively. This balance is especially true for the most 
important committees that deal with the federal budget, taxes or social programmes. 
Supporting evidence gathered through semi-structured interviews for this claim will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. Based on all of the above, I would say that it is not clear to 
what extent the informative approach can be effective for understanding committee 
purposes in the Mexican case. It seems that distributional logic is much easier to 
identify. 
 
2.1.2 Party cohesion 
The second set of theoretical assumptions on legislative organisation to be discussed 
here assesses the importance of maintaining party cohesion within Congress. It relates 
to the ability of parties to exert veto powers and/or set their agenda, and also to their 
control on the behaviour of individual members. This control can affect political 
careers and the ‘electoral connection’. Thus, the best way to identify and measure 
party cohesion in cases like the Mexican one will be discussed here. 
 
According to Morgenstern (2004), when voters make their choices in an election they 
will retrospectively identify a group of legislators who can be held responsible for the 
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status quo of public policies. That is, voters ‘can identify the collective intention and 
will of legislative groups when the members of those groups act in concert – 
repeatedly and predictably’ (Ibid, p. 4). However, individual behaviours of some 
legislators can be identified either as harmful or beneficial for the group’s objective. 
 
Voting unity and the behaviour of a group as a collective entity explain many inherent 
elements of power, such as pacts between legislators and leaders for appointments, as 
well as personal ideology and electoral goals, among other issues. 
 
There are many different ways to measure party cohesion. One of the most popular 
methods is known as ‘roll call voting analysis’ and has been employed for studies of 
small and large magnitudes. Morgenstern (Ibid, p. 4) claims that 
 
publicly available roll call votes provide a concrete gauge for the degree to 
which groups of legislators act in harmony. Patterns of roll call voting thus 
indicate whether voters can reasonably attribute successes or failures to a 
group (such as a party or faction) or whether individual legislators should be 
the focus of the voters’ attention. 
 
From the point of view of a researcher, roll call voting data can point out ‘which 
groups form coalitions, resolve whether parties are unified or fractionalized, and 
determine the issues on which groups divide’ (Ibid, p. 20). Sophisticated statistical 
methods using advanced computing software have been developed –particularly 
among experts studying the American congress- in order to model and predict patterns 
in roll call voting (Roberts, 2007). 
 
However, other scholars have argued against using this method on its own to assess 
party discipline, cohesion and strength (Krehbiel, 2000; Stratmann & Baur, 2002). For 
instance, Krehbiel (2000, p. 225) claims that it is ‘incapable of discriminating between 
non-partisan and partisan behaviour … [It fails] to appreciate individual preferences 
of legislators.’ In addition, aggregate roll call data collected from plenary voting fail 
to take into consideration the effect that informal and ‘seemingly obscure’ (Roberts, 
2007, p. 342) institutional rules have on voting patterns. That is, roll call voting 
analyses risk portraying an incomplete picture. 
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My research focuses on those ‘seemingly obscure’ rules, interactions and dynamics 
that precede plenary votes and therefore reach beyond roll call voting data. My 
assumption is that pre-floor-voting negotiations like those carried out in committees 
or in secretive meetings, and even the distribution of committee seats at the beginning 
of each legislature, are key -and perhaps even more useful- for understanding 
legislative procedures and outcomes. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, the 
non-cohesiveness of the PRD, the PAN, and the PRI, and my labelling them as 
‘divided’, derives from the analysis of their behaviours and interactions during 
negotiations and processes prior to floor votes. As will be discussed at a later stage, 
the level of cohesion in Mexican parties can be appreciated by observing the logic of 
committee appointments, negotiations between factions and influential figures, and, 
very importantly, the effect of other elements of the political system, such as electoral 
rules. 
 
This section explores the suitability of theories of legislative organisation and party 
cohesion to explain behavioural patterns in the Chamber of Deputies. As has been 
suggested, the fact that informal rules predominate in legislative procedures, such as 
committee appointments, allows the parties to exert a great amount of power within 
the institution. This results in the ‘invasion’ of partisan conflicts and dynamics over 
the Chamber, where they have ample room to control political careers and set their 
agendas in the best possible way. Committee allocations and the performance of these 
bodies’ daily tasks are set up under strong influence of those dynamics. 
 
Therefore, theories built to explain ‘model’ cases of legislative bodies, such as the 
American one, are too rigid to encompass informal dynamics, although it seems hard 
to believe that Mexico is the only outlier of theoretical arguments on committee 
purposes and party cohesion. Hence, this research can engage in adapting the 
aforementioned frameworks to differing cases. This will not only address the 
theoretical challenges or ‘puzzles’ just identified, but will also contribute to the 
relevant scholarly literature. 
 
So far, it would seem that Mexico’s institutions and parties are so sui generis that no 
theoretical framework can fully explain political behaviour within the Chamber of 
Deputies. However, this is not true. Although very specific issues cannot be addressed 
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through some existing theories, for example party cohesion and legislative 
organisation, there is a broader framework that can be used to understand the origin of 
the country’s ‘particularities’, and therefore identify how to assess legislative 
behaviour in Mexico. The following section presents historical institutionalism as the 
underlying theory of this work. 
 
2.2 The theoretical foundations of the research: historical institutionalism 
Any research aiming for validity must use a theoretical framework in order to follow a 
clear path towards the achievement of its initial objectives. That is, an existing body 
of knowledge can provide insights on how to approach certain aspects of reality. For 
this study, it is important to have theoretical insights into how informal rules have 
been locked in, namely, how the system has evolved over time. 
 
The best explanation is the one provided by the broader theoretical framework known 
as ‘new institutionalism’, and specifically a combination of two of its variants: 
historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. Historical 
institutionalism is suitable because it looks into how institutions fit into a particular 
context and its historical evolution. This enables us to trace the origin of informal 
rules, which have been able to predominate largely because the Mexican Constitution 
has not been replaced with a new one that matches the contemporary political reality 
of the country established over the last 30 years. In turn, the rational choice 
institutionalism explains the calculations behind the elite’s decision to implement 
those informal rules, and the logic behind their choice to keep them in place over 
time. 
 
Before looking concretely into historical and rational choice institutionalisms, it is 
useful to see a broader picture of how new institutionalism emerged and what it 
presupposes.  
 
2.2.1 New institutionalism 
Since the early stages of scholarly literature on political science, the questions posed 
were related to ‘the nature of the governing institutions that could structure the 
behaviour of individuals – both the governing and the governed – toward better ends’ 
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(Peters, 1999, p. 3). Both European and American scholars started building an 
institutional school of thought, which has evolved over the years into a rather solid 
and comprehensive theoretical framework. 
 
The main assumptions of the ‘old institutionalism’ are the following (summarised 
from Ibid): 
 
 It was concerned with law and the key role it plays in governing, as it sets the 
framework of the public sector and affects the way in which the government 
interferes in the life of citizens. 
 Structure matters and it determines behaviour. Therefore, old institutionalists 
analysed the different structures of presidential and parliamentary systems, as 
they were laid out in constitutions and formal texts. However, ‘there was no 
attempt to develop concepts that might capture other structural aspects of a 
system’ (Ibid, p.3). 
 Efforts of comparative analysis were made, where only whole systems were 
studied in parallel, and were seen as complex with embedded components. 
 History was seen as a crucial factor in the development of institutions. 
 Analyses were extremely normative, in that scholars focused their work on 
what good governments would look like. 
 
The original ‘old’ approach failed to consider the importance of specific actors within 
a polity and focused only on institutional designs as they are dictated by constitutions. 
These have been perceived as shortcomings, and have been dealt with to create a more 
comprehensive framework. Hence, this ‘old’ school of thought has been advanced 
into a ‘new’ institutionalism, which has (as will be seen below) kept some of the 
assumptions laid out by the early institutionalists. 
 
The new institutionalism: 
 
emphasizes the endogenous nature and social construction of political 
institutions … The translation of structures into political action and action into 
institutional continuity and change, are generated by comprehensible and 
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routine processes … A challenge for students of institutions is to explain how 
such processes are stabilized or destabilized, and which factors sustain or 
interrupt ongoing processes (March & Olsen, 2008, p. 5). 
 
Three main approaches emerged between the 1980s and 1990s ‘in reaction to the 
behavioural perspectives that were influential during the 1960s and 1970s and all seek 
to elucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and political 
outcomes’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 936). All three approaches called themselves the 
‘new institutionalism’ but address the relationship between behaviour and institutions 
and the factors of institutional change in different ways. However,  before discussing 
the distinctive views of each strand, it is useful to broadly define what an institution 
is. 
 
Unsurprisingly, a precise definition of what an institution is depends on what variant 
of institutionalism is being used; however, there are core elements of the term shared 
by all approaches. Peters (1999) identifies four key features of an institution: 1) they 
can be either formal or informal groups of individuals which interact among 
themselves in patterned ways that can be predicted; 2) institutions are stable 
throughout time; 3) they affect individual behaviour by constraining it in some way; 
and 4) values and meanings should be shared by the members of an institution. 
 
According to North (1990, p. 3), institutions are ‘the rules of the game in a society’. 
They shape interaction between humans and constrain behaviours. March and Olsen 
(2008, p. 3) provide a similar definition to the ones of North and Peters: 
 
An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized 
practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively 
invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the 
idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing 
external circumstances … Institutions empower and constrain actors 
differently and make them more or less capable of acting according to 
prescriptive rules of appropriateness. 
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North (1990) points out the importance of establishing a distinction between 
institutions and organisations. Although closely related, the latter are merely ‘groups 
of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives’ (Ibid, p. 5). 
They are able to influence institutional frameworks: ‘organisations are created with 
purposive intent in consequence of the opportunity set resulting from the existing set 
of constraints … and in the course of attempts to accomplish their objectives are a 
major agent of institutional change’ (Ibid, p. 5). I define political parties as 
organisations that aim at influencing institutional frameworks. 
 
Now, following Hall and Taylor (1996), I shall describe the main assumptions of the 
three streams of new institutionalism. First, I shall briefly address sociological 
institutionalism, followed by a lengthier discussion of the rational choice stream. 
Historical institutionalism shall be discussed in a separate subsection, as it is much 
more relevant for this research and thus deserves a bit more attention. 
 
Sociological institutionalism emerged within organisation theories in opposition to the 
notion prevalent in the 1970s about the differences in organisations. According to 
sociological institutionalists, organisations result from ‘the inherent rationality or 
efficiency of such forms for performing these tasks. Culture was seen as something 
altogether different’ (Ibid, p. 946). It conceives institutions in a much broader way 
than the other two approaches, to include ‘symbol systems, cognitive scripts and 
moral templates that provide the “frames of meaning” guiding human action’ (Ibid, p. 
947). Thus, culture is considered an institution. Furthermore, institutions influence 
behaviour by constraining actions and by helping individuals picture what they could 
do in a certain context. Thus, the ‘self-images and identities of social actors are said to 
be constituted from the institutional forms, images and signs provided by social life’ 
(Ibid, p. 948). 
 
With regard to the origin of institutions, sociological institutionalists argue that these 
adopt ‘specific forms or practices because they are widely valued within a broader 
cultural environment’ (Ibid, p. 949). 
 
In turn, rational choice institutionalists assume that actors have set preferences and 
therefore ‘behave instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of these 
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preferences, and in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation’ 
(Ibid, p. 945). This stream emerged among scholars studying behaviour within the 
American Congress. During the 1970s some of these academics sought better ways to 
explain discrepancies in congressional outcomes, and found that ‘institutions solve 
many of the collective action problems that legislatures habitually confront’ (Ibid, p. 
943). 
 
Politics is seen as a group of dilemmas of collective action and if no decisions are 
made towards the better good for everyone it is because there are no institutional 
arrangements in place to ensure others do their share of collective action. The 
behaviour of actors is triggered by their calculation of how others will act. Institutions 
structure interactions between actors by limiting the available choices and also by 
facilitating information and imposing enforcement mechanisms with aims at reducing 
uncertainty regarding the behaviour of others. 
 
In terms of how they explain institutional genesis and change, they state that ‘the 
process of institutional creation usually revolves around voluntary agreement by the 
relevant actors; and, if the institution is subject to a process of competitive selection, it 
survives primarily because it provides more benefits to the relevant actors than 
alternate institutional forms’ (Ibid, p. 945). 
 
In between the purely rational choice stream and the historical one, there is a group of 
scholars whose work deals mainly with economic institutionalism. They see decisions 
and behaviours led by opportunity maximisation but they also believe that history is 
very important for explaining institutions’ status quo and development.  
 
Within this school, North (1990, p. 7) explains institutional change as follows:  
 
Institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic theory, 
determine the opportunities in a society. Organisations are created to take 
advantage of those opportunities and, as the organisations evolve, they alter 
the institutions. The resultant path of institutional change is shaped by (1) the 
lock-in that comes from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and 
the organisations that have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure 
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provided by those institutions and (2) the feedback process by which human 
beings perceive and react to changes in the opportunity set. 
 
A mixture of informal norms, rules and enforcement characteristics define the set of 
choices and the resulting outcomes. Although formal rules such as constitutions or 
legal frameworks can be modified quickly through the approval of changes in 
legislative bodies or other formal instances, informal institutions (such as traditions, 
customs and codes of conduct) or constraints are always embodied in them  and they 
are very difficult to change overnight. Therefore, institutions are believed to change 
incrementally (Ibid). 
 
2.2.2 Historical institutionalism 
The third approach of the new institutional paradigm to be described, the historical 
one, is the main framework used for this research. It can be linked to the group 
theories of politics and the structural-functionalism framework that became relevant 
in the 1960s and 1970s. From the group theories, they adopted the notion that a 
crucial element of politics is conflict among rivals over the control of scarce 
resources. From structural functionalists, historical institutionalism extracted the 
concept of polities as a complex system with interacting parts. Nonetheless, this new 
paradigm improved both explanations (Hall & Taylor, 1996). 
 
This school defines the relationship between behaviour and institutions in broader 
terms than the two previously discussed. It combines concepts from a ‘calculus’ and a 
‘cultural’ view, which results in an assumption that ‘the strategies induced by a given 
institutional setting may ossify over time into world views, which are propagated by 
formal organisations and ultimately shape even the self-images and basic preferences 
of the actors involved in them’ (Ibid, p. 940). 
 
Furthermore, it argues that institutions create an uneven distribution of power among 
individuals, and there will always be winners and losers. They find institutions closely 
linked to ideas and beliefs. Institutions are not designed based on a conscious choice 
of actors, but rather guided by the political context at the time. Policy choices are seen 
as a political matter, instead of a rational choice (Peters, 1999). 
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One of the most important arguments for historical institutionalists is related to the 
development of institutions over time: 
  
History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but 
because the present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity 
of a society’s institutions. Today and tomorrow’s choices are shaped by the 
past. And the past can only be made intelligible as a story of institutional 
evolution (North, 1990, p. vii). 
 
‘Once governments make their initial policy and institutional choices in a policy area 
the patterns created will persist, unless there is some force sufficient to overcome the 
inertia created at the inception of the program’ (Peters, 1999, p. 64). This is known as 
path dependency. 
 
In recent years, explanations and principles of economics have been applied to 
political science in order to analyse complex settings more accurately, as suggested in 
the previous section. One of these efforts of theoretical extrapolation has been the 
application of increasing returns and therefore path dependency. Both are relevant 
concepts for historical institutionalism, as they assess the causes of institutional 
change and stability. 
 
The concept of path dependency supports the notion of historical importance for 
institutions and for the adequate analysis of political events in general. It ‘refers to the 
causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence … Previous events in a 
sequence influence outcomes and trajectories but not necessarily by inducing further 
movement in the same direction’ (Pierson, 2000, p. 252). 
 
In politics, there are four elements which lead to increasing returns: the central role of 
collective action, the high density of institutions, the use of political authority to 
alleviate power asymmetries and its complexity and lack of transparency (Ibid). 
Furthermore, political institutions have ‘a strong status quo bias generally built into 
them’ (Ibid, p. 257). 
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Even though there is a great amount of change taking place over time, ‘self-
reinforcing dynamics associated with collective action processes mean that 
organisations have a strong tendency to persist once they are institutionalized’ (Ibid, 
p. 259). Furthermore, since all the actors’ behaviours are constrained by current 
institutions, operating outside of these boundaries would be very costly. 
 
It is possible to identify a setting where path dependency or increasing returns are at 
work because the following four circumstances are evident: initial conditions can 
produce a wide range of outcomes; if small events happen at the right time, they can 
have considerable consequences which prevail over time; timing of events is crucial 
and earlier events matter more than later ones; and the equilibrium reached will be 
resistant to change (Ibid). Historical institutionalists tend to argue that the flow of 
events is ‘punctuated by critical junctures’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 942). 
 
Using path dependency implies the following argument: ‘previously viable options 
may be foreclosed in the aftermath of a sustained period of positive feedback, and 
cumulative commitments on the existing path will often make change difficult and 
will condition the form in which new branching will occur’ (Pierson, 2000, p. 265). 
 
In fact, historical institutionalism is not very efficient when it comes to explaining and 
predicting institutional change. ‘There appear to be no a priori criteria for determining 
when there is sufficient political or environmental “pressure” to generate a change’ 
(Peters, 1999, p. 69). 
 
However, change is possible, as Weyland (2008) suggests with his new version of 
historical institutionalism. He states that when actors are aware when events happen at 
the right moment, they can lead to enduring consequences, whether good or bad, and 
they could be open to change if it would prevent an undesirable situation. March and 
Olsen agree on the fact that institutions are not static. However, change cannot be 
made arbitrarily, because they ‘are defended by insiders and validated by outsiders, 
and because their histories are encoded into rules and routines’ (March & Olsen, 
2008, p. 7).  
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Based on the main precepts of the historical institutionalism just presented, it is quite 
logical that the status quo of the Chamber of Deputies and the political parties can be 
best understood if they are associated with the evolution of the Mexican political 
system in the 20th and 21st centuries. Ideas, beliefs and political matters are 
extremely important within the Chamber and, as will be seen in Chapter 4, the 
national political context prevalent at the time of the inauguration of each legislature 
is also extremely influential. The eclectic perception of cultural and calculus 
behaviours assumed by historical institutionalists within institutions will be clearly 
observed throughout the case study of the 60th Congress addressed in this research. 
 
Furthermore, as a complement to specific theories of party organisation and behaviour 
to be discussed in the following section, the rational choice approach is a good 
framework to explain the parties’ actions and strategies in the Chamber. It is 
particularly helpful for understanding how different levels of ‘selective path 
dependency’ apply across parties, where they PRI has had much more to gain from 
allowing changes to be made to certain frameworks in a context of divided 
government. Maximisation of opportunities within an institutional environment that 
allows better information of what others are able to do is key for parties’ behaviour in 
the Chamber.  Guy Peters (1999) claims that some eclecticism is useful when using 
institutionalism, so there is no harm in using these two approaches. 
 
The preceding paragraphs have explained in a very general manner the main 
assumptions of the new institutional approaches. It can be observed that they are quite 
different from one another, which has been one of the main criticisms but also an 
important strength of the approach. Thus, a few words on the matter are worthwhile. 
 
Even when the institutional paradigm has evolved and attempted new paths of 
explanations to fit the modern world’s institutions, it still has shortcomings. Hall and 
Taylor (1996, p. 936) point out that ‘it does not constitute a unified body of thought 
… [the three approaches] paint quite different pictures of the political world.’ Each 
one of the three institutionalisms has its own problems. 
 
Furthermore, Weyland (2002) highlights the inability of the institutional approaches 
to capture phenomena such as waves, which have been useful explanations of political 
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change or democratisation throughout the world. He therefore adds the notion of 
contagion effects from one country to another, by borrowing insights from cognitive 
psychology to understand ‘the shift in people’s propensity for assuming risk […], 
crucial for explaining striking turnarounds that end long periods of deterioration’ 
(Weyland, 2008, p. 314). 
 
Among other critiques to institutional approaches, Weyland’s (2002) argument on the 
inaccuracy of rational choice institutionalism to adequately study Latin American 
politics is worth mentioning. He states that this paradigm ‘puts excessive emphasis on 
formal rules in a region that is notorious for bending or evading such rules’ (Ibid, p. 
66). It ignores embedded informal practices such as clientelism and personalism, as 
well as the important role that ideas and models play in the region’s politics. 
Furthermore, it produces biased analysis ‘by overestimating the influence of elections 
and parliaments while downplaying the role of the state and interest groups’ (Ibid, p. 
78). 
 
However, alongside its shortcomings, it is undeniable that new institutionalism also 
has significant strengths for approaching analysis of political phenomena. Empirical 
evidence provided in the following three chapters will confirm this argument. 
 
2.3 Contributions to scholarly literature 
The preceding sections and subsections have mentioned that one of the objectives of 
this research is to contribute to the scholarly literature. With the use of historical 
institutionalism to understand the context-specific Mexican system, important 
contributions can be made to the literature on political parties and on the effects of 
term limits over parties and institutions. The following pages address this issue. 
 
2.3.1 Political parties 
Scholarly work on parties is vast and it would be extremely ambitious to assume that 
this work could contribute to all the topics it entails. Hence, it is necessary to identify 
the main streams in which this research fits. I shall first define what a political party is 
for the purposes of this research and thesis and then look into parties within society. 
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According to Sartori (in Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, p. 2), a party is ‘any political 
group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, 
candidates for public office’. In addition, following the historical institutionalism’s 
precepts, and for the purposes of this thesis, I define parties as organisations capable 
of influencing institutional designs. 
 
A party’s main roles can be seen in two different scenarios: as an actor within society, 
and in legislative bodies. The latter, although close to my research interests, is a vast 
area of study and is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, only a few clarifications 
will be made below. In contrast, this research can make key contributions to the 
literature on the role of parties in societies and so we shall look at this topic in more 
depth. 
 
In essence, legislative party theories seek to explain how parties maintain discipline 
and cohesiveness within Congress. In other words, they ‘draw attention to the social-
choice problem of majority rule instability: a party-free legislature would be chaotic, 
meaning that individual legislators would be unable to get anything done. Legislators 
thus have strong incentives to band together into durable legislative coalitions’ 
(Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 34). The body of studies, most of which were developed 
to study the United States’ House of Representatives, can be grouped into four main 
categories depending on how they explain the main strategy and purpose of parties in 
Congress: 
 
1. Division of labour organisations: represented by Aldrich’s (1995) view of 
parties as solutions to collective action problems, where party members are 
divided into party leaders and ‘backbenchers’, otherwise known as rank-and-
file members, to ensure the party’s interests are adequately pursued. 
2. Ideological self-selection: assumes that politicians approach parties with 
similar policy preferences. Therefore, these organisations are likely to be 
ideologically homogeneous. Represented by authors like Krehbiel (1993). 
3. Conditional party government: represented by Aldrich & Rohde (2004), who 
argue that parties do not always have the same level of cohesion. They can 
move from high to low levels depending on how costly it is to maintain 
homogeneity of the party.  
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4. Agenda cartel: represented by Cox & McCubbins (2005), who argue that 
parties are organisations that serve division of labour purposes, granting 
leaders the right to restrict the agenda through institutional ways such as 
committee appointments and holding a majority of seats. 
 
2.3.1.1 Parties in society 
Over time, both public opinion and scholarly literature have assessed the nature of 
parties and their effect on politics as both negative and positive. On the one hand, it 
has been said that they favour the private interests of ambitious politicians instead of 
the electorate. On the other, they are also seen as an effective solution for the 
representation of the interests of a specific sector of the electorate in government, 
which can be done in an easier and more orderly way through collective actors. 
Currently, there is an agreement on the fact that parties are very important for 
democracies in many different ways. ‘The nature of parties and party systems shapes 
the prospects that stable democracy will emerge, whether it will be accorded 
legitimacy, and whether effective policymaking will result’ (Mainwaring & Scully, 
1995, p. 2). 
 
One scholarly view conceives parties as organisations that solve problems of 
collective action by providing goods for their members, along with a ‘brand name’ 
associated with a reputation to be used while campaigning. Therefore, it could be said 
that they respond to the rational choices made by benefit and office seekers. Overall, 
they help actors in the political scene to deal with problems regarding electoral 
victories and governance once they are in office, which is helpful for maintaining 
long-term success (Aldrich, 1995). 
 
Furthermore, ‘they are the main agents of political representation and are virtually the 
only actors with access to elected positions in democratic politics’ (Mainwaring & 
Scully, 1995, p. 2). Parties reduce the information costs of voting for the electorate. 
‘Politicians form parties because they come to regard a collective good, their party’s 
public reputation or “brand name”, as critical to their individual success’ (Samuels & 
Shugart, 2010, pp. 34-35). However, there is normally a tension between politicians’ 
individual interests and collective incentives, as ‘individual politicians face the 
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dilemma of whether to pursue their individual interests or to devote resources to 
maintaining the party’s collective reputation’ (Ibid). 
 
Consequently, parties enforce institutional mechanisms that make politicians commit 
to the party’s collective goals and aims. Normally, this means that party leaders are 
trusted by rank-and-file members with the task of reducing collective action problems 
and costs, in some sort of ‘delegation’ principle (Ibid). Shared preferences are key for 
party formation, resulting in groups of individuals who are likely to collectively 
impact on governmental institutions once they have been elected to them. Parties have 
a large amount of power to shape institutions over time, through both formal and 
informal rules. Furthermore, they shape the environment in which they exist. 
 
Parties operate and interact with each other within constructs known as party systems, 
which can be defined as ‘the set of patterned interactions in the competition among 
parties. This notion suggests that some rules and regularities in how parties compete 
are widely observed – if not uniformly accepted – even if these rules and regularities 
are contested and undergo change. A system also implies continuity in its component 
parts’ (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, p. 4). 
 
When there is certain stability in party systems they are said to be ‘institutionalised’. 
Four conditions must be present in party systems for them to be considered as such 
(Ibid, p. 5). First, there must be stability in the rules and the ways in which inter-party 
competition takes place. Second, the most important parties ought to be rooted in 
society, so they can structure political preferences and achieve regularity in how 
people vote over time. Third, parties expect elections to be the sole path into 
government, and the major political actors see both parties and electoral processes as 
legitimate. Fourth, parties are autonomous from movements and organisations from 
which they may have emerged; thus, they should also be free from the interests and 
control of ambitious leaders. 
 
Institutionalising a party system is important because it implies that parties are: 
 
key actors that structure the political process; where it is less institutionalised, 
parties are not so dominant, they do not structure the political process as much 
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and politics tends to be less institutionalised and therefore more unpredictable. 
Democratic politics is more erratic, establishing legitimacy is more difficult, 
and governing is more complicated. Powerful economic elites tend to have 
privileged access to policy makers … [Thus], a very low level of 
institutionalisation produces problems (Ibid, p. 22). 
 
As was just suggested, institutionalisation facilitates governing and governability, 
because the links between the Executive, legislators and party leaders are stronger 
(Ibid). Undisciplined parties and a weakly institutionalised party system hinder the 
functioning of legislatures. Nonetheless, even if institutionalised party systems push 
parties towards being organisations that are free from particular interests of influential 
leaders, in practice it is often difficult to achieve. Every criterion of 
institutionalisation can go in any direction, whether forwards or, at some point, even 
backwards. For example, it is common to see parties develop certain levels of 
indiscipline and even fragmentation, which leads politicians to pursue particular goals 
in addition to or in replacement of the party’s ambitions. 
 
Cantú and Desposato (2009) state that intra-party conflicts are likely to emerge within 
federal systems of government, as elected officers at subnational levels tend to 
promote regionalism. Furthermore, ‘the characteristics and situations of parties are 
relevant to the levels of intra-party ideological cohesion. Parties in government may 
include more heterogeneous social and political groups, and will tend to position 
themselves in centrist positions. Access to government will allow them to stay united 
without emphasizing ideological cohesion’ (Freidenberg et al., 2008, p. 163). 
 
When intra-party divisions become more entrenched, it can be said that they have 
evolved into a concept known as factionalism. It will be seen in subsequent chapters 
that this is an important determinant for Mexican politics. 
 
Boucek (2009, p. 468) defines factionalism as ‘the partitioning of a political party (or 
other organisation and group) into subunits which are more or less institutionalized 
and who engage in collective action in order to achieve their members’ particular 
objectives … Depending on their specific design, institutions have the potential to 
contain factionalism or to encourage its growth.’ 
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Leaders of these groups ‘distribute combinations of incentives to maintain their 
organisational activity. Faction leaders can be thought of as political entrepreneurs 
who organize and mobilize politicians. By supplying selective and/or collective 
incentives, they induce politicians to join them and support their leadership’ (Bettcher, 
2005, p. 341). 
 
As expressions of social and political behaviours and interests, factions are in constant 
change and consequently the effect they have on parties and on a political system also 
evolves. Therefore, Boucek (2009, p. 456) suggests that ‘factionalism can acquire 
different faces at different times under specific conditions’. Three main faces of 
factionalism are identified: cooperative, competitive and degenerative. 
 
Cooperative factionalism is related to the building of consensus and is considered 
beneficial because it promotes cooperation between party members. On the contrary, 
competitive factionalism is represented by splits of intra-party groups as a 
consequence of dissent, polarisation and fragmentation. Although it can have positive 
consequences, for example widening voter choice and promoting democratic practices 
within parties, if it is not controlled it can lead to a complete destabilisation of parties. 
Finally, the degenerative face of factionalism consists of an excessive number of 
subgroups, each of which pursues their particular interests above the party’s, incurring 
patronage distributions (Ibid). Based on the general theories and arguments herein 
discussed on what parties should do and be, it is possible to see that Mexico fits 
within some but not so much in others. 
 
Overall, Mexican parties are factionalised, though all at different stages, and fit into 
the definition of organisations set up to solve problems of collective actions. To a 
certain extent, they represent the interests of one or more groups of society and they 
are also the sole ‘providers’ of public officials. Furthermore, parties are dominant and 
structure political processes, which would suggest that the system is institutionalised.  
 
However, the truth is that not all of the conditions that Mainwaring & Scully (1995) 
claim as required for a system’s institutionalisation are met. The Mexican system does 
have stability in its rules and in the ways in which parties compete for power, 
especially since new electoral rules gave elections more transparency from 1996 
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onwards. This in turn proves that parties see elections as the only legitimate way to be 
in power and they see each other as legitimate rivals. Institutions like the Chamber 
also have their own rules which regulate interactions and negotiations within them. 
Furthermore, parties are rooted in society as, at least the three largest ones, have 
managed to prevail for two to seven decades. 
 
The unfulfilled requirement, and thus the essence of the problem with Mexico fitting 
the conditions of institutionalism, is the autonomy from founding groups. Mexican 
parties are anything but independent from the movements and organisations from 
which they emerged. This means that ambitious leaders are everywhere in parties’ 
structures and manage to create ‘alternative’ ways of institutionalising political 
processes and rules (see evidence presented in Chapter 4, drawn, for example, from 
Díaz & González, interview, 2009; Monreal, interview, 2009, Servín, interview, 
2009). 
 
Therefore, based on all of the above, we can infer that by looking into the small 
details of party institutionalisation and the effect it has on Mexico’s democracy, a 
relevant contribution to the discussion on the causes and effects of the stability of 
party systems is possible to achieve. Furthermore, there are potential important 
contributions to the debate on issues related to party systems, such as term limits and 
informal politics, which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
So far I have defined political parties and described their importance for a democratic 
regime. I have mentioned that their stability is crucial for adequate coordination 
between the Executive, the legislative and party leaders. This, in turn, leads to better 
policy-making and a better performance of parties’ representative function. 
 
The representative function is fundamentally performed in Congress (Luna & 
Zeichmeister, 2005), and it gives way to interesting interactions and behavioural traits 
among parties. A considerable amount of scholarly literature has been produced with 
aims at better understanding party organisation and performance in legislative bodies 
around the world. It is obvious that legislative party theories are relevant for this 
research and I will therefore give a brief overview of them. 
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Once again, the theoretical puzzle derived from this research concerns the difficulty of 
applying ‘model’ theories to such a sui generis case. Instead of seeing this as a failure 
of theoretical frameworks, it is believed that their improvement or adjustment can be 
achieved, based on empirical cases like the Mexican one. 
 
In addition to the theoretical contributions suggested in this section, the singularities 
of the case analysed in this research also lead towards empirical evidence that can 
contribute to the wider literature on term limits, parties and institutions. The following 
subsection discusses this matter further.  
 
2.3.2 The effect of term limits on parties and institutions 
The theoretical debate on term limits has sought to identify the pros and cons in terms 
of how they affect the representative function of parties and legislative institutions. 
Those in favour argue that they eliminate particularistic behaviours and thus improve 
representation. On the other hand, those against argue that they do not eliminate ‘bad 
habits’, rather they create new ones. At the core of the debate is also the key issue of 
what effect term limits have on party power. 
 
Carey et al. (1998) identify three main ways in which term limits can affect legislative 
institutions. The first one is the effect they might have on its composition; the second 
is Congress members’ behaviour when in office; and the third consists of effects on 
the institution itself. ‘The first has to do with the types of individuals who seek and 
win office; the second with their priorities and activities in office; the third with the 
manner in which power is distributed within legislatures and between legislatures and 
other policymakers’ (Ibid, p. 273). 
 
In an effort to predict the effect of term limits on local congresses in the United States, 
Carey (1996) analyses a few cases around the world with constitutional prohibition 
for re-election. Lessons from Venezuela and Costa Rica show that term limits per se 
do not eliminate purely re-election-oriented behaviour. This is because the quest for 
fulfilling particular interests is not just a personal behaviour; it can also be generated 
by parties, which could aim to increase the electoral connection and the maintenance 
of voters’ support if legislators respond to the demands of certain groups of society. 
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Overall, Carey’s (1996; Carey et al., 1998) main conclusion on whether the 
composition of legislatures, legislators’ behaviour and institutions are affected by 
term limits is that the type of people who get elected does not vary with prohibition of 
re-election. Rather, the effects are much more noticeable in behaviour and 
institutional dynamics. Term limits do not fully inhibit ‘utilitarian’ views of 
legislative seats, i.e. seeing them as a tool for careerism. All in all, ‘legislators 
generally are responsive to those who control their political future’ (Carey, 1996, p. 
25), whether that is inside or outside Congress. However, it is important to have in 
mind that variations occur from one political system to the next. 
 
Behaviour and institutions are affected by non-re-election mainly through party power 
and behaviour, and party discipline and political particularism can increase or 
decrease as a result of term limits, depending on the electoral rules in place and the 
availability of post-assembly careers (Ibid). For instance, their existence has been 
thought to solve problems of party cohesion, precisely because term limits should 
discourage particularistic behaviour and purely re-election-oriented actions. 
Legislators are expected to work for the broader collective good instead of just 
focusing on the needs of their district. However, in reality they do not eliminate 
divisions or prevent the emergence of factions, as most individuals will try to ensure a 
future position when they leave Congress. 
 
Carey’s (1998) analysis of the effect of term limits on the United States’ local 
legislatures shows that non-re-election reduces majority party leaders’ control over 
their groups, because representatives defend causes other than the party’s general 
ones. As they are looking for future careers, they seem obliged to defend their 
district’s causes. Governors, councillors and local interest groups seem to have a 
considerable amount of power over state deputies. Furthermore, intra-party divisions 
and instability of party leaderships, common in Latin America, can lead to divisions 
due to the uncertainty of who will control future political careers (Carey, 1996).  
 
Mexico has had term limits since 1933. However, it was not included in Carey’s 
(1996) comparative study mainly because at the time the study was done, the country 
did not comply with the minimum conditions of democracy, namely true electoral 
competition and presidencies held by parties other than the PRI. Only one party had 
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been in power for decades and opposition forces were barely emerging. Hence, term 
limits in Mexico were seen by Carey as imposed by the PRI in order to control their 
own members and prevent them from founding competing opposition parties. It was 
‘a self-conscious effort to control by national party bosses to centralise political 
power’ (Carey, 1996, p. 16). 
 
However, in 2000, the PAN won the presidential elections and again in 2006. This 
forced the PRI, as well as other parties, to experience differently the effect of term 
limits on their power. During Vicente Fox’s presidency no serious attempts were 
made to change the Constitution to allow immediate re-election, contrary to the 
expectations of many. It was not until during Felipe Calderón’s presidencies that a bill 
was drafted and discussed, aiming for the abolition of term limits. However, the 
members of the PRI in the 61st Congress voted against allowing immediate re-
election during the approval of political reform in October 2011. 
 
This research attempts to understand the underlying logic of legislative behaviour in 
the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. The starting point for any assumption made is 
precisely the constitutional prohibition of re-election, and the many ways in which 
parties and individual politicians have found routes around term limits to build 
political careers. Therefore, the results of the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 on how 
parties control these careers will suggest useful insights into the operation and effects 
of term limits in Mexico. 
 
For instance, the previous subsection suggested that parties are not independent from 
the groups and movements from which they emerged. Therefore, leaders of those 
movements have solidified their power across all structures. The existence of term 
limits allows them to ensure that in every election, sympathisers of their cause can be 
placed on the party list for different offices. Consequently, particularistic interests are 
likely to be sought, even challenging party cohesion within, for example, the Chamber 
of Deputies. 
 
It will be seen that within the Chamber, just as in many of the cases observed by 
Carey (1996; Carey et al., 1998), party leaders’ power is reduced due to the strong 
influence that other figures have on deputies. Factions play a very important role, and 
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many times they can cause deputies to adopt particularistic behaviours in terms of 
securing deals and better results for municipalities, states or sectors. 
 
Furthermore, the collection of background information of members of the PAN, the 
PRD and the PRI during the 60th Congress shows that term limits do not obstruct 
politicians from returning to the Chamber after three years of completing their 
previous tenure. Not only does this mean that limits to re-election are overridden, but 
also that particularistic behaviours are still in place. This argument will be proven in 
Chapter 5, showing how those occupying a proportional representation (PR) seat have 
previously been deputies or senators and once elected to the 60th Congress, they were 
more likely to be appointed to committee presidencies. This could suggest that they 
are trusted by party figures, whoever they might be, to set the agenda and/or they have 
been rewarded for a good performance in the past. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The first and main goal of this chapter was to justify why historical institutionalism is 
an appropriate theoretical framework to guide my research, while also identifying the 
contributions that I could make to the paradigm. I argued the suitability of historical 
institutionalism based on its assumption of institutions as a conjunction of ideas or 
beliefs that solidify over time. In Mexico, the existence of term limits and the 
predominance of informal rules, combined with specific historical and contextual 
phenomena have made parties very powerful. They have not negotiated a thorough 
reform of the old authoritarian regime of the PRI, and have maintained clientelistic 
and elitist practices at work. Over time, these attitudes and behaviours of Mexican 
elites have become institutionalised, thus making it more difficult to achieve positive 
changes towards a better democracy in the country. 
 
Based on the above, my contribution to historical institutionalism lies in the fact that 
Mexico is an excellent case for observing the logic of path dependency, because the 
parties have not found the necessary incentives to create a new set of informal or 
formal rules to regulate political processes. They are actors with unchanged attitudes 
who are unlikely to be willing to renounce the benefits derived from operating under 
informal rules, undoubtedly negotiated to secure key party interests. 
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Moreover, I argue that path dependency in Mexico is clearly conditional. This is 
because actors have realised that some changes are good for everyone’s sake, but 
others are not. The PRI has perhaps been in a better position than the PAN and the 
PRD to realise the benefits and the possibility of changing some frameworks and not 
others. Had it refused to allow spaces for political competition in the 1990s, its 
legitimacy and survival would have been jeopardised. Critical junctures, therefore, 
have led to electoral reforms, which in turn have allowed for a more representative 
Congress and, ultimately, for the PRI’s presidential defeat. However, these moments 
when collective decisions about change are made have been absent for other crucial 
aspects of democracy, such as the elimination of term limits and the re-writing of 
legislative frameworks and other important pieces of legislation. 
 
A second goal of this chapter was to show how the singularity of Mexican institutions 
and political behaviour pose interesting challenges to legislative and party theories, 
and to assumptions on the effects of term limits. I specifically sought to prove that 
legislative theories based on the American congressional model cannot be applied to 
other cases in a straightforward way. In Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, I argued that the 
historical evolution of party leadership structures has complicated the pursuit and 
maintenance of political careers; the existence of multiple leaders and factions within 
parties has made party cohesion and discipline a complicated venture – unlike in other 
political systems. 
 
Term limits also have a strong effect on legislative behaviour. In this chapter, I 
confirmed the initial assumption made in Chapter 1 about how they reinforce party 
power, rather than limit it. For as long as conditional path dependency prevails in 
Mexico, particularistic behaviours associated with term limits will continue. Term 
limits and weak party discipline result in the inability of the Chamber to adequately 
perform its representative function.  
 
The reader might realise that I have made good progress in fulfilling the goals set at 
the beginning of this chapter, in terms of placing my research within theoretical 
frameworks that are broader than Mexican-focused ones. However, without further 
contextual information and empirical data it is difficult to argue convincingly how my 
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work contributes to legislative and party theories. It is thus necessary to give way to 
the empirical section of the thesis. 
 
2.4.1 What will the empirical chapters prove? 
In order to provide the evidence for sustaining the theoretical claims mentioned 
above, an empirical case study of the 60th Congress of the Chamber of Deputies will 
be presented. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, primary, secondary and 
first-hand information gathered through interviews will be processed using qualitative 
and quantitative analyses. Hence, Part II of this thesis shall lay out the empirical case 
study. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will provide the reader with empirical evidence on how the 
conditional lock in of institutions took place. This will involve a contextualisation of 
how the birth and development of the PRI, the PRD and the PAN (Chapter 3) shaped 
their behaviour as the three main parties in Mexico and the ones responsible for 
adapting institutions and processes to their convenience and needs. 
 
The empirical description of the 60th Congress (Chapter 4) and statistical analyses on 
background information of 440 of its members (Chapter 5) prove how parties rely on 
their power to set informal rules. These rules allow a more convenient distribution of 
committee seats between parties, and later on the negotiation among intra-party 
factions for giving access to agenda-setting positions to all groups. Through this 
detailed overview of legislative dynamics in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, the 
contributions to the literature on term limits, political parties and historical 
institutionalism should be fully achieved. 
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PART II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
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Chapter 3. Dissecting the nature and power of the Mexican parties 
 
Throughout the previous chapters, the reader has learnt that the Mexican case is one 
where institutional formation during the authoritarian reign of the PRI has resulted in 
a political system mainly regulated by informal rules. Even when party competition 
has increased in the last two decades and both the PRD and the PAN have secured 
electoral victories, the current party and electoral systems have yet to be fully 
renovated and cleaned of some of the old practices. Formal rules still matter less than 
informal ones. 
 
I have also said that the main purpose of this research is to contribute to the literature 
on the Mexican Congress and to theoretical frameworks on parties and legislative 
organisation. These contributions stem from an empirical case study of the 60th 
Congress of the Chamber of Deputies, which seeks to identify and analyse the 
underlying dynamics of legislative behaviour, related to committee distribution in the 
Chamber. In the second part of this thesis, I shall develop this empirical explanation, 
but first, it is necessary to understand the evolution and institutionalisation of the three 
main parties, and their role as architects of the Mexican system. 
 
In this chapter, I present the key contextual foundations upon which I shall build the 
empirical case study. It presents the reader with a historical account of how the three 
main parties in Mexico were born and evolved over the past few decades into 
powerful, hierarchical and interest-based organisations in addition to operating on 
ideological principles. This chapter is only a prelude to the empirical case study, a 
description that, based on the premises of historical institutionalism, aims to show 
how parties, their clientelistic networks, and electoral and legislative institutions have 
developed over time. This justifies the use of recent and older literature, where both 
are equally helpful for describing historical events that mattered for Mexico’s 
institutional design; this is particularly true for Section 3.4, a descriptive section that 
does not intend to make any empirical claims. 
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The contribution of this chapter to the overall thesis emerges from two main 
approaches: a textured assessment of the role, attitudes and behaviour of Mexican 
parties, and the conceptualisation of path dependency as a ‘selective’ process. It is 
worth briefly discussing them before delving into the chapter. 
 
3.1 Roles, attitudes and behaviour of Mexican parties 
Political parties are, for many reasons, key actors for modern democracies. In 
theoretical terms, they perform institutional and representational roles, as they are 
supposed to be a link between society and the state (Méndez de Hoyos, 2007; 
Peschard-Sverdrup & Rioff, 2005). The first role is related to the fact that parties are 
in charge of recruiting political leaders and organising government. In turn, the 
representational role consists of the aggregation and articulation of interests as well as 
the formulation of public policies. 
 
For some, shared preferences are key for party formation (Aldrich, 1995). They help 
ambitious politicians solve problems associated with winning elections and with 
governance itself, and ensure their long-term success. This is because parties solve 
problems of collective action by providing goods for their members, along with a 
‘brand name’ associated with a reputation to be used while campaigning. Therefore, 
they emerge as organisations responding to the rational choices made by gains and 
office seekers. 
 
Provided that the Chamber of Deputies’ members are representatives of political 
parties, it is logical to assume that their behaviour responds to, as well as reflects, the 
specific agenda and goals of the party they belong to (Díaz Rebolledo, 2005; Weldon, 
2004). Therefore, legislators are, as the theory suggests, agents working for the 
benefit of the party, as this is the only path to a political career; ‘they play a crucial 
role in democratic political systems, both as legislators and as prominent members of 
their parties’ (Alcántara Sáez, 2008, p. 266). This is especially true when there is a 
constitutional prohibition for re-election, which has proved impossible to remove even 
under divided government. However, only the largest and therefore most influential 
parties are likely to have a say in the institutional design. 
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The Mexican party system is mostly dominated by three main forces, the PRI, the 
PAN and the PRD, in order of appearance in the political arena. A series of smaller 
parties have been founded throughout the years. Some of them have either failed to 
obtain a minimum of 2 per cent of the votes in an election to comply with the Federal 
Electoral Institute’s (IFE) requirement to maintain registration (Lujambio, 1998;  
Nacif, 2005a), or have been unable to increase their participation in the legislative or 
Executive branches and thus failed to become a real competitor. Table 3.1 presents the 
parties that have taken part in federal elections between 1997 and 2009 and the vote 
shares they obtained for the Chamber of Deputies. 
 
Table 3.1 Political Parties Registered for Federal Elections 1997-2009 
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 
Party Seat 
Share 
% 
Party Seat 
Share 
% 
Party Seat 
Share 
% 
Party Seat 
Share 
% 
Party Seat 
Share 
% 
PAN 24.2 PAN 42.6 PAN 30.2 PAN 41.2 PAN 28.6 
PRI 47.8 PVEM 2.2 PRI 44.8 PVEM 3.8 PRI 47.4 
PRD 25 PRD 10.2 PRD 19.4 PRI 20.8 PRD 14.2 
PC 0 PT 1.2 PT 1.2 PRD 25.2 PVEM 4.2 
PT 1.4 PRI 42.2 PVEM 3.4 PT 3.2 PT 2.6 
PVEM 1.6 Conv. 0.6 Conv. 1 Conv. 3.2 Conv. 1.2 
PPS 0 PARM 0 PSN 0 PANAL 1.8 PANAL 1.8 
PDM 0 PSN  PAS 0 PASD 0.8 PSD 0 
    MP 0   PM 0 
    PLM 0   SM 0 
    FC 0     
Source: Author’s creation with information from IFE, 2008. 
Acronyms correspond to the following: Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI), Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), Partido Cardenista (PC), Partido del 
Trabajo (PT), Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVEM), Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), Partido 
Demócrata Mexicano (PDM), Convergencia (Conv.), Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana 
(PARM), Partido de la Sociedad Nacionalista (PSN), Partido Alianza Social (PAS), México Posible 
(MP), Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM), Fuerza Ciudadana (FC), Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL), 
Partido Alternativa Socialdemócrata y Campesina (PASD), Partido Social Demócrata (PSD), Primero 
México (PM). 
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Broadly speaking, the behaviour of opposition parties changed as a consequence of 
the gradual loss of power of the PRI, first in Congress in 1997 (what is known as the 
emergence of divided government) and three years later when it lost the presidency. 
This is particularly true for the case of the PRD and the PAN. 
 
During the 1990s, the country experienced an intensive period of democratisation of 
its legislative and electoral institutions, which is best exemplified by the PRI’s loss of 
its congressional majority in 1997. Furthermore, the PAN, and later on the PRD, 
began winning over local governments, thereby having the opportunity to prove to the 
electorate that they were a viable option. The political role of the collective actors 
under discussion has been modified during democratisation; however, ‘the identity of 
the parties has changed only somewhat’ (Philip, 2002, p. 132). 
 
The once-hegemonic PRI has always been institutionalised: ‘full of grey officers but 
also includes charismatic personalities; it has a bulky bureaucracy dependent on 
favours and political renovations; it is a station for improvisation and an incubator of 
specialists; a blanket for the ousted yet home for new leaders; a widely centralised 
federation’ (Zagal & Trelles, 2005, p. 209, my translation). Operational rules – at least 
up to 2000 – were created by party leaders and presidents, and mostly unwritten and 
customary (Reynoso, 2005) – the clearest example of this was the practice of 
‘dedazo’, through which presidents chose their successor. 
 
The PAN, born in the opposition, has had a written and formal framework, and has 
always needed it to represent a challenge to the PRI (Ibid). For instance, the PAN has 
been able to overcome internal crises concerning its strategies for electoral 
competition purely because of the statutory order that forces dissidents out of the 
party; dissidents’ positions were normally voted against in the party’s multiple 
conventions or statutory assemblies (Alarcón Olguín & Freidenberg, 2007). 
 
In turn, the PRD does not have either one of the above, and has rather depended on 
charismatic leaders to decide which way to go and what to do next (Reynoso, 2005). 
Because of its evolution process – as will be explained in Section 3.4.2 – the PRD has 
been shaped by factionalism, charismatic leaderships, and the lack of formal internal 
procedures. This is accompanied by an informal organisational culture that, on the one 
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hand facilitates access to decision-making posts, and on the other, keeps the party 
alive under the premise of a shared interest to maintain the PRD running (Martínez 
González, 2005a). 
 
This chapter will also provide the foundations for grasping the arguments laid out in 
Chapter 4 regarding legislative party groups’ operation. At least since 1997, 
legislative parties in Mexico have operated through a leadership structure that is not 
like anywhere else in the world. Strategies, party lines and discipline measures come 
from outside of Congress, rather than from the party leader. The existence of 
constitutional term limits, along with the factional nature of parties, allows regional or 
sectoral leaders to exert their power on deputies (Díaz Rebolledo, 2005; Langston, 
1998; Langston & Aparicio, 2008). This is possible due to the predominance of 
informal rules in the Chamber, which enables the use of congressional seats and 
concrete appointments to committees or governing bodies to control political careers 
and ensure loyalties (Langston & Aparicio, 2009). 
 
The key to the situation described above is to understand that the Mexican parties 
have evolved in a country where oligarchies have certain political fixtures that reflect 
deeper elements of Mexican politics, such as clientelism and the prevalence of 
regional power created by the same elites. In this chapter, we shall see that factions 
play a very important role in driving party behaviour and that the emergence of 
factionalism and its perennial status affects the balance of power within parties and 
inevitably reflects on their performance in government, such as Congress. 
 
3.2 The lock-in of informal rules: ‘selective’ path dependency 
Parties have, over time, developed internal fragmentations that result in the quest for 
achieving multiple agendas and goals set forward by different leaders (as suggested 
by Díaz Rebolledo, 2005 and Langston, 1998). Therefore, the performance of 
legislative party groups is complex, and achieved most likely and easily through 
informal rules, as everything else in the Mexican political system (Camp, 2010). 
 
This argument fits neatly within a theoretical explanation of path dependency, which I 
stated in the previous chapter as a key element of historical institutionalism, the 
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guiding framework for this research. That is, in order to understand why committee 
appointments in the Chamber are made the way they are, it is necessary to analyse 
how and why informal rules and general party behaviours have been locked in 
throughout the years. ‘Neoinstitutional approaches may demand further exploration of 
the specific historical conditions that allow formal rules to shape the political process’ 
(Pérez Liñán, 2005, p. 73). 
 
Consequently, this chapter reintroduces path dependency and explains how the PRI, 
the PRD and the PAN have built and maintained institutional processes which ensure 
that their agendas and goals can be fulfilled in Congress.  
 
We shall see that Mexican parties are organisations that have accumulated an 
outstanding amount of power because of the PRI’s gradual loss of its monopoly, and 
the consequential development of the PAN and the PRD. These three dominant actors 
have selectively replaced parts of an authoritarian institutional path with a plural yet 
elite one dominated solely by them, which allows them to adapt to changing political 
circumstances in order to survive. The PRD and the PAN, born as opposition forces to 
the PRI, have shaped and adjusted their structures and strategies to successfully 
compete with the PRI, within a political system created by the PRI itself (Hernández 
Rodríguez, 1998; Mizrahi, 1995 and 1998; Bruhn 1998). 
 
The three parties are very similar, if not the same, from an organisational point of 
view. For instance, all three of them have candidate selection processes designed to 
work around term limits while increasing the party’s control of political careers and 
all three parties also have internalised discipline and cohesion mechanisms to deal 
with factions and multiple particularistic interests (Nacif, 2002). Furthermore, they 
have ensured a steady flow of public funds to finance their activities, especially 
during elections (De Swaan et al., 1998). 
 
The formula for proportional representation was adjusted in 1996 to establish a cap on 
the number of seats that the largest party could obtain through PR. This was a strategy 
of the PRD and the PAN to curtail the PRI’s power in Congress, and at the same time, 
a relatively good deal for all three forces – even the for the PRI – to secure more seats 
given the support they were likely to have in the 1997 elections (Lujambio, 1998). 
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Thus, the current system is composed of parties who are concerned with fulfilling 
their own interests and might not prioritise the electorate’s needs (Fuentes Reyes & 
García Muciño, 2010).  
 
In order to lay out the path-dependent argument of this chapter and explain the origin 
of the parties’ complex behaviour in Congress, it is organised as follows. Section 3.3 
explores the nature and effect of factionalism on the expansion and entrenchment of 
the parties’ power networks across the political system. It also elaborates on the 
evolution and power of the Mexican oligarchies through their control over key 
elements of the political system of the country, and therefore the impact they have had 
on the country’s democratisation process. This analysis will be a necessary starting 
point for Chapter 4, which looks at how the parties exert their power on the Chamber 
of Deputies. In turn, Section 3.4 presents a brief timeline of the evolution of the PRI, 
the PAN and the PRD; this will help the reader understand how the power networks 
discussed in Section 3.3 were developed. 
 
3.3 Power networks and clientelism: shaping governmental institutions 
under divided leaderships and factionalism 
Since their increased access to power, Mexican parties, especially the opposition, 
have faced electoral victories but also defeats. Among other things, adapting to an 
increased competition during elections has meant that the PRI, the PAN and the PRD 
have sought electoral success both through representing the citizens’ will, but also by 
establishing clientelistic networks to secure mobilisation and support (see Bruhn, 
1998; Mirón Lince, 2005; Mizrahi, 1998). Therefore, the survival of the PRI, the PAN 
and the PRD can be attributed to their ability to profit from the benefits made 
available by the political and electoral system such as material resources, the 
prevalence of informal rules and the weakness of political institutions (Esparza 
Martínez, 1999; Wuhs, 2008). 
 
These benefits are what I consider to be the key path-dependent features of the 
Mexican system, and the reason why party behaviour is crucial – because the parties 
know how important they are for their political goals and have thus made sure not to 
lose them (as Wuhs, 2008 also suggests). That is, there is a collective agreement that 
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the electoral reforms, which have been approved by the three parties, should benefit 
them all, as they allow control of a considerable number of seats in Congress. Having 
shared power of the Chamber for over ten years means that the three actors have 
institutionalised both its formal and informal operational processes, for example the 
distribution of decision-making positions, and have, in turn, adapted their internal 
party policies and strategies to continue operating within the electoral and party 
institutions in place (Ibid). Let us remember that ‘self-reinforcing dynamics associated 
with collective action processes mean that organizations have a strong tendency to 
persist once they are institutionalized’ (Pierson, 2000, p. 259). 
 
The Mexican electorate has expressed dissatisfaction with the parties over the past 
few years and has lost trust in them (see Aziz Nassif & Alonso, 2009; Luna & 
Zechmeister, 2005; Méndez de Hoyos, 2007; UNDP, 2002). Using data from the 2011 
Latinobarómetro survey, Table 3.2 shows that Mexicans are 18 points below the Latin 
American average of preferring a democratic regime to an authoritarian one, and 
twice more indifferent to democracy over authoritarian governments. Only Guatemala 
scored lower than Mexico in the regional survey, which highlights the lack of trust in 
democracy that Mexican voters have. 
 
Table 3.2 Support for democracy in Mexico 
 Democracy is preferable 
to any other type of 
government 
In some cases an 
authoritarian government 
could be preferred over a 
democratic one 
People like me are 
indifferent to an 
authoritarian or a 
democratic regime 
Latin American 
regional average 
58 17 18 
Mexico 40 14 36 
Source: Author’s creation with information from Latinobarómetro, 2011. 
 
Table 3.3 uses data from the World Values Survey and clearly shows that the 
proportion of respondents who had no trust at all in parties had a 4.7 per cent increase 
by 2005, in comparison with the average of data collected for 1990, 1996 and 2000. 
The gap between those who do not trust parties at all and those who trust them ‘a 
great deal’ also became 2.5 per cent wider in 2005. 
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Table 3.3 Confidence in Political Parties 
 Year Year 
 Average for 1990, 1996, 2000 2005 
A great deal 5.30% 3.50% 
Quite a lot 25.40% 20.50% 
Not very much 34.30% 36.30% 
None at all 35.10% 39.80% 
Total 5336 (100%) 1530 (100%) 
Source: Author’s creation with data from the World Values Survey 
 
Results from the Mexican survey of the Comparative National Elections Project 
(CNEP) for 2006 show that, just a few days before the presidential and legislative 
elections, 76 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement ´political parties only 
serve the purpose of dividing people´; but at the same time, 71 per cent of respondents 
agreed with the statement ‘democracy cannot exist without political parties’. This is 
an indicator that, while the Mexican electorate is not fully satisfied with the parties’ 
performance, they recognise the very important role they play in the country’s 
democracy (Moreno, 2010). 
 
Voters are particularly sceptical of parties’ internal democratic development and 
therefore of their contribution towards the country’s better political practices.22 For 
instance, parties project a negative image because factions compete fiercely for power 
and candidate selection processes are solved through informal mechanisms or 
negotiations between party elites (see Chapter 4 for testimonies from parliamentary 
staff and members of Congress). These two issues reflect the lock-in of rules, which 
has taken place in the last couple of decades and are, therefore, central to 
understanding party behaviour. I shall discuss them further in this section. 
 
Given the fact that Mexico was governed by the PRI for 70 years, many of the modern 
political institutions in the country were created by the party, though were later 
                                                 
22
 Peschard-Sverdrup & Rioff (2005) suggest this is an international trend that parties must address if 
they wish to positively influence political systems. 
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modified to a certain extent due to electoral reforms and the creation of institutions 
such as the IFE (Meyer, 1995; Mizrahi, 1995; Philip, 2002). Thus, the ideals and 
practices inherent to hegemonic parties
23
 like the PRI can be found in the entire 
system through clientelism, elitism, and distribution of goods among party affiliates to 
maintain loyalties. Though the PAN and the PRD were born as opposition forces to 
the PRI and were driven by democratic goals, they have been unable to escape being 
influenced by these ‘common practices’ of Mexican politics (Wuhs, 2008). 
 
As will be seen in Section 3.4, the PAN’s and the PRD’s first electoral victories took 
place at the local level. Therefore, they ‘concentrated on developing party 
organizations through local and state-level electoral competition’ (Klesner, 2004, p. 
105). Over the years, secured victories in certain municipalities or states gave way to 
higher numbers of congressional seats, which meant a greater participation in federal 
decision-making, and the availability of increased opportunities for party members to 
have a political career (see Bruhn, 1998; Mizrahi, 1998). Nonetheless, local power, 
such as governorships and mayoralties, is still the most important political arena for 
the parties, and therefore the principal generator of divided leaderships. 
 
Hence, the PRI, the PAN and the PRD have created an electoral system in which 
territorial strongholds or sectoral support can secure relative stability for electoral 
gains. As a consequence, public offices become ‘goodies’ or prizes to distribute 
among those party members who, in some way, prove to be worthy of them. In turn, 
this affects the candidate selection process within each party, along with leadership 
structures and other important strategies (see Langston, 1998; Magar, 2012; Wuhs 
2008). 
 
The strategic selection of those members who are to represent the party’s interests 
throughout the executive and legislative offices is triggered by the fact that these 
government institutions are so weak that parties can shape and reshape them as they 
                                                 
23
 Magaloni (2006) defines hegemonic parties as oversized governing coalitions that are largely 
sustained through the distribution of government spoils and patronage. The pillar of a hegemonic party 
regime is its monopoly of mass support, which in turns allows the regime to deter elite divisions and to 
manipulate institutions by unilaterally controlling constitutional change. Furthermore, it employs 
elections as key instruments for obtaining information about the extent of the party’s mass support and 
its geographical distribution. The hegemonic party creates a market for political loyalty and makes 
citizens vest their interests in the survival of the regime. 
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see fit. Therefore, interest groups, sectors and any influential leaders within them will 
attempt to place ‘one of them’ at the decision-making table. 
 
Wuhs (Ibid) argues that candidate selection processes have evolved within the PAN 
and the PRD over the last ten years, as part of the parties’ process of 
institutionalisation and their quest for electoral success: 
 
[Party] leaders are confronted with the choice of giving priority to some party 
goals and not to others. Mexico’s mixed electoral system allowed party leaders 
to achieve opposing goals simultaneously by adopting heterogeneous selection 
mechanisms for different candidate posts. To serve party electoral goals (and 
achieve ‘democratic’ ends), they could open the field for executive contests 
and benefit from statewide and nationwide primary competition. They could 
also preserve the unity of partisan elites, and help build cohesive parties that 
might aid democratic consolidation, through the distribution of PR seats 
among key party leaders and factions. Preserving control of those candidacies 
also buttressed the power of the party leaders themselves. And, most evident 
in the PAN, party leaders placated activists, who otherwise might oppose open 
rules and elite decision making, by using processes that were closed to the 
party rank and file [...] (Ibid, p. 61). 
 
Divided leaderships have emerged over the years because of the increased 
opportunities for governors, moral leaders and important figures in Mexican political 
life to intervene in federal decision-making (see Camp, 2010; Díaz Rebolledo, 2005; 
Langston, 1995 and 1998). They do so with the purpose of maintaining and increasing 
their own power, whether in line with a particular party goal, or directly related to 
their personal interest. 
 
The existence of multiple leaders within the parties results in a situation of dispersion 
of loyalties of those elected to public office towards several principals. This is 
especially evident among members of Congress, who often do not prioritise the 
national party’s agenda, but seek to please their governor or regional party leader 
instead (as suggested by Díaz Rebolledo, 2005). Alternatively, some deputies choose 
to obey a moral leader, who can be any important figure within the party, instead of 
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their parliamentary group’s leader in the Chamber. This was the case of the members 
of Convergencia in the 60th Congress, since some of them preferred to take guidelines 
and orders from Dante Delgado, the national party leader, rather than from Alejandro 
Chanona, chosen as head of the legislative party group (Morales, interview, 2009). In 
an interview with Francisco Palomino, an experienced parliamentary advisor, I learnt 
that the divisions in the PRI’s group in the 60th Congress were the following24: 
 
The PRI’s factions in Congress mirror the divisions at the national level. One 
group follows Manlio Fabio Beltrones, leader of the PRI in the Senate. The 
other group is loyal to Enrique Peña Nieto, governor of the State of Mexico 
and who is seen as the strongest candidate for the 2012 presidential elections. 
The third group is headed by Beatriz Paredes, current leader of the PRI at the 
national level. She is the most moderate priista leader and one of her main 
operators within Congress is [Dep.] Javier Guerrero. The current PRI leader in 
the Lower Chamber, Emilio Gamboa, is somewhere between Peña Nieto and 
Paredes, and learnt to negotiate with both groups, which is why he manages to 
maintain a certain cohesiveness in the group (Palomino, interview, 2009). 
 
All three forces’ evolutionary processes since the late 1990s have given way for more 
faction-like internal disputes for power, though the amount and depth of the divisions 
vary across them. The PAN has seemed to be the one that has controlled them better, 
perhaps due to its reliance on formal rules. The PRD is the most fragmented party,
25
 
and its congressional group faithfully reflects this trait (Baena Paz & Saavedra 
Andrade, 2004). The PRI perhaps did not see the real problem that internal groups 
represent until it no longer had the power it once had, and therefore didn’t have the 
resources to keep everyone happy (Langston, 2007). 
 
                                                 
24
 Nonetheless, factions across the whole party structure also revolve around trade unions and other 
interest groups. Two prominent examples worth pointing out are: 1) the Teachers’ Union, led by Elba 
Esther Gordillo, a strong figure within the PRI capable of influencing voting results both on the 
Legislative floor and at the polls; and 2) the union of PEMEX workers, who have over the years 
lobbied for or against energy bills in Congress. 
25
 This is because, as the reader will learn in Section 3.4, the PRD was formed by very different 
ideological groups, such as a populist one, a radical and Marxist one, and a group of former priístas. 
Thus, particular interests and demands are very likely to impede a general party consensus. 
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What has been discussed in this section reveals a possible contradiction between the 
repeatedly suggested image of strong, centralised parties who run the country, and 
another one of divided organisations composed of smaller groups with differing views 
of how to lead the party to political success. However, in reality, centralised decision-
making and factionalism are complementary within Mexican parties to the point of 
being symbiotic. 
 
Centralisation of decision-making is necessary to deal with administrative and 
financial matters of the organisation, including the coordination of electoral 
campaigns and the negotiation with other parties, for coalitions or allocation of 
committee presidencies in Congress for example. Without centralisation, it would be 
very difficult for party factions to reach agreements in order to distribute candidacies, 
committee seats in the Chamber of Deputies and decision-making posts within the 
party structure. Without factionalism, though, parties would be unable to 
accommodate the interests of several sectoral or territorial groups, and would fail to 
expand their influence to strongholds which were not included in the party’s core at 
its time of birth (see chapter 5 of Wuhs, 2008). 
 
Hence, factions have not only persisted despite the gradual centralisation of parties 
over the years, but have also become deeply entrenched and have a strong effect on 
party behaviour. Quite obviously, factionalism has an impact on parties’ actions when 
in office, as will be seen in Chapter 4.  
 
3.3.1 The nature of factionalism 
In Chapter 2, factions were defined as subunits of a political party, when the party is 
partitioned so particular interests of some members can be met (Boucek, 2009). They 
can also be seen as channels for expressing dissent and for releasing internal pressures 
generated by parties (Bettcher, 2005). 
 
The logic of factions can be associated with ideological and interest-based incentives 
(Ibid). ‘Despite the historic role of state goods and services for building support in 
Latin America, the region’s parties have been regularly plagued by internal disputes 
[...] The logic of building political careers leads party colleagues to compete over 
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patronage needed to build support, leading to divisive factional disputes’ (Benton, 
2007, pp. 56-57). 
 
In Mexico, the most common figures to generate intra-party conflicts – aside from 
sectoral groups – are governors, subnational party organisations and certain groups 
within the electorate (Díaz Rebolledo, 2005; Hernández Rodríguez, 1998). The quote 
I included on page 110 of this thesis from my interview with Francisco Palomino on 
how the divisions in the PRI’s group in the 60th Congress mirrored the party’s 
national factions helps to prove this point. The factions were organised around a 
governor, a powerful senator and the national party leader (Palomino, interview, 
2009). However, trade unions and other interest groups are also known for being 
active as factions within Congress, and though perhaps in a limited way, interview 
material presented in Chapter 4 portrays the diversity of these groups. 
 
Carlos Lazard and Miguel Ángel Sánchez, who have been parliamentary advisors to 
deputies from both the PRI and the PRD over the past few years, revealed in my 
interviews with them that territorial bases are also important for Mexican factions, 
particularly for the PRI and the PRD, and this is mirrored in power struggles within 
Congress. In addition to having thematic organisation processes, deputies of the PRI 
are grouped by states of representation, and these are used by governors to put 
pressure on policy-making, particularly for budgetary matters (Lazard, interview, 
2009; Sánchez, interview, 2009). In the PRD’s case, factions representing the party’s 
territorial strongholds, particularly Michoacán and Mexico City are important and 
have rights over key committee seats. Erick López Barriga, member of the 60th 
Congress, was the coordinator for the group of deputies representing Michoacán; he 
was appointed to a secretariat of the Budget Committee precisely because of his 
position as coordinator of that very important state representation (López Barriga, 
interview, 2009). 
 
Historically, the PRD has been the most divided party, and its subgroups respond 
much more to leadership figures (Baena Paz & Saavedra Andrade, 2004) rather than 
geographical or sectoral flags, which is in contrast to the PRI. However, regional 
strongholds and relationships with unions do matter to a certain extent. Hilgers (2008, 
p. 124) argues that: 
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The emergence of one predominant leader, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, and the 
primacy of his political strategy set the party on a path of personalistic 
factions, and centralised power, despite the best intentions not to replicate 
these characteristics of the PRI. As a result of Cárdenas’ desire to oust the PRI 
from power, to do so in the electoral arena, and to do it as soon as possible, the 
PRD focused resources on elections. The resources, including time, that would 
have been necessary for institutionalising party rules and regulations to ensure 
internal cohesion and democratic procedures were not available. As a result, 
leadership and alliances were personalised, and factions battled for power. 
When the PRD began to win local and state governments, these tendencies 
spilled into its administration and played out as clientelistic relationships with 
citizens. 
 
In turn, the PAN’s factions can be broadly divided into newcomers and traditional 
party members. Analysing the PAN’s internal candidate selection process towards the 
presidential elections of 2005, Alarcón Olguín & Freidenberg (2007) suggest that the 
development of new (and perhaps more democratic) internal procedures has 
responded to multiple factors. One of them is the increase in factionalism within the 
party over the last decades, which ‘generated more demands for mobility and calls for 
further inclusion in the PAN’s process’ (Ibid, p. 734, my translation). The party 
needed to control and maximise its electoral objectives and prepare for achieving an 
internal cohesion that could help approve bills in a divided Chamber of Deputies 
(Ibid). 
 
A general categorisation of factions, following Boucek’s (2009) typologies of 
dynamics,
26
 would place the PRD’s factions within the competitive, even falling into 
degenerative, as will be seen for the case of the 60th Congress in the next chapter. In 
turn, the PAN’s subgroups are much more cooperative than the other two parties. 
 
Within these typologies, the PRI could be classified as having a combination of 
cooperative and competitive factions, especially for the 60th Congress. Langston 
(1995, pp. 244-245, my translation) describes the PRI’s factions as follows: 
                                                 
26
 As explained in Chapter 2. 
114 
 
The intra-regime political factions can be seen as cooperative hierarchies 
whose members and leaders work together towards the achievement of both 
common and personal goals. Therefore, we witness the classical tension of 
collective arrangements: if all individuals see to their personal goals and do 
not cooperate, then the group’s aims will be threatened and each actor will end 
up worse off than if they had cooperated. However, for fear that others may 
take advantage, many individuals do not stick to the agreement and, in doing 
so, receive even worse blows in return. Mexican political factions oblige and 
allow for cooperation of all individuals, which brings more benefits in the 
future. 
 
Despite the severity of conflict and tension between factions, reasonable party 
cohesion is normally reached towards presidential elections (as suggested by Alarcón 
Olguín & Freidenberg, 2007 and Langston, 1995). Joint efforts and force are needed 
to win in a context of increasingly high electoral competition. But when the election is 
over, the factions resume their conflict, especially regarding the adoption of rules and 
procedures. 
 
Outside of election time, regional or faction leaders are much more important than 
national leaders. This proves that loyalty-based, sector or region-specific systems for 
party organisation and the execution, as well as the maintenance of their power, has 
an effect on the parties’ participation in government. ‘The historic importance of pork 
and patronage for building party organisations and cultivating support in Latin 
America has also meant that politicians have concentrated on strategising over how to 
maximise access to the benefits of office, rather than on constructing coherent policy 
platforms or providing programmatic goods to constituents’ (Benton, 2007). For the 
Mexican case, this means that the power and influence of multiple party leaders also 
affects procedural dynamics of institutions such as the Chamber of Deputies, as will 
be discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Factions are groups seeking votes, offices and policies (Benton, 2007; Bettcher, 
2005). Overall, even if some of them are disorganised, factions in Mexican political 
parties have effective systems for the distribution of incentives, which mainly rely on 
public offices at different geographical and structural levels (as suggested by Alarcón 
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Olguín & Freidenberg, 2007; Baena Paz & Saavedra Andrade, 2004; Langston, 1995). 
Congressional seats are one of the most common prizes, and they are certainly 
important parts of political career-building, as stated by Miguel Ángel Jiménez, who 
was the party leader of the PANAL in the 60
th
 Congress (Jiménez, interview, 2010). 
Chapters 4 and 5 will analyse this particular matter in depth. 
 
The following section explores another important matter regarding the parties’ 
influence on the political system of the country: the electoral reforms of the late 20th 
century. It also points out the unlikelihood of a change towards a reduced scope of the 
parties at all levels of public life in Mexico. 
 
3.3.2 Mexican party oligarchies: origin and survival of the PRI, the PAN and the 
PRD 
The parties’ historical cycles, to be described in the second section of this chapter, 
along with the commodity-like use of public offices explained throughout this section, 
are examples of the parties’ capacity to adjust and reinvent themselves to keep, 
control and expand their power, thereby consolidating the replacement of a former 
hyperpresidentialist system with a partidocracy. 
 
Democratisation in Mexico during the 1990s, contrary to other countries of the region, 
resulted in stronger rather than weaker parties (Philip, 2002). Once the PRI lost the 
presidency in 2000, ‘a hegemonic party system was replaced by a hegemonic system 
of parties’ (Aziz Nassif & Alonso, 2009, p. 293). 
 
Since their birth, both the PAN and the PRD had the vision of making the country’s 
political system much more democratic. ‘Leaders were conscious of the parties’ 
shared commitment to democracy as well as the distinctions between their 
conceptions of it’ (Wuhs, 2008, p. 28). 
 
Given that parties are responsible for appointing members of government, their 
internal procedures for candidate selection, as well as their member’s views and 
behaviour inevitably affect the process of democratic consolidation (Valdés Zurita, 
2005). Thus, through a decades-long interaction with the PRI, and from both the 
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traditional left and the Catholic right (Philip, 2002), they managed to imprint some of 
their dynamics on the electoral system and public institutions (mainly the Chamber of 
Deputies). 
 
Loaeza (1999) labels the PAN as ‘a loyal opposition’, in that it was always careful to 
remain loyal to constitutional formalities in order to pursue its driving objective: bring 
about change through the electoral cause. She argues that: 
 
Throughout its history, and at least until the beginning of the 1980s, the 
National Action party always lived under aggravating conditions due to the 
tension derived from the ambiguity affecting any opposition party, and which 
is presented as the dilemma between co-governing and opposing the 
government, and in the problem of contributing to the operation of the 
institutional arrangement to which it belongs; this means supporting the 
governing functions of its adversary in power, or blocking its government and 
perhaps the institutional process as a way to overturn its adversary. However, 
for the case of the PAN this ambiguity was highlighted by the characteristics 
of the authoritarian environment, because although the constitutional regime 
allowed the articulation and representation of particular interests, the operation 
of the political system was adverse to party competition and, of course, to the 
alternation of power (Ibid, p. 29, my translation). 
 
Over time, and particularly during the 1990s, the PAN developed better candidate 
selection practices, to respond to its rapid electoral success at the local level (see 
Section 3.4.3 for further detail). It was also a key negotiating force in the Chamber of 
Deputies, particularly during the presidencies of Carlos Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo, 
when it pushed for electoral reforms that took the country a step forward in 
democratic developments. ‘Justice and the rule of law were primary components of 
contemporary conceptualisations of democracy evident in its doctrine at the party’s 
foundation’ (Wuhs, 2008, p. 28) 
 
In turn, although much younger than the PAN, the PRD has also had an impact on the 
country’s transition from a hegemonic party system to a more competitive one. It was 
formed by the fusion of the Democratic Current, a group of dissidents of the PRI led 
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by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, with satellite left-wing parties, and therefore has put 
pressure on the PRI’s electoral performance since the presidential election of 1988 
(Valdés Zurita, 2005). 
 
Wuhs (2008, p. 27) clearly sums up the PRD’s role in challenging the PRI’s regime: 
 
The PRD is a self-proclaimed left party. The party was founded on the 
promise of achieving the goals of the Mexican Revolution (especially 
economic and social justice) that had once been espoused by the PRI but, in 
the view of perredistas, had been abandoned with the regime’s turn to 
neoliberalism in the 1980s […] Therein were the party’s two foremost political 
objectives: a turn away from the neoliberal orthodoxy of PRI presidents since 
the 1980s and the removal of the PRI from the presidency. 
 
Together, the PAN and the PRD mobilised different sectors of society, which were 
already rather dissatisfied with the PRI’s approach in the hard economic times of the 
1980s (see Meyer, 1995; Philip, 2002; Whitehead, 1998). Nevertheless, as they began 
to see electoral success, they were forced to rethink their internal strategies for 
maintaining and growing electoral strongholds, and this at times represented a 
dilemma in terms of abiding to their original conceptions of how a democratic party 
should behave (Wuhs, 2008). Selection of candidates and distribution of party 
leadership offices became difficult tasks, as we shall see in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, 
perhaps even more so for the PRD; inevitably, both parties had to resort to clientelism 
and patronage and were thus under pressure to create favourable political conditions 
outside the party to keep internal power networks in operation (Ibid). 
 
In reality, however, the PRD and the PAN did not create the tripartite system by 
themselves. The PRI also played an important role; after all, the most important 
electoral reforms were approved when it still sat in the presidential chair. Philip 
(2002) argues that the breakthrough into transition politics in Mexico took place 
between 1986 and 1989, and one of the most important moments was the 1988 
elections, which were ‘a near-disaster for the PRI’, but from which the party 
recovered. He argues that: 
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It is evident that the vote against the PRI in 1988 was in part a protest vote 
against a very poor economic performance and in part a personal vote for 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. The votes lost by the PRI in 1988 were not 
irrecoverable. It was therefore feasible for the incoming government of Carlos 
Salinas to democratize Mexico without necessarily consigning the PRI to 
defeat. Salinas and his technocratic allies understood that, in the end, formal 
democratization would be unavoidable if Mexico was to enjoy good relations 
with the US. Without this it was hard to see Mexico enjoying an economic 
recovery (Ibid, pp. 139-140). 
 
We shall see in Section 3.4.1 that Salinas’ plan to democratise the country also 
involved changes in the way the president related to the party. Salinas believed that 
the ‘PRI required an organizational shaking up in order to make it fit for 
democratization’ (Ibid, p. 140). However, perhaps the most significant reorganisation 
processes of the party did not occur until 2000, when it lost the presidential seat to the 
PAN. Political competition increased even more then and with it opportunities to 
reshape the rules of the political game. 
 
Therefore, over time, the PRI, the PAN and the PRD have set in motion a process of 
democratisation which has gradually given them all a more equal access to power and 
therefore the opportunity to pursue their main political goals. One of their main 
accomplishments as architects of Mexico’s current political system has been the 
design of new institutions. ‘Institutional design has played a major role in shaping and 
consolidating the Mexican hegemonic party system. Even if most commonly accepted 
definitions of the Mexican regime insist upon the importance of informal rules in its 
day-to-day operations, it was through the framework of law that the conditions 
necessary for the implementation of political informality and arbitrariness were 
created’ (Prud’home, 1998, p. 139). 
 
Perhaps the parties’ main influence can be appreciated in the electoral reforms 
approved by Congress in 1996 and 2007.
27
 Among other things, these reforms made 
                                                 
27
 For an overview of these electoral reforms please refer to Chapter 2. Sections 3.4.1 through 3.4.3 
also provide details on the significance that these reforms had for the parties, particularly for the case of 
the PRI and the PAN. 
119 
 
more money available for campaigns, which increased and consolidated the power 
and outreach of parties (De Swaan et al., 1998). I argue that, ultimately, this also 
proves the deep entrenchment of oligarchies in Mexico, as we shall see in the final 
sections of this chapter. 
 
The electoral laws that have ruled elections since 1996 have been negotiated within 
the tripartite system. The main purpose of the electoral reform of 1996 was to 
legitimise elections, making them trustworthy and fair by granting autonomy to the 
IFE (Aziz Nassif & Alonso, 2009; Colomer, 2003; Lujambio, 1998). 
 
Overall, the 1996 reforms were a turning point for the country’s formal democracy, 
but still had serious shortcomings because the parties kept electoral competition 
limited to the most powerful forces only.  
 
Only the PRI, the PAN and the PRD have survived for decades, while smaller parties 
appear and disappear at almost every election due to their inability to reach the 2 per 
cent electoral threshold established. This suggests that perhaps the way the PAN, the 
PRI and the PRD have shaped the electoral system has made it impossible for other 
parties to build and maintain a cohort and a pool of candidates with a career in 
politics, and with the experience of playing alongside the existing political rules. New 
and smaller political parties result in groups of one-term-political-career individuals 
who, although operating on the fringes of legislative decision-making, benefit from 
the privileges of being in power. Only those smaller parties that form coalitions with 
the larger parties have been able to prevail. 
 
Colomer (2003, p. 13, my translation) discusses the limitations of the 1996 reforms in 
terms of making electoral competition an exclusive game: 
 
Within the democratisation process of political elections in Mexico, 
negotiations between the government officials of the PRI and the opposition 
prioritised the establishment of an independent electoral authority, capable of 
combating fraud and of applying criteria for parties and candidates to access 
public finances and mass media in an equal manner. In exchange for 
competition and honesty in elections, the opposition agreed to accept complex 
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electoral rules, designed to fit the electoral strength and expectations of all 
parties at every stage, and which were relatively exclusive and far from 
proportional. 
 
The adjustments worked fine in the midterm elections of 1997 and 2003, as well as in 
the presidential ones of 2000. However, since 2000, and more evidently in 2006, the 
positive virtues of the 1996 reforms (De Swaan et al., 1998) diminished when parties’ 
budgets were mainly spent on media campaigns; the use of mass media was crucial 
for the 2006 elections but media coverage was not done in the most transparent way 
(Aziz Nassif & Alonso, 2009). 
 
Therefore, in 2007 consensus was reached among the three largest parties in order to 
modify the model for using the media for campaigns. Serra (2009, p. 412, my 
translation) argues that: 
 
Implicitly or explicitly, discussing the rules that would guide elections in the 
future had two objectives: to begin healing the wounds and divisions that the 
2006 election left behind and to produce a new legal framework that would 
avoid future conflicts of that nature. The first of these goals seems to have 
been achieved to a certain extent, as the three main parties stood behind the 
reform. The second objective, however, was far from resolved, since a careful 
reading of the framework reveals several faults. 
 
The owners of TV and radio channels protested against the proposed modifications 
and the result was not a fully ‘cleansing’ reform that limited the power of the media. 
The nature of coalitions was also discussed in the reform, and even when the attempt 
was made to free the smaller parties from the 2 per cent clause if they ran in a 
coalition, the Supreme Court ruled that they still have to reach the threshold to keep 
registration (Aziz Nassif & Alonso, 2009). Consequently, the power of the three large 
parties was once again proved in the re-shaping of the electoral system. 
 
Even when formal electoral rules that affect the party system and the composition of 
Congress have been cleaned and made more accountable (Lujambio, 1998), informal 
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practices are still quite relevant. This is especially true for the Chamber of Deputies, 
as will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
It is very unlikely that the current status quo of powerful parties will change in any 
way. The existing context shows that the four elements of path dependency
28
 in 
political events are present: 1) multiple equilibrium; 2) contingency, which means that 
if events occur at the right moment, they can have enduring consequences; 3) a critical 
role for timing and sequencing of events; and 4) inertia, that is, the equilibrium 
reached by the development of a sequence of events will be resistant to change. 
 
The Mexican partidocracy is, in Crespo’s (2007, p. 95, my translation) words:  
 
an oligarchy that manages formal power from the parties without needing to 
be accountable to citizens, at least not when defending common interests. To 
modify this distortion, and quantitatively and qualitatively increase political 
representation, it is necessary to modify the normative framework of the party 
and electoral system. The parties have the faculty to modify this institutional 
arrangement, but because that could threaten their interests (sometimes 
common, sometimes of one of them with sufficient force to impede reforms), 
then we face a vicious circle… 
 
The parties have made changes to their internal rules accordingly with their increasing 
participation in the decision-making process (Wuhs, 2008). The increased role in 
decision-making, in turn, has allowed them to shape the political system to ensure that 
they remain at the centre of policy-making. Thus, we could say that the stability of the 
system, accompanied by its de-institutionalisation, is the product of a tension between 
informal and formal rules (as suggested by Prud’home, 1998). In the following 
section I shall guide the reader through a brief account of the history of the PRI, the 
PRD and the PAN, with aims at further understanding how, when and why these 
actors have adopted the behaviours and practices which have shaped the country’s 
political institutions.  
                                                 
28
 Let us remember that path dependency claims that: ‘previously viable options may be foreclosed in 
the aftermath of a sustained period of positive feedback, and cumulative commitments on the existing 
path will often make change difficult and will condition the form in which new branching will occur’ 
(Pierson, 2000, p. 265). 
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3.4 Shaping the political system 
As stated earlier, a key element for answering the main research question of this thesis 
is to understand why parties are hierarchical, powerful and operate through interest-
based networks. The foundations of such behaviours lie in historical moments such as 
their origin; the adoption and later adjustments of electoral strategies; the 
establishment of internal structures and the consequential emergence of internal 
groups or factions; and the development of stronger ties with interest groups, in 
addition to ideological ones. Hence, it is worth highlighting what I consider the key 
moments of the existence of the PRI, the PAN and the PRD. 
 
3.4.1 The PRI 
Initially named the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) in 1929 and representing 
leaders in specific regions of the country, it then became the Party of the Mexican 
Revolution (PRM) in 1938, a party of masses and collective organisations, 
representing organised groups. The dominant party in Mexico changed its name in 
1946 to Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (González Olguin, 2006). 
 
For nearly 50 years, it was subordinated to the presidential chair, and therefore 
adjusted its ideology and links to its electorate based on the policies implemented by 
the Mexican Chief Executive (Pozas-Horcasitas, 2008), who in turn was expected to 
follow the party’s traditions. The PRI has always had a considerably large electoral 
and administrative apparatus, standing upon a dual structure: territorial and sectoral.
29
 
 
As the dominant, largest, and most established party in the country, the PRI governed 
almost without any organised opposition for many years. Its power network was so 
overarching that it apparently met the needs and interests of a large percentage of the 
population. It resorted to long-term corporatism as a link to society and the fulfilment 
of representation of interests (Hernández Rodríguez, 1998). 
 
                                                 
29
 The former works vertically and the latter is composed of three main sectors: labour, peasants and 
working-class organisations. The sectors served the purpose of mobilisation for support towards the 
government and also guaranteed good government conditions through agreements with employers 
(Zagal & Trelles, 2005). 
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Nonetheless, its dependence on unions and organised movements related to natural 
resources and other key economic activities left the middle class unrepresented. The 
middle class began to grow and emerging opposition parties such as the PAN became 
the viable institutional channel to turn to for electing a government capable of 
fulfilling their demands (Lujambio, 2006). In addition, a new elite began to emerge 
within the PRI itself in the 1970s and 1980s seeking innovative approaches towards 
policy-making. 
 
As with any other political actor, the PRI went through important changes throughout 
the 20th century (Alcocer, 1993), but these were related far more to national policy-
making than for other parties. Mexican politics during the PRI’s reign resemble 
Venezuela’s during Acción Democrática’s dominance, in that the president and the 
head of the National Executive Committee were the ‘two nodes of power in the policy 
party’ (Coppedge, 1994, p. 66). Coppedge claims that ‘the relationship between these 
two power nodes structures the politics of the policy party. Mutual dependence gives 
both an incentive to get along […] Nevertheless, there are times when agreement is 
impossible, and in those situations, each actor has enough authority to act alone in 
certain spheres of policy-making’ (Ibid, p. 66-67). 
 
In addition, struggles between leaders also triggered conflicts and changes, which 
fuelled shifts in its position within the party system (as described by Camp, 2007; 
Mizrahi, 1995; Tirado Rasso, 2000; Zagal & Trelles, 2005). I shall attempt to provide 
a brief yet clear summary of the most important ones below. 
 
3.4.1.1 Key historical events 
First of all, in 1965, Carlos A. Madrazo, who a year before had been appointed as 
leader of the party, tried to internally consolidate democracy in the PRI. He made it 
clear that he planned on restructuring the party by acknowledging the importance of 
affiliates and mobilisation, along with the elimination of old and dishonest practices 
towards winning more votes during elections (González Olguin, 2006). 
 
The key part of his reform consisted of democratising processes for candidate 
selection and for electing local leaders. Candidates supported by a majority vote 
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would be admitted without necessarily having to be promoted by sectoral 
organisations. This meant that the sectoral structure would be weakened, giving way 
to a stronger link between the party and society (Ibid); increasing the power of the 
president of the National Executive Committee of the party was the only way to 
succeed (Pozas-Horcasitas, 2008). This would have been an obstruction to the power 
of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, then president of the country, and known for leading one of 
Mexico’s most authoritarian regimes, marked by the violent attack on student protests 
in October 1968. 
 
In addition, Madrazo’s reform reduced the influence that governors could have within 
the decision-making process; this was the main detonator of a huge opposition across 
the party, led by Governor Leopoldo Sánchez Celis, from the state of Sinaloa. 
Officers and public servants from all levels of government, led by governors and 
leaders of corporatist organisations with allies in the National Executive Committee of 
the party together made sure that Madrazo’s reform was set aside (Ibid). In the end 
Madrazo was forced to resign from the national leadership of the PRI (González 
Olguín, 2006). 
 
New organisational changes were attempted in 1973, shortly after Jesús Reyes 
Heroles became president of the PRI. Known as ‘one the most relevant ideologues of 
the regime, who was determined to ease the mechanisms for vertical control and allow 
greater participation of support groups in the party’ (Pereyra, 1988), Reyes Heroles 
wanted to provide the party with better foundations by leaving the unionised sectors 
out of the game (Reveles Vázquez, 2003a).
30
 
 
This took place during Luis Echeverría’s presidency (1970-1976), which was 
accompanied by organisational changes within the party, where younger politicians 
with less partisan careers than most leaders of the PRI were the closest collaborators 
to the president. In addition, the president held fewer processes of consultation with 
the party for national policies and for party-related matters (Ibid). 
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 Although it should be said anecdotally that most of these organisational changes were implemented 
as part of Luis Echeverría’s personal disputes with Fidel Velazquez, leader of the CTM, the largest 
labour union of the country. 
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Echeverría intended his regime to be a new era for Mexican politics, where there 
could be more room for political competition, a necessary characteristic of 
democracy. His goal was ‘to rescue and strengthen the support bases of the state and 
rehabilitate the presidential authority and prestige. To do so, Echeverría made as 
much contact as possible with various sectors of society, including groups within the 
opposition’ (Pereyra, 1988, p. 10, my translation).  
 
But the imminent economic crisis that led to the devaluation of the peso in 1976 and 
the adoption of harsh austerity measures forced Echeverría to reconsider the 
presidency’s relationship with the party’s unionised sectors. This was a clear obstacle 
to any modernisation plans, which would have failed anyway because of tensions 
between Reyes Heroles and Echeverría. The former ‘applied’ to be a presidential 
candidate without any designation from the latter. In a presidential system like the 
traditional PRI model, where the head of the federal executive power was also at the 
top of her party’s hierarchy (and is therefore the chief controller of political careers), 
Reyes Heroles’ move broke the golden rule of obeying the president. He was 
therefore fired from the leadership of the PRI. 
 
After Madrazo’s and Reyes Heroles’ failed attempts to modernise the PRI, a 
successful one finally came in 1977 during the presidency of Jose López Portillo 
(González Olguín, 2006). As previous modernisation projects, the one pursued by 
López Portillo and his advisors sought to minimise the effects of internal divisions 
and the declining capacity of voters’ mobilisation on the party’s electoral success in 
the future (Klesner, 1993; Lomelí, 2000; Pereyra, 1988). 
 
‘The political reform initiated in 1977 is the most prominent example of attempts at 
adaptation in this one-party or hegemonic party system, at modifying the rules of the 
political game so that the political elite does not have to fear losing power either 
constitutionally or extraconstitutionally’ (Klesner, 1993, p. 191). The purpose of the 
reform was to encourage the recent protest and opposition movements that had 
emerged from the student demonstration of 1968 to become opposition parties and 
compete in elections (Ibid). López Portillo and his advisors hoped that left-wing 
dissidents would channel their political discontent through institutional means and 
thus end the violent protests of the previous years (González Olguín, 2006). 
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However, the left was unable to capitalise on this opportunity for several reasons, 
including the lack of internal organisation and the existence of restrictive political 
structures for opposition parties to survive (Preston & Dillon, 2004). A real opposition 
to the PRI did not emerge and function adequately until decades later. 
 
As mentioned above, the 1980s was the period when the most important events for the 
PRI’s political future took place. When President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) 
came into power and implemented a conservative economic policy, the party found 
itself in a very delicate, contradictory situation. On the one hand, it sought to portray 
itself as ideologically nationalistic and thus its programme defended the working 
class; on the other hand, however, it unconditionally supported a series of restrictive 
governmental measures which economically affected the majority of the society 
(González Olguin, 2006). For example, the nationalisation of banks in 1982 led the 
country to an economic crisis, which was worsened after the tragic earthquake of 
September 1985 (Lomelí, 2000). 
 
Klesner wrote in 1993: ‘Mexico’s extended economic crisis has both strained the 
credibility of the governing elite and produced resentment among those who have 
suffered as a result of the economic depression and restructuring that Presidents de la 
Madrid and Carlos Salinas have pursued as the solution to that crisis’ (Klesner, 1993, 
p. 209). 
 
The 1980s is widely known as the ‘lost decade’ for Latin American countries because 
most of them experienced severe economic crises; Mexico was not the exception. 
Although the standard of living in the country had risen in previous decades, by 1982 
the scenario was one of a ‘multidimensional crisis’ (lasting until the mid-1990s) 
(Whitehead, 1998). On the economic dimension, the country’s foreign debt was 
extremely high; the banking system was in crisis; oil prices plummeted; and foreign 
lending was cut off (Smith, 1990). Moreover, on the political dimension, as has been 
suggested, there was a demand for a democratisation process of the PRI (and 
consequently of presidential politics). Given the severity of the crisis, it was 
impossible to deal with both economic and political changes at the same time. 
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‘With the debt crisis, as access to state resources diminished because of state 
streamlining and sharp reductions in state expenditure, the worker and peasant 
organisations that had backed the PRI began to withdraw support’ (Teichman, 2009, 
p. 73). 
 
Discontent among the social bases of the party led to the birth of a democratisation 
movement within the PRI, which would later on transform into the PRD, Mexico’s 
main left-wing party. The inadequate response of de la Madrid’s government to face 
the destruction caused by the earthquake saw the emergence of organised civil society 
movements and also new leaders within the PRI (Preston & Dillon, 2004; Teichman, 
2009). 
 
In 1987, the PRI’s leaders attempted to change the procedure for presenting 
presidential candidates, partly because of splits within the party, but also responding 
to a scandal on electoral fraud in the local elections in Chihuahua a year earlier. 
‘There is little doubt that widespread fraud took place in the 1985 and 1986 elections’ 
(Rodríguez, 1998 p. 166). 
 
Jorge de la Vega, the national leader of the party at the time, announced that the six 
preliminary candidates for the 1988 election would address the various sectors of the 
PRI to obtain approval. Several weeks later, however, de la Vega announced to the 
party affiliates that Carlos Salinas would run for the presidency; the outgoing 
president, Miguel de la Madrid, had returned to the tradition of choosing his 
successor, automatically cancelling any new internal procedures for candidate 
selection (Preston & Dillon, 2004). 
 
Carlos Salinas, elected as president in 1988, was an unpopular candidate in that 
electoral process and was unable to mobilise either his party or the sectors affiliated to 
it. ‘During the 1988 presidential campaign and election Mexico witnessed a withering 
of the PRI’s electoral clout, and an intense feud over the legitimacy of Salinas’ 
victory’ (Dresser, 1991, p. 3). During his campaign, he recruited technocrats and left 
out those leaders who could easily mobilise labour and peasant movements; this 
resulted in a very low turnout for the PRI – he won because the Minister of the 
Interior used electoral fraud (Lujambio, 1998; Preston & Dillon, 2004; Prud’home, 
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1998).
31
 Once in power, many of his actions continued to undermine the interests and 
power of the unions; for example he apprehended the leader of Pemex’s Union, 
known as ‘La Quina’, and later on replaced the leader of the teachers’ union with Elba 
Esther Gordillo (Preston & Dillon, 2004).
32
 
 
As Dresser (1991, p. 3) argues: ‘the Salinas administration came to power in a context 
defined by a decomposition of the traditional forms of political control, divisions in 
the state apparatus, fractures within the one-party system and weakened presidential 
authority’. 
 
Salinas’ strategy was to concentrate all the power in the presidency. ‘Under Carlos 
Salinas’ reign, and decided by no one else but him, the presidency weakened its 
traditional foundations: the party of the state, the official labour movement, the 
peasant organisations, and those of the ‘popular sector’. Through new internal 
alliances, strong external support and spectacular stunts, the president became 
powerful. However, it was a false power’ (Meyer, 1995, p. 340, my translation). He 
also ignored his party’s and its leaders’ recommendations of candidates to several 
elections. As Preston & Dillon (2004, pp. 134, my translation) state, he ‘really 
subjected the PRI to the strength of the principle of loyalty to the president’. 
 
However, an important caveat to add here is that Salinas’ authoritarianism took place 
only within the PRI. We shall see later on in this section that, being conscious of the 
near-electoral disaster of 1998 and knowing that a similar situation should not happen 
again, he made sure to introduce legitimacy to the political context during his term. 
This was achieved through legitimate negotiations with the PAN, which gained 
political salience and power as the opposition party. Salinas’ presidency therefore 
opened new paths for democratisation of the party system and the country in general, 
which were later on furthered by Ernesto Zedillo. 
 
                                                 
31
 The computer system designed to count the votes and provide live results throughout the night of the 
election day was tampered with by the PRI-led federal government, increasing the number of votes for 
Salinas in order to make him win. 
32
 We shall see later on that Gordillo has played a key role in Mexican politics, having an immense 
amount of power as the leader of the teachers’ union. 
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Carlos Salinas’ priority was to lead the country to modernity, thereby assembling his 
cabinet with technocrats like himself. Nonetheless, he also appointed old-school 
politicians known as dinosaurs as his advisors and heads of some ministries. Camp 
(1990, p. 104) analyses Salinas’ appointments to his cabinet and concludes that he 
‘has created a hybrid cabinet of technocrats in charge of economic agencies, 
combined with traditional politicians directing political departments’. Overall, Camp 
explains Salinas’ choices of collaborators in two ways:   
 
First, Salinas can be seen as coming into office as a weak president, having 
only a small personal camarilla, requiring, for political reasons, support from 
major political groups, including those of his three predecessors. A second 
interpretation suggests that Salinas made a decisive political move to 
strengthen his camarilla and gain broad elite support for his government after a 
divisive internal struggle for the nomination and difficulties during the 
presidential campaign. Salinas has not confined camarilla representation in his 
cabinet (Ibid, p. 102). 
 
He was determined to present Mexico to the world as a modern, democratic country, 
especially to the United States and Canada and thus succeed in negotiating the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Meyer (1995) argues that this was part of 
his personal strategy to pursue a career in international politics after stepping down 
from the presidential chair; he wanted to be president of the World Trade 
Organization. 
 
As part of his construction of a democratic image for the country, he accepted the 
opposition’s demand for electoral reforms. Though the PRI could gather enough votes 
to approve a reform that protected the party’s interests, Salinas ‘surrendered to the 
PAN, not because he needed votes, but rather due to the lack of something much more 
important: credibility’ (Meyer, 1995, p. 158, my translation). The PAN had the 
international credibility that the PRI needed (Ibid), and so Salinas had a ‘marriage of 
convenience’ with the PAN (Whitehead, 1998), which led in 1989 to the creation of 
the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). Years later, the IFE would allow for better 
elections, which in the end resulted in the PRI being voted out of power. 
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During Carlos Salinas’ presidency, the social programme named Pronasol (also 
known as Solidaridad) became the most important pillar of his government. It helped 
him to become gradually independent from local power groups and to build a new 
social base for the government by working in local communities. In the longer term, 
Pronasol also produced local political leaderships that would have enough influence to 
promote the PRI’s reform (González Olguin, 2006). 
 
Denise Dresser wrote in 1991 that: 
 
Pronasol can be viewed as an organisation and a strategy that is contributing to 
restructure and strengthen the pro-Salinas factions within the PRI by providing 
them with renewed sources of patronage […] Solidarity’s noble exhortations 
may be serving to legitimise PRI behaviour that tinkers with social reform as a 
way of entrenching the status quo without having to engage in structural 
political reform (Dresser, 1991, p. 5). 
 
Overall, Salinas tried to democratise Mexico in his own way, mainly under the 
premise that electoral efficiency, achieved through guaranteed support for the party –
cultivated during his presidency – would prevent the PRI from reliving the disastrous 
electoral process of 1988. The president of the PRI at the time, Luis Donaldo Colosio, 
agreed with him on this matter and thus Salinas’ strategy was accompanied by 
Colosio’s own modernisation project (Hernández Rodríguez, 1998). 
 
Colosio, who would later on be the presidential candidate for the 1994 elections, 
focused on strengthening the territorial organisation of the party, giving the urban and 
individual voter greater opportunities to participate in elections. ‘The idea was to win 
over the poorest urban sectors, previously led by organisations with no formal 
commitment to any political party but always ready to negotiate their support at 
election time’ (Ibid, p. 81). In Colosio’s view, the party would be better off if it were 
organised on a territorial basis, revitalising sectors to increase their presence within 
society (González Olguin, 2006). 
 
The reforms between 1988 and 1994 were an attempt to avoid as much opposition as 
possible to Salinas’ policies (Hernández Rodríguez, 1998). In addition, they sought to 
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embed the reforms within the party’s manifesto, making sure it matched the political 
conditions of the time. Ultimately, it was an effort to rearrange the party’s social base 
in order to refresh local leaderships with aims to win elections. As mentioned earlier, 
the PRI could not afford another electoral disaster like the one that happened in 1988, 
and timely adjustments were needed so the party could win elections honestly. 
Nonetheless, adverse situations such as the murder of Colosio during his presidential 
campaign, the economic crisis of 1994 and the Zapatista insurgency, impeded the 
consolidation of the Colosio-Salinas reforms within the party manifesto – though the 
foundations for the country’s democratisation in terms of legitimate political 
competition had begun to be laid out. 
 
Even when the modernisation project within the PRI was put aside, a few groups 
within the party kept the spirit of reform alive. This was the case of the ‘Renovating 
Stream’ (Corriente Renovadora or CD) of the PRI, who pushed for ‘the party’s 
autonomy from any source of power [such as the president, governors, mayors, 
interest groups, etc.], along with internal democracy, which, obviously, means the 
effective participation of the priistas in the adoption of the great decisions which 
concern the party: leaders, candidates, projects and programmes’ (García Ramírez, 
2001, my translation). 
 
Turbulent internal elections and the prevalence of vertical imposition with regard to 
candidate selection triggered ‘the departure of old PRI members with lengthy careers 
within the party and their migration to either the PRD or the Partido Acción Nacional 
(PAN)’ (Hernández Rodríguez, 1998). 
 
3.4.1.2 The beginning of the end of the PRI’s authoritarianism 
Salinas’ democratisation strategy (which was aimed at avoiding the repetition of 1988 
and presenting a new Mexico to the NAFTA partners) not only set patterns of 
negotiation between the PRI and the opposition (mainly with the PAN). It also made 
the point of forcing his party to make an effort in being electorally competitive. A 
clear example of this was the PAN’s defeat of the PRI in the gubernatorial elections in 
Baja California Norte in 1989, the first significant victory of the PAN. Margarita 
Ortega Villa, the candidate put forward by the PRI was unpopular in the state and 
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Salinas made it clear that the presidency would not intervene in her favour. This 
marked a new era of candidate selection for gubernatorial races, where those who are 
selected tend to have a state and municipal career rather than be part of a clientelistic 
network controlled from Mexico City (Díaz, 2005; Langston, 2000). The PRI was 
challenged as a party in Baja California Norte, and its hegemony was clearly 
contested. 
 
The economic crisis of 1994-1995 represented another risk to the PRI’s hegemony. It 
came at the very start of Ernesto Zedillo’s term, because of an uncoordinated 
sequence of events. Meyer argued in 1995: ‘the economic, political and moral 
collapse of the salinismo has impeded Ernesto Zedillo, the successor that Salinas 
himself appointed, from taking and using power effectively’ (Meyer, 1995, pp. 241-
242, my translation). In addition, his tenure also witnessed the party’s loss of its 
majority of seats in the Lower Chamber in 1997 and, three years later, the presidential 
chair. Overall, Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), whose electoral victory was more 
legitimate than Salinas’ (Ibid; Philip, 2002), managed to keep ‘a safe distance’ from 
the PRI. 
 
Zedillo was an outsider to the party who did not believe in the PRI’s traditional 
politics (Hernández Rodríguez, 1998). He was convinced that democracy was needed 
in the country in order to promote the consolidation of stable markets; he had to set a 
democratisation process in motion. The Zedillo-PRI cleavage can be explained using 
Coppedge’s (1994) argument on how the presidency and the Executive Committee of 
the party have enough authority to fulfil their results if no agreement can be reached 
towards a common goal. He was determined to democratise the country in order for 
economic stability to prevail, and made use of all his constitutional powers to do so, 
even if this would distance him even more from his party. This situation shifted the 
balance of power within the PRI, and also within the national context. 
 
Hence, during his administration there was an active campaign for democratic 
candidate selection principles. He made it clear that his role was to run the country, 
not the party, and his detachment from internal PRI politics gave room for the group 
of old-school politicians (like Roberto Madrazo) to keep the party as a strong electoral 
force by using their networks and power. 
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A clear example of how the old-style, corrupt and authoritarian PRI fought to keep the 
party alive, in clear opposition to Zedillo’s style, was when the latter attempted to 
force Roberto Madrazo to step down from the gubernatorial seat in Tabasco, for 
which he had held a non-transparent campaign and had dubiously won. Madrazo 
refused to obey and thus made it evident that ‘caciques’ (local bosses) still had (and 
still do today) a considerable amount of power; this situation also made it obvious that 
Zedillo had little authority over the traditional elite of the PRI (Preston & Dillon, 
2004). Furthermore, this incident led to the creation of a group within the party 
seeking to defend its traditions and status quo. 
 
The incident in Tabasco and the fact that Zedillo was seen by many groups as an 
outsider to the PRI, and unwilling to follow the party’s tradition of choosing his own 
successor, led to the approval of an internal reform known as ‘candados’ (locks) 
during the 17th National Assembly, which took place in September 1996. It impeded 
access to power for the technocrats, who were seen as individuals who ‘did not 
represent the convictions, feelings, style, and proposals of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party. It was a revolt of politics against technocracy, a wall built 
against the government’ (García Ramírez, 2001).  
 
Zedillo had publicly declared early in his presidency that he would not choose his 
successor. This had already reduced his bargaining power vis-à-vis the party’s, so 
there was not much he could do about the candados. Perhaps this event could be seen 
as the first time a president lost control of the PRI (Hernández Rodríguez, 1998). With 
the candados came the end of the dedazo era (when presidents chose their successor), 
and with it power shifted away from the president to the party, thereby reversing the 
effects of the reform that Madrazo had put forward in 1965. Oligarchic practices, 
typical of the PRI, would prove to be extremely useful for the party’s survival in the 
coming years, when political competition formally began after the 1996 electoral 
reforms. 
 
Zedillo’s administration hosted an even more important electoral reform than the one 
approved under Salinas. ‘In addition to dealing with the gross over-representation, 
corruption, and other factors, the 1996 reform provided very generous campaign funds 
and extensive free media time to the parties, thereby allowing the opposition to run 
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professional campaigns for the first time’ (Brinegan et al., 2006, p.78). It also 
involved the independence of the IFE from the government.  
 
Paradoxically, the reform led just one year later to the PRI’s loss of the legislative 
majority in the Federal Chamber of Deputies. Free and fair elections also meant that 
governors could be legitimate leaders, instead of mere presidential appointees as they 
had been in the past (Hernández Rodríguez, 2003). 
 
In addition, Zedillo broke the tradition of loyalty to former presidents by allowing 
Carlos Salinas’ brother, Raul, to be prosecuted for corruption and the murder of his 
former brother-in-law, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu (Preston & Dillon, 2004). One of 
his last revolutionary measures was to introduce primaries towards the 2000 
presidential election, in which Francisco Labastida defeated Roberto Madrazo. 
 
3.4.1.3 Internal fractures 
In addition to differences in perceptions of how the relationship between the party and 
the president should be led, and of how the party and the country should be 
democratised and modernised, the gradual division of the party and confrontation 
among its groups respond to changes in the typology of the elite in terms of their 
background, skills and goals (Camp, 2007, 2010). We could say that the last three 
presidents from the PRI, Miguel de la Madrid, Carlos Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo, had 
a different approach to politics from those who governed before 1982, who were seen 
as ‘old-school politicians’. In turn, de la Madrid, Salinas and Zedillo belonged to the 
new generation of technocrats.  
 
Politicians sought to preserve the system in order to maintain economic growth and 
ensure that the benefits for supporters kept flowing. In addition, the old elite believed 
in its capacity to make all sectors of society express themselves through the PRI. ‘In 
consequence, the particular projects that each president carried out during his six-
year-term seldom affected the system itself. That is why no president considered it 
necessary to subject the PRI to structural changes …’ (Hernández Rodríguez, 1998). 
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In turn, the new elite adopted a different approach to policy-making and linkage with 
the electorate. Inexperienced in public service, they believed that knowledge itself 
would bring viable solutions. The technocrats had high academic qualifications, 
generally in technologically sophisticated fields and they were part of the national 
bureaucracy but had little or no experience at all in elective offices (Camp, 2007). 
They focused on determining the ‘indispensable means to achieve an end’, without 
considering subjective and political aspects (Hernández Rodríguez, 1998). 
 
Furthermore, the emergence of several internal groups since the 1990s and even more 
in the 2000s can be associated with the urge to win space for influence in the PRI 
where a power vacuum has gradually emerged. In previous decades, internal divisions 
were linked to loyalties towards recognised leaders to develop specific projects and 
whose internal competence was the means to renewing the governing political elite.
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Nonetheless, ever since the party’s electoral battle became more difficult to win, new 
divisions have emerged with the main goal of promoting personal projects, rather than 
more collective ones. In other words, when winning an election, it is far more 
important for the PRI to resort to personal popularity and this shift has led to a similar 
instability to that of 1968, 1976, 1982 and 1994 (Hernández Rodríguez, 2005). 
 
A clear example of how the promotion of a personal project was put forward through 
a party office was when Elba Esther Gordillo became the legislative party leader in 
the 59th Congress (2003-2006) (Preston & Dillon, 2004). The head of the teacher’s 
union, she saw the opportunity to realise her own goals in Congress, even if that 
involved reaching ‘too many’ agreements with the PAN (Langston, 2007; Delgado, 
2007). She was removed from office early in her tenure and her protégées were also 
blocked from important decision-making offices in the legislature. In the end, 
Gordillo left the PRI and now backs Nueva Alianza, a party that she created in 2006, 
although this party supported PRI candidates in later elections, so no definitive break-
up or separation occurred. 
 
                                                 
33
 A useful tool for the PRI’s control over bureaucratic appointments was the so-called ‘camarillas’, a 
‘group of people who have political interests in common and rely on one another to improve their 
chances within the political leadership’ (Camp, 2007, p. 123). In resorting to some sort of mentor-
disciple relationship, they determined who was appointed to public office, and how far their political 
career could get. 
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Another example of the pursuance of personal projects is Roberto Madrazo. He was 
appointed the national party leader in 2002 and was key to keeping the party lively 
after the defeat of 2000 (Ibid); he used his post to pull as many strings as possible to 
become the presidential candidate for 2006. He succeeded, but gained many enemies 
within a group of governors (Pampillo Baliño, 2008). 
 
3.4.1.4 A strategy for survival 
Both old and new generations of priistas were challenged when their party historically 
lost the absolute majority of legislative seats in the Lower Chamber in 1997, and even 
more when the PAN won the presidency in 2000 (Mirón Lince, 2005). The 
technocrats had the most to lose with the party’s defeat, mainly because the candados 
introduced during Zedillo’s presidency shifted power to the traditional PRI elites 
(known as the dinosaurs). Rather than embarking on any modernisation project, the 
dinosaurs followed the path of traditional PRI practices, where clientelism, loyalties 
and networks are the best tools for keeping the party alive. An example of this was the 
years-long operation that the dinosaurs launched before the mid-term elections of 
2009, to pave the way for Enrique Peña Nieto to run for the presidency in 2012 
(Palomino, interview, 2009). 
 
The PRI had to make a transition from being the ruling party to a party like any other, 
with no easy access to public resources for funding its operations, and thus needed to 
come up with alternative sources of income. Furthermore, like any other party, it now 
has to truly compete in elections, and although it still controls many state and 
municipal positions, its ‘stock’ of prizes and punishments for members has been 
significantly reduced. In fact, in 2006 the IFE imposed a fine of 38.6 million pesos on 
the PRI for not reporting over 54,000 campaign spots on TV and radio during the 
2006 presidential elections (Redacción, 2008). This situation had two important 
implications: on the one hand, it proved that the party is no longer ‘untouchable’ and 
that the IFE is a fully independent body fulfilling its tasks (Woldenberg, 2005); and 
on the other hand, it put the PRI in serious financial difficulties. 
 
Having become an opposition party, the PRI set itself the clear objective of winning 
back the presidential chair. In order to achieve this, the party had to renew from 
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within (Mirón Lince, 2005), to appear as a political alternative to the panista 
governments of Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón. 
 
The PRI’s reform that started under Salinas was even more forcefully attempted in 
2000, but is still far from complete. This is particularly evident if we consider the fact 
that the dinosaurs and their corrupt practices have kept the party alive since 1997. In 
explaining the PRI’s defeat in the 2006 presidential election, Joy Langston (2007) 
shows that it is internally – perhaps irreconcilably – split, and it has been unable to 
shake off old practices associated with corruption while also being incapable of 
producing a cohesive national leadership. 
 
Madrazo helped destroy the PRI’s chances of retaking Los Pinos by using his 
leadership position in the National Executive Committee to force the party to give him 
the presidential nomination. His public image with both voters and his own party 
members of a corrupt and fraudulent politician with no substantive policy proposals 
proved impossible to change. The Mexican electorate did not appear to believe his 
promises, nor did they care that he was the most experienced politician in the race. 
Many of his party’s governors refused to support him because they calculated they 
had more to fear from him than from an opposition president. 
 
Finally, the salient issue in the 2006 campaign was economic, and Madrazo was 
unable to make credible promises or even present a reasonable alternative to the two 
front runners. It remains to be seen whether the PRI, a party that was once all things to 
all political groups, can remake itself into a party that does not represent only 
corruption, fraud, and ‘overweening pragmatism’ (Ibid, p. 24). 
  
Overall, Reveles Vázquez sees the following as basic requirements for the party’s 
reform to succeed (2003b): 
 
1. A dominant coalition able to survive without having the president as its leader, 
building internal mechanisms for consensus and cohesion in order to sell the 
party group’s vote to the best bidder in Congress, in exchange for the security 
of its key interests. In other words, the PRI must establish new working 
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relationships between factions, the legislative party group and national party 
leaders. 
2. A new equilibrium between leaders, officials and deputies and a fiscal 
decentralisation. This is quite difficult to achieve since the governors have 
acquired a considerable amount of power within the PRI; they can mobilise 
local constituencies and put pressure on federal government officials and party 
leaders. On this issue it is also pertinent to mention the positive fact that the 
PRI has learnt to negotiate with other political forces in Congress and, most 
importantly, among its internal factions, rather than resorting to confrontation. 
3. The restructure should be based on territorial interests rather than sectoral 
bases. This will necessarily influence the candidate selection process, which 
affects the power of the internal groups and the electoral connection. 
4. A new ideology, appropriate for an opposition party to work in a public sphere 
led by a right-wing government. In reality, the PRI has not found it so 
difficult, as many of the institutional rules and designs were put into place 
during the long period it was in power. However, what has been troublesome 
is the fact that it cannot be the left-wing revolutionary party which stands in 
opposition to the PAN, since that position is taken by the PRD. Thus, the PRI 
has had to learn how to behave as a more centrist party, which can easily side 
with the PRD but also with the PAN. 
5. New sources of income in order to keep the party structure alive and working 
to regain political power. In addition, the PRI will also need to pay the IFE’s 
fine from 2006 and be prepared to face financial challenges similar to this one 
in the future. 
 
Towards the 2006 presidential election, the PRI reformed its ‘Basic Documents’ 
(which contain the party’s platform and principles), reaffirming its intent to promote 
social justice through social democracy. Furthermore, a thorough reform was pursued 
in order to modify the procedures for the election of leaders and the designation of 
candidates. The structure of the National Political Council was also adjusted 
(Pampillo Baliño, 2008).  
 
However, Langston (2007, p. 24) argues that: 
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Much of its strength and cohesion after the 2000 presidential defeat resulted 
because most party members accepted Madrazo as party leader and believed 
he stood a good chance of storming Los Pinos in 2006. Even if they did not 
personally agree with him or his policies, they believed that they individually 
would be better off if he (and the PRI) won in 2006. 
 
The PRI has lived a period of crisis as a result of its gradual loss of power. Following 
Reveles Vázquez (2003b, my translation) the pre-crisis PRI can be defined as follows: 
a) a subordinate relation vis-à-vis the Executive, with the consequential dependence of 
the leadership to the latter; b) a sectoral structure; c) an ambiguous ideology, 
identified as revolutionary and nationalist; d) a predominance of those in office over 
the party and parliamentary leaders; e) a broad and secure source of income; f) a 
hegemonic condition of the party in the system. 
 
After the re-foundation began, its essential traits seem to be the following (Ibid, my 
translation): ‘a) a dominant coalition without any dependence towards the presidential 
institution; b) a territorial structure which is growing stronger against the sectoral one; 
c) a presumably social-democratic ideology; d) an unstable equilibrium among party 
leaders; e) limited funding; f) a condition of unstable dominion within the party 
system.’ 
 
Finally, and as suggested by Langston (2007), the most important problem which the 
PRI has had to solve is the absence of a true party leader, one that can be trusted by all 
the factions as the figure in charge of coordinating all the efforts to win back 
government. Such a figure should also come up with a successful campaign to regain 
the electorate’s trust, and portray the PRI as a viable opposition party to solve all the 
promises which have not yet been kept by the PAN since it won the presidency in 
2000. 
 
The PRI survived the democratisation process that began in 1997 and has continued 
throughout the first decades of the 2000s because of its power networks and 
clientelistic practices. It is, one the one hand, a corrupt party, but on the other, it is 
still very popular. Data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005-2008) 
show that the PRI was the first party choice for 27 per cent of respondents, just 1.6 per 
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cent less than those who stated that the PAN was their first choice. Despite the fact 
that it represents a system dominated by corruption and elitism, it has managed to 
keep control over most of its geographical and sectoral strongholds, showing that it is 
an established actor within the Mexican party system. 
 
3.4.2 The PRD 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of Lázaro Cárdenas – one of Mexico’s most prominent 
figures within the revolutionary and nationalistic ideology of the 20th century and one 
of the founders of the PRI – deserted the PRI in 1988 and ran against Carlos Salinas in 
that year’s presidential election. As mentioned in the previous section, there is a 
widespread feeling among Mexican society and opposition parties that the results of 
the election were tampered with (Lujambio, 1998; Meyer, 1995; Preston & Dillon, 
2004). Although the PRI’s candidate, Salinas, was declared the winner, it may have 
been Cárdenas who won the majority of the votes (Baena Paz & Saavedra Andrade, 
2004).
34
 
 
After the elections, Cárdenas founded the PRD, an umbrella party which brought 
together dissenting movements on the left side of the political spectrum, such as 
former communists, socialists and independent popular movements (Reveles 
Vázquez, 2004). Prior to the PRD, the Left in Mexico did not exist within the party 
system, mainly because it chose to remain non-institutionalised (Baena Paz & 
Saavedra Andrade, 2004), and because the PRI remained united. However, Cárdenas 
brought with him, and many more joined over time, a large group of ex-priistas with a 
very different mindset from the left-wing dissidents, which has complicated the 
consolidation and performance of the Left (Martínez González, 2005a). 
 
3.4.2.1 The roots of the PRD 
The PRD’s ideology has been, since its birth, composed of two streams. The first one 
was imprinted by the fusion of former left-wing satellite movements with the PRI 
dissidents led by Cárdenas, and consists of an anti-neoliberal discourse based on 
                                                 
34
 Particularly for the PRD, the electoral fraud left Cárdenas without the opportunity to be president 
and, being a key figure of the party, his followers supported him as their presidential candidate on 
repeated occasions, thereby contributing to internal conflicts and divisions, as will be seen. 
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Marxism (Martínez González, 2005b). The second, also associated with the priista 
past of many members of the PRD, is a populist narrative rooted in the principles of 
the Mexican Revolution as promoted by Lázaro Cárdenas. Both Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (leader of the PRD in 1996, mayor of 
Mexico City in 2000 and presidential candidate in 2006) are clear examples of the 
PRD’s populist leadership style and discourse (Bruhn, 2012). 
 
Loaeza (2007, p. 422) argues that: 
 
The lopezobradorista movement [in 2006] shows a striking continuity in the 
historical relationship of the left and populism: the former was subordinated to 
the latter on the basis of an appeal to the traditions of the Mexican Revolution, 
many of which are nondemocratic. These included its ideology – revolutionary 
nationalism – its paternalism and its patron/client forms of organization. 
However, it is López Obrador’s merit to have recognized in the insufficiency 
of the infrastructural power of the state – the central weakness of Mexican 
democracy. 
 
Once the Cold War ended and the international communist trend came to an end, most 
countries around the world embraced market-oriented economies. Mexico was no 
exception, as seen under de la Madrid’s and especially Salinas’ administrations, for 
example with the negotiation of NAFTA (Preston & Dillon, 2004). The PRD argued 
in the 1990s that Mexico’s adoption of a free market economy was not carefully 
negotiated, and that the process was imposed by the PRI’s elite without broad social 
consultation. However, the PRD lacked a clear and institutionalised party structure in 
order to come up with ‘a credible, alternative economic program’ (Craig & Cornelius, 
1995, p. 279). 
 
The PRD was formed through the amalgamation of social movements, unions, fronts 
or clandestine cells that had begun to consolidate after the student protests of 1968. 
They were groups of strong militants that operated outside institutional frameworks 
and were truly opposed to the PRI. Though at first reluctant to form a political party, 
over time they would attempt to stand for elections. They were close to social 
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movements and their strength came from entrenched sectors and their connections 
(Ibid). 
 
When expelled from the PRI in 1987, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and all those who had 
formed the ‘Democratic Stream’ (CD, its Spanish abbreviation) held negotiations with 
the newly created PSM (Mexican Socialist Party, its Spanish abbreviation; it was 
formed by six movements and small parties). They created the National Democratic 
Front (FDN, its Spanish abbreviation) and made Cárdenas their presidential candidate 
for the elections of July 1988 (Reveles Vázquez, 2004). As mentioned, though, the 
PRD would not become a formal party until the following year. 
 
3.4.2.2 Inherent weaknesses 
Its genesis as a party has imprinted a permanent mark on it in two ways. First, among 
the three largest political organisations in Mexico, the PRD is perhaps the one which 
most depends on charismatic leaders to guide it through all the enterprises in which a 
political party engages (Bruhn, 1998; Loaeza, 2007; Martínez González, 2005b; 
Reveles Vázquez, 2004). 
 
That role has been played primarily by Cuauhtémoc himself
35
 (though other figures 
have emerged over time, e.g. Porfirio Muñoz Ledo and Andres Manuel López 
Obrador) and it has, perhaps unfortunately, undermined the institutionalisation 
process of the party (Bruhn, 1998). He once had the power to distribute resources 
among the factions (appointments within the internal party structure or candidacies to 
public office), which triggered struggles among them; he is even said to have ‘turned 
the leadership-formation processes into violent ones to promote artificial leaderships’ 
(Martínez González, 2005a, p. 372). However, in the early 2000s he lost that power 
and yet refused to renounce his influence, thereby generating instability across the 
party. 
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 During the first ten years of the PRD’s existence, the most powerful of the ideological groups was 
the one which followed Cárdenas. Even when his leadership was undermined in the 2000s and other 
leaders have emerged as important heads of the National Council or as candidates to significant offices, 
he still has power and influence. Each one of the new leaders has proved to have their own strength to 
attract followers: mobilisation capacity, negotiation skills or simply charisma. 
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Examples of Cárdenas’ influence on the party are numerous. For instance, the PRD’s 
first goal was Cárdenas’ personal one: to be a strong opposition to Salinas’ 
government. Later on, towards the 1994 presidential election, a more institutional 
objective was sought: ‘the consolidation of a party of social struggle, acting within the 
boundaries of legality and violence’ (Reveles Vázquez, 2004, p.13, my translation). 
However, between 1994 and 1997, ‘the PRD seems to have been more prepared for 
post-electoral mobilisation to denounce fraud rather than to win an election’ (Gomez 
López, 2003, p. 251, my translation). 
 
Nonetheless, the PRI’s defeat in the midterm elections of 1997 and the PRD’s 
improved results,
36
 along with their participation in the electoral reforms of 1996, 
suggest that the PRD had reasons to trust the Mexican electoral system a lot more. In 
the 2000 elections it also seemed reconciled with the system, even when their votes 
decreased (Ibid). 
 
Furthermore, the fact that many small groups with their own agenda gathered under 
one umbrella generated irreconcilable differences between the factions. It is nearly 
impossible to homogenise and coordinate the group as a bulk, especially when it 
comes to selecting national leaders and coming up with formal rules. Consequently, 
this has given way to differing party structures across the states and, at least during 
the party’s early years, those who came from the PRI occupied the most important 
positions (Reveles Vázquez, 2004). 
 
The disputes among groups are especially visible and violent during the PRD’s 
periodical congresses, which serve the main purpose of electing national leaders and 
redefining statutory procedures for other types of decision-making. The reason for this 
is that factions control the dynamics of appointments. However, factions have been 
unable to become institutionalised and design a careful plan of action; instead they 
operate through pragmatic cooperative decisions which can fall through in the future 
(Martínez González, 2005b). 
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 In 1997, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo led the PRD to an unprecedented victory in the midterm elections 
where the PRI lost the majority in the Lower Chamber. Their victory in the first election of Mexico 
City’s mayor was also a significant defeat of the PRI. The capital city’s electorate had been unhappy 
with the PRI since de la Madrid’s bad performance after the 1985 earthquake. 
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For instance, the Second Congress, held in July 1993, was rather contentious from the 
moment its preparation began. The groups had experienced internal re-composition, 
responding to political events rather than ideologies. As a consequence, the method 
for dividing power among all the groups had to be adjusted in order to avoid schisms: 
each stream would get a number of appointments based on the percentage of votes it 
had obtained (Ibid). During this Congress, many of the candidates for the national 
leadership of the party presented their vision of what the party should become and 
therefore proposed their desired collaborators as part of the strategy to achieve it; 
however, inter-faction frictions overruled ideological proposals (Corona Armenta, 
2004). 
 
Andres Manuel López Obrador’s (known as AMLO) tenure as the national leader of 
the PRD between 1996 and 1999 was the result of peaceful internal elections (Ibid). 
Therefore, all the streams were happy to take part in the party’s professionalisation. 
New bodies were created in order for the party to have official entities dealing with 
conflicts and offering solutions for them. New secretariats were set up within the 
National Council’s structure and an additional body composed of powerful figures 
was created; its purpose was to keep charisma and institutional consolidation on track 
(Martínez González, 2005b). 
 
Furthermore, despite the fact that AMLO had been linked to the group that always 
proved loyal to Cárdenas (Bruhn, 1998), he pointed out the party’s main problems and 
shortcomings, with the sole intention of overcoming them and winning the 
presidential election of July 2000. Overall, AMLO believed that the PRD had to 
clearly define the alliances with other political forces of the country, and consider the 
possibility of allowing external candidacies. There also had to be a solid structure 
across the country, a professionalisation of the cadres, the achievement of efficiency 
in government and the adoption of a clear position on what was occurring in the state 
of Chiapas.
37
 López Obrador’s strategy for succeeding was to use dialogue and the 
adoption of moderate positions across all the internal factions. Indeed, his perception 
                                                 
37
 The reader might recall that in 1994 the Zapatista movement began its armed battle to defend the 
rights of the numerous indigenous communities in the state of Chiapas. Among the many demands of 
the movement, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) sought to include articles in the 
Constitution to grant the indigenous people control over their land and to legally recognise their 
language and traditions. 
145 
 
about what the party should do was correct (Corona Armenta, 2004; Martínez 
González, 2005b; Reveles Vázquez, 2004). 
 
However, the internal elections of 1999 were full of irregularities and therefore 
brought about a severe crisis. ‘Detached from official rules, the election resorted to 
informal agreements’ (Martínez González, 2005b, p.80, my translation). Thus, the 
groups had far more control over the procedure than the national leadership. In the 
end they managed to negotiate among themselves and Amalia García was elected as 
the president of the party for the period 1999-2002 (Reveles Vázquez, 2004). 
Unfortunately, she had a difficult time keeping stability and equilibrium among the 
factions. 
 
After the 2000 presidential election results Cárdenas lost a considerable amount of 
internal support having competed as the party’s candidate for the third consecutive 
time (Villegas Dávalos, 2001). This led to heated intra-party discussions stemming 
from ideological differences regarding the type of relations that should be established 
with the government of Vicente Fox, the role of Cárdenas in the party and the 
conceptualisation of the party itself (Baena Paz & Saavedra Andrade, 2004; Martínez 
González, 2005b). Thus, the 2000s could be seen as the greatest effort to 
institutionalise the path and nature of the PRD so as to win more offices and perform 
efficiently in those it already holds (Villegas Dávalos, 2001). 
 
In the spring of 2002, the PRD elected a new leader. Accusations of the process being 
undemocratic were only one of the bad public images it projected towards the 
electorate at that time. The two main contending groups, one led by Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas and which had Rosario Robles as its candidate, and the other led by Jesús 
Ortega and supported by Amalia García, came to have irreconcilable differences, 
which undermined the party’s efforts to win a higher number of seats in the midterm 
elections of 2003 (Corona Armenta, 2004). 
 
Within the PRD, procedural rules are created while dealing with the constant struggles 
between the groups and minimising the destabilising effect they have on the party’s 
institutionalisation and electoral results (Martínez González, 2005a). The nature and 
applicability are normally dependent on the ability of the national leader in office to 
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make the rest of the militants adhere to them. Furthermore, they involve clientelistic 
practices and manipulation of votes (as discussed by Corona Armenta, 2004 and 
Loaeza, 2007). 
 
Even if recognised by the PRI and by the Mexican electorate as an opposition party 
capable of defeating the PRI both at local and national levels, the PRD has also been 
seen as disorganised and unwilling to negotiate for the benefit of constituencies. On 
several occasions, the PRD has adopted mobilisation as its strategy for putting 
forward its political demands, rather than dialogue, agreement or negotiation with 
other political forces (Bruhn, 1998; Gomez López, 2003). As will be seen for the 
particular case of the party in the 60th Congress, adopting extreme positions during 
important negotiations left the PRD standing alone against the PRI and the PAN. 
 
3.4.2.3 The PRD in the eyes of the electorate and political rivals 
In the 2000s, the party’s internal struggles have grown much more radical. Some of 
the critical streams of the party, for instance, began to claim that it has ‘reproduced 
nearly all the vices and deformations of the Mexican political system and the old Left, 
although in a much more reduced quantitative and qualitative dimension’ (Villegas 
Dávalos, 2001, p. 81, my translation). Overall, though the PRD has a large number of 
qualified political leaders who emerged from old social movements, it lacks 
ideological leaders who are capable of uniting all the internal groups. The party is 
rather a ‘pragmatically oriented one’ (Ibid) which, over the years, has developed a 
large elite-based and clientelistic bureaucracy. Since the party is comprised of many 
former members of the PRI, at times it seems as though the PRD has the same 
attitudes of the PRI and cannot easily break free from that reputation (Loaeza, 2007). 
Nonetheless, the PRD has managed to put pressure on the PRI towards changing its 
strategy to attract voters and candidates, which is proof that it is an opposition force 
with opportunities to catch the electorate’s attention. The PRI became so concerned 
with losing votes and party members to the PRD that between 1989 and 1994, the 
latter was a ‘victim of a documented violence’ (Martínez González, 2005a), which 
was much more cruel in the states than in Mexico City. The PRI had the strategy of 
isolating the Left to reduce its risks of serious competition. 
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Once the PRI lost power in 1997 – both within the Chamber of Deputies but also in 
states and municipalities – the PRD saw more opportunities to access decision-making 
posts, and tried to increase its electoral victories by representing the sector of the 
electorate placed on the left-of-centre of the political spectrum. As leader of the party 
(1996-1999), López Obrador was determined to combine the defence of party 
principles with effective mobilisation of its militancy in order to win more elections 
(Bruhn, 1998). His strategy seemed to have paid off:  
 
In the first four local elections under López Obrador, the PRD increased the 
number of municipios it governed by thirty-four – fourteen more in the State 
of Mexico (for a total of nineteen), thirteen in Guerrero (for a total of 
nineteen), and six in Hidalgo (for a total of seven). And in 1997, the PRD 
actually replaced the PAN as the second-largest party in Congress (Ibid, p. 
135). 
 
Overall, the PRD has been able to build geographical areas of domination over time, 
where Michoacán and Mexico City are the most stable and important ones. The 
former has historically been the most important place for the party as it is the home 
state of Cárdenas and other important figures (López Barriga, interview, 2009). 
 
In turn, Mexico City has proved to be important since 1997, when the mayor was 
publicly elected for the first time, instead of being appointed by the president – yet 
another tradition of the PRI hegemonic government. In that first election, Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas was the winner and López Obrador succeeded him three years later. 
Furthermore, Andres Manuel López Obrador’s popularity towards the presidential 
election of 2006, which resulted in a national political crisis between the PRD and the 
PAN, stemmed from the PRD’s firm control of the mayoralty of Mexico City 
(Loaeza, 2007).  
 
Even when the party won some public offices lost by the PRI, it still had many 
weaknesses which stemmed from its initial birth as a formal organisation: it does not 
have stable factions, but rather groups (also known as tribes) and permanent divisions 
(Ibid). The groups do not confront each other on ideological grounds; they do so only 
to win appointments, thereby producing political cadres who do not necessarily have a 
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long and experienced career suitable for good government performance. They most 
likely belong to a faction that is capable of distributing positions to its members 
(Martínez González, 2005b). 
 
3.4.3 The PAN 
If the PAN’s history were to be told in one sentence, perhaps the best way to describe 
it would be to say that it went from being a closed circle, elitist group, to an actual 
opposition party (and then a governing party) that realised it had to open up so as to 
be electorally competitive (Mizrahi, 1998). Its own internal dynamics forced it to 
adapt to the national political context and to expand its territorial reach beyond the 
centre of the country (Loaeza, 1999). 
 
3.4.3.1 The origins 
The National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, known as PAN) was founded in 
1939 with a clear Catholic ideology and firm principles which were not to be 
renounced for any election (Hernández Vicencio, 2011). However, once it began 
accessing power in the 1990s, ideology alone was not enough to maintain its electoral 
connection and broaden its domain (Loaeza, 1999). The party was too small to cope 
with all the demands that an opposition party must meet and so new members had to 
be sought, even if this meant sacrificing the strict application of its ideology. Such a 
practical dilemma has been named by Mizrahi (1998) as the ‘cost of electoral 
success’. 
 
Once newcomers were allowed into the party to compete for offices and to join the 
groups of officers for public administration, the PAN began to face what all political 
parties must deal with: internal struggles for candidate selection, the emergence of 
internal groups and leaders, and the increasing difficulty of imposing rules for the 
regularisation of procedures. Those who became party leaders during the last two 
decades of the 20th century and the early 21st were forced to adopt a reformist 
position in order to ensure the completion of the institutionalisation process of the 
PAN (Hernández Vicencio, 2005). 
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3.4.3.2 Historical evolution 
Hernández Vicencio (2009) divides the party’s historical evolution into four stages: 
the first one consists of the ideological background of its foundation, which can be 
seen as the birth of a movement promoted by sectors of the society who were affected 
by the economic, political and social model of the so-called ‘modern state’. It was 
also an attempt of the Catholic Right to participate in politics. 
 
The second goes from the 1940s until the end of the 1960s. During those three 
decades, the PAN had a hard time dealing with internal pressures to build a party that 
had real chances of becoming a political alternative. The issue of the relation between 
the state and the Church was an important matter, along with the agreement on how to 
face capitalism and socialism. Furthermore, during this period the PRI was resorting 
to electoral fraud wherever they felt any pressure, which made it even more difficult 
for the PAN to consolidate itself. 
 
The third stage goes from the mid-1970s until the late 1980s, when there was a 
reorganisation of political actors in the whole country. Two fundamental issues had to 
be solved by the PAN: the acknowledgement that it was imperative to adopt a ‘hands-
on’ electoral attitude in order to win offices; and the party leaders’ dilemma on 
keeping essentially elitist networks as the core of its political activity or, instead, 
begin building agreements with key actors to guarantee electoral success (Reynoso, 
2005 also agrees on the importance of this period for the PAN’s institutionalisation). 
 
In the 1980s, many ‘political activists’ switched to be supporters of the PAN after the 
peso crisis of 1982. ‘Such newcomers were in many ways the inheritors of ideas and 
strategies advanced by Jose Angel Conchello, the upstart PAN leader who moved 
away from the more religious orientation that had emerged in the party in the 1960s 
and adopted an aggressively anti-regime stance in the 1970s’ (Shirk, 2006, p. 98). 
 
Further, since the late 1980s a faction called ‘neopanistas’ dominated the party, 
imprinting a pragmatic view of politics communicated through entrepreneurial 
language. They also transformed the party’s structure through an investment of 
considerable economic resources, the innovation of campaign procedures, such as the 
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use of the media, and the commitment to defend their votes in local elections through 
the selection of popular or charismatic candidates (Wuhs, 2008). 
 
Manuel Clouthier, who ran against Cárdenas and Salinas in the 1988 presidential 
election, belonged to this new group of panistas (Hernández Vicencio, 2009). Luis H. 
Alvarez, who led the party between 1987 and 1990, was also part of the ‘reformist’ 
generation. Neopanistas were one of the three internal factions of the party in the late 
1980s. The other two groups were the liberal Catholics and the conservative 
Catholics. 
 
Finally, a fourth period goes from the early 1990s and ends in 2000, when Vicente 
Fox won the election. This stage was also the decade when the PAN obtained several 
electoral victories at the local level, ‘accumulating over 600 municipal governments, 
four times the number of local victories it had won in the previous 50 years’ (Shirk, 
2006, p. 107). At this point, political figures of the extreme Right deployed a strategy 
to fight for the leadership of the PAN so as to realise their long-term project. 
 
In addition, during Salinas’ presidency, a series of constitutional reforms benefited the 
Catholic elite groups of the PAN. Religious institutions gained legal status and thus 
the Right had an amicable relationship with the government, along with opportunities 
for dialogue (see Metz, 1992). 
 
During the 1990s, the PAN worked on improving its institutional structure by: a) 
extending and strengthening its apparatus throughout the country; b) an alliance with 
business organisations, groups related to the Catholic Church and conservative civil 
organisations; c) building upon alternative citizen structures which emerged during 
elections; and d) the use of mass media for publicity (Hernández Vicencio, 2009). 
The adjustments seemed to work. Towards the end of the 1990s the PAN controlled 
eight zones across the country: two states in the North West, two in the North East, 
three in the central region, one state towards the Centre-north, one state in the West, 
some areas in the so-called ‘Metropolitan area’ of Mexico City, the State of Mexico 
and Morelos, and three states towards the South East of the country (Hernández 
Vicencio, 2009). 
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3.4.3.3 Increased presence in public institutions: strategies and performance 
While the PAN was an opposition party, one of its most important concerns was how 
to react and relate to the government of the PRI. During the Salinas and Zedillo 
administrations, the PAN took advantage of the modernising and reforming context to 
make visible its own interests and strategies (Gomez López, 2003; Shirk, 2006). This 
approach was obvious within the federal Congress, arranging a ‘marriage of 
convenience’ with the PRI (Oranday Dávila, 2002). 
 
Furthermore, when Salinas’ victory in the 1988 presidential elections outraged the 
entire country, the PAN’s Executive Committee cleverly negotiated its recognition of 
his government in exchange for the PRI’s acceptance of the PAN’s electoral victories 
in some states (Ibid). In turn, Salinas was sympathetic with the PAN, as he agreed on 
their view of economic policy and thus saw a good opportunity to favour a two-party 
system where the PRI and the PAN could co-exist rather easily. 
 
This cooperation with the government, however, was not well regarded by all the 
elites, especially not the most conservative ones. A movement known as the 
‘Democratic and Doctrinaire Forum’ was launched by around 60 members. In the 
early 1990s, a few of them left the PAN to either join other parties or found their own 
alternatives (Hernández Vicencio, 2009). 
 
Thus, Carlos Castillo Peraza (1993-1996) used his presidency of the PAN to reinforce 
‘a line of action which in practice privileged the relationship with the government and 
which in discourse highlighted the party’s original principles’ (Ibid, p. 186). 
 
Even at the end of the first decade of the 2000s, when it has held the presidency for 
two periods in a row and has increased its number of seats in Congress, there is an 
agreement among several scholars (Hernández Vicencio, 2005; Mizrahi, 1998; 
Reveles Vázquez, 2005a and 2005b; Reynoso, 2005) that although the PAN has 
succeeded in attracting the attention of more voters during elections, there are still 
several challenges that must be overcome. The most important one is to keep the party 
alive and vibrant, and linked to constituencies between elections. In brief, playing 
good government is not enough to maintain electoral connection. 
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Moreover, once in government, the PAN has reproduced a few of the PRI’s old 
practices which at some point they had criticised. First, based on statements from a 
couple of members who were known to be good candidates for the National 
Leadership, Álvaro Delgado (2007) points out that President Felipe Calderón was 
falling into the PRI’s tradition of the president being head of his party, deciding on 
internal matters such as the candidates for presiding over the National Executive 
Committee. Second, some of Calderón’s close collaborators in the federal government 
have been thought to intervene in the elections for state councils, as well as in party 
assemblies in charge of selecting candidates to public offices. 
 
There is currently an ongoing crisis of the institutional structure, in which the PAN is 
incapable of fulfilling the needs that the party has in its governmental duties, such as 
public policy-making and reaching agreements with other forces, while at the same 
time resuming the slow, internal transformation needed to keep a link with society 
(Reynoso, 2005). For instance, Vicente Fox’s presidency, the PAN’s first important 
electoral victory, has been repeatedly labelled as having served mainly the business 
community in Mexico and represented the interests of the bourgeoisie. The party itself 
was not necessarily represented during his government; there was a weak relationship 
between the President and his party group in the Federal Congress and he faced the 
crucial challenge of building state-society relations (as the PRI had done through 
corporatism) (Shirk, 2006). 
 
Though he had been governor of his home state, Guanajuato, Fox was not fully a 
militant of the PAN. He received a great deal of support for his campaign from an 
association he created, called ‘Friends of Fox’ (Reveles Vázquez, 2005a); the 
National Executive Committee of the Party did not provide much help. As a result, a 
candidate-centred type of politics emerged and negative consequences for the PAN’s 
institutional development came along. First, most of the party affiliates who supported 
Fox were ‘his’, whereby some voters just wanted the PRI out of the presidency and 
did not necessarily agree with the PAN, and so the PAN missed out on the 
opportunity to increase its membership base. This also meant that large sectors of 
Mexican society voted only for the PAN’s presidential candidate but remained loyal 
to their preferences for Congress, which made policy-making difficult to achieve due 
to the split Chamber. Most importantly, however, this whole situation reflected ‘the 
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short-sighted, centralized decisions of an aloof and insulated central leadership. This 
internal centralism generated frustration at the subnational level’ (Shirk, 2006, p. 28). 
 
Furthermore, both Fox and Calderón showed their party’s lack of professional or 
experienced members when filling positions within the public administration (Reveles 
Vázquez, 2005a). Their government proposals did not seem easily feasible in the short 
run, and accountability was difficult to achieve. In covering these shortcomings, the 
party elites sought to become much more pragmatic and less ideological, even 
exploring the possibility of external candidacies for Congress, so long as any person 
seeking to run for a legislative seat through the PAN passed some kind of test 
(Hernández Vicencio, 2009). 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the PAN has recruited a considerable number of former priistas, 
many of whom are close to Elba Esther Gordillo. Some of them have been included in 
the lists for congressional seats despite the fact that their records as public servants are 
not at all clean from corruption (Delgado, 2007). 
 
In the last decade, the party has faced one more difficulty, common to all three 
important players in the Mexican political arena: the emergence of internal divisions 
or factions. As has been mentioned throughout the brief layout of the party’s historical 
evolution, the consequences that divisions have brought about for the party’s 
everyday activities have not always been simple. Just to mention one of them, the 
election of the national leader by more democratic and open means is nearly 
impossible, and therefore the PAN’s national leader has historically been elected 
behind closed doors, exclusively by the National Council,
38
 formed by the aristocracy 
of the party (Reynoso, 2005). 
 
Overall, the selection mechanisms for the members of the National Executive 
Committee, where the party’s president had a great amount of power to decide on 
nominees, guaranteed the continuity of central control, thereby limiting considerable 
changes in the direction of the organisation (Shirk, 2006).  
 
                                                 
38
 In fact, the party’s elite is formed mainly by members of business organisations, Catholic groups and 
civil associations with conservative ideologies (Hernández Vicencio, 2009). 
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Agreements become difficult to reach as the party grows. According to Hernández 
Vicencio (2005), within the internal elite of the PAN, contradictions and consensus 
can be understood through two processes involving the elite: 
 
1) Openness, in terms of opening the party structure to new forms of linkage to 
society. This is derived from the first experiences in government, starting with local 
victories and then strengthened with Fox’s presidency. 
 
2) Re-composition of the elite, based on political factions and their preference for 
addressing certain topics before others. This means the way the factions express 
themselves varies across the country, since they are directly linked to the inherent 
characteristics of each state leadership. 
 
One way in which the groups maintain their power and influence over militants is 
through the use of peripheral or alternative associations. That is, even when they are 
not in control of the national leadership, local branches of the party can still mobilise 
their constituencies towards fulfilling their agenda (Muñoz Patraca, 2005). However, 
and unlike the PRD, not all the internal groups of the PAN overstep the institutional 
boundaries, even when they are fighting each other over controlling and exerting 
power. In addition, the use of peripheral groups allows certain panistas (militants of 
the PAN) to remain close to local constituencies, a very important weapon that the 
party must learn to use and maintain if it wishes to remain in power (Mizrahi, 1998). 
 
Overall, the elite that governs the PAN and which has held important offices 
throughout the entire country seems to have a constant brand to sell to constituents. 
Reveles Vázquez (2005a, p. 228, my translation) portrays it as follows: 
 
An elite which was extracted from the business world, sympathetic to 
neoliberalism, convinced of the values of neo-conservatism and adhering to 
centre-democracy. An elite in favour of the United States, market oriented, 
defending private property and undoubtedly promoting private investment no 
matter what. It respects the law, is in favour of the indirect representation of 
individual interests and truly opposed to old authoritarianism. At the same 
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time, it is prone to presidentialism, functional corporatism and pragmatic and 
oligarchic negotiation promoting its own project. 
 
*** 
This section highlights the key issues, processes and events of each of the three 
parties’ evolution that shaped their behaviour and strategies to advance their political 
power and significance throughout Mexico. Before losing congressional majority and 
years later the presidency, the PRI was strongly linked to the Chief Executive as well 
as sectoral and territorial bases for power. Towards the beginning of the 21st century, 
though, it was forced to reinvent itself within the political structure it had created 
since the 1930s. However, its influence and presence is still undeniably important. It 
remains a key actor in the Mexican scenario, mainly because the entire system was 
created by it in accordance with its particular needs and desires. Thus, the modern 
political history of the country, albeit with some recent modifications to reflect a 
greater pluralism, has the party’s mark.  
 
In turn, both the PRD and the PAN were born as opposition parties to the PRI and 
thus their main aim was to gradually win local elections and congressional seats. In 
order to achieve this, they went through several stages in the process of developing a 
self-identity, a sound strategy and adapting to changes in the political environment at 
the local and national levels. When the hegemonic party was voted out of full power 
towards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the PRD and the PAN were forced to 
adopt the actions and positions of parties with a certain amount of decision-making 
power. They also had to learn how to negotiate between them while maintaining the 
balance of their own internal forces. 
 
The historical account within this section provided supporting evidence for claims 
made in previous sections of this chapter about how all three parties have created 
networks to win power, which have been extended or improved in order to maintain 
all gains. Thus, the operation and internal politics of all parties have changed 
substantially since the late 1990s, as they have sought to maintain their positions at 
the decision-making table. This strategy for survival has locked in collective rules of 
behaviour which have endured long enough to shape the Mexican political system at 
the parties’ will. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
As a prelude to the empirical case study, this chapter’s main goal was to show how 
and why parties in Mexico have evolved into hierarchical and powerful organisations 
that operate through interest-based networks. A second goal, closely related to the 
first one, was to explain how the parties’ nature and behaviour have affected the 
formation and consolidation of democratic institutions over the last few decades. 
 
The answer to the first question is that there is a national political context where 
oligarchies have political fixtures that reflect deep elements of Mexican politics, 
simply because these powerful groups have set out the rules of the game. Such a 
situation explains why the three largest parties are nowadays powerful, hierarchical 
and interest-based. I identified and discussed three salient elements for the evolution 
of the party system: factionalism; decentralisation, which results in strong power 
networks at the local level; and the existence of divided leaderships. 
 
Parties have divided leaderships as a result of factionalism and the pressure from 
influential local figures. These various leaders are in need of public or party offices to 
distribute among their followers to maintain and expand their influence. By resorting 
to networks in and out of governmental bodies, they are likely to obtain resources to 
reward the loyal and punish the disloyal. 
 
In combination with constitutional term limits, factionalism, decentralisation and 
divided leaderships have marked the origin, growth and survival of the PRI, the PAN 
and the PRD. The sectors of the oligarchy associated with each party have managed to 
adapt to the changing political context of democratisation that began in the 1990s and 
has continued during the 2000s. 
 
This leads me to discuss how I have answered the second question guiding this 
chapter, i.e. how the parties have shaped the outcome of Mexico’s democratisation 
process and institutional formation. The answer is complex and stems from the fact 
that the hegemonic party system was replaced by a hegemonic system of parties, also 
known as a partidocracy. Altogether, the three dominant forces – the PRI, the PAN, 
and the PRD – eventually met in Congress, where they have fiercely competed for a 
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higher numbers of seats since 1997. In addition to governorships and mayoralties, 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies have become important for the parties and, logically, 
for politicians. 
 
Overall, in order to maintain and increase participation in federal as well as local 
decision-making, the parties have embedded the elite, hierarchical status quo of 
political processes such as electoral rules and candidate selection to prevent any 
unfavourable changes to their power. They have been successful due to their capacity 
to condition the lock-in or renewal of existing rules of behaviour depending on the 
convenience to forge collective agreements for change. 
 
More specifically, I argue that the inherent characteristics of the Mexican political 
system in general have been selectively shaped by the parties to fulfil their interests; 
no significant changes are likely to occur in the near future. 
 
At the time when the PRI was a hegemonic party, the opposition emerged not only as 
an alternative for representation of the electorate which was dissatisfied with the PRI, 
but also as a channel for the excluded elites to attempt to access power. As the PRI 
gradually lost momentum, the PRD and the PAN experienced electoral victories at the 
state and municipal levels, which in turn set the foundations of their own territorial 
and sectoral strongholds. 
 
Though debilitated, the PRI still operates through its clientelistic networks and well-
established sectoral and geographical operators. Under the leadership of the dinosaurs, 
it has managed to survive democratisation. It has remained as an important voice in 
collective agreements with the PAN and the PRD to change the rules in order to 
maintain the best possible position in a plural decision-making environment. Its elites 
have learnt how to use all their geographical and sectoral power to curtail the other 
parties’ electoral victories and thus remain in the political game. 
 
Altogether, the parties have managed to create and maintain a political system which 
operates under the principles of clientelism, control of political careers and constant 
negotiations to try to maintain the favourable status quo for as long as possible. This 
involves exerting power over rules and public policy, which in turn results in them 
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influencing procedures and even the institutional design of actors such as the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
 
Until a critical juncture is reached, during which the elites will take the risk of 
changing the rules of the game – which so far have been left unchanged – such as 
eliminating term limits, or formalising rules for candidate selection, the Mexican 
system will continue to empower the parties to control every single political process. 
Conditional path dependency in Mexico’s institutions was caused by the parties’ 
interactions and negotiations in a scenario originally created by the PRI and later on 
modified to fit the two leading opposition parties, the PAN and the PRD. These 
interactions were, in turn, shaped by each party’s historical formation and evolution 
and thus are unlikely to be radically changed in the near future. 
 
3.5.1 A final note in preparation for the empirical case study 
If the answers to this chapter’s guiding questions were to be true, then the empirical 
evidence provided in Chapters 4 and 5 should show that the parties extrapolate their 
internal divisions and dynamics to the Chamber of Deputies, which influence the 
negotiations they make with other parties on procedural issues. It should become 
evident that parties have full control of political careers; every single decision they 
make with regard to committee appointments and candidate selections should be 
strategic and in the party’s best interest. In turn, each member of the PAN, the PRD 
and the PRI in the Chamber should be expected to prove loyalty to their party and, 
most likely, to a particular faction or group within the party. 
 
Therefore, the following two chapters could be seen as the laboratories in which the 
assumptions made in this chapter about party behaviour ought to be proved or 
disproved. Elements of conditional path dependency, especially concerning the 
deliberately preserved informal rules and closed-door negotiations should be easily 
identified in the empirical description of the 60th Congress of the Chamber of 
Deputies offered in Chapter 4. We should expect to see, for example, that the decision 
behind the party elites’ approval of a reform to the Chamber’s rules on committee 
sizes and board positions in September 2006 (but not to other procedural mechanisms) 
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responds to the achievement of collective agreements that benefited everyone the 
most.  
 
In turn, within the results of the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 5, it should 
be possible to observe how the parties control political careers and find a way to use 
constitutional term limits in their favour. Through data on candidate selection for PR 
seats, as well as previous political experience of committee presidents and members 
of the Directive Board, the reader will observe that the parties have developed 
strategies to select individuals with leadership skills to the Directive Board, while 
preferring loyal and knowledgeable ones for senior positions in committees. We shall 
also see that party switching and defecting is a common practice, especially from the 
PRI to the PAN and the PRD, which suggests that common codes of practice and 
behaviour established across parties make it easier for politicians to pursue a career in 
the party that offers the best position. Let us now move on to the empirical chapters of 
the case study. 
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Chapter 4. Assessing the parties’ power in Congress: controlled 
dynamics within the Chamber of Deputies 
 
The previous chapter suggested that the parties have locked in formal and informal 
rules throughout the entire political system, which have allowed them to maintain the 
networks and resources to guarantee their existence and participation in government. I 
stated that if this assumption were to be true, then an empirical analysis of institutions 
such as the Chamber of Deputies would find clear examples of the extent of the 
parties’ power. This should show that the institutional design of the Mexican political 
system is highly influenced by the interaction between the three largest parties, the 
PRI, the PAN and the PRD. 
 
Given that Mexico democratised pragmatically (Merino, 2003), that is, without a 
thorough constitutional reform to reshape institutions and lay out all the formal 
frameworks needed to regulate the interaction of multiple competitive parties, only 
partial reforms were made by the three main parties over the last two decades. These 
were mainly electoral reforms aimed at securing their own survival and access to 
power; operations within most institutions, however, are regulated by informal rules 
put in place by the parties over time. 
 
This chapter provides the first part of the empirical evidence towards testing the 
aforementioned assumption. It lays out a descriptive case study of the 60th Congress 
of the Chamber of Deputies, focusing on procedural rules used by the parties to 
distribute committee seats and positions in other decision-making bodies. In essence, 
it aims at answering the question of how it is that parties’ power impacts on the 
Chamber of Deputies in particular. 
 
Thus, in accordance with what I discussed in Chapter 3 concerning why and how the 
parties have shaped institutions, this thesis identifies three main ways in which these 
actors influence the institutional design of Congress. One is the extrapolation of 
internal divisions, visible through the concentration of power of the parties in a 
sensible leader, the need for functional organisational structures within the Chamber 
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and through the use of agenda-setting offices to maintain discipline (Díaz Rebolledo, 
2005; Langston & Aparicio, 2009). Another one is the existence of a hierarchical 
decision-making process (Caballero & Dávila, 2006) and the third element consists of 
the strong effect that term limits have on political careers and the candidate selection 
process (Carey, 1996). 
 
Therefore, this part of my research illustrates the ways in which congressional 
processes are highly politicised as a reflection of partisan dynamics in the national 
context. The extrapolation of parties’ attitudes and behaviours towards Congress 
brings about the dominance of informal rules of practice over formal or legal 
frameworks, and also triggers tight party controls over very concrete operational tasks 
such as committee appointments and the distribution of intra-party organisation and 
coordination posts (see for example Langston & Aparicio, 2008, 2009; Nacif, 2002; 
Díaz Rebolledo, 2005; Weldon, 2004). That is, parties control the making of the 
procedural rules for nearly everything that happens inside the Chamber, and they also 
have the means and desire to maintain discipline and cohesiveness within their group 
(Nacif, 2002). 
 
Through interviews carried out with members of the 60th and 61st Congresses and 
their advisors, I obtained first-hand information on party dynamics. From the panista 
Senator and former Deputy, Adriana González, I learned that the PAN is generally 
perceived as a cohesive party, even more so while sitting in the presidential seat and 
so all its members knew that block votes were the only weapon to push the party’s 
agenda forward (González, interview, 2009). On the other hand, according to Luis 
Sánchez Jiménez, a PRD deputy, his party is all but disciplined, and sometimes even 
faction leaders have trouble keeping their members in control (Sánchez Jiménez, 
interview, 2009). The PRI is centrally controlled from the National Executive 
Committee, and although state coordinators have enough power and room for 
manoeuvre to set their particular agendas, cohesion is generally achieved. 
 
Overall, I would say that the greatest source of power for Mexican parties in Congress 
originates from the existence of term limits and the imperfect checks and balances. 
Both remained in place after the country democratised, because the party elites that 
shaped the system when partidocracy replaced a hegemonic party system chose to 
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keep them in place, and adapted their internal dynamics to operate in that context. 
Non-re-election gives way to the control of political careers, through the distribution 
of decision-making offices within the party group, and across committees and 
governing bodies of the Chamber. 
 
Francisco Palomino and Susana Servín, have been parliamentary advisors to deputies 
from the PRD and the PRI during their careers, and agreed on the fact that factions, as 
elite groups that operate top-down, are extremely important when it comes to parties 
modelling the Chamber’s procedures (Palomino, interview, 2009; Servín, interview, 
2009). As seen in the previous chapter, the historical evolution of all three major 
parties has been marked by constant internal struggles for power. Hence, the parties’ 
organisational structures result in vertical leadership networks which function on 
either geographical or sectoral sources of power with particular interests and seek to 
place their own players at the centre of the decision-making arena. For example, the 
coordinators of Impacto Legislativo
39
 are convinced that the unions put an incredible 
amount of pressure on the party groups of the 61st Congress, because they served as 
moral or ‘out-of-congress’ leaders for some deputies, and therefore contributed to 
creating internal divisions (Díaz & González, interview, 2009). 
 
This chapter makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the understanding 
of the power of party dynamics in the Chamber. It is divided into four sections: the 
first one is of a theoretical nature, analysing the effects of factionalism on the 
distribution of offices across party groups; it also discusses the legacy of party control 
on the purpose of committees. Hence, this section reaffirms what was mentioned in 
Chapters 1 and 2 with regard to the fact that it is impossible to neatly apply theories of 
legislative organisation and party behaviour to the Mexican case. 
 
In turn, the second section will look into the actual manifestation of the effects of 
party power on every day practices of the Chamber, providing empirical evidence of 
the institutional lock-in that has been repeatedly stressed in previous pages. It focuses 
on the predominance of informal rules and the hierarchical way of making decisions. 
                                                 
39
 The reader might remember from the Introduction that Impacto Legislativo is a project that has 
collected background information on deputies and senators since the 59th Congress. It also records  
their productivity while in Congress and provides all this information to the public free of charge on 
their website. 
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Furthermore, it includes a subsection on how parties control political careers, as it is a 
very important source of power for all members of the party elites and also a reason 
why informal rules are so important. 
 
A third section follows the theoretical and empirical answers to the question, 
consisting of a case study on the 60th Congress. It exemplifies the arguments laid out 
in the first two sections to provide the reader with empirical data to fully understand 
how the parties control the legislative dynamics of the Chamber. Concluding remarks 
are presented in the fourth section. 
 
4.1 Congress and political parties 
The electorate and national party leaderships expect legislative party groups to 
perform their representative role within Congress (Méndez de Hoyos, 2007). In doing 
so, it is anticipated that they will defend their views, policies and interests while 
negotiating the approval of public policies (what Marenghi & García, 2008 refer to as 
the focus dimension of the legislator’s representative role). Therefore, they will want 
to appoint members to the legislative committees, which will enable them to influence 
their policies of preference. 
 
Committees are the bodies in charge of scrutinising and sending bills for approval in 
plenary sessions, which means that parties will respect them as the most important 
spaces for agenda-setting and vetoing (Kaeding, 2004; Krehbiel, 1991; Langston & 
Aparicio, 2009). The appointments party leaders make to certain committees will 
reflect political strategies for decision-making and also for rewarding loyalties, which 
will be discussed later on as key elements of a party’s control over political careers. 
 
Loyalties are not only rewarded directly by party leaders, but also through 
negotiations or clashes between them and other important political figures such as 
governors or faction leaders outside Congress. For instance, during the 59th Congress, 
the leader of the PRI, Elba Esther Gordillo, made committee appointments in 
principle based on an electronic system which took into consideration the professional 
background and explicit requests of the party’s deputies. However, final decisions 
were made by the leader and her desire to please, control and even deliberately punish 
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important figures of the PRI, as I learned from Miguel Ángel Jiménez, leader of the 
New Alliance Party’s (Partido Nueva Alianza, abbreviated as PANAL) group in the 
60th Congress and advisor to Gordillo in the 59th Congress (Jiménez, interview, 
2010). 
 
The strategic use of legislative committees by parties has been explained by theories 
of legislative organisation. Although in many cases widely applied theories to other 
countries cannot be used to assess politics in Mexico accurately, they do suggest how 
parties’ power can shape the design of the Chamber of Deputies. Hence, I shall briefly 
refer to legislative organisation theories, complemented with an overview of 
theoretical explanations on the emergence of factions in political parties. A broader 
reference to these bodies of knowledge can be found in Chapter 2. 
 
As has been said, legislative organisation theories identify two main logics guiding 
the purpose of committees (Kaeding, 2004; Krehbiel, 1991). The first one, known as 
‘demanding’ or distributive, means that members of parliament will choose to belong 
to a committee related to their main policy interest and therefore sacrifice the 
possibility to influence decision-making in another area. Committees are seen as 
powerful, independent collective agents within the Chamber. In turn, the informative 
concept implies that committees are not independent agents, but rather parts of the 
whole legislative institution. They provide trustworthy information on bills to non-
committee members hoping to reduce amendments on bills once they reach the floor. 
 
Applying both concepts to the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, as is the case in other 
legislative institutions (as Kaeding, 2004 argues about the European Parliament), it 
can be said that ordinary committees serve both distributive and informational 
purposes. 
 
Three individuals who sat on the Directive Board (Xavier López Adame, 60th 
Congress, PVEM; Teresa Ochoa, 61st Congress, Convergencia; Luis Sánchez 
Jiménez, 60th Congress, PRD), said during my interviews with them that members of 
that body are carefully selected to ensure that the parties’ agenda is reflected in bill 
approvals, based on their area of expertise but also on their negotiation skills (López 
Adame, interview, 2009; Ochoa, interview, 2009; Sánchez Jiménez, interview, 2009). 
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The rank-and-file members, in turn, work on the details of bills, trying to provide their 
peers with reliable information before a plenary vote. For example, Elsa Conde, 
Martha Tagle and David Sánchez Camacho (members of the 60th Congress from the 
Partido Alternativa Social Demócrata or PASD, Convergencia and the PRD 
respectively) and Ignacio González Rebolledo (a PRI member of the 48th and 56th 
Congresses), stated that their job as experts in their subject was to take active part in 
the scrutiny of bills and report any relevant information to their peers through their 
party’s official communication channel (Conde, interview, 2009; González Rebolledo, 
interview, 2009; Sánchez Camacho, interview, 2009; Tagle, interview, 2009). 
 
This means that parties will have the means to have control over certain committees, 
most likely those related to the budget, taxes, energy and constitutional reform 
(Caballero & Dávila, 2006; Palomino, interview, 2009). According to Jesús Ramírez 
(PAN, 61st Congress), it also implies that notable figures among parties will place 
strategic players in those committees (Ramírez, interview, 2009). The predominant 
use of informal rules and elitist negotiations allow parties to shape the operational 
procedures of committees to better suit their interests. According to Francisco 
Palomino, the three golden rules for an effective agenda-setting in the Chamber are: 
1) negotiate outside the Chamber; 2) operate within committees; and 3) implement 
your strategies on the floor (Palomino, interview, 2009). 
 
4.1.1 The effects of factionalism on legislative behaviour 
It would be logical to assume that the leaders of the party groups in Congress would 
be the most obvious ones to decide on committee appointments. However, as seen in 
the previous chapter, Mexican parties are highly divided and, as a consequence, there 
are several ‘moral’ leaders influencing decision-making in the Chamber, as confirmed 
by the team at Impacto Legislativo, Dámaso Morales (advisor to the leader of 
Convergencia in the 60th Congress), and Francisco Palomino (Díaz & González, 
interview, 2009; Morales, interview, 2009; Palomino, interview, 2009). In order to 
understand fully how competing authorities exert their power over legislators and the 
Chamber in general, a brief reference to factionalism theory is useful. 
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As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, factionalism is ‘the partitioning of a political party 
(or other organisation and group) into subunits which are more or less institutionalised 
and who engage in collective action in order to achieve their members’ particular 
objectives … Depending on their specific design, institutions have the potential to 
contain factionalism or to encourage its growth’ (Boucek, 2009, p. 468). Furthermore, 
factions could also be defined as groups seeking votes, offices and policies, and their 
leaders will do everything within their power in order to succeed. This responds to the 
importance that motivation and organisation has for them (Bettcher, 2005). 
 
Overall, even if some of them are disorganised, factions in Mexican political parties 
have effective systems for the distribution of incentives, which mainly rely on public 
offices at different geographical and structural levels, as territorial bases are important 
for Mexican factions. Congressional seats are one of the most common prizes, and 
they are certainly important parts of political career-building (Jiménez, interview, 
2010; Palomino, interview, 2009). Chapter 5 will analyse this matter in depth. 
 
Therefore, we can infer that faction leaders develop organisational skills in order to 
expand their power to legislative instances, where they can facilitate or truncate 
careers for members of their networks. In the Mexican case, they are likely to 
manifest in clientelism, patronage and in using other types of incentives to maintain 
their leadership. Faction leaders are able to do so because of the vertical, top-down 
nature of their groups; in the Lower Chamber, power is exerted through committee 
distributions and intra-party organisational structures. Faction leaders make their best 
efforts to place their players in strategic positions to ensure survival, expansion and 
policy impact, as declared by Erick López Barriga (60th Congress, PRD), Humberto 
López Lena (60th Congress, independent deputy) and Luis Sánchez Jiménez (López 
Barriga, interview, 2009; López Lena, interview, 2009; Sánchez Jiménez, interview, 
2009). 
 
The fact that some legislators have gained a seat or a particular appointment within 
the Chamber means that they might follow moral or ‘factual’ leaders rather than the 
actual party leader of the group in Congress or the National Executive Committee (as 
confirmed during interviews carried out in 2009 with members of the PRD and PAN, 
and with parliamentary advisors). This is triggered by the fact that the Mexican 
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political elite, especially the one associated with the PRI, works as a ‘camarilla’ 
network.
40
 Furthermore, it is associated with the lack of democratic internal decision-
making in parties, where informal rules for candidate selection and decision-making 
are highly dependent on the allocation of resources and the distribution of benefits. 
Thus, if obeying a factual leader is more important for a future or even the current 
career than following the party leader’s plan, either in Congress or at a broader 
national level (as discussed in Langston & Aparicio, 2009), then a legislator will not 
think twice when choosing what to do. 
 
Factions working towards the achievement of their goals shape the informal rules 
governing the Chamber. Also, and most importantly, they are constantly evolving and 
struggling for power, which makes institutionalisation of formal legislative practices 
more difficult to achieve.
41
 
 
In Susana Monreal’s (PRD) experience during the 60th Congress, the party group 
adopted a very sectarian attitude. Each faction had its own practices and rules, and in 
order to interact with each one of them, she had to learn to play by their specific rules; 
this was the only way she could fulfil her role as secretary of the budget committee 
and make sure she was not left out of relevant negotiations (Monreal, interview, 
2009). 
 
4.1.2 The parties’ obligations according to the Chamber’s rules 
The construction and maintenance of parties’ structures and strategies has been 
enabled by the vague concept that the legal framework of the Chamber has of the 
nature and purpose of the parties. 
 
                                                 
40
 As discussed in Chapter 3, camarillas are groups for the distribution of power and offices through a 
mentor-disciple relationship, thereby ensuring that certain guidelines or principles are kept when 
making or applying policies. 
41
 Let us remember that, as stated in an earlier chapter, despite the severity of conflict and tension 
between groups, a reasonable party cohesion is normally reached towards presidential elections. Joint 
efforts and force are needed to win in a context of increasingly high electoral competition. But when 
the election is over, factions resume conflict, especially regarding the adoption of rules and procedures. 
Outside of election time, regional or faction leaders are much more important than the national leaders. 
The result is a situation of dispersion of loyalties of those elected to public office towards several 
principals within parties. This is especially evident among members of Congress, who often do not 
prioritise the national party’s agenda, but rather seek to please their governor, regional party leader or 
the head of the interest group they belong to instead. 
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The rules say that, within the Chamber, each party constitutes an independent faction 
or group, provided that they comply with the minimum requirement of five members 
laid out in Article 26 of the Organic Law (Congreso, 1999). According to Article 28 
of the same framework, ‘for the exercise of the constitutional tasks of its members, 
party groups provide information, advice, and prepare the necessary elements to 
articulate the formers’ parliamentary work’ (Ibid, my translation).42 
 
The operational obligations of party groups as laid out in the Organic Law are as 
follows. First of all, at the inaugural session, parties are forced to give the General 
Secretariat of the Chamber the following details: the name of the leader; the internal 
organisational rules and structure; the names of the group members; the document 
which states the formation of the party group; and the work agenda for each 
legislative period (Congreso, 1999, Art. 26). 
 
Aside from the obligations and rights outlined in the previous paragraph, there are no 
other limitations to parties’ behaviour in San Lázaro. Only a few duties are specified 
for the party leader in Article 27 of the Organic Law, such as the obligation to notify 
the Board of any changes in the composition of the group (Congreso, 1999). Also, it is 
clear that the coordinator speaks for the group and as such has a seat in the Council 
and the Conference, which grants formal power to the leader. The Council has the 
power to govern the Chamber as it sees fit, which leads to informal rules being set. 
 
The brief theoretical overview of parties’ operation in the Chamber provided in this 
section is helpful for understanding how the parties take advantage of the institution’s 
design to ensure their interests are fulfilled. I suggested that not only whole parties, 
but also their internal factions, have an agenda to fulfil. This leads to a highly 
politicised environment and the constant reshaping of operational rules to keep 
everyone happy. Having given the reader some theoretical foundations, it is now time 
to look into the empirical manifestations of the parties’ power. 
 
                                                 
42
 Furthermore, parties also serve organisational purposes, since they make negotiations more efficient 
by grouping similar interests and agendas (Aldrich, 1995; Cox, 1987; Cox & McCubbins, 2005). 
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4.2 Shaping the institution: who sets the rules and makes the decisions? 
Informal rules for the Chamber are set out at the beginning of each Congress. Strongly 
influenced by the national political context, negotiations are carried out by leaders and 
the parties with the most seats obtain greater freedom (Jiménez, interview, 2010). 
Until a new set of informal rules is laid out, the political agreements from the previous 
legislature are taken as valid (Caballero & Dávila, 2006). 
 
In turn, each group has its own internal battles regarding who has the power to make 
decisions on procedural matters and day-to-day issues. This is a consequence of 
factionalism, clientelism and the existence of multiple loyalties, all inherent features 
of the Mexican political system. 
 
Therefore, this section will empirically explore the nature of parties’ control over the 
Chamber of Deputies, highlighting the existence of hierarchical decision-making and 
elitism, which are enabled as a result of the informal rules. 
 
In practice, power networks are concentrated in two main sets of decision-making 
offices that are closely related to one another: top levels of parties’ leadership offices 
in Congress and the two main governing bodies of the Chamber. This became clear to 
me through interviews with members of Congress carried out as part of my PhD 
fieldwork and previously during my work as a researcher at a civil society 
organisation in Mexico monitoring legislative performance. It is clear that both sets of 
offices are at the forefront of legislative agenda-setting. Thus, factions and any other 
figure seeking to influence decision-making will most likely do whatever they can to 
participate in setting the rules through any of those two channels (Ramírez, interview, 
2009; Sánchez Jiménez, interview, 2009; López Barriga, interview, 2009). Committee 
appointments are also important. 
 
Quite obviously, party leaders have the greatest amount of responsibility for setting 
the agenda and appointing members of committees. They are also the orchestrators of 
their party’s strategy across the governing bodies.  
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Being constituted by factions and having fragmented leadership, the parties have to 
select a leader who is able to pave the way for success in terms of bill approval in 
accordance with the party’s agenda (Palomino, interview, 2009). In addition, they 
must also have the ability to foster consensus and cooperation among all the factions 
of the party at the national level. Moreover, it is normally the party leader who has the 
authority and responsibility to appoint members to committees and the Directive 
Board of the Chamber. In being the head of the party group, the leader sits in the 
Political Coordination Board (JUCOPO, its Spanish abbreviation) and therefore has 
the opportunity to participate in the re-shaping of the procedural rules of the Chamber 
that takes place every three years.
43
 
 
The party leaders should attempt to adopt a conciliatory position among all the party 
factions when making committee appointments, and they have pressure from the 
national councils to make sure the best results possible are achieved (Morales, 
interview, 2009). To succeed, it is likely for party leaders to ensure that the procedural 
rules allow them plenty of space to operate, and thus they will carefully set out the 
informal rules to be followed during the three years of their tenure. 
 
In addition, internal hierarchical organisations for each party group are important for 
controlling the performance of party members within committees. Appointments to 
them are made by party leaders with agenda-setting purposes, but also as a strategy to 
keep all the internal groups happy. For example, when distributing the vice 
coordination roles within the PAN for the 61st Congress, most of the appointments 
involved members from different groups within the party at the national level, as 
stated by Jesús Ramírez, member of the 61st Congress (Ramírez, interview, 2009). 
 
Closely related to the party leaders’ goal of maintaining cohesion is the effect that the 
fragmentation and competition levels of the party system have on negotiations for 
majorities towards floor votes. This has become especially important since the 
emergence of divided government in 1997. Since then, the PAN has been more 
                                                 
43
 Miguel Ángel Jiménez (interview, 2010), as the party leader of Nueva Alianza in the 60th Congress 
and thus a member of the JUCOPO for that period, describes his work in the Chamber as ‘a cabinet and 
negotiation job’ due to the constant battles for power among the leaders. 
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willing to establish alliances with the PRI, in contrast to the PRD, which has preferred 
to resort to confrontation, mobilisation and radicalism (Moreno, 1999). 
 
The fragmentation of the political system and the opposing positions of the Left and 
the Right have been reflected in Congress. Longer, more wearisome negotiations are 
carried out between the three leading parties. In addition, in order to facilitate 
agreements, governing bodies of the Chamber operate without accountability or 
transparency when discussing important matters. On some occasions meetings are 
held outside of Congress, thereby reducing the democratic quality of congressional 
practices. The result is a decidedly hierarchical decision-making system, which leaves 
smaller forces more or less incapacitated and having no say. 
 
Susana Monreal (interview, 2009), secretary of the Budget Committee in the 60th 
Congress and member of the PRD, recalls that important meetings towards budget 
negotiations were carried out at the Ministry of the Interior, late at night and without 
summoning everyone who should have been present (she was left out a few times). In 
fact, particularistic interests were so powerful in the 60th Congress that even 
Alejandro Padilla, the president of the committee, was overpowered by other political 
figures, within and outside Congress. In order not to damage his future political 
career, he chose to remain disciplined by adopting a silent, discreet position, letting 
others run the committee behind the scenes (Ibid). 
 
Smaller parties are sometimes unlikely to win a considerable number of seats in 
Congress unless they form an electoral coalition with one of the three largest. Once in 
the Chamber, each party group follows its own agenda and lays out individual 
strategies for influencing policy outcomes, as expressed by Martha Tagle 
(Convergencia) and Carlos Puente (PVEM) (Tagle, interview, 2009; Puente, 
interview, 2009). This explains why the large parties might not give a preference to 
their coalition partners when setting out rules within the governing bodies. 
 
However, when sensitive bills are being considered, smaller parties suddenly become 
useful to the three largest. Miguel Ángel Jiménez (interview, 2010), was repeatedly 
approached by the largest parties to secure his party’s support before votes that were 
likely to be very close. 
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As in all the legislatures after the second half of the 1990s, the 60th Congress had no 
single majority governing the Chamber. This meant that the only way to approve bills 
was to secure votes from more than one party group. In 2006, there was an addition to 
Article 26 of the Organic Law in this regard, stating that those parties which shared 
common ideological views would be able to sign agreements in order to achieve 
parliamentary majorities (Congreso, 1999). 
 
For example, at the beginning of the 60th Congress, when the distribution of the 
committees was being discussed in the JUCOPO, the PRD wanted to preside over 
either Budget or Finance, but both the PAN and the PRI wanted one of them as well. 
Therefore, to secure enough votes to give the Budget Committee to the PAN and the 
finance one to the PRI, the leader of the former was willing to offer access to a 
secretariat in a committee to each member of Nueva Alianza and a seat on the 
Directive Board. This is the reason why the Organic Law was modified to increase the 
number of seats in the latter body (Jiménez, interview, 2010). 
 
It would be logical to think that coalitions would be difficult to achieve or perhaps 
even regarded as inefficient in a context of internal fragmentation or parties, as it 
could lead to a reduced number of seats available for their distribution among the 
groups and party figures. However, this is not always true. Having allies across all 
levels of government helps the realisation of political promises through the 
achievement of public policies. 
 
For instance, when deputies make an electoral connection in their states, they tend to 
address specific concerns, which generally relate to material benefits such as roads, 
schools, economic support or employment. If their party does not control access to 
resources in order to keep a promise, deputies need to find allies among those who 
manage the goods or services required (Puente, interview, 2009). 
 
One way to make things easier is to resort to a public official belonging to a party of 
the same coalition. For instance, this mechanism facilitated vertical accountability for 
Carlos Puente, a PVEM deputy from Zacatecas whose main goal was to improve rural 
communications in the state. The state is governed by the PRD but several 
municipalities are held by the PRI. Therefore, he was able to lobby for rural 
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communications with mayors, who could in turn submit budget proposals for the 
projects (Ibid). This does not mean that cooperation is straightforward and always 
successful, but it does show the usefulness of coalitions for Congress members. 
 
Legislators are expected to make use of any formal or informal mechanisms in and 
outside of the Chamber to keep electoral promises and remain accountable to their 
electorate. When belonging to smaller parties, making use of networks derived from 
electoral coalitions is a clever strategy. However, the fact that deputies do what they 
can to deliver specific outcomes does not necessarily mean that they are being 
accountable to constituencies. Alberto Olvera (interview, 2009), an expert on civil 
society at the Universidad Veracruzana, is convinced that deputies are more likely to 
be loyal to governors or other important political figures. Thus, their legislative work 
may just be aimed at fulfilling the agenda of a leader or figure to whom they are 
accountable, and who has the power to decide upon their future career. 
 
The following subsection will focus on how political careers are controlled by parties, 
with the purpose of proving that it is perhaps the key source of power that the 
politicians exploit to influence the dynamics in the Chamber of Deputies. Empirical 
data obtained through interviews with members of the 60th Congress will be 
presented as supporting evidence. 
 
4.2.1 The control of political careers 
I have repeatedly said that one of the greatest sources of parties’ power within the 
Chamber of Deputies is related to the fact that non-re-election (a mechanism 
originally designed by the PRI to prevent caudillos like Porfirio Díaz from accessing 
and monopolising power) allows them to control political careers. In turn, this is 
enabled by the predominance of informal processes for parties’ internal issues, such as 
candidate selection and the dynamics for agreements among factions, managing 
demands of both territorial and sectoral leadership figures. Furthermore, the fact that 
the Chamber functions mainly by informal rules and procedures, which change every 
three years with an incoming legislature, easily allows for career patronage to take 
place. 
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4.2.1.1 Candidate selection 
Regarding the candidate selection process as a battle between the internal groups of a 
party, I discussed in Chapter 3 that as the electoral power of the PAN and the PRD 
grew, they had to make the right choices in order not to lose what they had earned, 
and also to widen their scope of control. As for the PRI, the divide between the 
politicians and the technocrats, along with the fierce competition between the sectors 
to maintain benefits extracted from controlling government positions, made it difficult 
to agree on a more democratic candidate selection process, or at least on a way to 
select those who could secure enough votes among the disappointed electorate, who 
were voting for the opposition instead. 
 
It is a fact that the candidate selection process in the three parties is not fully 
democratic and clearly associated with clientelistic and elitist practices. Furthermore, 
the reluctance of many internal elites of the PAN and the PRD to allow for external 
candidates favours controlling whose name is put on the electoral list (see Chapter 3). 
Whenever there is a shortage of long-term party members to be parachuted into 
Congress to pursue a particular agenda, the PRD resorts to its network of grassroots 
organisations and movements to fill a seat. 
 
This is how an individual like David Sánchez Camacho, a gay rights activist, was 
elected to the local congress of Mexico City and then moved on to a PR seat in the 
60th Congress, where he was appointed as secretary of the Committee of Vulnerable 
Groups. His name was put at the top of the electoral list for the federal Congress 
because he had the support of all but one of the PRD’s factions, as he had proved 
good performance as a local deputy (Sánchez Camacho, interview, 2009).  
 
The logic of such a cautious selection process is associated with ensuring an electoral 
victory in an increasingly competitive environment. This is a common practice around 
the world; Galasso & Nannicini (2009) found that in Italy, parties compete in the most 
contested districts with those candidates that can not only win the party’s regular 
votes, but also non-aligned voters. 
 
In Mexico, the PRI selects candidates for relative majority seats who are closer to 
communities, and leaves the PR seats to more experience, party-loyal individuals, as I 
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learned from Gerardo Sosa, a PRI deputy in the 60th Congress (Sosa, interview, 
2009). Langston (1998) has found evidence of how, after divided government 
emerged in 1997, candidate selection in the PRI is much more influenced by 
governors and local actors than before. Overall, candidate selection is also related to 
controlling policy-making and maintaining ideologies and interests safe from external 
influences or unwanted changes.
44
 
 
The PAN has similar strategies to the PRD and the PRI. I was told by Federico Ling, 
parliamentary advisor to the panista Gerardo Buganza (60th Congress, president of 
the committee of Foreign Affairs), that Dep. Buganza secured a top position on the 
list and also his committee presidency as a recognition or prize for his defeat during 
the election for governor in the state of Veracruz in 2004 (Ling, interview, 2009). He 
also had ample political experience both at the local and federal level prior to 2006. 
 
4.2.1.2 Rewarding loyalists and punishing mavericks 
Different figures across party structures are in charge of monitoring the performance 
of Congress members, with aims at determining future allocations of public offices. 
Therefore, the performance of Mexican deputies, in terms of keeping discipline and 
showing loyalty to the party’s leadership figures, are strongly influenced by their post-
assembly career ambitions (see, for example, Langston & Aparicio, 2009). 
 
Each party has its own mechanisms for giving out carrots and sticks, as well as for 
keeping their members working for the benefit of the party,
45
 even if it is only a 
faction who they are loyal to.
46
 Parliamentary advisors Francisco Palomino, Federico 
Ling and Miguel Ángel Sánchez, said to me that state coordinators in the PRI, area 
coordinators in the PRD and vice coordinators (known as members of ‘the bubble’) in 
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 Wuhs (2008) presents a complete analysis of how the candidate selection processes have evolved in 
all three parties as the two opposition ones began to win more elections in the 1990s and 2000s. 
45
 This is measured by the achievement of goals, such as the approval of bills in committees (especially 
when it comes to budget allocations) or the negotiation of procedures in favour of the leader (as some 
sort of direct benefits for patrons). 
46
 Fully documented throughout the academic literature on the Mexican Congress (Camp, 2007; Carey, 
1996, 2003; Casar, 2000; Díaz Rebolledo, 2005; Langston, 1998; Langston & Aparicio, 2009; Nacif, 
1997, 2002) is the issue of maintaining party cohesion and discipline in the Chamber. Although clear 
whip-like figures have not necessarily been pointed out, most authors claim that it is a fact that 
discipline and cohesion can be measured through the analysis of floor votes, especially after the 
implementation of the electronic voting system. 
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the PAN could be seen as ‘career operators’ or even ‘head-hunters’ for future political 
careers. Moisés Alcalde (60th Congress, PAN), confirmed this statement (Palomino, 
interview, 2009; Alcalde, interview, 2009; Ling, interview, 2009; Sánchez, interview, 
2009). 
 
Those who have misbehaved are unlikely to be considered for future political posts, 
especially when involving electoral processes.
47
 In the meantime, during the three-
year legislature the parties learn how to deal with mavericks and the negative effects 
of their indiscipline. One way of punishing mavericks is to deprive them of financial 
support for scrutinising bills appropriately, such as not allocating a deputy with funds 
for enough parliamentary assistants; this is a common practice in the PRI, according 
to Carlos Lazard, who has been parliamentary advisor to deputies from the PRI, PRD 
and Convergencia (Lazard, interview, 2009). Trips and participation in international 
parliamentary events are also ways to punish or reward deputies (Jiménez, interview, 
2010). Julio Castañeda Pech, Secretary of Public Relations of the PAN in the 61st 
Congress, revealed that, in some cases, ‘problematic’ deputies who refuse to toe the 
party line are sent away when a crucial vote will be carried out, avoiding any risk to 
the agenda (Castañeda Pech, interview, 2009). 
 
In most cases, informal rules give plenty of options both to parties or specific factions 
for giving out carrots and sticks. For instance, the distribution of committee seats, the 
key power positions, is negotiated first among the party leaders and then among party 
members. In order to be appointed to a committee presidency or secretariat, or to any 
other agenda-setting office, a deputy must be regarded as a suitable choice. If they fail 
to meet the party’s expectations once in office, they may be reallocated. 
 
For example, despite having a mechanism of consultation and review of résumés or 
CVs for appointing committee members, the PAN still goes through considerable 
internal political pressure to decide who gets what office. In order to keep the 
important party figures happy, it first names members of ‘the bubble’ (the vice 
coordinators) to reduce pressure and then looks into committee seats (Ramírez, 
interview, 2009). Generally speaking, to be appointed to an important position, 
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 The PAN throws disloyal members out of the party. In turn, the PRD does not seem to punish them 
(Lazard, interview, 2009). 
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wanting to sit in it is not enough: ‘experience and political sensibility are also needed, 
along with an appropriate background, and political importance within the party’s 
hierarchy. Throughout the committee appointment process, there is considerable 
pressure to allocate seats, for example, from the National Executive Committee and 
the governors. Therefore, the distribution of seats is a multifactor process, as 
confirmed by Obdulio Ávila, a panista deputy in the 60th Congress’ (Ávila, interview, 
2009). 
 
In turn, under a rather unclear mechanism or agreement, the PRD’s factions distribute 
among themselves the seats available in committees and governing bodies of the 
Chamber. Within factions, the prizes are carefully allocated based on regional 
leaderships or focused requirements (López Barriga, interview, 2009; Monreal, 
interview, 2009; Sánchez Camacho, interview, 2009; Sánchez Jiménez, interview, 
2009). 
 
For instance, the party was entitled to three secretariats in the Budget Committee for 
the 60th Congress, one of which had to be allocated to a deputy from the state of 
Zacatecas, which was governed by the PRD. The first option was Javier Calzada, but 
since he became the vice coordinator of the party, the seat was then given to Susana 
Monreal, who had been working in the team of Governor Amalia García and who also 
had the professional background to sit in the committee, as she is an accountant 
(Monreal, interview, 2009). 
 
One of the remaining two seats was given to Erick López Barriga, who, despite not 
being affiliated to any faction, was the coordinator of the deputies from Michoacan. 
This was the largest state representation within the party, and historically the PRD’s 
most important geographical base, which explains why that group was entitled to the 
seat (López Barriga, interview, 2009). The third seat was given to Carlos Altamirano 
Toledo, who has ample experience in budget-related matters within the federal 
bureaucracy. 
 
The PRI’s strategy for committee appointments is generally decided outside the 
Chamber. Information collected through interviews suggests that the National 
Executive Committee pre-negotiates seat allocations with governors, sectoral and 
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factional leaders and long-time members of the party (Lazard, interview, 2009; 
Sánchez, interview, 2009; Servín, interview, 2009). More politically experienced 
members (i.e. those who have held public offices in the past) are more likely to be 
appointed to committee presidencies, and are normally loyal to an important party 
figure (Sosa, interview, 2009). 
 
4.2.1.3 Distribution of intra-party offices 
In addition to committee appointments (to be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter), career-building and maintenance within the institutional design of San 
Lázaro can also be found in the integration of intra-party organisational structures. 
 
Ignazio González Rebolledo, for example, was a PRI deputy twice, once in the 48th 
Congress and again in the 56th Congress. The first time he campaigned in the state of 
Veracruz and won a relative majority seat, the second time his name was placed at a 
high enough position to become a proportional representation deputy. Though not 
extremely active in the party before sitting in Congress for the first time, and not even 
at present after holding several other public offices, his leadership in the magisterial 
movement of the 1960s, his career as a lawyer, an academic and his efficiency during 
the first months of his first tenure, made his party leader take him along when he 
became mayor of Mexico City. Thus, good connections with party figures, but also 
professional skills and results can ensure long-term political careers (González 
Rebolledo, interview, 2009). 
 
In addition, state coordinators in the PRI have a great amount of power.
48
 They are the 
direct link with the governors and are therefore vulnerable to lobbying during budget 
negotiations (Lazard, interview, 2009). Their appointment as coordinators is decided 
by the vote of their peers, and both professional background and negotiating skills are 
very much taken into account. Gerardo Sosa, coordinator of the deputies from 
Hidalgo, for example, was the Dean of the University of the State of Hidalgo, which 
                                                 
48
 For both the PRI and the PRD, the size of the states’ representation is of great importance. 
‘Influential deputies are those who represent a state with many seats in the Chamber. A larger number 
of them also means that the governor can exert a stronger political control over them’ (Jiménez, 
interview, 2010). 
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undoubtedly contributed to building a strong enough name to lead his fellow deputies 
(Sosa, interview, 2009). 
 
In turn, Deputy Luis Sánchez (PRD) was appointed to the vice presidency of the 
Directive Board in 2007 because of his experience as the party’s spokesman when the 
legislature began. He was proposed by his faction, ADN (National Democratic 
Alternative, ADN is its Spanish abbreviation), at the time the largest group within the 
party in Congress. Negotiations were difficult, as the position is important for the 
party and also for the faction in particular and therefore it was necessary to appoint a 
trustworthy, loyal deputy, not extremely neutral but yet able to keep peace among 
groups (Sánchez Jiménez, interview, 2009). He did not finish his tenure in San 
Lázaro, as he was convinced by his group to take over the presidency of the Council 
of the State of Mexico. 
 
4.2.1.4 So how do parties control political careers? 
As seen in the previous examples, the pursuance of further political careers after 
occupying a legislative seat can respond either to party or individual incentives. 
Whether a deputy has the opportunity to be in a decision-making position across the 
intra-party legislative hierarchy or to sit in a standing committee depends on the 
faction of affiliation, the type of seat, and the district or circumscription of 
representation. 
 
Deputies who get into Congress through a closed list (proportional representation 
seats or PR) are more likely to have better opportunities for influencing decision-
making. This is mainly because those seats are filled by more experienced, or at least 
more party-loyal and/or faction-loyal individuals. Gerardo Sosa (PRI, 60th Congress) 
and Javier Zambrano (60th Congress, PAN), confirmed that a PR deputy’s name is 
put on the list by one of the high-ranking figures to whom they have proved capacity 
and willingness to promote certain interests (Sosa, interview, 2009; Zambrano, 
interview, 2009). 
 
Each party has its own criteria and dynamics for putting together closed lists. For 
instance, the PAN leaves the decision to the state councils and the National Executive 
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Council does not intervene unless disagreements cannot be solved locally (Ramírez, 
interview, 2009). In turn, the PRI uses a great number of its PR seats to ensure that 
certain influential, i.e. sectorial, groups have representation in the Chamber (Sánchez, 
interview, 2009). It is through this mechanism that controversial figures such as Elba 
Esther Gordillo have made it to one or more legislatures.
49
 
 
The arguments just laid out suggest, therefore, that the promotion or constraint of a 
political career is a process which sometimes begins many years before being elected 
to Congress. Sitting in the Chamber of Deputies can be a trampoline for other and 
perhaps better posts, such as mayoralties, governorships or access to the Senate. So in 
order to secure access, those aspiring to get there should begin working for it as early 
as possible. In fact, as Miguel Ángel Jiménez (interview, 2010, my translation) states: 
‘the Chamber of Deputies is a required step to be taken by anyone who is pursuing a 
political career. It provides resources and media exposure.’ 
 
Francisco Palomino, parliamentary advisor, confirms Jiménez’ statement: ‘the 
Chamber is formed by three types of individuals: 1) those who can aspire to a 
legislative seat as their highest achievement; 2) those who use their legislative seat as 
a stepping stone to a better position; and 3) those who are on their way down from 
higher grounds’ (Palomino, interview, 2009, my translation). 
 
Furthermore, the fact that parties’ power (the PRI’s more than the PRD’s and the 
PAN’s) reaches all levels of government (see Chapter 3) means that their control of 
political careers can be much tighter. For the particular case of the Congress, it also 
means that factions can ensure the prevalence of their legacy in the institution despite 
the constitutional term limits. 
 
That is, even when a legislator’s tenure lasts only three years, factions have the power 
to make sure they appoint some of their members to the Chamber, as interviews with 
Susana Monreal and Erick López Barriga have suggested (Monreal, interview, 2009; 
López Barriga, interview, 2009). Factions will also make the greatest effort to ensure 
that they participate in decision-making bodies or relevant committees. These are part 
                                                 
49
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, she is the leader of the teacher’s union, a former member of the PRI and 
a very controversial figure in Mexican politics. 
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of the set of important positions in politics that will allow the groups to set their 
agendas, and therefore their control will always be their priority (as suggested by 
Martínez González, 2005a, 2005b). 
 
The purpose of this section was to highlight the main tools that parties have in the 
Chamber in order to ensure their power is preserved. It was said that the way they 
operate in Congress is a reflection of the hierarchical and elitist decision-making 
system which prevails across all levels of the entire party structure. The legislative 
power and other governmental institutions are sources of ‘goodies’ to distribute 
among loyal members, and also arenas for agenda-setting. Therefore, those making 
appointments to committees and governing bodies of the Chamber make sure that the 
rules remain favourable to them. All the dynamics discussed in this section and the 
previous ones will now be exemplified with a case study. 
 
4.3 Party power in the 60th Congress 
The previous sections explored, in theoretical and empirical terms, the way in which 
the parties’ power is reflected in the Chamber of Deputies. Though some empirical 
supporting data has been given on the control of political careers, further references to 
reality are needed to provide a complete and clear picture of how the dynamics work. 
 
This section will present the case of the 60th Congress, which was elected in parallel 
to President Felipe Calderón in July 2006. This electoral process was one of the most 
controversial ones in Mexico’s history, perhaps generating even more conflict and 
polarisation than the one which took place in 1988 when Carlos Salinas dubiously 
defeated Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (Aziz Nassif & Alonso, 2009). The defeat of the 
PRD’s candidate, Andres Manuel López Obrador, not only polarised society and the 
party system (Loaeza, 2007), but also accentuated divisions within both the PRD and 
the PAN. 
 
Furthermore, alongside the presidential elections, and within the first three months of 
the 60th Congress’ life, several states and municipalities renewed local congresses 
and city councils. The majority of the elections and processes took place smoothly 
and peacefully. However, the PRI’s victory in the election for governor in Tabasco, 
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home state of López Obrador and stronghold of the PRD, led to the PRD being an 
even more radicalised party and to some social unrest (Magar & Romero, 2007). 
 
Overall, local and federal elections led to multi-party representation across the 
country, which would increase pressure on the deputies from all parties to work with 
local governments of their same affiliation to keep campaign promises. The greatest 
amount of pressure for many deputies comes from governors; those from the PRI are 
approached through the state coordinations; members of the PAN are lobbied through 
the general coordination of the party and the foundations; the PRD deputies, in turn, 
are approached directly by governors and their staff (Lazard, interview, 2009). In fact, 
it could be said that local elections have a strong impact on national legislative 
dynamics, as the congressional agenda is used in negotiations and as a tool for 
blackmailing in local electoral processes (Jiménez interview, 2010). 
 
Provided that particularistic interests and contexts have a strong impact on 
congressional politics, as has been suggested, then conflict, disorganisation and 
constant obstacles to effective decision-making were expected to appear in the 
Chamber between 2006 and 2009. The parties thus had to make additional efforts to 
keep things running calmly and smoothly among their congressional faction. Luis 
Sánchez and Xavier López Adame recall that sitting on the Directive Board entailed a 
great responsibility in that particular Congress, because they had to make sure that 
sufficient and timely information about other parties’ positions was communicated to 
their peers in time to make important decisions. They were also responsible for 
steering legislative issues in favour of their party’s interests, which was a very 
difficult task in the 60th Congress (López Adame, interview, 2009; Sánchez Jiménez, 
interview, 2009). 
 
In keeping control over parties’ agendas and opportunities, both formal and informal 
rules needed to be adjusted and strategies for such a task ought to have been 
adequately planned. The eight leaders in the 60th Congress would have to prove 
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excellent negotiation skills in order to sit around the same table and prevent gridlocks 
within their groups
50
 and also in the general Chamber. 
 
Having set out this brief background of the inauguration of the Congress under study, 
I shall now discuss the organisation and details of each one of the party groups for the 
period 2006-2009. 
 
4.3.1 Party groups, coalitions and political placements 
To begin analysing the eight party groups’ practical approaches to the difficult post-
electoral context and each one’s organisational and procedural details, it is useful to 
show a picture of the left-right political scale which prevailed between 2006 and 2009 
in the Lower Chamber. 
 
Figure 4.1 Political Location of Parties at the 60th Congress 
 
 
Author’s creation with data from Wiesehomeier & Benoit, 2007 
Acronyms correspond to the following: Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), Partido del 
Trabajo (PT), Partido Alternativa Social Demócrata (PASD), Convergencia (Conv), Partido 
Revolucionario Institutional (PRI), Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL), Partido Verde Ecologista de 
México (PVEM), Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the two forces in severe confrontation throughout the 
legislature, the PRD and the PAN, are at completely opposite ends of the political 
scale. In turn, the PRI, who governed the country for over 70 years, is currently placed 
at the centre of the spectrum.
51
 Table 4.1 shows the party composition of the 
legislative body under study. 
 
                                                 
50
 Although the Mexican economy was relatively stable in 2006, the gap between the rich and the poor, 
along with the job market were not at their best level. The outreach of social programmes needed to be 
expanded and other forms of support for the poorest were in demand. All the parties could expect 
demands for policies favourable to many different sectors and organisations, especially during the 
negotiation of the annual budget, as has happened over the years. 
51
 The location of the parties displayed in Figure 4.1 was made based on an unpublished database of 
expert surveys conducted in 2006, which allows an accurate measure of the parties’ ideologies around 
the period of the 60th Congress’ inauguration. A considerable number of the statements made in the 
following pages will seem more understandable or logical if this is kept in mind. 
PRD 
PT PASD Conv 
PRI 
PANAL 
 
PVEM 
 
PAN 
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Table 4.1 Party Composition of the Chamber of Deputies, 60th Congress
52
 
Party Total number of seats % 
PAN 207 41.4 
PRD 126 25.2 
PRI 106 21.2 
CONV 18 3.6 
PVEM 17 3.4 
PT 11 2.2 
NA 9 1.8 
PASD 5 1 
Independent members (SP) 1 0.2 
Total 500 100 
Source: LX Legislatura Cámara de Diputados, 2006a 
Acronyms correspond to the following: Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), Partido del 
Trabajo (PT), Partido Alternativa Social Demócrata (PASD), Convergencia (Conv), Partido 
Revolucionario Institutional (PRI), Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL), Partido Verde Ecologista de 
México (PVEM), Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). 
 
Furthermore, two coalitions were formed to compete in the 2006 legislative elections: 
the Alliance for Mexico (PRI/PVEM) and the Alliance for Everyone’s Well-being 
(PRD/PT/Convergencia).
53
 
 
Even though Convergencia, the PT and the PVEM gained seats in San Lázaro through 
a coalition, and their political agendas for the legislative period were pretty much in 
tune with the PRD’s or the PRI’s, they operated as an independent political force once 
settled in the Chamber. In fact, the alliance between the PRI and the PVEM in 
practice was only marginal; the latter was mainly an ally to the PRI in its role as a 
pivotal party when it came to important votes such as budget-related matters (López 
Adame, interview, 2009). 
 
In turn, although the alliance with the PRD was certainly useful for Convergencia to 
increase its number of seats, it did not always feel obliged to take part in the former’s 
protests. ‘Convergencia is a social democratic party and many times it differs from the 
PRD in terms of the forms they tend to use to express themselves’ (Tagle, interview, 
2009, my translation). 
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 In turn, the Senate was formed by 52 members of the PAN, 33 of the PRI, 26 of the PRD, six of the 
PVEM, five of Convergencia, five of the PT and one independent member (Senado de la Republica, 
2006). 
53
 This coalition formation proves that the PVEM, PT and newly emerged parties such as Convergencia 
cannot see themselves as relevant opposition players and thus run independently to make their own 
way into decision-making positions. 
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Regarding cooperation between parties in the 60th Congress, the PRI made it explicit 
in its legislative programme for 2006-2009 that negotiation and dialogue with other 
political parties was the only way for policies to become real (PRI, 2006a). The 
smaller parties, whether they entered Congress through coalitions or on their own, 
also made it clear that they were open to negotiation. 
 
For example, as secretary of the Finance Committee, Deputy Carlos Puente (PVEM) 
was in charge of defending the party’s position and interests regarding the tax reform 
in 2007. He was driven by the spirit of achieving ‘whatever could be possible based 
on agreements with other parties. The party had the philosophy during the 60th 
Congress of being part of the solution rather than being part of the conflict’ (Puente, 
interview, 2009). 
 
Moreover, the PRI was clever enough to exploit its historically unprecedented status 
of a third minority, standing in the middle of two confronting forces: the PAN and the 
PRD. It voted with the former, but also with the latter, depending on who offered the 
best ‘deal’. During the 60th Congress it was not easy to intuitively predict governing 
majorities or coalitions, even when the origin and development of the three great 
forces kept them more or less on the same spot along the political scale (Caballero & 
Dávila, 2006). 
 
The organisational features of the party groups were a very useful tool for party 
leaders to achieve cohesion. In general terms, as the size of the group increases, its 
internal organisation is expected to become more complex. The criteria for divisions 
of labour vary across all eight forces, but most of them follow thematic divisions, 
which relate both to the committee structure of the Chamber and to the party’s 
programme.
54
 In the following pages I briefly overview the organisation of the eight 
forces during the 60th Congress. 
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 Detailed organisational figures and tables on the electoral agendas can be found in Appendix 2. A 
greater emphasis will be made on the three largest parties, due to their complexity and importance as 
the leading actors in the Chamber and the Mexican political system in general. 
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4.3.2 PAN 
The PAN was divided into nine vice coordinations, which in turn were subdivided 
into internal councils in charge of monitoring several committees.
55
 The group formed 
by the general coordinator and the vice coordinators was known as the Coordination 
Board, or by its colloquial title, ‘the bubble’ (Ramírez, interview, 2009; Zambrano, 
interview, 2009; Ávila, interview, 2009). 
 
4.3.2.1 Choosing the leader 
The leader, Hector Larios, was proposed by the National Council of the PAN and 
approved by the majority vote of the group members.
56
 Aside from his legislative 
experience as a senator, a federal and local deputy for nearly a decade, he has been 
affiliated to the party since 1990 and very active at the highest levels. For instance, in 
2005 he was vice president of the election commission for presidential candidates of 
the PAN and during the late 1990s he occupied important positions in the party 
delegation in the state of Sonora (Impacto Legislativo, 2008). 
 
However, the congressional leader of the party in government not only needed to have 
an outstanding political career; the ability to ensure discipline and support of 
presidential initiatives was equally crucial. According to an administrative staff 
member of the party group in San Lázaro, the PAN proved to be a cohesive party in 
the 60th Congress and probably part of it was due to Larios being careful to combine 
sensibility and interpersonal skills to fulfil his duties as coordinator (Castañeda Pech, 
interview, 2009). Despite an overall cohesion within the party group, there were 
particularistic interests working behind the scenes, such as the Church and the 
business elite (Zambrano, interview, 2009), so Larios needed to ensure that policy-
making ran smoothly. 
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 The vice coordinators dealing with legal, social and economic affairs (which oversee the highest 
number of committees) would be the most likely to work towards the fulfilment of the most salient 
issues of the legislative agenda. 
56
 Though in reality he is believed to have been imposed by the National Council of the Party, in 
contrast to the leader of the PRI, who was, indeed, elected by his peers (Jiménez, interview, 2010). 
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4.3.2.2 Organisational strategy for the party in power 
Being the party holding the Executive chair, it is obvious that the PAN required 
effective channels of communication and control in order to ensure the approval of 
presidential bills. They saw themselves ‘as the parliamentary group of the party in 
government and in consequence [their] commitment was to promote the matters that 
led towards a better government and to prepare budgets which observe the priorities 
of the Executive’ (Diputados PAN, 2007, pp. 16, my translation). 
 
President Calderón has had a partisan political career, and was therefore much more 
concerned than his predecessor about making sure his initiatives were internalised by 
deputies from the PAN (Ramírez, interview, 2009; González, interview, 2009). 
Hence, the layout of the original documents presenting the political agenda showed 
the party group’s proposals as part of the general 2006-2012 programme, which 
encompassed the presidency, the Senate, and the 60th and 61st Congresses. Therefore, 
the deputies’ goals were clearly linked with the Executive’s. 
 
Furthermore, the legislative party group held several meetings with President 
Calderón as a constant and close dialogue mechanism. Gatherings with other 
members of the federal administration relevant to the party’s legislative agenda were 
also organised throughout the Congress (Diputados PAN, 2007). 
 
The role, motivations and behaviour of the PAN in Congress have changed since it 
stopped being the opposition and reached the presidency. The relation of the 
legislative party group with the Executive has varied according to the president: Fox 
kept surveillance only on ‘his’ topics and ‘his’ initiatives, while Calderón demanded 
to be briefed about everything that was going on in the Chamber (González, 
interview, 2009). Therefore, the general belief of the PAN’s Congress members, but 
especially of those holding an office within the party structure, was to ‘back the 
Executive, support him. If it is not done with the purpose of following the party´s 
history, then it must be done to defend the state’s interests’ (Ibid, my translation). 
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4.3.2.3 Maintaining cohesion 
The complex operational structure adopted suggests that periodical reports on salient 
scrutiny and approval tasks within committees could easily be requested by the vice 
coordinators. Heads of councils put those reports together based on communications 
with committee members, and then handed them over to their superiors. In addition, it 
also facilitated top-down controls and instructions on votes. 
 
An interview held with a former deputy of the PAN confirmed these assumptions. 
When asked about the party’s mechanisms to build consensus and thus ensure 
cohesiveness, Senator Adriana González stated that in the Lower Chamber there is 
hardly any debate, rather, there is a pre-negotiated/agreed position between the heads 
of the different hierarchies. That is, internal communications are bottom-up: the 
committee presidents report to the internal council, which in turn brings the issue to 
the area coordinator. It is the area coordinator who then brings the matter forward to 
the party leader, who is accountable to the national party council (González, 
interview, 2009). 
 
In fact, prior to the inauguration of a congress, the outgoing deputies meet with the 
incoming ones and together they review milestones and next steps (Castañeda Pech, 
interview, 2009). The party’s agenda is carefully and centrally crafted and its 
implementation is also closely followed by party figures within Congress, like 
advisors and the foundations. Thus, there is hardly any freedom to succeed in policy-
making in ways different from the party’s official procedures (Alcalde, interview, 
2009; Ávila, interview, 2009). 
 
Periodical meetings between the coordination and the other entities within the party’s 
structure ensure effective communication towards the fulfilment of the group’s goals. 
There were four types of meetings, of which the most important one for setting the 
agenda was the one held with the council presidents (Diputados PAN, 2006b). 
 
In turn, during the plenary meetings, the party leader and the vice coordinators 
presented to the rest of the members the list of issues on the agenda for floor votes, 
along with the party’s position on them. It is at this point where rebels were expected 
to come forward and explain why they did not agree with the decision (Castañeda 
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Pech, interview, 2009). Generally speaking, the main reason for not toeing the party 
line in the Chamber was due to possible negative impacts of legislation for the 
municipality to which a deputy might be associated (Ibid). 
 
Members of the PAN considered their party to be cohesive. The ‘golden rule’ in the 
PAN is that collective decisions oblige everyone simply because block-voting is much 
more powerful (González, interview, 2009). However, they also believed they have 
the right to defect, and when they did so, it is said that they used a ‘conscience vote’ 
or that they performed a ‘conscientious objection’. Federico Ling, a well-known 
figure within the party for his broad experience in legislative matters, came up with 
three simple recommendations for legislators to exert their conscientious objection: 1) 
try to convince the group on your standing point; 2) let others convince you that you 
are wrong; 3) if you are still not willing to vote along with the party, then use your 
speaking time on the floor to give your arguments (Rodriguez Prats et al., 2008). This 
maxim has become traditional in the party’s legislative practices and is complemented 
with César Jáuregui’s57 arguments on defection: a defecting deputy must ensure their 
argument is 1) authentic; 2) possible to communicate; and 3) not harmful to the party 
(Ibid). 
 
In addition to plenary meetings, problematic situations were more likely to be spotted 
and acted upon at the committee level. This was expected to be done by the PAN’s 
members sitting as presidents or secretaries and thus in contact with their peers in the 
congressional organs. The next responsible officers for settling disagreements and 
possible defections were the heads of the consultative councils which oversaw the 
committees (Ling, interview, 2009). 
 
According to official party documents, the councils were ‘spaces for reflection, 
analysis, deliberation and decision-making which allow [ed] one to determine or 
define where the PAN’s parliamentary group stood on different legislative matters’ 
(Diputados PAN, 2007, pp. 14, my translation). Therefore, committee and council 
presidents could be considered as whips within the PAN (Ling, interview, 2009). 
                                                 
57 César Jáuregui was Senator during the 60th Congress and is also considered one of the PAN’s most 
experienced legislators. 
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Alternatively, the maintenance of discipline was also achieved through the 
foundations, which have traditionally been institutionalised advisory bodies for the 
PAN within the Chamber. Aside from generating reports and information on salient 
issues of policy-making, they are the first filter for any bill proposal that a panista 
deputy wishes to put forward. They will either let the bill go through to the next level 
of approval (to a group of deputies who are experts on the topic), advise the proponent 
to revise and re-submit the bill or simply block the proposal from going through.
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Foundations were in constant communication with ‘the bubble’, and thus also gave 
notice of defections (Zambrano, interview, 2009; Ávila, interview, 2009). 
 
Another issue, closely related to maintaining party lines, is the improvement of 
legislative and political skills of the party members (Alcalde, interview, 2009). As has 
been said, the PAN is still under an ongoing institutionalisation process, where 
newcomers are welcome but expected to follow the party’s ideology. This ‘controlled 
professionalisation’ of cadres is applicable to using speaking time. 
 
Though controlled by the party leader, it seems that interventions during floor votes 
could be easily scheduled (Diputados PAN, 2007, pp. 12, my translation): 
 
With the purpose of putting together a team of better qualified and more 
professional deputies who can respond to society’s needs, the parliamentary 
group of the PAN in the 60th Congress seeks to work as a team and wishes to 
be the space for the development of all its members, therefore: it seeks equal 
opportunities for everyone; it does not want to have a group of expert 
speakers, everybody has to use speaking time; the group offers support to all 
the members for skill-improvement either at the master or doctoral level or for 
any other educational programme. 
 
This argument of equal opportunities for public speeches is supported by information 
published by the party (Diputados PAN, 2006c);
59
 it therefore seems that speaking 
                                                 
58
 If a bill proposal is banned by the foundations, its proponent can still attempt to push it through 
during a plenary meeting of the party. This is when the author of the bill is expected to resort to the 
maxims laid out in the previous paragraphs. 
59
 The web page does not specify date of last update, but based on the date of access, the data could 
cover up to the first ordinary period of sessions of the third year of the 60th Congress. 
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time was often granted, since the number of speeches range from one to 78 per 
deputy. The content of the addresses to the plenary, however, is unknown. 
 
4.3.3 PRD 
As the second largest party in the Chamber, and both an ideologically and 
contextually open rival of the PAN, the PRD needed an appropriate organisational 
structure to exert its legislative power. That was its sole opportunity to have an impact 
on national public policy after its defeat in the 2006 presidential election. Thus, 
cohesiveness, discipline and efficiency would have to be achieved in order to block 
votes and gain strong party positions. 
 
4.3.3.1 Organisational and leadership structure 
The PRD had a simpler organisation than the PAN. Though it was also based on 
thematic divisions of labour, with area coordinators overseeing a certain number of 
committees, there were no councils mediating between the vice coordinators and the 
committee board members. The Directive Board of the PRD consisted of 14 thematic 
coordinations,
60
 eight offices in charge of monitoring administrative and procedural 
matters of the group, the two members of the Chamber’s Board and one vice 
coordinator (PRD, 2006a). They all reported to Javier González Garza, the party 
leader. 
 
González Garza joined the PRD in 1989, and has held important positions in the 
party’s national council, especially throughout the 1990s. He was a federal deputy in 
the 56th Congress (1994-1997) and between then and 2006 he was either head or 
deputy director of governmental agencies in Mexico City (Impacto Legislativo, 2008). 
As a result, he was well connected to important party figures at the national level. He 
also had the negotiating skills to face the challenges of leading one of the most 
divided groups in the Chamber, and which was in open confrontation with the party in 
government. But despite his conciliatory approach among the PRD’s factions, 
González Garza had his own political interests and did not hesitate to pursue them, 
even if not all the factions agreed with him. An example of this was when he 
                                                 
60 Although the procedural rules for the party establish twelve area coordinations, the information 
available on the website shows two more. 
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contributed to a fast track approval of the electoral reform negotiated in late 2007, 
which put unnecessary pressure on the council of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) 
to elect a new leadership and apply a series of complicated reforms to its structure and 
legal framework (Sánchez Jiménez, interview, 2009). 
 
Both the coordinator and the vice coordinator were elected by the totality of the party 
members in Congress. They proposed the names of the heads of the rest of the offices 
within the Directive Board and the final approval was given by the majority vote of 
the party group. If the proposal failed to be approved and a second one had also been 
rejected, then each head of coordination would have had to be elected separately 
(PRD, 2006c, Art. 15).  
 
It is the party’s tradition that all members of the Directive Board are ratified (or 
replaced) at the beginning of each year of the legislature, which makes party officers 
accountable for the developments and setbacks that may occur within their area of 
supervision (Ibid, Art. 17). However, since their appointment depended on 
negotiations between the factions then their performance was linked more with their 
group’s interests. Furthermore, accountability was expected to be established towards 
their faction rather than to the whole party group (Sánchez, interview, 2009; López 
Barriga, interview, 2009; Monreal, interview, 2009). 
 
4.3.3.2 Communication processes under conflictive factionalism 
As with the PAN, both bottom-up and top-down communication processes could be 
established. In bottom-up processes, members of the party who sat on committee 
boards would discuss any relevant matters with the area coordinator. However, 
whether such communication brought about successful policy-making outcomes for 
the party would depend on the faction flag which each deputy held. That is, fruitful 
dialogue between committee board members and their coordinator within the PRD 
could be impossible to achieve if faction rivalries were present (López Barriga, 
interview, 2009). 
 
For example, as Secretary of the Committee of Vulnerable Groups, Deputy David 
Sánchez Camacho was responsible for communicating to his area coordinator any 
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important situation, such as committee opinions on which the PRD as a whole should 
take a certain position. Furthermore, as the ‘speaker’ of his party in the committee, he 
had to submit a periodical report of his achievements and those of his peers within the 
legislative body. In general, he held regular meetings with Holly Matus, head of the 
area of social equality, to ensure that the party’s agenda was being fulfilled regarding 
vulnerable groups. However, he had a considerable amount of freedom to represent 
his party within the legislative body he sat in. As Secretary, he consulted his fellow 
party members before making a decision as a board officer of the committee (Sánchez 
Camacho, interview, 2009). 
 
According to the standard internal procedural rules of the PRD for its legislative 
group in the Lower Chamber, rank-and-file members must have the approval of their 
area coordinator before releasing a proposition on behalf of the whole party. In 
addition, they are able to present an annual report to their constituencies and consult 
them whenever they feel a bill may affect them. Mass media and other discussion 
forums could be used for the dissemination of a report (PRD, 2006c, Art. 6).  
 
On the other hand, top-down communication was traditionally held during the party’s 
monthly plenary meetings. Nonetheless, they appear to have been rather disorganised 
and not taken seriously by the deputies. Therefore, many members of the party group 
decided to stop attending them and rather negotiate informally for support on certain 
bills (Monreal, interview, 2009; López Barriga, interview, 2009; Servín, interview, 
2009; Sánchez, interview, 2009). 
 
In addition, each area coordinator was obliged to discuss with the deputies in their 
field all the initiatives to be presented and committee opinions to be signed by 
members of the party at least once a month. During the committees, the coordinator of 
debates notified the group of the daily agenda and gave the opportunity for the 
members to express their thoughts for up to three minutes if they wished to. This 
would appear to be the right moment for dissent to have been expressed; however, in 
practice, any argument against the party position was instead made via speaking time 
on the floor, or even through the media (Sánchez Jiménez, interview, 2009). 
Mavericks were hardly ever punished by the party (López Barriga, interview, 2009; 
Sánchez Jiménez, interview, 2009). 
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4.3.3.3 Establishing party lines 
The criteria for allocation of speaking time are unclear and it would be interesting to 
know how dissenting party members negotiated with their leader in order to have the 
opportunity to speak up. The internal rules of the parliamentary group of the PRD 
state only that all members had the right to ‘participate in the debates of the Chamber 
and also in the decisions of the party’ (PRD, 2006c, Art. 5). 
 
According to members of the PRD’s party group, there was freedom of speech, at 
least compared to other parties (Monreal, interview, 2009; Sánchez Jiménez, 
interview, 2009). In addition, party lines were practically non-existent, not only 
because of the presence of multiple factions, which complicated general agreement, 
but also because of more individual positions among the members on specific topics 
(Monreal, interview, 2009; Sánchez Camacho, interview, 2009). Even if freedom was 
the norm in the party group, though, there were controls to make sure no one made 
statements as if they had been agreed upon by the whole party. When necessary, the 
party’s spokesman had the obligation to come out and clarify that a certain statement 
had been given by a deputy as a personal opinion (Sánchez Jiménez, interview, 2009). 
 
In accordance with the party’s recent history, the PRD was the most fragmented one 
in the 60th Congress. Such lack of cohesiveness was directly related to the electoral 
results of July 2006, but at the same time it stemmed from old internal divisions 
within the National Council in the context of the general leadership elections of 
previous years.
61
 
 
Susana Monreal (interview, 2009) claims that the control of legislative positions and 
spaces for agenda-setting is often achieved through bribes to fellow party members, 
particularly across factions. This practice has had important consequences in the 
PRD’s factionalism, locking-in what she calls a ‘chronic system of sects’. Party 
leaders cannot break this equilibrium and rather opt for trying to keep everyone 
happy. 
 
                                                 
61 A detailed explanation of the internal groups within the PRD can be found in Garduño (2008), Baena 
Paz & Saavedra Andrade (2004) and in Borjas Benavente (2003). 
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These internal divisions resulted in increased difficulties for achieving block votes. 
This situation was capitalised on by the PAN and the PRI and most likely also 
affected public opinion and the electoral results for 2009, where the PRD dropped 
down from the second to the third largest party in Congress. Nonetheless, the party 
leader of the PRD made his best efforts to negotiate with the PAN and the PRI to 
preside over key committees for the group’s agenda. 
 
Overall, the PRD’s internal division was an enemy of the organisational structure’s 
efficiency. Over the last two years of the 60th Congress, there was a lack of 
willingness of party members to observe what the Directive Board recommended on 
concrete pieces of legislation. They sometimes even voted against bills which would 
benefit their own factions (Sánchez Jiménez, interview, 2009). Therefore, even if the 
formal structure was designed to ensure efficiency, cohesiveness and discipline, the 
reality turned out to be rather different. 
 
4.3.4 PRI 
As explained earlier, since the PRI lost the majority of seats in the midterm elections 
of 1997, it has been forced to learn how to negotiate with other political forces in 
order to gain majorities for floor votes. In addition, for the last three Congresses, it 
has had to learn how to behave as an opposition party, and without an obvious 
‘orthodox type of politics’ present; that is, there is no longer a president to maintain 
discipline and cohesiveness in Congress (Sosa, interview, 2009). Both in the 58th 
(2000-2003) and 59th
 
(2003-2006) Congresses, it was the largest minority, with 208 
and 222 seats respectively; however, in the 60th Congress it won only 106 seats 
making it the third largest party (LIX Legislatura Cámara de Diputados, 2003; LX 
Legislatura Cámara de Diputados, 2006b). 
 
The PRI was well aware of its importance to the PAN and the PRD for playing the 
system. Therefore, it learnt to sell its group vote to the highest bidder, which was 
generally the PAN. The PRD was at times too busy dealing with internal conflicts, 
and so the PRI and the PAN governed the 60th Congress (Sánchez, interview, 2009). 
However, in order to deliver the ‘product’, the party first had to process it internally, 
taking into consideration its own agenda and thereby self-imposed limitations. 
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4.3.4.1 Reconciling factions 
As stated in Chapter 3, the base of the PRI has historically been unions and other 
important political groups in relation to its long-term maintenance of governmental 
control. However, many more types of internal factions have emerged within its 
militants and members, which are inevitably mirrored in the states and also in 
Congress. They have sometimes become so irreconcilable that consensus on the 
party’s legislative positions cannot be immediately reached (Palomino, interview, 
2009). The stage or status of the rivalries between groups determines the type of 
actors who represent the party in Congress and, logically, the type of intra-party 
politics which prevail (Sosa, interview, 2009). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (see page 110 of this thesis), three main groups can be 
identified within the PRI for the 60th legislature. Francisco Palomino, an experienced 
parliamentary advisor, describes them as follows. The first was led by the leader of 
the PRI in the Senate, Manlio Fabio Beltrones. The second gathered around the well-
known Governor of the State of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto.
62
 The third group, in 
turn, was composed of the moderate priista Beatriz Paredes – national leader of the 
party at the time- and her followers. Emilio Gamboa, leader of the PRI’s legislative 
group in the Lower Chamber, was placed between Paredes and Peña Nieto, and his 
not belonging to any of the three groups gave him the independence to negotiate the  
party’s cohesiveness (Palomino, interview, 2009). 
 
Gamboa joined his party in 1972. Among other partisan activities, he was part of the 
team of coordinators for Francisco Labastida’s presidential campaign in 2000. 
Furthermore, he was a close collaborator of Miguel de la Madrid while de la Madrid 
served as President of Mexico (1982-1988), State Secretary and director of several 
important public entities during the 1990s; he sat in the Senate twice (57th and 59th 
Congress) (Impacto Legislativo, 2008). 
 
As the party leader in the 60th Congress, since the PRI, like the PRD, is divided into 
several groups following different figures, Gamboa had to negotiate with all the 
                                                 
62 The interviewee also stated that old-school politicians who are his followers had begun to campaign 
towards the 2009 legislative elections, and so the 2009 Congress would be a useful weapon against the 
PRI’s presidential campaign. 
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factions in order to maintain a certain level of cohesiveness. The negotiations were 
crucial tasks as the PRI was smart enough to operate between the PAN and the PRD 
to work on majorities towards important votes. Perhaps one of the most useful 
negotiating tools employed by Gamboa was the distribution of coordinating offices 
among all three party factions. After all, the PRI’s internal organisation within the 
Chamber was quite hierarchical and coordinated actions through thematic areas and 
based on divisions by state of representation. 
 
The organisational structure of the PRI, along with the operational framework, had the 
purpose of ‘contributing to consensus-building within the Parliamentary Group …’ 
aside from guaranteeing freedom of speech and democratic as well as equal 
participation of the members of the party group (PRI, 2006c, Art. 5). 
 
4.3.4.2 Operational structures, communication processes and party lines 
The existence of multiple coordinating offices facilitated communication and 
efficiency, but at the same time left open spaces for subgroups to stand against the 
general interests of the party. For example, local leaders of the PRI were well known 
to exert influence through the state coordinations, making consensus-building and 
block voting more difficult to achieve in the federal Lower Chamber. This was 
especially true for lobbying for budget allocations (Lazard, interview, 2009). 
 
Emilio Gamboa’s advisor, Guillermo Amerena, described to me the communication 
processes of the PRI in the 60th Congress. These were, as for the previous two parties, 
both top-down and bottom-up. Regarding top-down processes, there were two types 
of preparation meetings before floor votes. During the first one, Deputy Gamboa met 
with the vice coordinators, the state coordinators and the other officers to discuss the 
main issues on the agenda and agreed on the party position to be taken. Then, the 
second meeting took place with all the deputies of the party, in which the positions 
agreed upon in the previous meeting were transmitted to the whole group. Standpoints 
were taken on specific issues and opinions were given by the members (Amerena, 
interview, 2009). 
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Although party lines were given to the members in the meetings, as per the members’ 
own request, the PRI also began providing channels for its members to give opinions 
instead of only following official lines (Ibid). Presidents and secretaries of committees 
were given full freedom to do what they believed was best for the party when it came 
to committee scrutiny and decisions. However, Gamboa kept an eye on things through 
the plenary meetings to ensure that no extreme or ‘inconvenient’ positions were being 
taken (Ibid). Criteria for allocation of speaking time are unspecified, so there are no 
elements for judging the actual opportunities that members had to express their 
opinions on the floor. 
 
In general, the coordination of legislative affairs, so as to fulfil the party’s agenda, 
was done by the working groups, which were formed by a representative, the 
members of the party sitting in the committees involved and a technical secretary to 
assist with practical matters (PRI, 2006c, Art. 22). In addition, the PRI had a ‘council 
of directors of committees and representatives of the working groups’ (Ibid). Its main 
task was to gather the party leader, the presidents and secretaries of ordinary 
committees and the representatives of the working groups in order to have accurate, 
up-to-date information on the legislative tasks being done throughout the Chamber. 
The leader was in charge of organising the meetings, and he could decide to make 
them plenary or selective (specialised) (PRI, 2006c, Art. 25). 
 
Thus, it would be logical to assume that the members of the council were the ones in 
charge of making sure that party lines were followed within committees. Bottom-up 
mechanisms for the identification of threats should begin with the presidents and/or 
secretaries of the committees, as was the case in the previous two parties analysed in 
this chapter. 
 
Party lines were more likely to be emphasised for crucial topics on the party’s agenda, 
such as union-related issues like pensions or retirement funds, energy, budget, 
allocation of federal funds to the states, communications and transport. These issues 
have been traditionally at the top of the PRI’s concerns. 
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4.3.4.3 Behaving as an opposition party 
There is one final topic worth highlighting regarding the PRI. The document which 
outlines the party’s agenda for the 60th Congress and the near political future in 
general repeatedly states that the organisation was at a critical stage both internally 
and at the national level. It therefore had to evolve as a viable option for constituents 
(PRI, 2006a). 
 
That is, the PRI acknowledged that there was ‘a serious problem of confrontation, 
uncertainty and intolerance between polarised forces which created an adverse 
environment for the country’s development. The PRI had, among other challenges, to 
re-position itself before a sceptical society […] The PRI’s situation was critical, but 
its representation and presence was undeniable’ (Ibid, p. 2, my translation). 
 
The clear intention of acting as a critical opposition party
63
 continues throughout the 
document: 
 
While the Right claims to have established the democratic regime and the Left 
seeks a legal fracture for the elaboration of a new Constitution, the PRI claims 
the need to reform laws and institutions as a way to respond to the new 
challenges, as part of a perspective of social and democratic transformation 
under conditions of political agreement (Ibid, p. 7, my translation). 
 
Finally, I should also say that the party knew it was important to maintain a clear 
position of non-negotiation regarding key issues of its agenda, but still be flexible 
enough to participate in joint ventures on other matters. Thus, the PRI’s official 
documents confirm the suggestion made here of it selling its votes to the highest 
bidder, but always keeping in mind its own interests. 
4.3.5 Other parties 
4.3.5.1 Convergencia 
Having been formally recognised as a registered political party in 1999, Convergencia 
competed in the elections of July 2000 within a coalition of the PRD and other small 
                                                 
63 This was a discursive strategy to win a legislative majority in the midterm elections of 2009. 
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parties. As a result, it won two seats in the Lower Chamber, one in the Senate and one 
more in the local Congress of the Federal District (Convergencia, 1999). In the 59th 
Congress (2003-2006) it won five seats in the Federal Lower Chamber (Ibid); as for 
the 60th Congress, when it ran for office in coalition with the PRD and the PT, it 
became the fourth largest minority, with 17 deputies. 
 
Convergencia’s organisation was very simple. Hierarchically speaking, it had only 
one general coordinator, Alejandro Chanona, and all the thematic areas were dealt 
with by each party member sitting in the relevant committee (Tagle, interview, 2009). 
Thus, intra-party communication processes were much more straightforward than in 
the previous parties that have been analysed. 
 
Based on the weekly legislative agenda laid out in the Chamber’s council meetings, 
the coordinator communicated to his faction the position to be taken on the issues to 
be discussed. That is, he provided an overview of the political agenda for the week, 
including the legal implications of the bills under discussion and he then expressed 
what the party was interested in doing about the matter. This led to a discussion with 
the members of the group, aiming at a final consensus on how to vote in order to 
maintain cohesiveness. Overall, the party can be seen as a leftist, cohesive party 
(Morales, interview, 2009). 
 
Due to the small size of the group, it is difficult to identify the figure in charge of 
ensuring everyone toed the party line. To begin with, a clear party line is hard to see, 
since there was an actual leader, the coordinator, and a moral leader, Senator Dante 
Delgado, the founder of Convergencia, and so two party lines can be identified and 
two figures towards whom loyalty could be proved (Ibid). 
 
Nonetheless, a general legislative agenda for the 60th Congress did exist, and deputies 
of Convergencia were expected to work towards its achievement. The programme was 
put together in compliance with the agreements reached while forming the electoral 
‘Coalition for Everyone’s Well-being’ (PRD/PT/Convergencia). Thus, it looks very 
much like the PRD’s and the PT’s party make-up in that its main concern is social 
development and equality. 
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4.3.5.2 PVEM 
In turn, the Green and Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM, its Spanish abbreviation) 
has been in Congress since 1997. It has formed electoral coalitions with the PAN and 
the PRI, and for the 60th Congress it won 17 seats in the Lower Chamber through the 
Alliance for Mexico (PRI/PVEM). 
 
The general coordinator of the group was Gloria Lavara, and there were no other 
internal organisational offices. In fact, channels of communication and decision-
making on the party’s positions were established in an informal, easy-going manner; 
‘they were not at all solemn, because the party is a generational project’ (Puente, 
interview, 2009). One possible additional reason for not adopting a more complex 
organisation in Congress is that the national leader of the PVEM, Emilio González, 
was a member of the legislative group for the period of 2003-2006, so direct 
supervision from the National Council did not need to be institutionalised.
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However, that does not mean that institutionalised meetings did not take place. Every 
morning, before a Chamber’s plenary session, there was a meeting to discuss the daily 
agenda and also the party’s position on certain issues. At that moment a member was 
chosen to use speaking time in order to set out the group’s position on a floor vote. 
Sergio Mendoza, advisor to Dep. Puente, explained to me that the choice of speaker 
normally related to expertise in the topic or belonging to the committee submitting the 
bill or presenting the scrutiny and amendments of a proposal (Mendoza, interview, 
2009). As in all the other parliamentary groups, speaking time in the PVEM was 
controlled by the coordinator. 
 
4.3.5.3 PT 
The Labour Party (PT, its Spanish abbreviation) joined the electoral coalition of the 
PRD and Convergencia for the 2006 elections. This resulted in them winning ten seats 
in the Lower Chamber. Deputy Ricardo Cantú was elected as the party leader and 
Jaime Cervantes as vice coordinator. As was the case for Convergencia, the PT’s 
legislative agenda for 2006-2009 met most of the PRD’s concerns. Its main goal was 
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 However, it seems that Deputy González, who was also party leader, did not intervene too much in 
the party’s legislative operation. Rather, he was busy with administrative issues at the national level 
and left the true leadership of the group to Deputy Lavara (López Adame, interview, 2009). 
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to ‘transform the institutions of the Mexican State to match our political development 
with the level of forwardness that we have reached’ (PT, 2006). 
 
4.3.5.4 PANAL 
New Alliance (Nueva Alianza, also referred to as PANAL) registered as a political 
party in 2004 and received formal recognition of the IFE in 2005 (Nueva Alianza, 
2006b). As a result of this recognition, for the 2006 elections it ran independently and 
won ten PR seats in the Lower Chamber. However, in 2007 one of its deputies 
requested admission to the PAN and therefore left PANAL’s group with only nine 
members but with no implications for the party’s presence in the Chamber. 
 
The party is linked to Elba Esther Gordillo, a controversial political figure in Mexico. 
Since 1989 she has been the leader of an important teacher’s union in the country 
(SNTE), which operates throughout several federal ministries and public institutions 
such as the National Lottery, the Health Agency for Public Officers (ISSSTE) and 
even the Federal Electorate Institute. She became a Federal Deputy three times and 
was once a Senator; her last tenure was in the 59th Congress, when she was the leader 
of the PRI’s group in the Lower Chamber, however, she gave up her seat only one 
year after the inauguration (Martínez, 2007; Redacción, 2006).
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Having been a member since 1970, Gordillo formally broke from the PRI in 2005, 
when she quit as the General Secretary of the party, and since then it appears that she 
has been using PANAL to place her protégées in important positions (Redacción, 
2006). She is regarded as a corrupt politician who uses clientelistic practices to 
achieve her interests and there appears to be evidence that her union gave enough 
votes for New Alliance to keep its registration as a political party (Martínez, 2007). 
 
The initial coordinator of the group was Miguel Ángel Jiménez, but in April 2008 he 
handed the position over to Silvia Luna. The party leader is assisted by a vice 
coordinator and Mónica Arriola was elected to this post since the beginning of the 
legislature. 
 
                                                 
65 Her resignation was requested due to her excessive willingness to negotiate with the PAN. 
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4.3.5.5 PASD 
As with PANAL, the PASD (Partido Alternativa Social Demócrata) ran for elections 
for the first time in 2006. Five deputies formed the parliamentary group in the Lower 
Chamber led by Marina Arvizu. Its electoral programme and legislative agenda stated 
that the party was formed by citizens who fight for changing unjust and unequal 
practices within Mexico’s political, social and economic situation (PASD, 2006). 
 
This suggests that a small group formed by members with similar interests and 
backgrounds could easily communicate to vote in the same direction. They held 
regular meetings to discuss both conjectural and non-conjectural issues of the 
legislative agenda. For the case of the former, positions were taken in order to vote 
cohesively on the floor. The latter, in turn, were derived from the electoral programme 
of the PASD and so block votes were not required to be agreed upon (Conde, 
interview, 2009). 
 
Even if party discipline was the norm, there was always the possibility of a 
‘conscientious vote’, that is, of a member’s defection. In such cases the party tried to 
convince the individual to abstain instead of voting against the rest of the faction. In 
the end though, whether the deputy decided to follow the recommendation or not 
depended on the reason why they were following their own beliefs (Ibid). 
 
According to Deputy Conde (Ibid), defection within her party would stem from the 
fact that it is a citizen’s party per se and its background consists of civil causes such 
as feminism, human rights, freedom, etc., so each party member is committed to a 
civil cause. Elsa Conde is committed to the feminist movement so when she thought 
of defecting it was with the sole objective of not contradicting her electoral promises. 
 
*** 
As a general conclusion on party organisation and communication during the 60th 
Congress, it can be said that, regardless of the size and location on the political scale, 
all eight party groups relied much more on informal norms than on formal ones. With 
cohesion and discipline their main tools for effective agenda-setting, all forces, and 
especially the three largest ones, had to find routes for overcoming obstacles such as 
factionalism and divided leaderships. They had to reward loyal members and control 
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the rebellious ones, and the best way to succeed was to keep it clear that a satisfactory 
legislative performance would be crucial for a post-assembly career. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
As suggested in Chapters 1 and 3, the Chamber is the governmental institution where 
the three largest parties have the greatest opportunities to shape decision-making 
procedures. This chapter sought to illustrate exactly how parties influence the 
Chamber of Deputies, both in terms of its institutional design and its every day work. 
A first, general answer to the question derives from the parties’ use of conditional 
path dependency, whereby they design procedural rules to suit their goals. Parties use 
committees and other governing bodies as agenda-setting offices, and also to maintain 
a balance of power between internal factions by distributing seats in them as prizes to 
loyal members. This, in turn, requires making sure that the rules allow such use of 
committee seats. 
 
The case study on the 60th Congress illustrates the hierarchical and elitist nature of 
the decision-making process, along with the dynamics that party leaders engage in 
when seeking to ensure favourable rules. The post-electoral context of July 2006 
further triggered competition among the political forces and their own internal 
factions. Consequently, reforms to both formal and informal rules were extreme but 
necessary to ensure governance and the achievement of agreements within 
committees and on the floor. Additional adjustments were made accordingly within 
each party group in order to keep cohesion and discipline as tight as possible. Success 
was easier or harder to achieve depending on the level of fragmentation between 
factions. 
This particular context of extreme reforms and negotiation mechanisms carried out 
throughout the 60th Congress proves that rules created through collective action are 
likely to be followed. They are also likely to endure for as long as the actors involved 
decide collectively that they are still suitable for regulating policy-making in the 
Chamber. Hence, even if the PRI, the PRD and the PAN were not absolutely satisfied 
with the agreements reached for distributing committees and seats in the Directive 
Board, they were all aware that it was the only way they could all be included. Not 
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even the unhappiest player of all, the PRD, took the risk of not abiding by the 
established rules.  
 
A second, and more specific way in which the parties affect the Chamber’s design and 
purpose has to do with the tight control they exert on political careers. Term limits 
and ‘bespoke’ informal rules allow the parties to favour loyal and reliable individuals 
by appointing them to certain committees or positions within these bodies. Loyal 
party members, whether to a faction, sectoral or geographical leaders, are respected 
and rewarded, while disloyal ones’ aspirations of a career in politics are truncated. 
Using congressional positions as carrots and sticks and a purely distributional 
approach to committees inevitably has an impact on the original purpose of the 
institution, impeding its representing the electorate. 
 
The following chapter will look deeper into the control of political careers during the 
60th Congress by determining the variables which made committee appointments 
more predictable. With this analysis, it should be possible to see clearly that the 
parties have been overcoming the barriers imposed by constitutional term limits and 
seem to have unwritten rules as to which individuals are most suitable for the different 
positions that need to be filled in the Chamber. 
206 
 
Chapter 5. Party control over political careers 
 
Throughout this thesis we have seen that Mexican parties have diversified their power 
networks over the years, some relying more on sectoral strongholds, with others 
relying on territorial ones. They have all been capable of adaptation to achieve better 
negotiations to secure themselves more effective participation in the decision-making 
process. The PAN, the PRD and, quite logically, the PRI have maintained the 
clientelistic and hierarchical decision-making practices that prevailed during the PRI’s 
rule, and have re-shaped a selection of informal rules and formal frameworks to cope  
with greater pluralism and electoral competition in the last few decades. 
 
It has also been repeatedly said in previous chapters that the three main political 
parties in Mexico have accumulated a large amount of power. They use it strategically 
across the governmental agencies in which they participate to secure a place in the 
decision-making system, which in turn leads to the establishment of certain patterns of 
behaviour that cannot easily be changed. 
 
This situation has consequently influenced the design and operation of public 
institutions. Since it is where all three dominant parties are constantly represented, the 
Chamber of Deputies is one of the bodies most affected. For example, as seen in 
Chapter 4, its vague rules towards party groups’ behaviour and its outdated 
regulations for committee allocations and management of directive bodies have not 
been improved on by the parties. Instead, the parties have resorted to rather informal 
agreements (acuerdos) to distribute positions at the beginning of each legislature and 
whenever negotiations are needed. 
 
More specifically, Chapter 4 identifies two main effects of parties’ power over the 
Chamber of Deputies, the institution of interest for this research. The first one relates 
to the dynamics of committee appointments, which define the purpose of committees 
as informative but also demanding. 
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Parties not only appoint deputies to committee seats based on their professional or 
political experience, but also consider their loyalty towards the party and the 
consequential reassurance that they will work for the party’s interest. Therefore, 
committees provide the whole Chamber with accurate information on bills, so as to 
facilitate decision-making at the time of floor votes. At the same time though, 
committees concentrate on deputies whose interests (whether they are their own or the 
party’s) lie within the jurisdiction of the committee they sit in (Kaeding, 2004). 
 
Second, the governing bodies of the Chamber, particularly the Directive Board, are 
also comprised of carefully selected members of each party. They are expected to 
communicate procedural matters to their group in a timely manner and also to 
facilitate the promotion of their party’s interest. Consequently, deputies’ previous 
political experience determines their appointment to the Board, converting the Board 
into an elitist body where only those with appropriate leadership skills are likely to sit. 
 
Overall, both allocations are related to parties’ control over political careers and the 
close link between national and in particular local politics and legislative dynamics. 
Therefore, this chapter will support the arguments laid out in Chapters 3 and 4 about 
how the parties mirror their internal divisions in their legislative behaviour, their 
preference for hierarchical decision-making processes and how their exploitation of 
term limits to control political careers has had a strong impact on the Chamber’s 
operation. 
 
Through a statistical analysis, my aim is to prove what has been argued in preceding 
chapters: what really matters within parties’ strategies for appointments to committee 
presidencies and seats in the Directive Board is the partisan background of deputies. 
This constitutes a form of party discipline, exercised through the control of political 
careers. 
 
Particular positions across the parties’ coordination structures are also given on the 
basis of networks and loyalties. However, due to strong differences between the three 
parties’ organisations, it is impossible to present an analysis for their underlying 
power dynamics. This matter will therefore be left aside. 
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Background information was collected for the deputies of the PAN, the PRD and the 
PRI in the 60th Congress in order to document their age, gender, educational level as 
well as political and non-political work experience prior to 2006. The database also 
specifies appointments to committees or governing bodies, along with linkages to 
organisations or sectors associated with the party. 
 
The data collection was driven by the determination to find the best predictor or 
combination of predictors for appointments to presidencies within committees and to 
the Directive Board. The possible independent variables were identified as: 
 
 Party of representation (e.g. are there variations across parties?) 
 Type of seat 
 Previous public office (federal, state or municipal level) 
 Previous bureaucratic position (federal, state and municipal level) 
 Active participation in the party as an officer at any level 
 Association with sectors or organisations linked to the party 
 Age, gender and level of education. 
 
Since the information was substantial with a population of 440 deputies, it was 
possible to obtain significant results for the statistical analysis. In addition, several 
variables were used to establish basic parameters to complement the empirical 
description of the 60th Congress laid out in Chapter 4. 
 
The results discussed in the following pages constitute valuable evidence on how all 
three parties share the strategy of moving their loyal members around the national and 
local public institutions to fulfil their interests. This suggests that the PAN and the 
PRD, born within the system created by the PRI, have adopted the PRI’s practices of 
‘recycling’ loyal members, finding ways around the constitutional prohibition of re-
election and bringing former deputies back into the Chamber. In doing so, all three 
parties have locked in informal rules for party organisation and behaviour. 
 
With the purpose of presenting the data collected and discussing the results obtained 
in a clear and comprehensive manner, this chapter is divided into five sections. The 
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first one provides summary statistics of the population, showing general 
characteristics of each party group and differences between them regarding education 
levels, age or gender composition. In addition, it points to the proportion of deputies 
who had bureaucratic or elected experience before joining Congress in 2006. Records 
of party switching are also mentioned. 
 
The second and third sections present the statistical analysis carried out in order to 
understand the logic of appointments to senior positions of the committees and the 
Directive Board respectively. 
 
A fourth section follows, which adds statistical evidence to the argument laid out in 
Chapter 3 regarding candidate selection processes. It addresses the question of which 
factors make members of the parties more likely to be nominated to the Chamber 
through proportional representation (PR) seats.  
 
A discussion of the results obtained from the statistical analysis is presented in the 
fifth section. As this is the final chapter of the case study developed in Part II of this 
research, I conclude it by providing an overview of the main empirical findings spread 
across Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
 
5.1 The general picture: summary statistics 
As has been said, the data collected was not only used to construct models for the 
statistical analysis, but also served to provide a quantitative supplement to the 
empirical description of the 60th Congress presented earlier in this research. Table 5.1 
summarises the descriptive statistics obtained, which will be overviewed in this 
section. 
 
First of all, it should be mentioned that the 60th Congress of the Chamber of Deputies 
was, as politics in Mexico has traditionally been, predominantly male. It can be seen 
in Table 5.1 that a considerably larger proportion of all three parties’ members were 
men. Unsurprisingly, as it is the oldest and most traditional party, the PRI had the 
fewest number of female members. 
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Table 5.1 Background Information of Deputies 
 PAN PRD PRI 
Age     
Mean 46 49 52 
        
Gender     
Female 21.7% 20.5% 16.0% 
Male 78.3% 79.5% 84.0% 
        
Education     
University Degree 65.2% 48.0% 61.3% 
Postgraduate 23.2% 17.3% 19.8% 
        
Previous Elected Office     
Federal     
Deputy 10.6% 12.6% 27.4% 
Senator 2.4% 0.8% 9.4% 
Both 3.9% 2.4% 8.5% 
None 83.1% 84.3% 54.7% 
State     
Deputy 32.9% 36.2% 39.6% 
Governor 0.5% 0.8% 1.9% 
None 66.7% 63.0% 57.5% 
      
Municipal     
Mayor 11.6% 15.7% 28.3% 
Councillor 22.2% 10.2% 5.7% 
Both 1.0% 0.8% 4.7% 
None 65.2% 73.2% 81.3% 
 Total with no experience = 71.4%      
Previous Bureaucratic Position     
Federal 20.3% 11.8% 21.7% 
State 24.6% 28.3% 45.3% 
Municipal 28.5% 16.5% 8.5% 
None 26.6% 43.3% 24.5% 
 Total  with no experience = 30.9%        
Sectoral affiliation     
Active 9.2% 18.9% 15.1% 
 
Total 207 127 106 
N = 440 
Source: Author’s calculations with information collected from Impacto Legislativo, 2008 
 
Regarding age, it can be seen that the PAN has the youngest mean, while the PRI has 
the oldest members on average. Given that it had the monopoly of public offices for 
decades, this finding is not surprising; it also indicates that the deputies with the 
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longest political careers belong to the PRI. However, looking into particular cases, it 
is interesting that the PRD has the youngest member, aged 27, and the PAN has the 
oldest deputy, aged 79. 
 
Education levels are an important factor for the purpose of committees, especially 
under the informative approach. Higher education levels mean that the deputies have 
much more specialised knowledge on policy issues and therefore should be able to 
engage in in-depth discussions within committees prior to the approval of a bill on the 
floor. Overall, the members of the PAN, the PRD and the PRI for the period under 
observation mostly had a university degree as their highest qualification. However, a 
smaller proportion of individuals had achieved a postgraduate degree, slightly more of 
whom belonged to the PAN. 
 
Drawing information from records on deputies’ experiences in elected offices and 
bureaucracies, either at the federal or local levels, provided interesting data about the 
differences between the political backgrounds of the members of each party. 
 
5.1.1 Bureaucratic experience 
Summary statistics presented in Table 5.1 show that not all members of the three 
parties had held bureaucratic positions prior to being elected to the 60th Congress, but 
compared to the number of members who had not been elected to office, non-
bureaucratic experience was less uncommon. Of those who had a previous 
appointment, the most common offices vary between parties: the highest proportion of 
members of the PRI and the PRD had experience in state bureaucracies, whereas 
members of the PAN had served in municipalities. 
 
In contrast, the least common positions held by the PRD’s members were at the 
federal level, quite logically as the party has never held the presidency. In the case of 
the PRI, the smallest proportion had worked in municipal bureaucracies, presumably 
because the party had much more appealing offices to distribute at the federal and 
state levels. Rather obviously, the PAN’s lowest number of members’ experience 
corresponds to the federal level; it won the presidency only in 2000 and many of the 
former bureaucrats aligned with the PRI remained in their posts. After all, the PAN 
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did not have large numbers of experienced individuals to take over the entire public 
administration. 
 
5.1.2 Elected office experience 
As suggested above, a high proportion of members of all three parties had no previous 
experience in elected offices. This is especially true at the municipal level. With 
regard to the federal level, the PRI has the most cases of deputies who had previously 
been deputies, senators or both. It is followed by the PAN and in third place comes 
the PRD, with a considerably lower proportion than the PRI. The office most 
commonly held by members of all three parties was a seat in the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
 
Very few deputies manage to return to the Chamber twice and even fewer achieve it 
three times (see Table 5.2 below). It is not surprising that the highest number of those 
who were federal deputies three times belong to the PRI, the majority of whom have 
also been senators, as the party was in full control of the legislative body for decades. 
The results shown in Table 5.2 also prove that, even with the existence of 
constitutional term limits, political careerism is in place. Since no independent 
candidates are allowed to run for office, parties have become powerful providers of 
political careers for ambitious politicians. 
 
Table 5.2 Number of Times Elected as Federal Deputy 
  PAN PRD PRI   
  Number of cases 
Total % 
(of total 
population) 
Once 26 18 26 70 15.9% 
Twice 3 0 10 13 2.9% 
Three times 1 1 2 4 0.9% 
Never previously 177 108 68 353 80.2% 
Total 207 127 106 440 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation with information collected from Impacto Legislativo, 2008 
 
At the state level, congressional seats were also the most common political 
experience. Around a third of the members of the PAN, the PRD and the PRI had 
been elected as deputies in their states prior to 2006. It is interesting to point out that 
the differences between the parties are not as strong as at the federal level, which 
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reinforces the argument laid out in Chapter 3 about electoral competition between the 
three being highest in the states. 
 
Information about political experience of the members of the 60th Congress was also 
considered for municipal offices. Among those who were mayors, the majority 
belonged to the PRI, followed by members of the PRD and last came the PAN. The 
most common office for the PAN was that of councillor. For the PRD, the majority of 
those who had held a municipal office prior to the 60th Congress had been mayors. 
The same office was the most popularly held by members of the PRI. 
 
Logically, it seems that the PRI is the party with the most cases of pre-legislative 
experience in publicly elected offices. Its long-term control of the country still 
provides it with an extensive machinery to draw from for power allocation purposes.  
Furthermore, another general trait observed so far is that tenure at the state level 
seems to be the most common among all the parties’ members. This is expected, as 
local congresses and governorships have been the PAN’s and the PRD’s initial 
electoral victories. 
 
However, parties are not the only ones responsible for the considerable number of 
individuals who have been in and out of public offices throughout their lives. This 
circumstance also points towards the predominance of ambitious politicians who see 
politics as a convenient means for a career which allows access to resources and fame. 
This could suggest that there is an underlying culture of political ambition and the 
exploitation of networks for personal benefits. 
 
5.1.3 Links to party-affiliated organisations 
Following the statements made throughout the empirical section of this research in 
Part II, the achievement of political careers is allowed or restrained by different party 
figures. These are not necessarily involved in the organisation itself, but can also 
belong to entities or sectors associated with the party’s life and electoral success. 
Hence, a variable was created within the database in order to include information 
about the deputies’ affiliation to these groups. 
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Explicit links to organisations or sectors were not registered for the entire political 
population; however, analysing those who did have records made it possible to 
observe that the PRD had the highest level of activity. Next came the PRI, followed 
by the PAN. 
 
The PRD was formed in 1989 by the fusion of several left-wing parties and 
organisations, and affiliation of its members to any of these former actors was 
considered as belonging to relevant sectors. Therefore, a higher activity of the PRD’s 
deputies in this realm might compensate for their reduced experience in elected 
offices or bureaucratic posts compared to the PRI and the PAN. 
 
This is also related to the fact that many deputies representing the PRD have emerged 
from non-political sectors such as civil society groups, the academic world and 
cultural spheres. 
 
5.1.4 Party switching 
It is interesting to see how many deputies have switched between parties and when 
they have done so. This constitutes valuable evidence of political ambition and 
careerism among Mexican politicians, as it could imply that the politician would be 
loyal to any party that gives them the opportunity to build a career.  
 
It is worth remembering that the historical evolution of the parties presented in 
Chapter 3 point out occurrences of party switching, especially from the PRI to either 
the PRD or the PAN. Table 5.3 presents data for the 60th Congress; both the PAN and 
the PRD had members who had been affiliated to another party earlier in their 
political career. In contrast, none of the members of the PRI had any records of party 
switching. 
 
A closer observation of the cases of party switching, in terms of when these happened, 
could suggest that their nature was office-seeking. This is closely linked with the 
theory of parties being the allocators of political careers. Although it was unavailable 
for seven of the total 28 cases of party switching, information collected for the 
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remaining ones show that all of them started to happen in the 1990s, when the PRD 
and the PAN became electorally competitive. 
 
Furthermore, the earlier defections (in 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1999) were changes of 
affiliation from the PRI to either the PAN or the PRD. This trend was similar in 2000, 
2005 and 2006, which coincides with the preparation of candidacies towards the 
federal congressional elections of 2000 and 2006. 
 
Table 5.3 Party Switching 
 PAN PRD PRI 
 Number of cases 
Switched from the PRD 2 0 0 
    Elected through PR 0 0 0 
    Elected through SMD 2 0 0 
Switched from the PRI 10 12 0 
    Elected through PR 3 1 0 
    Elected through SMD 7 11 0 
Switched from the PAN 0 2 0 
    Elected through PR 0 0 0 
    Elected through SMD 0 2 0 
Other 1 1 0 
    Elected through PR 1 0 0 
    Elected through SMD 0 1 0 
Total switches 13 15 0 
    
Previously elected to office by a 
different party 6 3 0 
    Elected through PR 2 1 0 
    Elected through SMD 4 2 0 
Source: Author’s calculation with information collected from Impacto Legislativo, 2008. 
 
With regard to switches to the PRD or the PAN, all of them happened between 2003 
and 2005, except for the case already explained in Chapter 4. It consists of one deputy 
who resigned from the PANAL when already sitting in the Chamber of Deputies and 
then decided to join the PAN’s legislative group. Being an independent member of the 
Chamber reduces one’s possibility to be actively involved in the decision-making 
process, since most opportunities are negotiated by parties and are thus granted to 
their members. 
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Although the cases of moving from one party to another are merely assumptions as 
they are not tested through appropriate and reliable statistical analysis to prove 
causation, they do place most of the switches from the PRI within a period of better 
opportunities for career-building in opposition parties. 
 
Table 5.3 also shows that 23 out of the 28 switches were made by individuals elected 
to the 60th Congress through a single-member district (SMD) seat. This could suggest 
several things: first, that in the ‘recipient’ party, PR seats were reserved for those who 
had been in the party for longer; second, that the ‘newcomers’ were likely to ensure a 
victory in their district for some reason, for example popularity or likelihood to defeat 
the candidate put forward by their previous party; and third, that they were offered 
that seat if they joined the party. 
 
Once in the Chamber, 57 per cent of the individuals with recorded party switches 
were appointed as a secretary of a committee and 18 per cent to a presidency. The rest 
were rank-and-file members of a committee and just one individual sat as a secretary 
of the Directive Board. This could suggest that senior positions were used as carrots 
for these new members or maybe were seen as opportunities for effective policy-
making. This suggestion is an assumption though as it was not tested through 
statistical analysis. 
 
Finally, and related to this topic, it was also relevant to register how many of those 
deputies who had switched parties had been elected to office with their previous party. 
The observations show that both the PAN and the PRD had six and three cases of 
deputies who had held an elected office before with a different party from the one 
they represented in Congress. Their previous experience was perhaps welcome for 
their new party’s strategy. Six out of the total nine cases were elected to an SMD seat, 
consistent with the overall seat pattern of those individuals who switched party. 
 
5.1.5 What do these statistics suggest? 
This section has presented an overview of the summary statistics derived from the 
database on members of the 60th Congress affiliated to the PAN, the PRD and the 
PRI. Primarily used to complement the empirical description of the Chamber offered 
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in Chapter 4, it does, however, suggest a couple of explanations towards what type of 
profile makes it easier to be appointed to a committee presidency or the Directive 
Board. 
 
First, the information suggests that, since the vast majority of members of Congress 
do not have previous experience either as public officials or civil servants, then the 
privileged few who do are more likely to be trusted by party leaders to do a good job 
as presidents or secretaries. They have obviously been active in politics and therefore 
have good relationships with the party and perhaps even with the electorate. 
 
The second preliminary statement which can be extracted from the descriptive 
statistics presented herein is based on the higher records of political activity at the 
state level, both in local congresses and bureaucracies. It could be inferred that 
deputies with such prior experience would have higher aspirations within the 
Chamber and probably therefore have the adequate networks to fulfil them. However, 
making inferences from summary statistics does not provide reliable results. Many 
factors are involved at the same time when predicting appointments and the actual 
effect of each one cannot be accurately measured with simple descriptive statistics. 
Therefore, it is necessary to carry out a multivariate analysis to see how multi-causal 
factors correlate with each other. 
 
The following sections discuss the elaboration and results of the analysis run to 
predict appointments to committees and the Board for the 60th Congress. They are 
followed by a prediction of candidate selections to PR and SMD seats. 
 
5.2 Committee appointments and party discipline: determinants of 
distribution of senior positions 
Previous studies on Mexican politics have attempted, just as this one, to identify 
behavioural patterns regarding legislative decision-making (Casar, 2000; Nacif, 1997, 
2002; Weldon, 2004).
66
 There is one particular paper in which Langston & Aparicio 
(2009) determine that appointments to the most active and important committees 
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 For a full review of the scholarly literature on the Mexican Congress, refer to Chapter 2. 
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between 1997 and 2006 were driven by previous legislative experience at the federal 
level and not by the type of seat. 
 
In this context, this study seeks to contribute to the existing knowledge on committee 
appointments. In order to do so, this chapter aims at finding clear evidence of strong 
party power over the Chamber between 2006 and 2009 by observing the actual logic 
of the distribution of committee presidencies and the conformation of the Directive 
Board. 
 
5.2.1 The variables of the study 
It was decided that background information should be collected for the PAN, the PRD 
and the PRI, as presented in Chapter 3, as they are the largest parties and combined 
they had 440 deputies. The main question to answer with the data is whether it is 
possible to identify what the most important predictor or set of predictors was for 
appointments to committees and the Directive Board. The independent variables were 
established based on the arguments made in Chapters 3 and 4 regarding the main 
power structures that have been key for the three parties throughout the years. As 
already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, they were set as follows:  
 
 Party of representation (to see whether there are variations across parties) 
 Type of seat 
 Previous public office (federal, state or municipal level) 
 Previous bureaucratic position (federal, state and municipal level) 
 Active participation in the party as an officer 
 Association with sectors or organisations linked to the party 
 Age, gender and level of education. 
 
Similarly, the dependent variable was derived from the statements made in Chapter 4 
about committee appointments being highly politicised. This is because committees 
are the bodies in charge of scrutinising bills and have the power to block initiatives 
from reaching the floor. Thus, they are key for parties’ agenda-setting and vetoing and 
so the selection of members to sit in each of them should be made carefully. 
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Even though the Organic Law of the Chamber states that committee appointments 
should be made according to deputies’ expertise, political pressures are inevitably 
strong. Langston & Aparicio (2009) point out that parties have state representations 
(and for the case of the PRI sector representations), which means that the party leaders 
in Congress will receive pressure from governors or other state-based individuals to 
have their agents placed on the front line. Hence, those deputies with strong links to 
their states, to a sector or to the party in general (such as PR deputies) are more likely 
to be appointed as presidents. 
 
Putting the matter of committee appointments in terms of a principal-agent 
relationship, it is obvious that the parties are very strong principals, because they 
control appointments very tightly, especially leadership positions. In their role as 
agents, deputies are required to show that they are working for the benefit of their 
electorate, but also that they are following the lines set by their principal. As will be 
tested in the next section, the same thing happens with the Directive Board, which is 
regarded as an important tool to keep control of procedural matters such as allocation 
of bills to committees and agendas for floor votes. 
 
For the time being, let us focus on committee appointments. Based on all of the 
above, I defined three dependent variables – Committee Presidency, Priority 
Committee and Seniority Positions in Priority Committee – and created two models 
for each one of them. Each model was tested in a binary logistic regression and results 
are shown in Table 5.4.
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The independent variables represent previous experience in elected offices at the 
federal, state and municipal level, as well as experience as a civil servant at the same 
three levels. Any activity within organisations or entities associated with the party’s 
stronghold was also considered as part of the relevant background. 
 
Finally, age, gender and level of education served as control variables for model 1 of 
each dependent variable. They were also used for model 2, in which two additional 
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controls were added: membership of the PAN and the PRI, which look for variations 
across parties. The PRD was taken as the baseline category. 
 
It should also be mentioned that all the variables, except for age and level of 
education, were coded as dummies, where 1 equals having held the public office or 
bureaucratic position in turn, and 0 means they had not. As for gender, 1 equals 
female and 0 means male. 
 
The results presented in Table 5.4 suggest that being appointed to a presidency in any 
of the ordinary, special, investigative or administrative committees was more likely 
for those who had been members of the Chamber of Deputies prior to 2006. 
Furthermore, the column for marginal effect (in italics) shows the effect that the 
independent variable has on the dependent variable in changing from 0 to 1. For 
model 1 it states that former federal deputies have a 13 per cent chance of obtaining 
such important positions; for model 2 it is 12 per cent. 
 
Langston & Aparicio (2009) rightly differentiate between committees, and they 
assume that appointments to some are more politicised than to others. They created 
two categories: the first one grouped those committees that had registered the highest 
levels of productivity in terms of how many bills they received, scrutinised and later 
on were approved on the floor; and the rest were grouped in the second category. 
 
In this study, I also selected a few committees and labelled them as ‘priority’ ones,68 
but rather than considering their productivity levels, I classified them according to the 
traditional importance their area of specialisation has had for the parties’ and the 
national agenda. This also means that the eight committees in this category should be 
highly sought after by deputies and party figures. 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.5, the only predictor significant at conventional levels for 
being appointed to a priority committee is the variable ‘Previous Bureaucratic 
Experience at the Federal Level’. Thus, those members of the 60th Congress who had 
served in the federal bureaucracy prior to their election as deputies in 2006 had a 20 
                                                 
68
 Committees of: Agriculture, Energy, Interior, Finance, Budget, Constitutional Amendments, 
Oversight and Parliamentary Practices. 
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per cent higher chance of being seated in one of these eight committees. The same 
prediction applies for presidencies and secretariats in those eight committees, as seen 
in Table 5.6. Those who had been federal bureaucrats prior to their congressional seat 
were 12 per cent more likely to be the president or secretary of one of those 
committees.  
 
Generally speaking, it appears that experience at the federal level is what really counts 
when the parties are evaluating who to appoint to key positions, either as presidencies 
or any position in priority committees. A further discussion will be presented in 
Section 5.5. 
 
5.3 Making assumptions on the Directive Board 
An identical multivariate analysis to the ones just discussed was carried out to predict 
appointments to the Directive Board. The dependent variable was set as ‘Directive 
Board’ and two models were created; one without party dummies and the second one 
including the party of affiliation. Results are shown in Table 5.7. 
 
Let us remember that being on the Directive Board is, along with committee 
presidencies, a powerful position. Not only does the Board provide its members with 
additional benefits such as media coverage, assistants and better offices within the 
Chamber, but it also gives them power status within their parties. They are regarded 
as guarantors of the fulfilment of the party’s agenda across committees and on the 
floor. Therefore, they are expected to be reliable, loyal and very experienced 
politicians. 
 
Table 5.7 shows that having been a mayor or a councillor increases the probability of 
appointment by 10 per cent in both cases. Although a further discussion of the results 
will come in Section 5.5 of this chapter, I should highlight here that, while committee 
appointments were based on experience at the federal level, the composition of the 
Board relied more on municipal careers.   
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Table 5.4 Predictors for Committee Presidencies 
DV = Committee Presidency 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
438 obs. 
R2 = 0.0384 
Model 2 
430 obs. 
R2 = 0.0446 
Constant -1.4 
(1.0) 
-1.1 
(1.0) 
 
 Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Marginal Effect Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Marginal Effect 
Previous Elected Experience at the Federal Level     
Senator 1.0 
(1.0) 
 
0.20 1.0 
(1.0) 
 
0.20 
 
Deputy 1.0** 
(0.33) 
 
0.13 1.0** 
(0.34) 
 
0.12 
 
Deputy and Senator 1.1* 
(1.0) 
0.20 1.1* 
(1.0) 
0.21 
 
Previous Elected Experience at the State Level     
Deputy -0.12 
(0.30) 
 
-0.02 -0.14 
(0.30) 
 
-0.02 
 
Governor -0.41 
(1.2) 
-0.10 -0.44 
(1.2) 
-0.10 
 
Previous Elected Experience at the Municipal 
Level 
    
Mayor -0.40 
(0.40) 
 
-0.10 -0.40 
(0.40) 
 
-0.10 
 
Councillor 0.21 
(0.40) 
0.03 0.30 
(0.40) 
0.04 
 
Previous Bureaucratic Experience     
At Federal Level 0.12 
(0.40) 
 
0.02 0.15 
(0.34) 
 
0.02 
 
At State Level 0.14 
(0.33) 
 
0.02 0.13 
(0.33) 
 
0.02 
 
At the Municipal Level -0.30 
(0.41) 
 
-0.04 -0.20 
(0.42) 
 
-0.03 
 
Active Work or Involvement     
As Party Officer -0.30 
(0.33) 
 
-0.04 -0.30 
(0.33) 
 
-0.04 
 
In a Sector Linked to the Party 0.10 
(0.40) 
0.01 0.10 
(0.34) 
0.01 
 
Controls     
Level of Education -0.10 
(0.20) 
 
-0.01 -0.11 
(0.16) 
 
-0.02 
 
Gender -0.20 
(0.34) 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.20 
(0.34) 
 
-0.02 
Age 0.00 
(0.02) 
 
0.00 -0.00 
(0.02) 
 
-0.00 
 
Member of the PAN   -0.32 
(0.32) 
 
-0.10 
 
Member of the PRI   0.00 
(0.40) 
0.00 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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Table 5.5 Predictors for Priority Committee 
DV = Priority Committee 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
438 obs. 
R2 = 0.0474 
 Model 2 
438 obs. 
R2 = 0.0476 
 
Constant -1.0 
(1.0) 
 
 -.40 
(1.0) 
 
 Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Marginal Effect Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Marginal 
Effect 
Previous Elected Experience at the Federal Level     
Senator 1.0 
(1.0) 
 
0.13 
 
1.0 
(1.0) 
 
0.14 
Deputy 0.30 
(0.30) 
 
0.10 
 
0.30 
(0.30) 
 
0.10 
Deputy and Senator 0.22 
(1.0) 
0.10 
 
0.24 
(1.0) 
0.10 
Previous Elected Experience at the State Level     
Deputy -0.10 
(0.23) 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.10 
(0.23) 
 
-0.01 
Governor 2.0 
(1.2) 
0.40 
 
2.0 
(1.2) 
0.40 
Previous Elected Experience at the Municipal 
Level 
    
Mayor -0.34 
(0.31) 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.34 
(0.31) 
 
-0.10 
Councillor -0.33 
(0.32) 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.32 
(0.33) 
 
-0.10 
Mayor and Councillor 0.40 
(1.0) 
0.80 
 
0.40 
(1.0) 
0.10 
Previous Bureaucratic Experience     
At Federal Level 1.0** 
(0.32) 
 
0.20 
 
1.0** 
(0.32) 
 
0.20 
At State Level 0.22 
(0.30) 
 
0.10 
 
0.23 
(0.30) 
 
0.10 
At the Municipal Level 0.20 
(0.32) 
0.04 
 
0.22 
(0.32) 
0.10 
Active Work or Involvement     
As Party Officer 0.12 
(0.30) 
 
-0.02 
 
0.12 
(0.30) 
 
0.03 
In a Sector Linked to the Party -0.13 
(0.33) 
-0.03 
 
-0.14 
(0.33) 
-0.03 
Controls     
Level of Education -0.12 
(-0.12) 
 
-0.03 -0.12 
(0.13) 
 
-0.03 
Gender -1.0 
(0.30) 
 
-0.14 
 
-1.0 
(0.30) 
 
-0.14 
Age -0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.00 
Member of the PAN   -0.08 
(0.26) 
 
-0.01 
Member of the PRI   -0.08 
(0.31) 
-0.01 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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Table 5.6 Predictors for Seniority Positions in Priority Committees 
DV = Senior in Priority Com. 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
438 obs. 
R2 = 0.1043 
 Model 2 
438 obs. 
R2 = 0.1066 
 
Constant -2.2 
(1.2) 
 
 -2.0 
(1.0) 
 
 Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Marginal Effect Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Marginal Effect 
Previous Elected Experience at the Federal Level     
Senator -0.10 
(1.0) 
 
-0.00 -0.11 
(1.0) 
 
-0.01 
 
Deputy 0.30 
(0.42) 
 
0.03 
 
0.24 
(0.43) 
 
0.02 
 
Deputy and Senator 0.20 
(1.0) 
0.02 0.20 
(1.0) 
0.17 
 
Previous Elected Experience at the State Level     
Deputy -0.54 
(0.40) 
 
-0.04 -1.0 
(0.40) 
 
-0.04 
 
Governor 2.0 
(1.14) 
0.30 2.0 
(1.13) 
0.30 
 
Previous Elected Experience at the Municipal 
Level 
    
Mayor -0.40 
(1.0) 
 
-0.03 -0.40 
(1.0) 
 
-0.03 
 
Councillor -0.32 
(1.0) 
 
-0.02 -0.25 
(1.0) 
 
-0.02 
 
Mayor and Councillor 1.31 
(1.0) 
0.20 1.33 
(1.0) 
0.20 
 
Previous Bureaucratic Experience     
At Federal Level 1.1** 
(0.43) 
 
0.12 1.13** 
(0.44) 
 
0.12 
 
At State Level 0.30 
(0.42) 
 
0.02 0.24 
(0.43) 
 
0.02 
 
At Municipal Level -1.0 
(1.0) 
-0.10 -1.0 
(1.0) 
-0.05 
 
Active Work or Involvement     
As Party Officer 1.0 
(1.0) 
 
0.10 1.0 
(1.0) 
 
0.10 
 
In a Sector Linked to the Party 0.31 
(0.44) 
0.03 0.30 
(0.44) 
0.03 
 
Controls     
Level of Education -0.10 
(0.20) 
 
-0.01 -0.12 
(0.20) 
 
-0.01 
Gender -1.0 
(1.0) 
 
-0.10 -1.0 
(1.0) 
 
-0.10 
 
Age -0.01 
(0.02) 
 
-0.00 -0.01 
(0.02) 
 
-0.00 
 
Member of the PAN   -0.30 
(0.41) 
 
-0.02 
 
Member of the PRI   0.02 
(1.0) 
0.00 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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Table 5.7 Predictors for Directive Board 
DV= Directive Board 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
405 obs. 
R2 = 0.2044 
 Model 2 
405 obs. 
R2 = 0.2156 
 
Constant -6.38 
(2.13) 
 
 -7.22 
(2.37) 
 
 Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Marginal Effect Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Marginal Effect 
Previous Elected Experience at the Federal Level     
Senator and Deputy 1.2 
(1.1) 
 
0.03 1.0 
(1.06) 
 
0.02 
 
Deputy -0.12 
(1.0) 
-0.01 -0.20 
(0.82) 
-0.00 
 
Previous Elected Experience at the State Level     
Deputy  0.13 
(0.6) 
0.00 0.18 
(0.60) 
0.00 
 
Previous Elected Experience at the Municipal 
Level 
    
Mayor 2.12*** 
(0.75) 
 
0.1 2.11*** 
(0.77) 
 
0.80 
 
Councillor 2.0*** 
(1.0) 
0.10 1.90*** 
(0.71) 
0.10 
 
Previous Bureaucratic Experience     
At Federal Level 1.21 
(0.03) 
 
0.03 1.20 
(1.0) 
 
0.02 
 
At State Level 
 
0.10 
(1.0) 
 
0.00 -0.02 
(1.0) 
 
-0.00 
 
At Municipal Level 2.0 
(1.0) 
-0.01 -1.0 
(1.0) 
-0.01 
 
Active Work or Involvement     
As Party Officer 1.24 
(1.1) 
 
0.02 1.22 
(1.10) 
 
0.01 
 
In a Sector Linked to the Party 1.1 
(0.72) 
0.03 1.20 
(1.0) 
0.03 
 
Controls     
Level of Education 0.10 
(0.30) 
 
0.00 0.21 
(0.30) 
 
0.00 
 
Gender 2.0 
(1.0) 
 
0.7 2.1*** 
(1.0) 
 
0.10 
 
Age -0.01 
(0.03) 
 
-0.00 -0.01 
(0.03) 
 
-0.00 
 
Member of the PAN   1.0 
(1.0) 
 
0.01 
 
Member of the PRI  1.02 
(1.0) 
 
0.02 
 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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5.4 Determinants of seat type 
Chapter 3 discussed candidate selection processes for all three parties. It was said that, 
overall, ‘outsiders’ were unlikely to be considered. Single-member district (SMD) seats 
should be the ones which the parties distribute more carefully, as they are scrutinised by 
the electorate and they also count for the highest number of seats in the Chamber. In 
contrast, PR ones are often occupied by career politicians, who have held many 
different public positions and who are well-connected with the party. 
 
This last section provides statistical evidence for the distribution of PR candidacies to 
the Chamber for 2006. The results of the analysis are consistent with the 
aforementioned argument (see Table 5.8). 
 
As in the previous sections, one dependent variable was set out, in this case ‘PR seat’, 
and two models were created for it, one without party dummies and the second one with 
control for the party of affiliation. According to the results of the logistic regression, the 
most important factors that influenced the type of seat were whether the legislators had 
either been deputies, senators (or both), mayors or councillors, bureaucrats at any level 
or local deputies. 
 
However, only prior experience of federal deputy, senator or both of these offices had a 
positive effect on being nominated to a PR seat, increasing the probability by 22, 45 and 
54 per cent respectively; having been a civil servant at the federal level also had a 
positive effect of 15 per cent. The rest of the variables had a negative effect; that is, they 
reduced the possibility of gaining a PR seat instead of SMD by 21 per cent if they had 
been mayors, 16 per cent if they had been councillors or municipal bureaucrats, 13 per 
cent for experience as state bureaucrats and 10 per cent if they had sat in a local 
congress. 
 
This data suggests two main findings.  
 
First of all, experience at the state and municipal level can point towards a closer 
relationship with the electorate that will be represented in the federal Chamber and also 
with the regional party office. In turn, this could mean that it is easier for individuals in 
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this particular circumstance to win a seat through direct election and therefore would be 
prioritised for an SMD seat. After all, the number of SMD seats won throughout the 
country by a certain party ensures a corresponding proportion of PR seats, and so 
‘secured’ electoral victories should be taken advantage of. 
 
Second, those who have been in the public spotlight at the federal level previously are 
better off on closed lists. They are perceived by citizens as ambitious individuals 
pursuing their private interests rather than the common good and are therefore less 
likely to be voted for. At the same time though, they are clearly favoured by party 
officials to step into Congress, as they have been around the political sphere long 
enough to know how institutions work. Thus, they can succeed in putting the party’s 
agenda forward more easily. Finally, they have probably built the necessary connections 
within their party to maintain their reputation and image in public life, and certainly 
have enough connections to be placed on the list for a PR seat. Let us discuss in more 
detail the results presented in this and the two preceding sections. 
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Table 5.8 Predictors for Type of Seat 
DV = Proportional Representation Seat 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
438 obs. 
R2 = 0.0474 
 Model 2 
438 obs. 
R2 = 0.0476 
 
Constant -0.50 
(1.0) 
 
 -0.85 
(0.89) 
 
 Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Marginal Effect Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Marginal Effect 
Previous Elected Experience at the Federal Level     
Senator and Deputy 2.44*** 
(0.70) 
 
0.54 
 
2.41*** 
(0.65) 
 
0.53 
 
Deputy 1.0*** 
(0.32) 
 
0.22 
 
0.98*** 
(0.33) 
 
0.22 
Senator 2.0*** 
(0.70) 
0.45 
 
2.0*** 
(0.66) 
0.45 
Previous Elected Experience at the State Level     
Deputy -0.50* 
(0.30) 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.50* 
(0.26) 
 
-0.10 
Governor 1.04 
(1.70) 
 
0.25 
 
1.15 
(1.75) 
 
0.28 
Deputy and Governor -1.0 
(1.12) 
-0.16 
 
-1.06 
(1.14) 
-0.17 
Previous Elected Experience at the Municipal 
Level 
    
Mayor -1.30*** 
(0.40) 
 
-0.21 
 
-1.27*** 
(0.40) 
 
-0.22 
Councillor -1.0** 
(0.40) 
 
-0.16 -1.0*** 
(0.37) 
-0.17 
Previous Bureaucratic Experience     
At Federal Level 0.70** 
(0.33) 
 
0.15 
 
0.64* 
(0.33) 
 
0.14 
At State Level -0.70** 
(0.30) 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.65** 
(0.30) 
 
-0.13 
At Municipal Level -0.90** 
(0.36) 
-0.16 
 
-1.0** 
(0.38) 
-0.17 
Active Work or Involvement     
As Party Officer 0.23 
(0.31) 
 
0.05 
 
0.23 
(0.31) 
 
0.05 
In a Sector Linked to the Party -0.05 
(0.35) 
0.01 
 
-0.01 
(0.35) 
-0.00 
Controls     
Level of Education 0.02 
(0.13) 
 
0.00 
 
0.06 
(0.13) 
 
0.01 
Gender 0.77*** 
(0.30) 
 
0.17 
 
0.76** 
(0.28) 
 
0.17 
Age -0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
 
-0.00 
Member of the PAN   0.35 
(0.30) 
 
0.10 
 
Member of the PRI   0.12 
(0.35) 
0.03 
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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5.5 Discussion 
In addition to completing the empirical description of the 60th Congress with statistical 
data, this chapter has the purpose of searching for patterns to predict appointments to 
decision-making positions. The statistical analysis required looking into actual evidence 
of the parties’ control over political careers and therefore of how they have embedded 
path dependency at the core of Mexico’s political institutions. 
 
The starting point for any conclusion drawn from the analysis presented above is the 
existence of term limits. This prohibition explains the large number of deputies with no 
previous experience in elected office or in bureaucratic posts. Furthermore, it affects the 
predictors for committee presidencies and seats on the Directive Board because 
politicians must maintain a good relationship with their parties if they wish to remain 
active in public life. 
 
However, despite constitutional prohibition for re-election, those seeking to build a 
career as an elected official have managed to jump from one office to another across 
different levels of government. If they have been deputies, once their term ended they 
are likely to have sought a new public post elsewhere and then perhaps have made their 
way back into Congress three or more years later. Hence, the database I built for the 
60th Congress shows that 30, 19 and 38 members of the PAN, the PRD and the PRI 
respectively sat in San Lázaro before. They enjoyed the advantage of having a 
reasonable amount of knowledge about the procedures and politics of the Chamber but 
due to constitutional restrictions, were unable to keep working towards the achievement 
of their parties’ legislative agenda. 
 
Therefore, once they were back in a legislative seat, it is not surprising that they would 
be more likely to be appointed as presidents of committees. In addition to their 
experience in the institution, this group of deputies must have pleased their party in their 
previous tenure, at least enough to be considered for the job once again. Overall, they 
could be regarded as trustworthy actors capable of ensuring the achievement of partisan 
and hopefully constituencies’ agendas. 
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A similar logic of reliability applies for predicting appointments to ‘priority 
committees’. For these cases, individuals who have worked as public servants within the 
federal bureaucracy have a greater opportunity for appointment. The main concerns of 
these important bodies are constitutional amendments, the federal budget or specific 
policy programmes developed by certain ministries, which are better addressed by those 
who have been on the implementation side. Furthermore, these are topics likely to be 
prioritised in the parties’ agendas, in an attempt to meet the demands and promises 
made during the elections. Hence, success must be guaranteed by the parties through 
sensible appointments and the federal bureaucracy constitutes an additional source of 
people to recruit trustworthy individuals from. 
 
The Directive Board, another crucial body for setting agendas, is also ideally composed 
of deputies who have had a visible role in their party. It was seen that experience in 
municipalities was the significant predictor at conventional levels. The duties of a 
member of the Board are not as politically significant as those of a committee president, 
but positions are much scarcer and they guarantee media coverage and wide 
recognition. 
 
As can be seen, loyal partisan involvement, either through previous elected offices or 
public service, is rewarded with the facilitation of a political career. The parties have the 
power to use appointments as carrots and sticks and they do indeed use it. 
 
In order to maintain access to the offices that they use as prizes and therefore to 
decision-making roles, parties must ensure satisfactory electoral results. Therefore, as I 
have repeatedly stated in previous chapters, they must come up with sensible strategies 
for candidate selection. 
 
I showed in Section 5.4 that having been a deputy, a senator or both made candidates 
more likely to gain a PR seat. Experience in the federal bureaucracy also has a positive 
effect on being selected. This is part of the parties’ strategy to use more popular figures 
among the electorate for SMD positions and then place the loyal and partisan career 
politicians on the closed lists for PR seats. The reason for this is twofold: it derives from 
the Mexican electorate’s disenchantment with politicians, who are regarded as selfish 
individuals seeking nothing more than personal success and satisfaction instead of 
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representing constituents, and it also responds to the strategies of the parties for 
strategically allocating positions so that loyal members are rewarded at the same time 
that their agenda is implemented. 
 
The results of the analysis herein presented show that the occupants of PR seats are 
‘parachuted’ into Congress by the parties. This suggests that there is consistency with 
loyalty patterns. Overall, the nomination to any type of seat and the appointment to 
committees or to the Directive Board are unavoidably controlled by party figures. 
 
In addition, the evidence points towards a very interesting pattern of party strategy for 
successful agenda-setting. As a committee’s purpose is both informative and 
distributive (see Chapter 4), party officials must recruit experts on key issues and also 
individuals who can function as leaders. Therefore, individuals with experience in the 
bureaucracy or in organisations related to a specific issue are more likely to be 
appointed to certain committees, and even more so if they are relevant to the parties’ 
agenda. 
 
This was exemplified in Chapter 4 when each party’s internal selection mechanisms for 
committees were described. I said in Sections 4.3.1 through 4.3.3 that the three main 
parties distributed a questionnaire in which every deputy gave a list of their committee 
preferences, normally based upon their area of expertise. The majority of deputies of all 
three parties could expect to be placed in one of their top three options. 
 
In terms of recruiting individuals with leadership skills, the fact that committee 
presidents were more likely to be those with previous legislative experience at the 
federal level points to the parties’ need for people with better knowledge of 
congressional procedures. 
 
This strategy of diversifying recruitment for party members throughout the Chamber 
can also be seen for the Directive Board and as has been shown, it is more likely for 
those who have been mayors to be selected to the presidency or secretariat of such a 
crucial body. Being in charge of organising the plenary session’s agenda and 
channelling bills to committees, the Directive Board would probably be better managed 
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by individuals who can impose their authority, maintain order and discipline and 
delegate tasks to other bodies of the Chamber. 
 
In essence, the Board should be composed of those party members with the leadership 
skills to act as gatekeepers for their party’s interests, ensuring their party gets full access 
to key events and votes. Luis Sánchez Jiménez’ testimony (a member of the PRD during 
the 60th Congress), referenced extensively in Chapter 4, states that as a vice president of 
the Board his job was to prepare the plenary sessions, informing his party about other 
parties’ aims and goals on certain issues, while also presenting his party’s formal 
position on bills and planning for its success (Sánchez Jiménez, interview, 2009). 
 
Someone with experience at the municipal level should be accustomed to handling some 
procedural and bureaucratic matters, while delegating others to alternative specialised 
bodies, such as local congresses or governors. They must necessarily have good 
negotiation skills and be determined to make their party’s views succeed. 
 
This diversification of appointment strategies, i.e. subject expertise for committees and 
leadership skills for the Directive Board, reflects the parties’ need to construct and 
maintain a pool of loyal members to recruit from. This can be possible only if they can 
easily control political careers, and over time expand the outreach of their networks to 
useful sectors such as the federal bureaucracy. 
 
The predictors found in this chapter for different positions show that those who had the 
opportunity to prove their loyalty and commitment to a party figure could be more 
easily appointed. Hence, although the majority of the deputies in the 60th Congress did 
not have public service experience or a history of being in elected office, having a 
previous political career has an effect on being at the front line of the decision-making 
system. 
 
I recorded in at least one of the interviews used in Chapter 4 to describe the dynamics of 
the 60th Congress that a successful political career should include tenure in the 
Chamber of Deputies because it guarantees media coverage and public exposure 
(Jiménez, interview, 2010); it also offers opportunities for useful networking. 
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Regardless of whether this takes place at the beginning or the end of someone’s career, 
getting there requires good connections or proof of political aptitude to a party.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Having discussed the results of my statistical analyses, linking them to the findings of 
Chapters 3 and 4, it is clear that I have successfully answered the question that drove 
my data collection and analysis. I asked whether the partisan background of deputies is 
a significant factor in the allocation of committee presidencies and positions of the 
Directive Board. The answer is ‘yes’. The distribution of offices across all levels of 
government, including candidacies, is controlled by party figures, guided by loyalty and 
effectiveness to develop the party’s agenda. This necessarily affects internal processes 
of governmental institutions and therefore their institutional design. 
 
Operating through a vicious cycle, parties benefit from the possibility to tightly control 
political careers. This allows them to recruit reliable individuals from different 
strongholds to fill pivotal agenda-setting positions. By doing so, they allow for and 
encourage careerism among politicians across all levels of government and, ultimately, 
parties and their members lock-in rules of behaviour and institutional operations that set 
dependent paths which prove extremely difficult to change. If all the main parties follow 
similar strategies and find that these work throughout the years, then it is very unlikely 
that they will agree on new patterns of behaviour in the near future. Thus, this chapter 
proves that the parties’ power has shaped Mexican institutions to their own needs, 
reflecting their internal dynamics and behaviours. 
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have provided the reader with substantial empirical evidence on 
how parties have accumulated power and used it to shape the country’s political system 
to serve their interests. Having completed the case study, it is useful to provide an 
overview of the results obtained and how they contribute to a better understanding of 
the Mexican Congress. The following section serves this purpose. 
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5.7 Final remarks: Empirical findings and normative contributions of the 
case study 
The case study presented herein has provided substantial empirical evidence on how 
term limits and party power determine deputies’ behaviour. Hence, my results provide 
added value to existing studies on candidate selection processes in Mexico (Langston, 
1998; Langston & Aparicio, 2009) and on how career ambitions affect legislative 
behaviour (Díaz Rebolledo, 2005). New data was produced to understand electoral 
connections and political ambitions from within the Chamber rather than focusing on 
deputies’ careers outside of Congress. 
 
5.7.1 Control of political careers and term limits 
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the case study presented throughout this 
chapter and the two preceding ones consists of substantial evidence of the extent of the 
parties’ power, particularly within the Chamber of Deputies. This was clearly 
highlighted through the observation of two concrete issues: the control of political 
careers by over-powerful parties; and the inability of term limits to eliminate political 
careerism and self-interest. 
 
By controlling political careers, the parties maintain discipline within their legislative 
groups whereby parties use public positions as prizes for loyal members. At the same 
time though, this has had a strong effect on the country’s political behaviour, as it 
triggers the lock-in of political ambition as the only incentive for becoming a member of 
Congress, rather than encouraging elected officials to represent the electorate’s will. In 
the long term, this practice makes the Chamber more likely to continue to be used by 
the parties to set their agendas and by politicians to fulfil their career ambitions, instead 
of it becoming an efficient representative institution. 
 
Legislators tend to prioritise the interest of the party figure they are loyal to and 
dependent on in order to build and maintain a long-term career in politics. These 
figures, in turn, have made sure that the necessary informal rules remain in place to 
continue managing political careers as they see fit. Ultimately, this has created an 
informal system used by parties to override term limits and use this strategy to increase 
their power. 
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The statistical analysis presented in this chapter clearly confirms the suggestion made in 
Chapters 3 and 4 that parties tightly control political careers. We have learnt that they 
have strategies for appointing senior members of committees and members of the 
Directive Board. Candidate selection processes for PR seats also proved to be carefully 
planned by party leaders. Overall, party figures always ensured that the most suitable 
individuals were appointed to fulfil the organisation’s agenda. 
 
In addition to unveiling the extent of parties’ power and the use that they make of it to 
control political careers, the empirical description of the 60th Congress also provides 
evidence towards the effects of term limits on the Mexican political system. As the 
reader might remember from Chapter 2, I argued that scholars are divided in their 
opinion about how term limits affect the representative function of legislative 
institutions and parties. Some state that they are good because they eliminate 
particularistic behaviours and therefore improve representation. However, others argue 
that term limits only replace bad attitudes among legislators with others, such as 
reduced accountability towards citizens (Carey, 1996). 
 
Based on the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5, we can clearly observe that term 
limits in Mexico have certainly not eliminated particularistic behaviour. Their effect has 
been quite the opposite, as they have vested the parties with the considerable power of 
using public offices as carrots and sticks. The common practice of party switching 
discussed in previous pages proves that particularistic behaviour tempts some politicians 
to change their affiliation if a better career prospect is offered elsewhere. 
 
In reality, term limits were imposed by the PRI in the 1930s with the purpose of 
controlling its own members. Knowing that good performance in Congress guaranteed a 
stable career, legislators focused on pleasing the head of the party. When the PRD and 
the PAN became competitive in federal elections, they adapted their practices and 
strategies to a scenario where, although term limits are a constitutional prohibition, they 
can be overridden and used as an extremely valuable tool. 
 
Prior to 2011 there was no serious attempt to change the Constitution to eliminate the 
prohibition of immediate re-election. When it was finally included in a proposal for 
thorough political reforms drafted in 2011, changes to term limits were voted against by 
236 
 
the members of the PRI, the PVEM and the PANAL in the 61st Congress 
(Reforma/Staff, 2011; Salazar & Estrop, 2011). This reflects the ability of parties to 
summon collective agreements to change some institutional paths but not others, 
particularly if they are not considered beneficial to all members of the governing elite. 
 
By selecting which rules to keep in place and which ones to change, the Mexican parties 
have engaged in what I suggest is a conditional type of path dependency. That is, 
following a historical institutionalist theoretical perspective, we should expect the 
political institutions to consist of a set of rules that constrain the behaviour of those 
operating within them. These rules are created by a group of actors and can be modified 
only when there is a collective agreement that a new path should be taken. 
 
The way in which political elites in Mexico have locked in informal rules and kept term 
limits shows that they have all agreed, whether implicitly or explicitly, that these rules 
suit their collective and individual interests. Path dependency is reliant on the 
willingness of the elites to renounce some privileges in order to secure a favourable 
position in the long term. Hence, the PRD and the PAN have adopted rules of behaviour 
set by the PRI, and since they have all been increasing or sustaining their electoral 
victories and thereby access to power by behaving in such a way, ‘critical junctures’ 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996) have been absent and with this substantial changes to issues like 
term limits have not been made. 
 
However, other changes to formal frameworks have been possible. Federal electoral 
reforms and other important modifications to political rules in the last two decades have 
been made by the parties because the parties in power have considered them beneficial. 
In this way, the Mexican system has been shaped by the PRI and re-shaped under 
pluralism according to existing political contexts that require adequate rules of 
collective action. Path dependency in Mexico is clearly conditional upon the elites’ 
calculation of the best way to preserve their power.  
 
5.7.2  Normative contributions 
The contextual arguments and empirical findings shown in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 not only 
uncover interesting patterns of legislative behaviour in response to the initial research 
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question, but also highlight broader issues about Mexican politics. It is worth discussing 
them briefly.  
 
I argued that Mexico has made some progress towards democratic consolidation, but is 
still struggling to bring key legal frameworks up to date in order to improve institutional 
processes and democratise decision-making. The decision-making process is mainly 
done by the elites and behind closed doors, thereby reducing accountability and 
transparency, and with it, undermining the electorate’s right to information and political 
participation. 
 
The main reason behind this is that the parties have made sure that the rules, both 
informal and formal, serve their interests. The Mexican system was created by the PRI 
in the early part of the 20th century and has endured despite the fact that since the 1990s 
the PRD and the PAN have become important electoral competitors. Altogether, they 
have maintained informal rules of operation and allowed for elitist decision-making to 
prevail. 
 
Because thorough constitutional amendments that ensure clearer and perhaps fairer 
participation in politics for all actors have not been possible, constant negotiation of 
informal rules is the only way forward. All three actors have therefore learnt to 
manoeuvre around formal rules which might constitute an obstacle to their interests or 
agendas. 
 
Although the Mexican scenario is now much more democratic since the PRI lost the 
majority in Congress in 1997 and later on the presidency in 2000, the existence of 
informal rules and the lack of clarity regarding the limits to parties’ power has 
undermined the quality of democracy in the country. Even when electoral reforms 
negotiated in the last two decades have led to greater political pluralism, further reforms 
are necessary to improve transparency, accountability, representation and democracy as 
a whole, but this will happen only if the parties see these changes as favourable for their 
interests. 
 
The preceding pages have attempted to summarise the findings of Part II’s empirical 
case study on the 60th Congress of the Chamber of Deputies. These results should 
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provide an answer to the research question set out at the beginning of this work, and 
support the contributions that I hope have been made to the literature on the Mexican 
Congress, legislative and party theories, and to the concept of path dependency. In the 
last few pages of this thesis I revisit my research question and discuss the extent to 
which I succeeded in adding valuable knowledge to the aforementioned subjects.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
This research has sought to understand the causes of legislative behaviour in Mexico 
mainly through an empirical case study of the 60th Congress of the Chamber of 
Deputies. My purpose was to identify what drives appointments to committees and the 
Directive Board and, therefore, to observe how informal rules have conditionally been 
locked in across the country’s political system. 
 
Answering the main question meant unpacking it into three specific ones. The first, of a 
contextual nature, asked why Mexico has developed a unique institutional design where 
some formal frameworks have been selectively reformed to ensure democratic party 
competition but others still reflect an authoritarian, undemocratic past. I explored this 
matter throughout Chapters 1 and 2, and argued that because Mexico democratised 
without a thorough constitutional reform, practical arrangements made by the elites 
have served as behavioural frameworks. Over time, this has generated and locked in 
phenomena such as term limits, hyper-presidentialism, and the later replacement of a 
strong Executive with a hegemonic system of parties. Altogether, this has made the 
operation of Mexico’s institutions and the behaviour of its parties very different from 
what general theories of legislative organisation and party behaviour dictate. For 
instance, in Mexico there is not a clear whip (as in the European Parliament or in the 
British Parliament) in charge of making sure that fellow deputies toe the party lines. 
Instead, discipline is kept by multiple figures, ranging from faction leaders to area 
coordinators within the party groups. 
 
The second question – dealt with in Chapter 3 – focused on parties as the main political 
actors and asked why they have evolved into hierarchical, powerful organisations that 
operate through interest-based networks, shaping political institutions to their benefit. I 
then followed up with a third question, narrowing my focus on the effect of party 
behaviour to the Chamber of Deputies only and asked how it is that parties’ power 
affects the institutional design and day-to-day operation of the Chamber, particularly 
concerning appointments to committees and governing bodies – the main questions of 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
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In answering questions two and three, I emphasised that term limits are a key issue 
affecting legislative behaviour and institutional operations. Assuming that their 
existence makes politicians extremely loyal to their party, term limits have made parties 
become very powerful over the years. Being easily overridden, non-re-election makes 
party loyalty the main, and perhaps the only, route into a steady political career, rather 
than a good record of representation. 
 
An important fact to consider at this point of the thesis is that the extent of parties’ 
power and their consequential ability to shape institutions as they see fit has been 
possible due to the inherent weakness of Mexico’s institutions. This weakness, in turn, 
is not only a direct effect of the 70-year long hegemonic power of the PRI and the 
imprint it has left on the system, but also the consequence of the lack of comprehensive 
state reform to modernise and further the country’s democratisation process. Perhaps if 
institutions had been made stronger through constitutional ammendments and the 
elaboration of new codes for each of the federal powers, parties would have found it 
much more difficult to operate they way they do now. Particularistic behaviours and 
parties’ control over political careers, although unlikely to disappear in full, could today 
have a reduced impact on the longer term operation of the Chamber of Deputies. 
Transparency, efficiency and accountability could perhaps be much easier to achieve. 
However, despite it being on the legislative agenda since the early 2000s, a 
comprehensive state reform has not been agreed upon, and thus institutions remain 
inherently weak. 
 
Through my work, I have reached empirical and theoretical findings that represent 
significant contributions to the literature on the Mexican Congress, party and committee 
theories, and term limits. In addition, I provide evidence that broader theoretical 
frameworks such as historical institutionalism and path dependency, both of which are 
the theoretical guides for this research, can lead to a clear understanding of the 
evolution of political institutions and actors. I summarise my findings in the following 
pages, classifying them into empirical, theoretical and normative findings. 
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6.1 Empirical findings 
First, and perhaps most importantly, this research has provided substantial empirical 
evidence towards a better understanding of the allocation of committee seats and 
appointments to the Directive Board in the Chamber of Deputies. We now know that 
these are done by carefully selecting those members with relevant experience in politics 
and specific public offices. Those with previous legislative experience are more likely 
to be appointed to committee presidencies in general, while those who have served in 
the federal bureaucracy are particularly useful for parties in priority committees. In turn, 
previous municipal experience can increase the probability of a deputy being appointed 
to the Directive Board. 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have also gathered new data on candidate selection procedures. 
I confirmed that individuals who have proved their allegiance to their party by having 
served in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate in the past are more likely to be elected 
to Congress through proportional representation. 
 
Furthermore, we learnt that one way in which parties cope with factionalism is through 
distributing seats in committees among the factions, who then decide how to fill them 
according to their internal negotiation practices. Altogether, these findings improve our 
knowledge on how party power networks operate in Mexico, affecting the quality of its 
democracy and setting rules of behaviour that are likely to endure over the years. The 
issues herein discussed have also been found to cause deputies’ self-interested and 
particularistic behaviour, driving them to prioritise their party’s needs in order to secure 
a long-term political career. The analysis of committee business would have 
undoubtedly provided further details of the practicalities of how party and factional 
discipline are implemented, and would have added valuable evidence to this latter 
argument. Future research should explore the matter by requesting access to committee 
meetings’ minutes and other relevant primary sources of information. In addition, future 
efforts to revisit this research topic could also profit from complementing my detailed, 
qualitative data gathered through interviews, with data collected by longitudinal studies 
like the University of Salamanca’s Latin American elite survey. This would allow to 
observe cross-party trends of the importance that deputies give to party lines. 
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Mexican deputies, just as any politicians, are expected to act in favour of their party’s 
interests, and to protect and promote its brand. Parties are, after all, the primary 
providers of elected public officials and so anyone wishing to represent society’s 
interests in government must make sure that access to elected offices is as smooth as 
possible. Therefore, it is not surprising that deputies are prone to particularistic 
behaviours, but in the Mexican case party (or faction) driven behaviours interfere with 
the transparent and democratic operation of institutions. This matter sheds light on the 
weakness of the country’s institutions, and on the fact that they were created and shaped 
by a single party over a long period of 70 years.  
 
Second, and related to the statement made above, my work has found the root of 
legislative behaviour in the hierarchical, clientelistic attitudes and strategies of the PRI, 
the PAN and the PRD. Throughout the empirical case study presented in Part II 
(Chapters 3, 4 and 5) we observe that opposition parties emerged and adapted to a 
decades-old system designed by the PRI to grant itself resources and power. 
Consequently, the PAN and the PRD have developed the same attitudes of the PRI and 
there has been increasingly fierce competition between them for resources and power 
(Guerrero, 2004; Klesner, 2004; Martínez, 1997). Thus, the parties have had to design a 
set of informal rules of negotiation, competition and collaboration in parallel with 
formal frameworks to enable them to coexist. If the political elites who run the three 
parties fail to adopt a more democratic and transparent attitude towards politics and 
power, then it is unlikely that the behaviour of their party groups in Congress will move 
away from informal rules and careerism. 
 
Overall, it is empirically proven in this research that parties have strongly influenced the 
institutional design of the Chamber, which now reflects the parties’ internal divisions, 
their hierarchical decision-making processes and their strict control over political 
careers and candidate selection processes. As mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, this outcome has been possible due to the inherent weakness of Mexico’s 
formal institutions. Had institutional rules and formal operational guidelines been 
modernised and complemented with the necessary constitutional amendments, the 
Chamber of Deputies would perhaps be better equipped to handle political competition, 
leaving parties’ power more limited than it is today. 
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The inductive and empirical approach to legislative behaviour developed herein has 
allowed us to observe that parties have settled into a very comfortable position of 
power, both facilitated and maintained by the creation of informal rules suitable for 
political pluralism, and the selective adherence to formal codes of practice. In practice, 
this is evident in the recruitment of PR candidates to Congress based on their partisan 
and professional background, which allows parties to create a pool of suitable 
individuals for different positions across the Chamber. Consequently, building and 
maintaining a political career has become a fierce competition, where only those who 
are loyal to the party (or a faction) are likely to survive. 
 
6.2 Theoretical contributions 
Throughout this thesis, I have repeatedly said that Mexico’s political elites have 
developed very particular processes of institutional operation, and therefore it is a case 
that cannot be easily approached by applying ‘model’ theories built through the 
observation of the American presidential system or European parliamentary systems. I 
assumed that any approach towards understanding legislative behaviour in Mexico must 
see history and context as the main determinants of the elites’ decisions to build and 
lock-in certain institutional paths, i.e. the unintended consequences of the country’s 
pragmatic democratisation process. Thus, historical institutionalism and the concept of 
path dependency were key theoretical constructs in this research. 
 
Institutions were understood along the lines of Hall & Taylor (2006) as a set of rules of 
behaviour created by actors which, over time, become universalised and cannot be 
broken or changed unless collective agreement is reached to do so. In turn, through path 
dependency it is possible to understand that rules of collective action become locked in 
as a result of the common agreement between elites. This leads to the existence of ‘self-
reinforcing dynamics’ that make institutions persist over time. Changes will occur only 
when there is collective agreement on their suitability. 
 
In the Mexican case, every single institution was created by the PRI, and when the PAN 
and the PRD became electorally competitive, they maintained most of the old rules and 
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changed only a few of them.
69
 Political elites in Mexico operate under formal and 
informal rules, built and amended along the way to maximise the opportunities for the 
three largest parties to continue sharing power in the best possible way. This has meant 
that while some institutional paths have been locked in, others have not, making path 
dependency in Mexico conditional. That is, while collective agreement has been 
reached to modify electoral rules to allow for more transparent and institutionalised 
processes, which ultimately led to the PRI’s loss of an absolute legislative majority and 
later on of the presidential seat, political elites have been unwilling to negotiate a 
thorough constitutional reform that could eliminate term limits and reduce parties’ 
control over political careers. This argument of conditional path dependency is a useful 
explanation of the country’s past and future political development, particularly when 
explaining how the PRI has been forced to relinquish some of its hegemonic power over 
the last few decades to guarantee its long-term survival. Thus, the argument of 
conditional path dependency is perhaps one of the most significant contributions of this 
research. 
 
However, it would be misleading to say that path dependency and historical 
institutionalism alone can explain every single detail of how elites’ behaviour and 
strategies emerged. Admittedly, the detailed origin (beyond historical and contextual 
developments) of the PRI’s, the PAN’s and the PRD’s motivations and strategies to 
influence decision-making has not been thoroughly explored in this research. Delving 
further into that topic would have required resorting, for instance, to elite theory 
(Highley & Pakulski, 2007; Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1935) in order to explain how 
leadership groups across the country achieved a cohesive power and established key 
networks to effect a regime and specific political outcomes. 
 
In addition to historical institutionalism and path dependency, as I stated in Chapter 2, 
this work contributes to theoretical explanations of party cohesion and discipline and to 
theories of legislative organisation, suggesting possible ways to improve these 
frameworks’ perception of outliers, such as the Mexican case, or the opportunity for 
new theory-building. For example, committees are regarded by parties and deputies as 
tools to advance political agendas, just as anywhere in the world. However, 
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 However, as suggested in Chapter 2, the PRI is perhaps the actor who had the most power to select 
which rules could be modified, because it had been in power for decades. 
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particularistic behaviours triggered by term limits and encouraged by multiple party 
leaders, as a result of factionalism, have exacerbated distributive perspectives for 
allocating committee seats. Committees are not merely designed for deputies to trade 
influence with another, thereby becoming more powerful in a certain policy area and 
less powerful in others as would happen under a distributive perspective (Kaeding, 
2004), and they are certainly not designed just for developing policy expertise as an 
informative perspective would suggest. Instead, committee seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies are used as prizes for loyal members, and are strategically allocated to 
maintain a certain balance between factions and party subgroups. 
 
As a result, committee purpose and seniority mechanisms in Mexico (and perhaps in 
other Latin American countries) are much more dependent on informal mechanisms 
than the European Parliament or the American Congress. In addition, they have more 
significance for future political careers, as they are used as prizes or punishments by the 
parties. 
 
Furthermore, party discipline and cohesion in Mexico cannot be solely measured by 
resorting to roll call data analysis on floor votes, as this would capture only the level of 
factionalism that is already known, at least in the PRI and the PRD. Instead, what is 
needed is a more in-depth approach that could help us understand how discipline is 
enforced in divided parties with multiple interests at stake. For instance, discipline in 
the Mexican case is better measured at the committee level, where it is mostly 
monitored by factional or sectoral leaders, rather than by the legislative party group’s 
coordinator. Voting decisions and political points are made much earlier than plenary 
votes; deputies’ efforts to please their principals consist of much more than pressing the 
correct button on voting day. A secure political career requires constant negotiations, as 
I exemplified in Chapter 4 with material from my interviews with Dep. Luis Sánchez 
(PRD, 60th Congress, member of the Directive Board) and David Sánchez Camacho 
(PRD, 60th Congress, Secretary of the Committee of Vulnerable Groups), among many 
others. And these negotiations are carried out informally, sometimes behind closed 
doors. 
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Thus, the Mexican case has proved that flexible theoretical perceptions of political 
issues and actors can offer better results, at least when used to analyse non-consolidated 
democracies like the Latin American ones. 
 
6.3 Normative contributions and future research 
Although Mexico is a very unique case due to all the empirical and theoretical elements 
discussed throughout this research, it is possible to extract some general arguments 
which could be helpful to address other countries with a similar institutional formation. 
This is particularly true with regard to analysis on the quality of democracy or 
legislative politics in Latin America. 
 
In countries like Mexico, which have democratised within the period known by scholars 
as ‘The Third Wave of Democracy’ (Huntington, 1991), the role of actors has been 
crucial in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. However, because their 
attitudes have not been entirely cleaned of corruption, it has been impossible for 
democracy to fully consolidate: ‘with consolidation, democracy becomes routinized and 
deeply internalized in social, institutional and even psychological life, as well as in 
calculations for achieving success’ (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 3). 
 
Institutions such as the legislative power and the judiciary, as well as political parties or 
organisations, have been unable to guarantee representation and the protection of civil 
rights. Furthermore, ‘the responsiveness of governmental policies to the preferences of 
the electorate’ (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006, p. 6), known as political accountability, 
is not easily achieved due to the imperfect nature of the relationship of representation 
and the lack of necessary conditions for controlling agencies to function adequately. 
 
The results in this research concur with Morgenstern’s (2002) argument that, compared 
to the US Congress, the efficiency of Latin American legislatures is much more affected 
by the party and electoral systems. Parties’ internal stability and struggles can seriously 
affect the approval of bills and therefore their success at being representative. 
 
Mexican parties have been described here as divided, clientelistic and vulnerable to 
local pressures, and thus their congressional behaviour and performance are dependent 
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on multiple leaders. Other countries in Latin America are in a similar situation, and 
could thus be approached using similar methods to those applied in this research. That 
is, understanding congressional performance elsewhere in Latin America could be 
achieved by observing strategies for allocating legislative candidacies. 
 
For instance, Argentina is a case where party unity in Congress has been very strong in 
the last few decades and gridlocks have therefore been avoided relatively easy (Jones, 
2002). However, individual legislators elected through decentralised closed lists have 
been convinced to vote with the party by either their provincial leader or party figures 
with the promise of positions and benefits, or other types of incentives (Morgenstern, 
2002). 
 
Alternatively, legislative seats in Brazil are allocated through open lists. Those with a 
greater power to influence legislators are governors and national party leaders, and thus 
deputies will do what is best for their state or the party’s interest if they wish to build a 
long-term political career (Ames, 2002). That is, Brazilian deputies are under regional 
and national pressure while taking part in policy-making, and must also accommodate 
their own interests (Cheibub, Figueiredo & Limongi, 2009). 
 
In contrast to Mexico, where local and particular interests are much stronger, party 
leaders in the Brazilian federal Congress have been successful in setting party lines and 
making members stick to them. Important legislation has been approved in the past 
couple of decades which proves that, when the elites’ attitudes are focused on policy-
making instead of on the achievement of particular interests, then democratic rules and 
behaviours can be locked in. Ultimately, this allows for the consolidation of democracy 
and representation. 
 
In summary, the inductive case study developed herein has provided theoretical 
assumptions about the limitations that party power and candidate selection mechanisms 
have for legislative efficiency and representation. These could be used to analyse 
legislative behaviour as a factor of democratic quality in other countries with similar 
institutional designs. However, a careful consideration of the evolution of institutions 
and actors would be needed. 
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In the future, I would be interested in delving further into this matter, perhaps 
comparing Mexico with a contrasting Latin American country such as Brazil, but before 
doing so it would be interesting to see whether there have been substantial variations 
over time in parties’ criteria to appoint senior members of committees in the Chamber 
of Deputies. I would be particularly interested in extending the database of background 
information on legislators to cover previous Congresses and the 61st legislature, and see 
how party leaders have changed their strategies from the times when the PRI was the 
dominant force in the Chamber, to later years, when the PAN and the PRD have become 
true electoral competitors. 
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Appendix 1: Methodology and questionnaires used for interviews 
 
In-depth interviews were conducted on two separate fieldtrips. The first one took place 
between the 26th of January and the 6th of February 2009, and the second in September 
of the same year. The main purpose of these interviews was to complement the official 
information found in legal documents and on institutional web pages, to present a more 
accurate empirical description of the 60th Congress. 
 
A series of emails were sent out in early January 2009 to 14 pre-made contacts in the 
Chamber of Deputies, requesting appointments for interviews. Once physically in 
Mexico City, phone calls were made to eight other possible interviewees following 
recommendations from third parties.  
 
The initial intention was to interview Congress members from all eight groups, while 
making a greater effort to contact the party leaders. Advisors and staff from key 
committees such as the Budget Department were also targeted as it was envisaged that 
they too would have accurate information about daily practices not documented in 
official sources. Interviewing advisors was also useful to ensure representativeness of 
interviewees if deputies themselves could not be contacted easily. 
 
Due to agenda constraints, only 13 interviews could be conducted in the first trip. Table 
A1 shows the names of the interviewees and the date of the meeting. 
 
A second trip was arranged for September 2009, with the purpose of carrying out 
another round of interviews. As was done prior to the first trip, a series of emails were 
sent in order to secure meetings with members of Congress and their staff.  Table A2 
has the details of the 21 interviews performed. The reader will notice that the last 
interview, with Miguel Ángel Jiménez, was done in May 2010. This is because he was 
unable to meet me during my fieldtrips to Mexico, and I did not have the opportunity to 
interview him until he came to London to work at the Mexican Embassy. 
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Table A1 Fieldtrip, January-February 2009 
Name Position Date of Interview 
Dámaso Morales Advisor to Alejandro 
Chanona, Coordinator of 
Convergencia 
26/01/2009 
David Sánchez Camacho Deputy (PRD) 26/01/2009 
Guillermo Amerena Advisor to Emilio Gamboa 
Patrón, Coordinator of the 
PRI 
26/01/2009 
Joy Langston Researcher at the Centro 
de Investigación y 
Docencia Económicas 
27/01/2009 
Elsa Conde Deputy (PASD) 28/01/2009 
Francisco Palomino Advisor during 59th and 
60th Congress to deputies 
from the PRI 
28/01/2009 
Adriana González Senator (PAN) 29/01/2009 
Jeffrey Weldon Head of the Department of 
Political Science, Instituto 
Tecnológico Autónomo de 
México (ITAM) 
29/01/2009 
Julio Castañeda Pech Linkage Secretary of PAN 30/01/2009 
Federico Ling Technical Secretary of the 
Committee of Foreign 
Affairs/Advisor to Dep. 
Gerardo Buganza, PAN 
30/01/2009 
Benito Nacif Researcher at the Centro 
de Investigación y 
Docencia Económicas 
(CIDE) and Member of the 
Board of the IFE 
04/02/2009 
Sergio Mendoza Advisor to Dep. Carlos 
Puente, PVEM 
5/02/2009 
Carlos Puente Deputy (PVEM) 5/02/2009 
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Table A2 Fieldtrip, September 2009 
Interviewee Position Date of interview 
Ignacio González 
Rebolledo 
Former Federal Deputy 
(48th and 56th Congress, 
PRI) 
8/09/2009 
Alberto Olvera Researcher at the Institute 
of Historical and Social 
Research, University of 
Veracruz. Specialist on 
accountability and 
participation 
8/09/2009 
Marta Tagle Former Federal Deputy 
(60th Congress, 
Convergencia) 
14/09/2009 
Roberto Ramírez Archer Director of Budget and 
Public Expenditure 
Studies, Centre of Studies 
of Public Finances, 
Chamber of Deputies 
15/09/2009 
Moisés Alcalde Former Deputy (60th 
Congress, PAN) 
17/09/2009 
Humberto López Lena Former Deputy (60th 
Congress, Independent) 
21/09/2009 
Obdulio Ávila Former Deputy (60th 
Congress, PAN) 
21/09/2009 
Carlos Lazard Parliamentary staff since 
1988 
22/09/2009 
Susana Servín Parliamentary staff since 
1994 
22/09/2009 
Gerardo Sosa Former Deputy (60th
 
Congress, PRI) 
23/09/2009 
Luis Sánchez Jiménez  Former Deputy (60th 
Congress, PRD) 
23/09/2009 
Teresa Ochoa Current Deputy (61st 
Congress, Convergencia) 
24/09/2009 
Miguel Ángel Sánchez Parliamentary staff since 
1997 
24/09/2009 
Susana Monreal Former Deputy (60th 
Congress, PRD) 
24/09/2009 
Xavier López Adame Former Deputy (60th
 
Congress, PVEM) 
25/09/2009 
Diego Díaz & Víctor 
González 
Directors of Impacto 
Legislativo 
28/09/2009 
Javier Zambrano Former Deputy (60th 
Congress, PAN) 
30/09/2009 
Erick López Barriga Former Deputy (60th
 
Congress, PRD) 
30/09/2009 
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Jesús Ramírez Current Deputy (61st 
Congress, PAN) 
1/10/2009 
Ángeles Cortés Director of the Centre of 
Studies of Women’s 
Development and Gender 
Equality, Chamber of 
Deputies 
1/10/2009 
Miguel Ángel Jiménez Deputy (60th Congress) 21/05/2010 
 
 
Table A3 Failed Interviews 
This table has been removed for reasons of copyright 
 
The conversations were established based on the following eight questions designed to 
obtain specific information. They proved to be successful, and extra data was revealed 
by the interviewees. 
1. Are there set mechanisms/procedures within the party for consensus building, like 
daily meetings? 
 
2. |Is there a mechanism for being appointed to a committee? How did you get 
appointed to the committees you sit in, for example? 
 
3.  o  o  have certain ‘special’ obli ations or d ties to f lfil, derived from the 
committee seat you occupy? 
 
4. Do you communicate in any way (apart from the approved bills which are published 
in the DOF and then executed) with your state and locality regarding your 
achievements? 
 
5. Do you distinguish between bills when scrutinising them, that is do you personally 
handle differently more locally targeted bills from the rest? 
 
6. Would you say that your party votes cohesively on all issues? 
 
7. Do you think that changes should be made to the formal rules of Congress in order 
for it to become more efficient? 
 
8. What are your plans for after Congress? 
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The interviews were not recorded. My previous experience proved that Mexican 
Congress staff and members are much more open to disclosing information and 
engaging in a lengthy conversation when only notes are being taken by the interviewer. 
Therefore, the most important facts were kept in notes, which were later transcribed into 
a computer file. Only some of the interviewees requested some of their statements to 
remain anonymous when referenced in the research, and so the information was used 
cautiously in the text, quoted vaguely, i.e. as ‘a member of Congress’. 
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Appendix 2: The party groups of the 60th Congress: Organisational structures and electoral agendas 
Figure A1 Organisation of the PAN in the 60th Congress, Author’s creation with data from Diputados PAN, 2006b 
Vice Coord., Administration: H. M. 
Ramos 
Vice Coord.,Legislative Process: A. 
Fernández 
Vice Coord., Parliamentary Debate 
& Education: J. J. Rodríguez 
Vice Coord., Relations with Civil 
Society: G.Aranda 
Vice Coord., Legal Affairs: M. d. P. 
Ortega 
Vice Coord., Social Affairs: B. E. 
Reyes 
Economic Vice Coord., D. Parra Vice Coord., Agriculture: G. Escaroz 
Coord: H. Larios 
Committee of Parliamentary 
Practices: M. E. Álvarez (Secy) 
Council of Federal Affairs: C. Pérez 
(Pres.); D. Chávez (Secy) 
Committee of Urban 
Development: O. Ávila 
(Pres.) 
Federal District Committee: 
M. G. González (Secy) 
Committee for Federalism’s 
Strength: A. Enríquez (Pres.) 
Comm. of Population, 
Borders & Migration: A. 
Valladolid (Pres.)  
Council of Domestic Policies: L. G. 
Parra (Pres.); M. E. Moreno (Secy) 
Committee of the Interior: D. 
Carrasco (Pres.) 
Jurisdictional Committee: E. 
Duck (Secy) 
Justice Committee: V. d P. 
Lagunes (Secy); C. A. Navarro 
(Secy) 
Comm. of Constit. Points: 
Secys J. G. Guerrero and  D. 
A. Martínez 
Committee of Radio, TV and 
Film: four secretaries 
Committee of Public 
Security: two secretaries 
Council of Sovereign Policy: A. 
Landero (Pres.); A. Torres (Secy) 
Committee of National 
Defense:  J. González (Pres.) 
Marine Committee: M. A. 
Peyrot (Secy) 
Committee of Foreign 
Affairs: G. Buganza (Pres.) 
Council of Human Development: F. A. 
Frayle (Pres.); Á. H. García (Secy) 
Committee of Cooperative 
Promotion & Social Economy: L. 
Magallón (Pres.) 
Committee of Health: H. 
Ramírez (Pres.) 
Committee of Social 
Security: E. Arizmendi 
(Secy) 
Committee of Labour & 
Social Benefits: T. del Toro 
(Pres) 
Council of Social Development: L. 
Carbajal (Pres); R. Franco (Secy) 
Committee of Social 
Development: R. López 
(Secy) 
Housing Committee: three 
secretaries 
Council of Education Policies: F. Murillo 
(Pres.); J. Solano (Secy) 
Committee of Science and 
Technology: two secretaries 
Committee of Culture: two 
secretaries 
Committee of Public Education 
& Educational Services: four 
secretaries 
Committee of Youth & 
Sports: four secretaries 
Council of Special Social Policies: S. 
Degante (Pres.); A. Medina (Secy) 
Committee of Indigenous 
Affairs: two secretaries 
Committee for the Attention of 
Vulnerable Groups: L. Rojas 
(Pres.) 
Committee of Gender 
Equality: two secretaries 
Committee of Citizen 
Participation: two secretaries 
Council of Economic Development 
Committee of 
Communications: two 
secretaries 
Economic Committee: A. 
Rodríguez (Pres.) 
Committee of Energy: D. 
Maldonado (Pres) 
Transport Committee: two 
secretaries 
Committee of Tourism: 
three secretaries 
Council of Public Economy: D. Parra 
(Pres.) 
Committee of Public Office: 
B. Roaro (Pres.) 
Treasury Committee: 
three secretaries 
Budget Committee: R. 
Padilla (Pres.) 
Oversight Committee: two 
secretaries 
Council of Environment, Natural 
Resources and Water: J. Bolaños (Pres.); 
J. Palafox (Secy) 
Committee of Environment 
and Natural Resources: three 
secretaries 
Committee of Water: three 
secretaries 
Council of Farming Policy: M. 
Romo (Pres.) 
Committee of Agriculture 
and Farming: four 
secretaries 
Committee of Rural 
Development: three 
secretaries 
Fishing Committee: four 
secretaries 
Council of Rural Policy: J. I. Rubio 
(Pres.); M. Stefanonni (Secy) 
Committee of Agricultural 
Reform: R. Ceja (Pres.) 
Vice Coordinator of Special 
Projects: M. E. Álvarez 
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Table A4 Thematic organisation of the PAN in the 60th Congress 
Vice Coordination Councils Committees 
Administration   
Legislative Process  Parliamentary Regime, Rules and 
Practices 
Parliamentary Debate and 
Education 
  
Relations with Society   
Legal Affairs Federal Affairs; Domestic 
Policy; Sovereign Policy 
Urban Development; Federal 
District; Empowerment of 
Federalism; Population, Borders 
and Migration Affairs; Interior; 
Jurisdictional; Justice; 
Constitutional Points; Radio, TV 
and Film; Public Security; 
National Defence; Marine; 
Foreign Affairs  
Social Affairs Human Development; Social 
Development; Education 
Policies; Special Social Policies 
Cooperative Promotion and 
Social Economy; Health; Social 
Security; Labour and Social 
Benefits; Housing; Science and 
Technology; Culture; Public 
Education and Educational 
Services; Youth and Sports; 
Indigenous Affairs; Attention to 
Vulnerable Groups; Gender 
Equality; Citizen Participation 
Economic Economic Development; Public 
Economy; Environment, Natural 
Resources and Water 
Communications; Economy; 
Energy; Transport; Tourism; 
Public Office; Treasury; Budget; 
Oversight; Environment and 
Natural Resources; Water 
Agriculture Farming; Rural Policy  Agriculture and Farming; Rural 
Development; Fishing; 
Agricultural Reform 
Source: Author’s creation with data from Diputados PAN, 2006b 
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Table A5 The PAN’s Legislative Agenda for the 60th Congress 
Main area Specific Issues 
Economic Agenda Fiscal Fiscal incentives; simplification of tax obligations; participation of states and municipalities in tax 
collection  
Federal Budget Multi-year budget; reduction of government’s expenditures; performance evaluation mechanisms 
Scrutiny of Public Finance Transparency in political parties’ expenditures 
Economy Increase in financial authorities’ power; protection of personal information; enhance development 
banks; transparency and modernisation of state companies related to energy; credits to small 
businesses; promotion of more free trade agreements beneficial to Mexico; better industrial policies; 
incorporation of informal sector to formal economy 
Tourism Improvement of touristic infrastructure; promotion of tourism 
Transport Construction of roads in indigenous communities; increase in airport capacity 
Environment Protection of natural resources through education; law enforcement 
Farming Protection of internal market against disloyal practices; legal provisions for land ownership protection 
Legal and Political Agenda Public Security and 
Criminal Justice 
Constitutional autonomy of the General Attorney’s Office; implementation of judges for ensuring 
execution of criminal punishments; eradication of human trafficking; oral trials for criminal 
processes; transformation of Federal Public Security Ministry into a Ministry of the Interior; 
unification of all federal police forces; provision of faculties for investigation to the police; creation of 
a general database on criminal information; ensure rights of victims; general reforms to the 
Constitution and other frameworks to improve law enforcement and public security 
Institutional Reform 
(Political Reform) 
Eliminate term limits for federal deputies; reduction of size of Legislative Power; regulation of 
lobbying; professionalisation of legislators and efficiency of scrutiny process; limitations to political 
immunity; regulation of presidential veto; mechanisms for budget management; transparency of all 
ministries and coordination between them 
Electoral Reform Homologation of elections across the country; regulation of pre-campaigns; reduction of public funds 
for political parties and campaigns; reduction of campaign duration; creation of mechanisms for 
plebiscites and referenda, with the necessary regulation for them; transparency and accountability of 
political parties  
Human Rights Constitutional recognition of human rights; provision to declare as unconstitutional those laws 
violating human rights 
Fight Against Corruption, 
Transparency and 
Administrative 
Development 
Better regulated salaries of public officers; upgrade to constitutional status transparency and 
information access measures and ensure compliance of all entities which receive public funding 
Personal Data; Lottery, 
Rafts and Bets; Radio and 
Television 
Consolidate legal framework for the protection of personal data 
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Table A5 The PAN’s Legislative Agenda for the 60th Congress 
Social Policy Agenda Social Development Adequate policies for distribution of federal resources between states and municipalities; transparency 
and accountability for social programmes, including a list of beneficiaries and sanctions to officers 
who misuse resources; promote regional development 
Housing Strengthen housing institutions; guarantee property rights of housing and land  
Health Universalisation and homologation of health services currently provided by diverse entities and 
increase in coverage; strengthen the national health system by professionalising staff, ensuring 
sufficient supplies of medicines, improving quality of service and reducing costs; clear legislation on 
bioethics 
Labour and Social 
Benefits 
Promote new alternatives for hiring personnel, in order to ensure working rights; reduction of risks in 
working spaces; flexible contracts for women and young people; promote gender equality and 
eliminate discrimination; foster democratic unions, guaranteeing transparency, accountability and 
effective defence of workers’ rights; promote incorporation of young professionals to the labour 
market 
Social Security Transform pension programmes to ensure minimum amounts and ensure financial solvency; create a 
universal popular pension system; expand and modernise day care centres, expanding the service to 
more working women; actions in order to support Mexicans abroad 
Education Improve quality of higher education, ensuring that graduates can easily integrate into the labour 
market; increase social participation in education policies; improve educational evaluation; promote 
teachers’ training; expand scholarship programmes 
Culture Establish the right to culture and Congress’ right to legislate in cultural matters; strengthen legal 
framework of culture 
Science and Technology Strengthen CONACYT (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología) to make scientific and 
technological development a national priority; increase of budget for the sector, fiscal stimulus to 
private sector to foster technological development; promote sustainable development 
Gender and Equality Consolidate gender perspective within the public administration agencies and increase number of 
women in important decision-making posts; harsher sanctions against rape and crimes against women 
Vulnerable Groups Investments for accessibility improvements in public buildings and transport; guarantee respect of 
rights of children and teenagers; protection of young people against addictions, crime, violence and 
sexual abuse 
Indigenous People Integration of mixed mechanisms and agencies for the members of indigenous communities; launch 
initiatives for social and productive development of indigenous people and create copyrights 
Citizen Participation Incorporate mechanisms such as referenda, plebiscites and citizen initiatives to the Constitution; 
increase spaces for civil participation in legislative decision-making and public policies 
Family Constitutional reforms to identify the family as the centre for protection and social development and 
create the General Family Law to legalise its rights; coordinate actions to eradicate domestic violence 
Source: Author’s creation with data from Diputados PAN, 2006a 
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PRD 
 
Figure A2 The Directive Board of the PRD in the 60th Congress 
Source: Author’s creation with data from PRD, 2006a 
Coordinator: 
Javier González 
Vice Coordinator: 
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Table A6 The PRD’s committee oversight within thematic areas 
Area Coordination Committees of Supervision 
Communication, Transport and Tourism (Coordinator: Rafael Franco) Communications; Transport; Tourism 
Culture, Education, Science and Technology (Coordinator: Miguel 
Ángel Solares) 
Public Education and Educational Services; Science and Technology; Culture 
Economic Development (Coordinator: Alejandro Sánchez) Economy; Energy; Agricultural Reform; Cooperative Promotion and Social Economy 
Rural Development (Coordinator: Adriana Díaz) Agriculture and Farming; Rural Development 
Social Equality (Coordinator: Holly Matus) Gender and Equality; Youth and Sports; Indigenous Affairs; Attention to Vulnerable Groups 
Public Finances (Coordinator: Faustino Soto) Treasury; Budget 
Social Justice and Human Rights (Coordinator: Alliet Bautista) Justice; Human Rights 
Environment and Natural Resources (Coordinator: Roberto Mendoza) Agriculture and Farming; Rural Development; Environment and Natural Resources; Fishing; 
Water 
International Policy (Coordinator: Jesús Zazueta) Foreign Affairs; Population, Borders and Migration Affairs 
Domestic Policy (Coordinator: Claudia Cruz) Radio, TV and Film; Citizen Participation 
Social Policy (Coordinator: Daniel Dehesa) Health; Social Security; Labour and Social Benefits; Housing 
State Reform (Coordinator: Salvador Ruiz)  
Security and Law Enforcement (Coordinator: Andrés Lozano) Public Security; National Defence; Marine 
Oversight of the Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF) and Social 
Controllership (Coordinator: Hugo Martínez) 
Oversight; Public Office 
Source: Author’s creation with data from http://prdleg.diputados.gob.mx/trabajo/t_01.htm 
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Table A7 The PRD’s Electoral Programme for the 60th Congress 
Topic Proposals 
Transformation of Political Institutions Transparent and democratic participation; 
mechanisms for civil participation like plebiscites, 
referenda and popular initiatives; full inclusion of 
human rights in the Constitution; improve duties 
of Congress in order to increase efficiency, 
transparency and achievement of legislators 
Human Rights Full inclusion of human rights in the Constitution; 
indigenous rights; compliance with the San 
Andres agreements to achieve autonomy of the 
indigenous people; extension of children’s, 
elderly people’s and young people’s rights as well 
as being guaranteed by the State; disabled 
people’s and women’s rights must also be better 
protected by the law 
Legal Reforms New regulations for the media to avoid 
monopolies; new environmental and natural 
resources’ legislation 
Social Policy Procurement of sufficient financial resources to 
improve education, social security and health 
services; decent retirement programmes and 
pensions; economic aid to elderly people (over 70 
years old); creation of full-time schools; 
guarantee health services to the entire population 
and promote the construction of popular housing 
Economic Policy Alleviation of poverty and economic inequality; 
economic reactivation programme, which 
includes fiscal reform, the promotion of national 
savings, investment and employment. Its goals are 
to guarantee economic growth, solve agricultural 
crises and back up social policy; revision of 
NAFTA 
Foreign Policy Foreign policy for the benefit of the entire nation; 
re-emphasise constitutional provisions regarding 
foreign policy; promotion of peace 
Domestic Policy Joint effort with other political forces to develop 
the country by overcoming political gridlocks and 
approving reforms 
Source: author’s creation with data from PRD, 2006b 
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PRI 
Figure A3 Organisational chart of the PRI in the 60th Congress 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation with data from PRI, 2006b 
 
 
Table A8 The PRI Working Group’s Oversight of the Committees 
Working Group Ordinary Committees Overseen 
Economic Development Economy, Communications, Science and 
Technology, Transport, Cooperative Promotion 
and Social Economy, Urban Development, 
Tourism, Energy 
Rural Development and Environment Agriculture and Farming, Agricultural Reform, 
Water, Rural Development, Environment and 
Natural Resources, Fishing 
Social Equality Youth and Sports, Indigenous Affairs, Vulnerable 
Groups, Gender and Equality 
Financial Policy and Accountability Budget, Finance, Public Office and Oversight 
Domestic Policy and State Reform Constitutional Points, Radio, TV and Film, 
Citizen Participation, Interior, Federal District, 
Empowerment of Federalism 
Legislative Process Parliamentary Rules and Practices 
Foreign Policy Foreign Policy, Population, Borders and 
Migration Affairs 
Social Policy Social Development, Culture, Public Education 
and Educational Services, Health, Social Security, 
Labour and Social Benefits, Housing 
Security, Justice and Human Rights National Defence, Public Security, Jurisdictional, 
Justice and Human Rights, Marine 
Source: author’s creation with data from PRI, 2006c 
Coordinator: Emilio Gamboa 
Vice Coordinator: Juan Manuel Parás Vice Coordinator: Lourdes Quiñones 
Vice Coordinator: Raúl Cervantes Vice Coordinator: Adolfo Mota 
Vice Coordinator: Daniel Amador Vice Coordinator: Tomás Gloria 
Chief of Staff: Lorena Martínez Twenty nine State Coordinators 
 
Coordinators of Sectors: Horacio Duarte 
(Agricultural), Andrés Bernal (Popular) 
and Patricio Flores (Labour) 
 
Coordinator of the National Organization 
of Women in the PRI: Yolanda 
Rodríguez 
Nine Working Groups 
Members of Committees of the Chamber 
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Table A9 The PRI’s Legislative Agenda for the 60th Congress 
Topic Specific Issue 
Social Concerns Review social policies and programmes; discuss 
the incorporation of social groups that are 
marginalised from economic processes and social 
programmes, such as ‘Opportunities’; full exercise 
of social rights for all Mexicans; revise the 
mechanism of the Popular Insurance: strengthen 
and modernise the IMSS and the ISSSTE, without 
privatising them; increase coverage of the basic 
levels of pre-school, elementary and secondary 
schools; solve the demand of mid-level education, 
technological schools and universities 
Political Proposals Promote a different relation between powers; 
redesign institutions; redistribute responsibilities 
among government branches; materialise a third 
generation of reforms of the political organisms 
and of the electoral processes such as the IFE, the 
composition and attributions of Congress, the 
regulation of internal campaigns, direct re-election 
of deputies or second round of presidential 
elections, the political attributions of the Judiciary 
and the organisation and attributes of the Federal 
Executive 
Economic Priorities Better distribution of income through a more just 
fiscal burden and an integral fiscal reform; defend 
natural resources and the national heritage but also 
promote an energy reform which widens the 
energy offering and reduces costs for users 
without jeopardising national sovereignty; act 
upon the productive problems, unemployment and 
low income, especially in the rural sectors 
Regionally Targeted Budget Give the municipalities sufficient resources to 
meet their increased responsibilities; promote 
regional development; increase resources for 
priority areas and programmes, such as education, 
health, rural development, poverty alleviation, 
employment opportunities, public security, 
infrastructure, etc., which have a great social and 
economic impact 
Source: author’s creation with data from PRI, 2006a 
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Convergencia 
 
Table A10 Legislative Agenda of Convergencia for the 60th Congress 
Topic Main Proposals 
State Reform, Democratic Governance and New 
Constitutional provisions 
Re-emphasise importance of parties as political and 
representative actors; legal changes to promote 
legislative majorities; greater attributions for Congress 
in budgetary matters; ensure justice and law 
enforcement through a series of legal reforms; 
electoral reform; increase of civil participation 
mechanisms in Congress; better frameworks for 
federalism to operate more efficiently 
Equality and Human Rights Make explicit in the Constitution the protection of the 
rights of children, disabled population and young 
people; new framework to protect women concerning 
abortion, labour and non-discrimination 
A New Social Policy Unified health system; universal social security; 
recognition of the right to nourishment; improved 
housing policy; effective alleviation of poverty; 
external evaluation of social programmes 
Education, Science, Technology and Culture Full-time schools; improvement of quality of 
education and also widen accessibility to more sectors 
of the population; make science and technology a 
national priority; establish in the Constitution the right 
to culture to force the State to improve its actions 
within the sector 
Economic Policy for a Sustainable and Equal 
Development 
Legal reforms to improve development of farming, 
fishing and nourishment options; protection of natural 
resources; modernise the energy sector; thorough fiscal 
reform and revision of specific tax collection 
procedures; increase and improve financial aid for 
development; improve labour protection frameworks; 
improve pension system 
Global Affairs, Regional Blocks and National Projects Involve Executive and the Legislature in foreign 
policy; approve a National Immigration Law 
Source: Author’s creation with data from Convergencia, 2006 
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PVEM 
 
The party’s legislative agenda for the 60th Congress, as in previous legislatures, 
mainly focused on environmental issues, such as the right of all Mexicans to clean 
water, ensuring those who damage the environment are made responsible for their 
actions, and working towards the sustainability of productive activities. However, 
they also included provisions regarding fiscal reform, the inclusion of direct 
participation mechanisms such as  referenda and plebiscites and adequate regulations 
of lobbying in Mexico. 
 
Overall, any topic to be promoted or defended by the PVEM was expected to be 
included in the electoral programme it presented along with the PRI during the 2006 
campaigns (PVEM, 2006). The party was determined to participate in collective 
decisions so as to prevent gridlocks and deliver legislative results. 
 
PT 
 
Generally speaking, the party proposed a series of reforms towards a better state and 
an improved government, by promoting the direct participation of citizens, more 
efficient electoral institutions, accountability and transparency mechanisms regarding 
political campaigns as well as the promotion of coalitions. It also aimed for more just 
practices and frameworks for Federalism to be fully efficient (decentralisation of 
public administration, earmarking public resources and the strengthening of states’ 
and municipalities’ tax collection powers). Finally, as a labour party, it could not omit 
its priorities regarding social benefits and social guarantees such as housing, 
education, social security, pensions, health services and human rights, all of which 
should be priorities for the Mexican State (Ibid). 
 
PANAL 
 
As a new party running for elections independently for the first time, NA (or PANAL) 
presented a relatively broad legislative agenda for the 60th Congress, divided into 
seven large sections: re-definition of the social duties of the state; electoral reform and 
democratic consolidation; integral reform of the federal public finances; economic 
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growth with an equality perspective; globalisation; law enforcement, security and 
legal affairs; and democratic culture. 
 
Overall, the main demands and promises to its electorate focused on achieving the 
necessary legal reforms in order to defend human rights, ensure better social policies 
(i.e. housing, social security or education), develop mechanisms for transparency and 
accountability across all governmental practices, stimulate the internal market and 
tackle unemployment. In addition, the party was committed to helping Mexicans 
living abroad to be better protected by consulates (Nueva Alianza, 2006a). 
 
PASD 
 
Overall, the legislative agenda of the party rested on two principles. The first was the 
promotion of a development model which fosters high-quality education, investment 
in productivity, economic growth, employment, social well-being and the 
conservation of the environment. In turn, the second principle sought to build a 
society with universal rights and freedoms, to which everyone must have access, with 
effective guarantees and simple mechanisms to defend them. All of the above must be 
achieved in a context of political plurality and social diversity (PASD, 2006). Specific 
legal reforms and new frameworks were proposed throughout the document to help 
achieve these goals. 
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Appendix 3: Output for multivariate analyses discussed in Chapter 5 
 
DV = Committee President 
 
Model 1 - without party dummies 
 
Logit model  
Dependent variable ComRole_Pres 
Independent variables PrevElectFederalSenator 
 PrevElectFederalDeputy 
 PrevElectFederalBoth 
 PrevElectState_Deputy 
 PrevElectState_Governor 
 PrevElectState_Both 
 PrevElectMunic_Mayor 
 PrevElectMunic_Councillor 
 PrevElectMunic_Both 
 PubServiceState 
 PubServiceFederal 
 PubServiceMunicipal  
 ActivePartyOfficer 
 ActiveSector 
 LevelEducation 
 Gender 
 Age 
Note: PrevElectState_Both = 0 predicts failure perfectly. PrevElectState_Both dropped and 1 
obs not used 
Note: PrevElectMunic_Both = 0 predicts failure perfectly. PrevElectMunic_Both dropped and 
8 obs not used 
 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -205.10529 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -197.41414 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -197.07643 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -197.0761 
 
Logistic regression 
Number of obs = 430 
LR chi2(15) = 16.06 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3782 
Log likelihood = -197.0761 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0391
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Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Z p 95% Confidence interval 
PrevElectFederalSenator 0.933429 0.6061502 1.54 0.124 -0.2546031 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.791206 0.3349736 2.36 0.018 0.1346699 1.447742 
PrevElectFederalBoth 1.079819 0.5618879 1.92 0.055 -0.021461 2.181099 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.12457 0.2744783 -0.45 0.65 -0.662538 0.4133972 
PrevElectState_Governor -0.40845 1.20393 -0.34 0.734 -2.768109 1.951208 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.37725 0.3816383 -0.99 0.323 -1.125248 0.3707472 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor 0.20529 0.3610979 0.57 0.57 -0.502449 0.9130285 
PubServiceState 0.14003 0.3247787 0.43 0.666 -0.496525 0.7765842 
PubServiceFederal 0.121761 0.3741637 0.33 0.745 -0.611586 0.8551085 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.280839 0.4090394 -0.69 0.492 -1.082541 0.5208636 
ActivePartyOfficer -0.255832 0.327279 -0.78 0.434 -0.897287 0.3856228 
ActiveSector 0.084168 0.3679892 0.23 0.819 -0.637077 0.8054137 
LevelEducation -0.077399 0.1540744 -0.5 0.615 -0.379379 0.2245811 
Gender -0.186795 0.3386563 -0.55 0.581 -0.850549 0.476959 
Age 0.002208 0.0159481 0.14 0.89 -0.02905 0.0334652 
Constant -1.405105 0.9263934 -1.52 0.129 -3.220803 0.4105923 
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Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(ComRole_Pres) (predict) 
= .17290244 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval X 
PrevElectFederalSenator 0.17129 0.13342 1.28 0.199 -0.090218 0.432797 0.037209 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.134044 0.06459 2.08 0.038 0.007448 0.260641 0.148837 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.203374 0.12769 1.59 0.111 -0.046895 0.453643 0.046512 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.017597 0.03828 -0.46 0.646 -0.092628 0.057433 0.348837 
PrevElectState_Governor -0.051041 0.12973 -0.39 0.694 -0.305302 0.20322 0.009302 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.049711 0.04599 -1.08 0.28 -0.139851 0.040429 0.172093 
PrevElectMunic_Cllor 0.030749 0.05651 0.54 0.586 -0.08 0.141497 0.151163 
PubServiceState 0.020387 0.0481 0.42 0.672 -0.073887 0.114661 0.304651 
PubServiceFederal 0.017851 0.05619 0.32 0.751 -0.092288 0.127991 0.186047 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.038027 0.05222 -0.73 0.466 -0.140371 0.064316 0.204651 
ActivePartyOfficer -0.038447 0.05149 -0.75 0.455 -0.139366 0.062472 0.8 
ActiveSector 0.012278 0.05474 0.22 0.823 -0.095012 0.119568 0.137209 
LevelEducation -0.011069 0.02201 -0.5 0.615 -0.05421 0.032073 2.12326 
Gender -0.025762 0.04496 -0.57 0.567 -0.113878 0.062355 0.204651 
Age 0.000316 0.00228 0.14 0.89 -0.004154 0.004786 48.0977 
Note: dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
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Model 2 - with party dummies 
 
Logit model  
Dependent variable ComRole_Pres 
Independent variables PrevElectFederalSenator 
 PrevElectFederalDeputy 
 PrevElectFederalBoth 
 PrevElectState_Deputy 
 PrevElectState_Governor 
 PrevElectState_Both 
 PrevElectMunic_Mayor 
 PrevElectMunic_Councillor 
 PrevElectMunic_Both 
 PubServiceState 
 PubServiceFederal 
 PubServiceMunicipal  
 ActivePartyOfficer 
 ActiveSector 
 LevelEducation 
 Gender 
 Age 
 PolPartyPAN 
 PolPartyPRD 
 PolPartyPRI 
Note: PrevElectState_Both = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PrevElectState_Both dropped and 1 
obs not used 
Note: PrevElectMunic_Both = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PreElectMunic_Both dropped and 8 
obs not used 
Note: PolPartyPRD dropped because of collinearity 
 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -205.10529 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -196.78764 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -196.42509 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -196.42473 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -196.42473 
 
Logistic regression 
Number of obs = 430 
LR chi2(17) = 17.36 
Prob > chi2 = 0.4302 
Log likelihood = -196.42473 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0423
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Variables Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
PrevElectFederalSenator 0.888751 0.6154348 1.44 0.149 -0.317479 2.094981 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.7459087 0.341134 2.19 0.029 0.0772984 1.414519 
PrevElectFederalBoth 1.096505 0.5649287 1.94 0.052 -0.0107352 2.203744 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.1425578 0.2753767 -0.52 0.605 -0.6822862 0.3971707 
PrevElectState_Governor -0.4435416 1.198703 -0.37 0.711 -2.792956 1.905873 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.3981119 0.3856767 -1.03 0.302 -1.154024 0.3578005 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor 0.2780094 0.3680656 0.76 0.45 -0.4433858 0.9994047 
PubServiceState 0.1332843 0.3283672 0.41 0.685 -0.5103036 0.7768723 
PubServiceFederal 0.1533236 0.3791725 0.4 0.686 -0.5898409 0.8964881 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.1994694 0.4153639 -0.48 0.631 -1.013568 0.6146289 
ActivePartyOfficer -0.271513 0.3312189 -0.82 0.412 -0.9206902 0.3776641 
ActiveSector 0.0671858 0.3691931 0.18 0.856 -0.6564194 0.790791 
LevelEducation -0.1127877 0.1574522 -0.72 0.474 -0.4213884 0.195813 
Gender -0.1809094 0.3392438 -0.53 0.594 -0.8458151 0.4839962 
Age -0.0004154 0.016193 -0.03 0.98 -0.032153 0.0313222 
PolPartPAN -0.3202253 0.323258 -0.99 0.322 -0.9537993 0.3133487 
PolPartPRI 0.0030939 0.3655764 0.01 0.993 -0.7134226 0.7196104 
Constant -1.058447 0.9756412 -1.08 0.278 -2.970669 0.8537742 
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Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(ComRole_Pres) (predict) 
= .1720646 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval X 
PrevElectFederalSenator 0.1610058 0.13342 1.21 0.228 -0.100483 0.422495 0.037209 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.1248538 0.06481 1.93 0.054 -0.002166 0.251874 0.148837 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.2066326 0.12867 1.61 0.108 -0.045552 0.458817 0.046512 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.0200249 0.03812 -0.53 0.599 -0.094734 0.054685 0.348837 
PrevElectState_Governor -0.0545463 0.12529 -0.44 0.663 -0.300117 0.191024 0.009302 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.0520118 0.04584 -1.13 0.256 -0.14185 0.037826 0.172093 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor 0.0421602 0.05914 0.71 0.476 -0.073761 0.158082 0.151163 
PubServiceState 0.0193145 0.04837 0.4 0.69 -0.075489 0.114118 0.304651 
PubServiceFederal 0.0225379 0.05745 0.39 0.695 -0.090054 0.13513 0.186047 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.0273338 0.05462 -0.5 0.617 -0.134392 0.079725 0.204651 
ActivePartyOfficer -0.040775 0.05222 -0.78 0.435 -0.143124 0.061574 0.8 
ActiveSector 0.0097248 0.05428 0.18 0.858 -0.096671 0.116121 0.137209 
LevelEducation -0.0160676 0.02239 -0.72 0.473 -0.059953 0.027818 2.12326 
Gender -0.0248805 0.04496 -0.55 0.58 -0.113007 0.063246 0.204651 
Age -0.0000592 0.00231 -0.03 0.98 -0.00458 0.004462 48.0977 
PolPartPAN -0.0454027 0.04553 -1.0 0.319 -0.134644 0.043838 0.474419 
PolPartPRI 0.000441 0.05214 0.01 0.993 -0.101743 0.102625 0.232558 
Note: dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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DV = Priority Committee 
 
Model 3 - without party dummies 
 
Logit model  
Dependent variable Priority Committee 
Independent variables PrevElectFederalSenator 
 PrevElectFederalDeputy 
 PrevElectFederalBoth 
 PrevElectState_Deputy 
 PrevElectState_Governor 
 PrevElectState_Both 
 PrevElectMunic_Mayor 
 PrevElectMunic_Councillor 
 PrevElectMunic_Both 
 PubServiceState 
 PubServiceFederal 
 PubServiceMunicipal  
 ActivePartyOfficer 
 ActiveSector 
 LevelEducation 
 Gender 
 Age 
Note: PrevElectState_Both = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PrevElectState_Both dropped and 1 
obs not used 
 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -273.68738 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -260.85727 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -260.71418 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -260.71408 
 
Logistic regression 
Number of obs = 438 
LR chi2(16) = 25.95 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0548 
Log likelihood = -260.71408 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0474
290 
 
 
Variables Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
PrevElectFederalSenator 0.5827468 0.577445 1.01 0.313 -0.5490245 1.714518 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.2506266 0.2991106 0.84 0.402 -0.3356195 0.8368727 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.2233861 0.5382557 0.42 0.678 -0.8315756 1.278348 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.0682651 0.2272248 -0.3 0.764 -0.5136175 0.3770872 
PrevElectState_Governor 1.485523 1.222384 1.22 0.224 -0.9103055 3.881352 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.3432281 0.3078208 -1.12 0.265 -0.9465458 0.2600896 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.3301718 0.3221399 -1.02 0.305 -0.9615544 0.3012109 
PrevElectMunic_Both 0.3561864 0.7838479 0.45 0.65 -1.180127 1.8925 
PubServiceState 0.2189643 0.2807948 0.78 0.436 -0.3313834 0.769312 
PubServiceFederal 0.8095192 0.3165828 2.56 0.011 0.1890283 1.43001 
PubServiceMunicipal  0.2036148 0.3188132 0.64 0.523 -0.4212477 0.8284772 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.1146177 0.2814336 0.41 0.684 -0.436982 0.6662175 
ActiveSector -0.1276701 0.3263193 -0.39 0.696 -0.7672443 0.5119041 
LevelEducation -0.116641 0.1238425 -0.94 0.346 -0.3593677 0.1260858 
Gender -0.7270058 0.3000415 -2.42 0.015 -1.315076 -0.1389354 
Age -0.0050757 0.0132148 -0.38 0.701 -0.0309763 0.0208249 
Constant -0.4591042 0.7777564 -0.59 0.555 -1.983479 1.06527 
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Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(PriorityCom) (predict) 
= .30774747 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval X 
PrevElectFederalSenator 0.1347864 0.14142 0.95 0.341 -0.142383 0.411956 0.03653 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.055084 0.06758 0.82 0.415 -0.077378 0.187546 0.150685 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.0493405 0.1228 0.4 0.688 -0.191351 0.290032 0.045662 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.0144873 0.04803 -0.3 0.763 -0.108626 0.079651 0.356164 
PrevElectState_Governor 0.3546842 0.27437 1.29 0.196 -0.183069 0.892437 0.009132 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.0697302 0.05929 -1.18 0.24 -0.185935 0.046475 0.16895 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.0670121 0.06193 -1.08 0.279 -0.188397 0.054373 0.148402 
PrevElectMunic_Both 0.0803876 0.18553 0.43 0.665 -0.283241 0.444016 0.018265 
PubServiceState 0.0473697 0.06156 0.77 0.442 -0.073293 0.168032 0.305936 
PubServiceFederal 0.1856435 0.07572 2.45 0.014 0.037233 0.334054 0.182648 
PubServiceMunicipal  0.0443393 0.07082 0.63 0.531 -0.094462 0.18314 0.203196 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.0240863 0.05831 0.41 0.68 -0.090191 0.138364 0.80137 
ActiveSector -0.0266984 0.06692 -0.4 0.69 -0.157866 0.104469 0.134703 
LevelEducation -0.0248491 0.02636 -0.94 0.346 -0.07651 0.026812 2.13699 
Gender -0.1405551 0.05136 -2.74 0.006 -0.24121 -0.0399 0.200913 
Age -0.0010813 0.00281 -0.38 0.701 -0.006598 0.004435 48.2968 
Note: dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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Model 4 - with party dummies 
 
Logit model  
Dependent variable Priority Committee 
Independent variables PrevElectFederalSenator 
 PrevElectFederalDeputy 
 PrevElectFederalBoth 
 PrevElectState_Deputy 
 PrevElectState_Governor 
 PrevElectState_Both 
 PrevElectMunic_Mayor 
 PrevElectMunic_Councillor 
 PrevElectMunic_Both 
 PubServiceState 
 PubServiceFederal 
 PubServiceMunicipal  
 ActivePartyOfficer 
 ActiveSector 
 LevelEducation 
 Gender 
 Age 
 PolPartyPAN 
 PolPartyPRD 
 PolPartyPRI 
Note: PrevElectState_Both = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PrevElectState_Both dropped and 1 
obs not used 
Note: PolPartyPRD dropped because of collinearity 
 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -273.68738 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -260.80505 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -260.65961 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -260.6595 
 
Logistic regression 
Number of obs = 438 
LR chi2(18 )= 26.06 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0985 
Log likelihood = -260.6595 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0476
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Variables Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
PrevElectFederalSenator 0.5994617 0.5855534 1.02 0.306 -0.5482019 1.747125 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.255848 0.303661 0.84 0.399 -0.3393166 0.8510126 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.2369856 0.5398892 0.44 0.661 -0.8211779 1.295149 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.0691098 0.2274227 -0.3 0.761 -0.5148501 0.3766304 
PrevElectState_Governor 1.47848 1.221165 1.21 0.226 -0.9149591 3.871919 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.3362896 0.3106004 -1.08 0.279 -0.9450552 0.272476 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.3216966 0.3267213 -0.98 0.325 -0.9620585 0.3186653 
PrevElectMunic_Both 0.3826054 0.7900972 0.48 0.628 -1.165957 1.931167 
PubServiceState 0.2291863 0.2844343 0.81 0.42 -0.3282946 0.7866672 
PubServiceFederal 0.8251632 0.3201982 2.58 0.01 0.1975862 1.45274 
PubServiceMunicipal  0.2175976 0.3236502 0.67 0.501 -0.4167451 0.8519403 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.1224058 0.2842344 0.43 0.667 -0.4346833 0.6794949 
ActiveSector -0.1354017 0.327114 -0.41 0.679 -0.7765333 0.50573 
LevelEducation -0.1235183 0.1265286 -0.98 0.329 -0.3715098 0.1244732 
Gender -0.7267888 0.300183 -2.42 0.015 -1.315137 -0.1384409 
Age -0.0051878 0.0134046 -0.39 0.699 -0.0314603 0.0210847 
PolPartyPAN -0.0806604 0.2689903 -0.3 0.764 -0.6078718 0.4465509 
PolPartyPRI -0.0855163 0.3175974 -0.27 0.788 -0.7079957 0.5369632 
Constant -0.3995485 0.8213291 -0.49 0.627 -2.009324 1.210227 
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Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(PriorityCom) (predict) 
= .30767174 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval X 
PrevElectFederalSenator 0.1388709 0.14366 0.97 0.334 -0.142696 0.420438 0.03653 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.0562581 0.06868 0.82 0.413 -0.078344 0.190861 0.150685 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.052443 0.1236 0.42 0.671 -0.189809 0.294695 0.045662 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.0146638 0.04806 -0.31 0.76 -0.108863 0.079535 0.356164 
PrevElectState_Governor 0.3530972 0.27473 1.29 0.199 -0.185363 0.891557 0.009132 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.0683804 0.05995 -1.14 0.254 -0.185885 0.049124 0.16895 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.065369 0.06299 -1.04 0.299 -0.188826 0.058088 0.148402 
PrevElectMunic_Both 0.0866501 0.18804 0.46 0.645 -0.281906 0.455206 0.018265 
PubServiceState 0.0496078 0.06243 0.79 0.427 -0.072746 0.171962 0.305936 
PubServiceFederal 0.1893787 0.07661 2.47 0.013 0.039217 0.33954 0.182648 
PubServiceMunicipal  0.0474448 0.07207 0.66 0.51 -0.093802 0.188691 0.203196 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.0256947 0.05876 0.44 0.662 -0.089472 0.140861 0.80137 
ActiveSector -0.0282782 0.06691 -0.42 0.673 -0.159425 0.102868 0.134703 
LevelEducation -0.0263106 0.02692 -0.98 0.328 -0.079082 0.026461 2.13699 
Gender -0.1404947 0.05137 -2.73 0.006 -0.241182 -0.039807 0.200913 
Age -0.0011051 0.00285 -0.39 0.699 -0.0067 0.00449 48.2968 
PolPartyPAN -0.0171643 0.05717 -0.3 0.764 -0.129221 0.094892 0.47032 
PolPartyPRI -0.0180571 0.06646 -0.27 0.786 -0.148311 0.112197 0.239726 
Note: dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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DV = Priority Committee Senior 
 
Model 5 - without party dummies 
 
Logit model  
Dependent variable Priority Committee Senior 
Independent variables PrevElectFederalSenator 
 PrevElectFederalDeputy 
 PrevElectFederalBoth 
 PrevElectState_Deputy 
 PrevElectState_Governor 
 PrevElectState_Both 
 PrevElectMunic_Mayor 
 PrevElectMunic_Councillor 
 PrevElectMunic_Both 
 PubServiceState 
 PubServiceFederal 
 PubServiceMunicipal  
 ActivePartyOfficer 
 ActiveSector 
 LevelEducation 
 Gender 
 Age 
Note: PrevElectState_Both = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PrevElectState_Both dropped and 1 
obs not used 
 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -157.57842 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -144.33533 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -141.38917 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -141.14368 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -141.14273 
 
Logistic regression 
Number of obs = 438 
LR chi2(16) = 32.87 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0077 
Log likelihood = -141.14273 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1043
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Variables Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
PrevElectFederalSenator -0.0813878 0.7704033 -0.11 0.916 -1.591351 1.428575 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.2896723 0.4226989 0.69 0.493 -0.5388023 1.118147 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.1719084 0.7030665 0.24 0.807 -1.206077 1.549893 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.5354543 0.3628727 -1.48 0.14 -1.246672 0.1757631 
PrevElectState_Governor 1.702665 1.137128 1.5 0.134 -0.5260652 3.931396 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.3700947 0.4942274 -0.75 0.454 -1.338763 0.5985733 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.3169352 0.5200931 -0.61 0.542 -1.336299 0.7024286 
PrevElectMunic_Both 1.313214 0.9357962 1.4 0.161 -0.5209128 3.147341 
PubServiceState 0.2524776 0.4221866 0.6 0.55 -0.574993 1.079948 
PubServiceFederal 1.096886 0.4288835 2.56 0.011 0.2562902 1.937483 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.7332988 0.6117209 -1.2 0.231 -1.93225 0.4656521 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.6801249 0.4649639 1.46 0.144 -0.2311875 1.591437 
ActiveSector 0.3082665 0.4397872 0.7 0.483 -0.5537006 1.170234 
LevelEducation -0.0921216 0.1878239 -0.49 0.624 -0.4602498 0.2760065 
Gender -0.978407 0.5082073 -1.93 0.054 -1.974475 0.017661 
Age -0.0054175 0.0197967 -0.27 0.784 -0.0442184 0.0333834 
Constant -2.157991 1.191215 -1.81 0.07 -4.49273 0.1767477 
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Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(PriorityComSenior) (predict) 
= .09028616 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval X 
PrevElectFederalSenator -0.0064815 0.05945 -0.11 0.913 -0.123005 0.110042 0.03653 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.0258685 0.04081 0.63 0.526 -0.054116 0.105853 0.150685 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.0150539 0.06549 0.23 0.818 -0.113309 0.143417 0.045662 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.0415338 0.02641 -1.57 0.116 -0.093299 0.010231 0.356164 
PrevElectState_Governor 0.2600755 0.25673 1.01 0.311 -0.243097 0.763248 0.009132 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.027548 0.03315 -0.83 0.406 -0.092518 0.037422 0.16895 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.0237908 0.03552 -0.67 0.503 -0.093401 0.045819 0.148402 
PrevElectMunic_Both 0.1765133 0.17906 0.99 0.324 -0.174447 0.527474 0.018265 
PubServiceState 0.0216102 0.03752 0.58 0.565 -0.051937 0.095157 0.305936 
PubServiceFederal 0.1205402 0.0596 2.02 0.043 0.003729 0.237351 0.182648 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.0508656 0.03486 -1.46 0.144 -0.119181 0.01745 0.203196 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.047599 0.02745 1.73 0.083 -0.006198 0.101395 0.80137 
ActiveSector 0.0277875 0.04328 0.64 0.521 -0.057043 0.112618 0.134703 
LevelEducation -0.0075664 0.01542 -0.49 0.624 -0.037782 0.022649 2.13699 
Gender -0.0643454 0.02601 -2.47 0.013 -0.115316 -0.013374 0.200913 
Age -0.000445 0.00162 -0.27 0.784 -0.003627 0.002737 48.2968 
Note: dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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Model 6 - with party dummies 
 
Logit model  
Dependent variable Priority Committee Senior 
Independent variables PrevElectFederalSenator 
 PrevElectFederalDeputy 
 PrevElectFederalBoth 
 PrevElectState_Deputy 
 PrevElectState_Governor 
 PrevElectState_Both 
 PrevElectMunic_Mayor 
 PrevElectMunic_Councillor 
 PrevElectMunic_Both 
 PubServiceState 
 PubServiceFederal 
 PubServiceMunicipal  
 ActivePartyOfficer 
 ActiveSector 
 LevelEducation 
 Gender 
 Age 
 PolPartyPAN 
 PolPartyPRD 
 PolPartyPRI 
Note: PrevElectState_Both = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PrevElectState_Both dropped and 1 
obs not used 
Note: PolPartyPRD dropped because of collinearity 
 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -157.57842 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -144.06202 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -141.03665 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -140.77907 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -140.77781 
Iteration 5: log likelihood = -140.77781 
 
Logistic regression  
Number of obs = 438 
LR chi2(18) = 33.60 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0141 
Log likelihood = -140.77781 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1066
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Variables Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
PrevElectFederalSenator -0.1132427 0.771873 -0.15 0.883 -1.626086 1.399601 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.2409495 0.4336404 0.56 0.578 -0.60897 1.090869 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.1882133 0.7067297 0.27 0.79 -1.196952 1.573378 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.5416607 0.3634917 -1.49 0.136 -1.254091 0.1707699 
PrevElectState_Governor 
1.667912 1.130556 1.48 0.14 -0.5479365 3.88376 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.3903031 0.4978923 -0.78 0.433 -1.366154 0.5855479 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.2496955 0.527782 -0.47 0.636 -1.284129 0.7847381 
PrevElectMunic_Both 1.328721 0.9430454 1.41 0.159 -0.5196143 3.177056 
PubServiceState 0.2432689 0.4274255 0.57 0.569 -0.5944697 1.081007 
PubServiceFederal 1.129176 0.4373272 2.58 0.01 0.2720299 1.986321 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.6617178 0.6184795 -1.07 0.285 -1.873915 0.5504797 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.6424929 0.4696066 1.37 0.171 -0.2779192 1.562905 
ActiveSector 0.2980867 0.4410347 0.68 0.499 -0.5663254 1.162499 
LevelEducation -0.1204695 0.191305 -0.63 0.529 -0.4954203 0.2544814 
Gender -0.9644284 0.5091189 -1.89 0.058 -1.962283 0.0334263 
Age -0.0084412 0.0202327 -0.42 0.677 -0.0480966 0.0312141 
PolPartyPAN -0.2867859 0.4068826 -0.7 0.481 -1.084261 0.5106893 
PolPartyPRI 0.018357 0.4458812 0.04 0.967 -0.855554 0.892268 
Constant -1.810931 1.257376 -1.44 0.15 -4.275343 0.6534805 
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Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(PriorityComSenior) (predict) 
= .08991117 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval X 
PrevElectFederalSenator -0.0088764 0.0579 -0.15 0.878 -0.122359 0.104606 0.03653 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.021137 0.04061 0.52 0.603 -0.058465 0.100739 0.150685 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.0165213 0.06636 0.25 0.803 -0.11355 0.146592 0.045662 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.0418318 0.02635 -1.59 0.112 -0.093474 0.009811 0.356164 
PrevElectState_Governor 0.2516089 0.25215 1.0 0.318 -0.242588 0.745806 0.009132 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.0287897 0.03293 -0.87 0.382 -0.093331 0.035752 0.16895 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.0190275 0.03733 -0.51 0.61 -0.092191 0.054136 0.148402 
PrevElectMunic_Both 0.1789824 0.18121 0.99 0.323 -0.176192 0.534157 0.018265 
PubServiceState 0.020713 0.03773 0.55 0.583 -0.053232 0.094658 0.305936 
PubServiceFederal 0.124721 0.06133 2.03 0.042 0.004525 0.244917 0.182648 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.0464397 0.03634 -1.28 0.201 -0.117669 0.024789 0.203196 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.045169 0.0281 1.61 0.108 -0.009908 0.100246 0.80137 
ActiveSector 0.0266892 0.04299 0.62 0.535 -0.057575 0.110953 0.134703 
LevelEducation -0.0098577 0.01564 -0.63 0.528 -0.040506 0.020791 2.13699 
Gender -0.0633626 0.02611 -2.43 0.015 -0.114534 -0.012191 0.200913 
Age -0.0006907 0.00165 -0.42 0.676 -0.003928 0.002546 48.2968 
PolPartyPAN -0.0233444 0.03293 -0.71 0.478 -0.087892 0.041203 0.47032 
PolPartyPRI 0.001508 0.03678 0.04 0.967 -0.070577 0.073593 0.239726 
Note: dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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DV = Directive Board 
 
Model 7 - without party dummies 
 
Logit model  
Dependent variable Directive Board 
Independent variables PrevElectFederalSenator 
 PrevElectFederalDeputy 
 PrevElectFederalBoth 
 PrevElectState_Deputy 
 PrevElectState_Governor 
 PrevElectState_Both 
 PrevElectMunic_Mayor 
 PrevElectMunic_Councillor 
 PrevElectMunic_Both 
 PubServiceState 
 PubServiceFederal 
 PubServiceMunicipal  
 ActivePartyOfficer 
 ActiveSector 
 LevelEducation 
 Gender 
 Age 
Note: PrevElectFederalSenator = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PrevElectFederalSenator dropped 
and 16 obs not used 
Note: PrevElectState_Governor = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PrevElectState_Governor dropped 
and 3 obs not used 
Note: PrevElectState_Both = 0 predicts success perfectly; PrevElectState_Both dropped and 1 
obs not used 
Note: PrevElectMunic_Both = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PrevElectMunic_Both dropped and 8 
obs not used 
 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -67.380478 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -60.140341 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -54.092273 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -53.733982 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -53.726961 
Iteration 5: log likelihood = -53.726953 
 
Logistic regression 
Number of obs = 405 
LR chi2(13) = 27.31 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0113 
Log likelihood = -53.726953 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2026
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Variables Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
PrevElectFederalDeputy -0.1188074 0.8431475 -0.14 0.888 -1.771346 1.533731 
PrevElectFederalBoth 1.16159 1.057009 1.1 0.272 -0.9101103 3.23329 
PrevElectState_Deputy 0.1271027 0.5688408 0.22 0.823 -0.9878048 1.24201 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor 2.122439 0.745518 2.85 0.004 0.6612501 3.583627 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor 1.908414 0.6986109 2.73 0.006 0.5391622 3.277667 
PubServiceState 0.0700538 0.7881862 0.09 0.929 -1.474763 1.61487 
PubServiceFederal 1.20624 0.775521 1.56 0.12 -0.3137534 2.726233 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.4488941 0.9231645 -0.49 0.627 -2.258263 1.360475 
ActivePartyOfficer 1.244152 1.081559 1.15 0.25 -0.8756647 3.363969 
ActiveSector 1.086904 0.7202849 1.51 0.131 -0.324828 2.498637 
LevelEducation 0.0953607 0.2658196 0.36 0.72 -0.4256362 0.6163576 
Gender 1.972828 0.6223303 3.17 0.002 0.7530834 3.192573 
Age -0.0062796 0.0336675 -0.19 0.852 -0.0722668 0.0597076 
Constant -6.376445 2.131744 -2.99 0.003 -10.55459 -2.198303 
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Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(DirBoardNum) (predict) 
= .0168827 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval X 
PrevElectFederalDeputy -0.0018964 0.01299 -0.15 0.884 -0.027362 0.023569 0.155556 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.0334786 0.04785 0.7 0.484 -0.060313 0.127271 0.044444 
PrevElectState_Deputy 0.0021487 0.0098 0.22 0.826 -0.017051 0.021348 0.355556 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor 0.0805033 0.04871 1.65 0.098 -0.014966 0.175972 0.160494 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor 0.0669123 0.04031 1.66 0.097 -0.012087 0.145912 0.153086 
PubServiceState 0.0011779 0.01345 0.09 0.93 -0.025186 0.027542 0.311111 
PubServiceFederal 0.0306672 0.02869 1.07 0.285 -0.025569 0.086903 0.175309 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.0066254 0.01218 -0.54 0.586 -0.030488 0.017237 0.212346 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.0152882 0.0102 1.5 0.134 -0.004704 0.03528 0.797531 
ActiveSector 0.0273436 0.02618 1.04 0.296 -0.023964 0.078651 0.140741 
LevelEducation 0.0015828 0.00443 0.36 0.721 -0.007097 0.010263 2.1284 
Gender 0.0642391 0.03154 2.04 0.042 0.002418 0.12606 0.209877 
Age -0.0001042 0.00056 -0.19 0.852 -0.0012 0.000992 47.6617 
Note: dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
 
304 
 
Model 8 - with party dummies 
 
Logit model  
Dependent variable Directive Board 
Independent variables PrevElectFederalSenator 
 PrevElectFederalDeputy 
 PrevElectFederalBoth 
 PrevElectState_Deputy 
 PrevElectState_Governor 
 PrevElectState_Both 
 PrevElectMunic_Mayor 
 PrevElectMunic_Councillor 
 PrevElectMunic_Both 
 PubServiceState 
 PubServiceFederal 
 PubServiceMunicipal  
 ActivePartyOfficer 
 ActiveSector 
 LevelEducation 
 Gender 
 Age 
 PolPartyPAN 
 PolPartyPRD 
 PolPartyPRI 
Note: PrevElectFederalSenator = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PrevElectFederalSenator dropped 
and 16 obs not used 
Note: PrevElectState_Governor = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PrevElectState_Governor dropped 
and 3 obs not used 
Note: PrevElectState_Both = 0 predicts success perfectly; PrevElectState_Both dropped and 1 
obs not used 
Note: PrevElectMunic_Both = 0 predicts failure perfectly; PreElectMunic_Both dropped and 8 
obs not used 
Note: PolPartyPRD dropped because of collinearity 
 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -67.380478 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -59.794286 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -53.45929 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -53.009618 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -52.996938 
Iteration 5: log likelihood = -52.996915 
 
Logistic regression Number of obs = 405 
LR chi2(15) = 28.77 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0172
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Log likelihood = -52.996915 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2135 
 
Variables Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
PrevElectFederalDeputy -0.1511608 0.8521753 -0.18 0.859 -1.821394 1.519072 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.9873208 1.063763 0.93 0.353 -1.097617 3.072259 
PrevElectState_Deputy 0.1807008 0.570398 0.32 0.751 -0.9372587 1.29866 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor 2.105255 0.7675367 2.74 0.006 0.6009105 3.609599 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor 1.898099 0.7085963 2.68 0.007 0.5092762 3.286923 
PubServiceState -0.0217243 0.7940685 -0.03 0.978 -1.57807 1.534621 
PubServiceFederal 1.163994 0.7828004 1.49 0.137 -0.3702666 2.698255 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.5726992 0.9397339 -0.61 0.542 -2.414544 1.269145 
ActivePartyOfficer 1.222435 1.093807 1.12 0.264 -0.9213877 3.366257 
ActiveSector 1.20037 0.7382525 1.63 0.104 -0.246578 2.647319 
LevelEducation 0.2088056 0.2900518 0.72 0.472 -0.3596856 0.7772967 
Gender 2.097165 0.6427912 3.26 0.001 0.837317 3.357012 
Age -0.0078927 0.0335975 -0.23 0.814 -0.0737427 0.0579572 
PolPartyPAN 0.7879873 0.8538712 0.92 0.356 -0.8855695 2.461544 
PolPartyPRI 1.019591 0.8991513 1.13 0.257 -0.7427128 2.781896 
Constant -7.215987 2.370619 -3.04 0.002 -11.86231 -2.569659 
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Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(DirBoardNum) (predict) 
= .01519792 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval X 
PrevElectFederalDeputy -0.0021528 0.01163 -0.19 0.853 -0.024939 0.020633 0.155556 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.0235764 0.03807 0.62 0.536 -0.051041 0.098194 0.044444 
PrevElectState_Deputy 0.0027773 0.009 0.31 0.758 -0.014855 0.020409 0.355556 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor 0.0719874 0.04591 1.57 0.117 -0.018 0.161974 0.160494 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor 0.0600985 0.03787 1.59 0.112 -0.014119 0.134316 0.153086 
PubServiceState -0.0003239 0.01179 -0.03 0.978 -0.023422 0.022774 0.311111 
PubServiceFederal 0.0263135 0.02573 1.02 0.306 -0.024116 0.076743 0.175309 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.0073958 0.01057 -0.7 0.484 -0.028121 0.013329 0.212346 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.0135954 0.00951 1.43 0.153 -0.005035 0.032226 0.797531 
ActiveSector 0.028627 0.02638 1.09 0.278 -0.023084 0.080338 0.140741 
LevelEducation 0.0031252 0.00433 0.72 0.47 -0.005352 0.011602 2.1284 
Gender 0.0650245 0.03122 2.08 0.037 0.003828 0.126221 0.209877 
Age -0.0001181 0.0005 -0.23 0.815 -0.001106 0.00087 47.6617 
PolPartyPAN 0.0121526 0.01343 0.91 0.365 -0.014166 0.038471 0.491358 
PolPartyPRI 0.0210287 0.02413 0.87 0.384 -0.02627 0.068327 0.212346 
Note: dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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DV = Seat Type PR 
 
Model 9 - without party dummies 
 
Logit model  
Dependent variable Type of Seat: PR 
Independent variables PrevElectFederalSenator 
 PrevElectFederalDeputy 
 PrevElectFederalBoth 
 PrevElectState_Deputy 
 PrevElectState_Governor 
 PrevElectState_Both 
 PrevElectMunic_Mayor 
 PrevElectMunic_Councillor 
 PrevElectMunic_Both 
 PubServiceState 
 PubServiceFederal 
 PubServiceMunicipal  
 ActivePartyOfficer 
 ActiveSector 
 LevelEducation 
 Gender 
 Age 
Note: PrevElectState_Both = 0 predicts success perfectly; PrevElectState_Both dropped and 1 
obs not used 
 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -277.28855 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -228.16261 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -226.37106 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -226.34098 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -226.34097 
 
Logistic regression 
Number of obs = 436 
LR chi2(16) = 101.90 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -226.34097 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1837
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Variables Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
PrevElectFederalSenator 1.953201 0.6514444 3.0 0.003 0.676393 3.230008 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.9500394 0.3186807 2.98 0.003 0.3254366 1.574642 
PrevElectFederalBoth 2.437116 0.6514315 3.74 0 1.160333 3.713898 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.4919788 0.2558596 -1.92 0.054 -0.9934544 0.0094969 
PrevElectState_Governor 1.04948 1.675505 0.63 0.531 -2.23445 4.333409 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -1.278246 0.3976122 -3.21 0.001 -2.057552 -0.4989408 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.9181906 0.364206 -2.52 0.012 -1.632021 -0.20436 
PrevElectMunic_Both -0.9745762 1.128899 -0.86 0.388 -3.187177 1.238025 
PubServiceState -0.6527297 0.2964637 -2.2 0.028 -1.233788 -0.0716715 
PubServiceFederal 0.6746104 0.3258225 2.07 0.038 0.0360101 1.313211 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.8765854 0.3644784 -2.41 0.016 -1.59095 -0.1622209 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.2269874 0.3093911 0.73 0.463 -0.379408 0.8333828 
ActiveSector -0.0453484 0.3465667 -0.13 0.896 -0.7246067 0.6339099 
LevelEducation 0.0185055 0.1294311 0.14 0.886 -0.2351748 0.2721858 
Gender 0.7729076 0.2770541 2.79 0.005 0.2298915 1.315924 
Age -0.005572 0.014091 -0.4 0.693 -0.0331898 0.0220459 
Constant -0.4973016 0.8289916 -0.6 0.549 -2.122095 1.127492 
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Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(TypeSeatPR) (predict) 
= .29749139 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval X 
PrevElectFederalSenator 0.4526787 0.12702 3.56 0 0.203723 0.701635 0.036697 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.2184064 0.07659 2.85 0.004 0.068298 0.368514 0.151376 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.5377882 0.10085 5.33 0 0.340128 0.735448 0.045872 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.0996254 0.04979 -2.0 0.045 -0.197221 -0.00203 0.357798 
PrevElectState_Governor 0.2495393 0.41518 0.6 0.548 -0.564202 1.06328 0.009174 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.2169236 0.05115 -4.24 0 -0.317181 -0.116666 0.169725 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.1644812 0.05404 -3.04 0.002 -0.27039 -0.058572 0.149083 
PrevElectMunic_Both -0.1613235 0.13746 -1.17 0.241 -0.430735 0.108088 0.018349 
PubServiceState -0.1287861 0.05466 -2.36 0.018 -0.23591 -0.021662 0.307339 
PubServiceFederal 0.1512085 0.07702 1.96 0.05 0.000258 0.302159 0.183486 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.1619378 0.05751 -2.82 0.005 -0.274659 -0.049217 0.201835 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.0460693 0.06086 0.76 0.449 -0.073223 0.165362 0.802752 
ActiveSector -0.0094134 0.07145 -0.13 0.895 -0.149447 0.13062 0.135321 
LevelEducation 0.0038675 0.02705 0.14 0.886 -0.049143 0.056878 2.13532 
Gender 0.1737544 0.06516 2.67 0.008 0.046047 0.301462 0.201835 
Age -0.0011645 0.00294 -0.4 0.692 -0.006935 0.004606 48.2729 
Note: dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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Model 10 - with party dummies 
 
Logit model  
Dependent variable Directive Board 
Independent variables PrevElectFederalSenator 
 PrevElectFederalDeputy 
 PrevElectFederalBoth 
 PrevElectState_Deputy 
 PrevElectState_Governor 
 PrevElectState_Both 
 PrevElectMunic_Mayor 
 PrevElectMunic_Councillor 
 PrevElectMunic_Both 
 PubServiceState 
 PubServiceFederal 
 PubServiceMunicipal  
 ActivePartyOfficer 
 ActiveSector 
 LevelEducation 
 Gender 
 Age 
 PolPartyPAN 
 PolPartyPRD 
 PolPartyPRI 
Note: PrevElectState_Both = 0 predicts success perfectly; PrevElectState_Both dropped and 1 
obs not used 
Note: PolPartyPRD dropped because of collinearity 
 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -277.28855 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -227.4551 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -225.60582 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -225.57301 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -225.57299 
 
Logistic regression Number of obs = 436 
LR chi2(18) = 103.43 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -225.57299 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1865 
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Variables Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
PrevElectFederalSenator 1.960082 0.6582242 2.98 0.003 0.6699867 3.250178 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.976767 0.3252156 3.0 0.003 0.3393562 1.614178 
PrevElectFederalBoth 2.409661 0.6516239 3.7 0 1.132502 3.68682 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.4802382 0.2570286 -1.87 0.062 -0.9840051 0.0235286 
PrevElectState_Governor 1.1547 1.745461 0.66 0.508 -2.26634 4.57574 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -1.274811 0.4017887 -3.17 0.002 -2.062303 -0.48732 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.9726669 0.3677152 -2.65 0.008 -1.693376 -0.2519583 
PrevElectMunic_Both -1.056441 1.142254 -0.92 0.355 -3.295218 1.182335 
PubServiceState -0.6446734 0.2983912 -2.16 0.031 -1.229509 -0.0598374 
PubServiceFederal 0.63861 0.3287084 1.94 0.052 -0.0056466 1.282867 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.9512714 0.3712772 -2.56 0.01 -1.678961 -0.2235814 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.2323145 0.3125023 0.74 0.457 -0.3801787 0.8448077 
ActiveSector -0.0086563 0.3480927 -0.02 0.98 -0.6909054 0.6735928 
LevelEducation 0.0565503 0.1337755 0.42 0.672 -0.2056448 0.3187454 
Gender 0.7603831 0.2782139 2.73 0.006 0.2150939 1.305672 
Age -0.0037456 0.0142652 -0.26 0.793 -0.0317049 0.0242137 
PolPartPAN 0.3520688 0.2924475 1.2 0.229 -0.2211177 0.9252553 
PolPartPRI 0.1248307 0.3484475 0.36 0.72 -0.5581139 0.8077754 
Constant -0.8532989 0.8798345 -0.97 0.332 -2.577743 0.871145 
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Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(TypeSeatPR) (predict) 
= .29675774 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval X 
PrevElectFederalSenator 0.4540477 0.12817 3.54 0 0.202831 0.705264 0.036697 
PrevElectFederalDeputy 0.2246777 0.07812 2.88 0.004 0.071557 0.377798 0.151376 
PrevElectFederalBoth 0.5336682 0.10261 5.2 0 0.332548 0.734788 0.045872 
PrevElectState_Deputy -0.0971812 0.05002 -1.94 0.052 -0.195225 0.000863 0.357798 
PrevElectState_Governor 0.2753184 0.42756 0.64 0.52 -0.562689 1.11333 0.009174 
PrevElectMunic_Mayor -0.2160726 0.05165 -4.18 0 -0.317308 -0.114837 0.169725 
PrevElectMunic_Councillor -0.1721652 0.05321 -3.24 0.001 -0.276458 -0.067873 0.149083 
PrevElectMunic_Both -0.1706927 0.13107 -1.3 0.193 -0.427577 0.086192 0.018349 
PubServiceState -0.1270956 0.05507 -2.31 0.021 -0.235022 -0.019169 0.307339 
PubServiceFederal 0.1425818 0.07736 1.84 0.065 -0.009033 0.294197 0.183486 
PubServiceMunicipal  -0.1733996 0.05689 -3.05 0.002 -0.284906 -0.061893 0.201835 
ActivePartyOfficer 0.0470449 0.06128 0.77 0.443 -0.073055 0.167145 0.802752 
ActiveSector -0.0018042 0.07246 -0.02 0.98 -0.143819 0.14021 0.135321 
LevelEducation 0.0118016 0.0279 0.42 0.672 -0.042889 0.066493 2.13532 
Gender 0.1706211 0.06538 2.61 0.009 0.042477 0.298765 0.201835 
Age -0.0007817 0.00298 -0.26 0.793 -0.006616 0.005052 48.2729 
PolPartPAN 0.0736647 0.06122 1.2 0.229 -0.046316 0.193645 0.472477 
PolPartPRI 0.0263857 0.07457 0.35 0.723 -0.119775 0.172546 0.240826 
Note: dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
